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Signed:
This thesis was originally projected in seven 
chapters. A chapter surveying the politico-demographic 
scene in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary 
and Rumania has had to be omitted for practical reasons. 
While the text and to some extent the structure of the 
thesis have been altered accordingly, some impression 
may remain in certain places that the work has not been 
fully moulded into a unified whole.
In that connection, I would like to quote the 
following passage from the University's Rules for 
Ph.D. theses.
"the thesis... must be a connected piece of writing, 
but may comprise a series of papers on related 
topics, provided that these are accompanied by 
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each other and to the wider context of the subject."
(Rule 19, (3))
While it is my belief that the work in its present 
form does comprise a unified whole, a contrary view 
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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts to describe the main areas and 
the main ways in which population trends affect politics 
in the USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia. Discussion is 
concentrated on the domestic rather than the international 
aspects of the problems involved, and special attention 
is devoted to the fields of ethnic relations and populat­
ion policy-making. While a loosely comparative framework 
has been adopted, each of the three main countries is 
treated as an individual case study. Special endeavours 
have been made to avoid the repetition and the lack of 
regional colour and authenticity that comparative studies 
are sometimes apt to fall into. While considerations of 
space have prevented extending the analysis to the 
remaining countries of Socialist Europe, comparative 
references to them are frequent; and the general chapters 
2 & 6 are partly devoted to them. In this way, it is 
hoped that some of the contrasts and similarities between 
the three main countries in the study and the other 
countries in the area will be brought out.
A rather fuller statement of the problems tackled
in the thesis can be found in the Introduction.
INTRODUCTION
During the 1960s, there was a dramatic decline 
in birthrates in the USSR and the European socialist 
states. This decline brought in its train agonizing 
reappraisals of population policies and doctrines 
in virtually all the countries concerned. Albania 
alone has been spared the soul-searching. Elsewhere national 
birthrates have fallen so low that the high fertility once 
held to be an essential feature of socialism seems little 
more than a nostalgic memory. And like the sinister 
Malthusians portrayed in erstwhile Soviet critiques of 
Western demography, Soviet bloc observers are now apt at 
times to view rapid population growth and countries or 
peoples engaged in it with some reserve. From regarding 
domestic population development with total unconcern or 
untroubled confidence, the governments of Eastern Europe 
are now passing over to or towards an active involvement 
that borders at times on morbid preoccupation reminiscent 
of the introspective centipede who began analysing his own 
gait.
Much of the public anxiety is focused on the 
socio-economic problems presented by fluctuations, imbalances, 
shortages and local or temporary superfluities of manpower 
supply either currently experienced or seen as in prospect.
Most of the rest is expended on the apocalyptic prospect 
that at some point in the future, this or that country, 
republic or region might pass into a phase of "narrowed 
reproduction" (i.e. population decline) of indefinite duration.
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In this respect, the Eastern European countries seem to be 
experiencing something similar to the extinction scare 
associated with the intemperate extrapolation of trends in 
Net Reproduction Rates in Western Europe in the 1930s.
That population decline or stagnation is disastrous both 
economically and in general tends to be taken as self-evident.
On the other hand, at the international level, fertility 
decline has since the mid-1960s been accepted as a worthy 
objective for Third World Countries, if coupled with appropriate 
socio-economic policies in other directions. But for the 
Socialist countries themselves, the time when population 
might have to be restricted is not in sight.
While the spectre of depopulation is obviously 
a strong emotional stimulant in itself, one suspects that it 
frequently serves consciously or unconsciously as a symbolic 
surrogate for anxieties about potential transformations in 
relative ethnic or national strength. The emotion may not 
be wholly irrational. Existing trends of differential 
fertility seem to suggest that major transformations are 
indeed in the making.
This thesis is concerned with the political 
aspects of demographic trends in Socialist Europe over 
the last two decades or so. Any approach to these problems 
immediately encounters demarcation difficulties. The area 
of overlap between politics and population is vast. On 
broad definitions of both, one might well need to discuss 
a country's social and economic policies and politics in 
their fullest complexity to exhaust the subject. This study 
must inevitably be biased in certain thematic as well as
3 .
regional directions. The main emphasis will be placed 
on the political implications of the present size and growth 
tendencies and potential of national and ethnic populations 
and sub-populations. Such matters as, for example, internal 
and external migration, urbanization, changing educational 
and occupational structure, health and education administration, 
gerontology or environmental pressures - all of which might 
quite properly be regarded as falling within the purview of 
the politics of population or population policy - will only 
be dealt with insofar as they affect the issues directly 
connected with numerical aggregates. The range of issues 
actually touched on will vary from country to country.
Thus, for example, emigration will be only of tangential 
interest in the case of the Soviet Union, whereas for 
Yugoslavia it will have to be given a special section to 
itself; the question of ethnic relations will be marginal 
for Poland, but central for both USSR and Yugoslavia. The 
reason for so defining the subject of study is partly pragmatic; 
considerations of manageability dictate that lines be drawn 
somewhere, and when, as in this case, the subject-matter 
is amorphous and rich in ramification, a certain 
arbitrariness may be unavoidable. But drawing the line 
where it has been drawn has the additional advantage of 
focusing attention on those concerns which most people 
would regard as being relevant to population policy rather 
than social policy. The central issue of pro- or anti- 
natalism is held in the foreground, and priority given to 
demographic rather than sociological, medical or ecological 
problems.
Also, as its title indicates, the emphasis
in this study is being placed on the political impact 
of demoyraphic trends rather than the demographic impact 
of political decisions. The latter approach has already 
received a good deal of attention.  ^ But in any case the 
choice reflects the background and interests of the 
author in politics rather than demography.
And finally, greater stress will be laid on 
politics than policies: on dilemmas, differences and 
conflicts rather than on past or present measures taken 
by governments to affect the course of demographic events. 
Here the preponderance of literature in favour of the
1 See, eg., J. Berent "Causes of Fertility Decline
in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union"
Population Studies vol. 24 (1970) pp. 35-58 
& 247-292; C. Tietze "The Demographic 
significance of Legal Abortion in Eastern 
Europe" Demography vol. 1 (1964) p. 119;
A Klinger "Demographic Aspects of Abortion"
IUSSP International Conference London 1969 
vol II,p. 1153; Robert J. McIntyre "The Effects 
of Liberalized Abortion Laws in Eastern Europe" 
in R. Clinton and R. Godwin Research in the 
Politics of Population Lexington 1972; J. van der 
Tak Abortion, Fertility and Changing Legislation 
Lexington 1974, pp. 13-30; C. Tietze and M.C. 
Murstein "Induced Abortion:1975 Factbook"
Reports on Population/Family Planning December 
1975; S. Klonowicz "Legalizacja sztucznych 
poronieh a dynamika rozrodczo£ci w Polsce"
Studia Demograficzne no. 36 (1974) p.85.
5 .
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approach not adopted is overwhelming. Commentators
from the socialist countries themselves naturally are at 
pains to avoid direct discussion of the politics of population 
issues. Many Western observers for whatever reasons, tend 
to pursue the same course. Hence a politics- rather 
than policy-oriented approach seems opportune.
Broadly speaking, from the vantage-point just 
outlined, the points of intersection between population and 
politics in Socialist Europe can be schematized as follows:
2 See, e.g., Henry P. David Abortion and Family
Planning in Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe 
New York 1970; vT Bodrova "La politique d^mographique 
dans les R^publiques Populaires d'Europe" Population 
1973 p. 1001; G. Acsadi "Recent Problems on 
Population Policies in the European Region of 
Socialist Countries" IUSSP International Conference 
London 1969 vol 11, p. 1381; M. Macura "Population 
Policies in Socialist Countries of Europe"Population Studies vol XXV111 (1974) No. 3, 
p. 369; R. McIntyre "Pronatalist Programmes in 
Eastern Europe" Soviet Studies vol. XXV11 (1975)
No. 3, p. 366; K. Dzienio "Do^wiadczenia europejskich 
krajdw socjalistycznych w zakresie ksztaltowania 
polityki ludno£ciowej" (paper presented &t a 
conference on population policy held in Jadwisin, 
near Warsaw, March 1972); B. Berelson Population 
Policy in Developed Countries New York 1974,
Chs. 6,9,12,13,17, and 25; M. Kirk, M. Livi- 
Bacci and E. Szabady Law and Fertility in Europe 
2 vols. Dolhain (Belgium) 1975, Chs. 3, 4, 8,
11, 15, 16, and 21. K. Dzienio has prepared a 
comprehensive work dealing with the economic and 
demographic aspects of population policy in 
Eastern Europe, which, when published, is likely 
to render a good deal of the existing literature 
superfluous. In addition to the more general 
works cited above, a great deal has also been 
published on particular Eastern European countries. 
Many of these will be cited at appropriate points 
elsewhere in the thesis.
Socio-economic Policies: the policy implications
variations in labour supply, consumer demands,
3 'educational requirements, ebc.
Ethnic Relations: the influence of demographic 
changes (and prospective changes)on the relative 
strengths of ethnic populations within states.
International Relations: the influence of
demographic changes (and prospective changes) on 
the relative power positions of the nations 
concerned. ^
Ideology: the effects of population trends on
the world-views and self-images of the regimes 
in question.
Within this area, special attention will be 
devoted to the demographic aspects of labour 
supply as being the economic ramification of 
population trends which seems to engage the 
greatest degree of concern in official circles.
The question of international population policy 
(i.e. the attitude adopted by governments 
towards world population problems and attempts 
made by the UN and other international 
organizations to solve them) will be considered, 
where applicable, under the heading of 
"Ideology". In fact, the USSR and Yugoslavia 
appear to be the only two states which pursue 
sovereign policies in this regard.
7.
5. Migration: the demographic changes caused
and political issues raised by internal
5
and international population movements.
6. Population policies: the issues raised by
the attempts of governments (or interest 
groups) to influence population trends.
The relative weight accorded to these topics will, 
as was suggested earlier, vary from country to country as 
the data appear to dictate; and at times, one or another of 
them will be discussed only very cursorily or dismissed 
altogether. With these qualifications, the above schema 
will be applied to each of the three main countries being 
examined.
5 This very interesting subject will be largely 
excluded from direct discussion under separate 
heading. It is a vast topic and at the same 
time one concerning which data is perhaps 
unusually elusive. Moreover, in the case of 
international migration at least, it has 
usually been of limited relevance. An exception 
will be made for Yugoslavia in this latter respect.
6 The term "interest groups" should, of course, 
be understood here in the sense appropriate to 
the Socialist states. The whole question of 
group influences on the making of policy in 
the area of population problems is one 
worthy of more than the incidental treatment 
given it in this essentially topographical
study. As the issues involved in population policy are
usually seen officially as less than of the first
importance, group participation tends to be
more active and(or?) more visible than is usually
the case. One is thus afforded a better glimpse
than is customary of the policy-making process
(cf. in this connection the unusually informative
study of Soviet family reforms in the 1950s and
1960s by Peter Juviler in P. Juviler and H. Morton
Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in
Transition).
8.
A word or two should perhaps be said about the
regional bias of this study. USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia
have been singled out for more detailed consideration for
a number of reasons. They are, to begin with, the three
7largest countries in Socialist Europe. And on the 
reckoning of most, they must also be accounted the most 
important politically. Moreover, they happen to be the 
three countries in which population policy remains to some 
extent an open issue. Elsewhere, while things are 
continuing to happen, the basic orientation of the governments 
concerned is uniformly pro-natalist, and the means for 
achieving these ends are being made increasingly explicit, 
thus reducing the domain of politics in favour of the 
domain of policies. Finally there are the pragmatic 
reasons. To avoid superficiality and ponderous repetition, 
a choice of some smaller number from among the nine 
possibilities seemed mandatory. That being so, one 
automaticafly chose the countries and the languages 
where one's competence was greatest. In the course of the 
thesis reference will be made frequently to the other 
European Socialist countries and to China. But no special 
section will be devoted to them. Although Albania will 
be referred to periodically, generalizations can usually 
be taken as not including it. Albania is an exceptional
7 Yugoslavia is actually slightly larger than
Rumania in area, and currently (thanks to 
the respective population policies followed 
by the two countries) slightly smaller in 
population.
9.
case, and one, moreover, concerning which neither the 
author, nor anybody else, the Albanians perhaps included, 
appears to know very much. ®
Chapter 1 will provide a general introduction to 
the field of population politics and policies and the 
Soviet Marxist tradition on demographic questions. Chapter 2 
will provide a cursory sketch of the main features of 
demographic development in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union in recent decades. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 will attempt 
a detailed examination of each of the three main countries 
in turn. And finally, Chapter 6 will briefly summarize the 
main features of the demographico-political scene in 
Eastern Europe as a whole, seeking in the process to give 
some broad impression of where the three countries discussed 
in this thesis fit into the overall pattern.
8 For a most interesting (and rare) glimpse of
Albanian demographic developments, see 
E. Hofsten "Demographic Transition and 
Economic Development in Albania" European 
Demographic Information Bulletin VI (1975) 
no. 3, p. 147.
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CHAPTER 1
POPULATION, POLITICS AND THE SOVIET MARXIST TRADITION
1. a Population and Political Studies.
The common ground between the study of politics
and demography has not until very recently attracted
more than passing interest from social scientists. This
seems to have been particularly true in the case of
political science. As of 1970, it was still possible for
an American political scientist to assert that what he
regarded as the two key problems of the remaining decades
of the century, pollution and population growth, had not
yet had a single article devoted to them in any major US
2political science journal, either national or regional. 
According to one source, no more than two political scientists
1 The term "political studies" has been used
here as one broad enough to embrace both 
Western social science and what is known in 
the Socialist countries as (the field of) 
"population policy" (Russian: politika 
narodonaseleniia; Polish: polityka ludno£ciowa; 
Serbo-Croat: populaciona politika).
2 A.E. Keir Nash "Pollution, Population and the
Cowboy Economy" Journal of Comparative Administrat­
ion (1970) no. 1, p. 119-20, quoted in Richard 
L. Clinton, William S. Flash and R. Kenneth 
Godwin Political Science in Population Studies 
Lexington 1972, p. 147.
11
could be said to have "made a professional commitment to
3population studies" before the mid-1960s. The first
two courses on population and politics to be taught in
political science departments were apparently instituted 
4only in 1971. And it has been claimed of a book
that was published in the 1972, that it was "the first 
book-length treatment of population questions by
5political scientists". A questionnaire conducted among 
representatives of seven social sciences in US universities 
to determine the extent of their professional interest in 
population studies evoked a weaker response from political 
scientists than from any other group with the exception of 
one.  ^And in the introduction to a volume of the US 
Commission Report on Population and the American Future 
devoted to political aspects of the problem we find the 
admission: "It became quickly apparent to the Commission 
that political science had, by comparison with other 
social sciences - especially economics, demography, and
3 R. Clinton and R. Godwin in Research in the 
Politics of Population Lexington 1972 p. 14, 
note 14. As of 1972, Clinton was aware of
"a dozen or so political scientists ... working 
in the population field". R. Clinton Population 
and Politics Lexington 1973 p. xix.
4 Clinton, Flash and Godwin op.cit., p. 148, 
note 13.
5 The claim was made of the Clinton, Flash and 
Godwin volume in. Clinton and Godwin op. cit. p.2.
Edwin D. Driver Essays on Population Policy 
Lexington 1972, p. 133-34.
6
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sociology - little to offer by way of policy-relevant 
research". ^
The other social sciences have not been over­
precipitate in tackling these problems either. Bernard 
Berelson has estimated that over the 25 years 1946-1971 
the entries catalogued under "Policies" in Population Indexghave not amounted to more than 2-4% of the total. What 
is true of demography is undoubtedly true a fortiori of the 
social sciences less directly concerned with population
9matters. As for the demographers, their interest has 
been overwhelmingly in Third World countries; ^  and in the 
central question of fertility control. They have 
usually (with the notable exception of the French) been 
less interested in domestic policy considerations. And 
while the neo-Malthusian concern of recent years has been 
making Western population growth something of a political 
issue also, the attitude of most demographers to this latter
7 Report of the Commission on Population Growth and 
the American Future Vol. IV Governance and 
Population Washington 1972, p. 13.
8 B. Berelson "Population Policy: Personal Notes" 
Population Studies XXV (1971) p. 173.
9 cf. the essay of Driver's cited above: "The Social 
Sciences and Population Policy: A Survey"
Driver op.cit.,p. 129-169.
10 At least by contrast with some of the more committed and radical advocates of Zero Population 
Growth and associated doctrines. For an angry 
reproach, see A.E. Keir Nash "Demographology in
US Population Politics" in Clinton & Godwin 
op. cit., p. 71.
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question has on the whole been more sceptical and detached. 
Relatively few appear to have been in the forefront of public 
controversy. Those that are more actively concerned with 
policy questions tend in the present climate to be more 
interested in fertility control than in fertility stimulation, 
which does not predispose them to taking an interest in events 
in the Socialist countries where exactly the reverse concerns 
are dominant.
11 Irrespective of whether their concern is primarily
with Western or Third World population growth, 
Western neo-Malthusian movements seldom betray 
any interest in such collateral questions as 
whether or not the Third World countries might 
not object to such outside concern with their 
birth rates; whether or not there are good 
reasons for supposing that the Socialist 
countries will decisively alter their attitudes 
to world population questions and refrain from 
encouraging Third World resentments; whether or 
not anti-natalist population policies in the 
West should be concerted with a similar 
"demographic disarmament" in the East; and so on. 
For a discussion of the frustrations suffered by 
the "international population community" at the 
UN Population Conference held in Bucharest in 
1974 (resulting to some extent from their neglect 
of some of these matters), see J. Finkle and 
B. Crane "The Politics of Bucharest: Population, 
Development and the New International Economic 
Order" Population and Development Review vol. 1 
(1975) No. 1, p. 87. For two typical Neo- 
Malthusian pieces which almost wholly ignore the 
Socialist world while purporting to deal with 
world population problems, see S. Kaplan and 
R. McCormick Innovative Organization for 
Population Research Springfield, Illinois, 1971 
(the index of which contains one reference to 
USSR and none to Karl Marx); and M. Endres 
On Defusing the Population Bomb New York 1975 
(which does briefly discuss Marx's views, but 
does not appear to offer any advice on how 
to defuse Socialist opposition to defusing 
the population bomb).
i
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Indeed were it not for the almost unique character
of the various thorough-going governmental programs that
have been adopted by the Socialist countries from time to
time, the interest of Western scholars in the area would
probably have been quite negligible. As things are, there
is a strong tendency for professional demographic interest
in Socialist population policies to limit itself to requests
to colleagues in Socialist countries to provide the required 
12information. Where the more sensitive areas of
government policy are concerned (and "more sensitive" in 
the Socialist context needs of course to be broadly 
interpreted), it is somewhat naive to expect that Socialist 
colleagues will be able to speak frankly and fully about 
what they believe to be the moral or other shortcomings of 
their national demographic policies. Moreover,
Western demographers tend naturally to be primarily interested 
in the policies themselves and their demographic effects and 
antecedents, rather than in the political context from 
which they have emerged and the political consequences 
they appear likely to entail.
The reasons for the recent surge of interest in 
the West in the political aspects of population are obvious 
enough: the Third World population explosion since World 
War 11; the wave of neo-Malthusian alarm about Western 
population levels (and allied ecological concerns) in
12 Compare the works by Bodrova, Acsadi, Macura and 
Berelson cited in Introduction, footnote 2.
13 In some ways it is even harder for them to be fully 
candid when they are invited to contribute to 
international volumes, where willy-nilly they find 
themselves forced into the role of flying the 
national flag.
15
wide circles of public opinion; the emergence of a radical 
feminist movement; the contraception and abortion 
controversies, and so on. Similarly, in the Socialist 
case, one does not need to look far afield to find 
reasons for the increasing public and official concern 
of recent years: growing labour shortages; a revival of 
ethnic and national sensitivities; the dramatic decline in 
fertility and natural increase rates of the 1960s, etc. 
However, the reasons for the earlier almost complete lack 
of interest are rather more elusive, especially in the 
case of Western social science in general, and political 
science in particular.
Clinton and Godwin, two political scientists who
have devoted a good deal of attention to this problem,
have suggested variously: that in the post-war period,
political scientists were too busy "adjusting to the Cold
14War conditions of the fatuous fifties"; that
compartmentalization of knowledge and lack of 
interdisciplinary cross-fertilization hampered the 
acquisition of the necessary additional specialist know­
ledge; and that thereafter the behavioural revolution's 
drive towards quantification and value-free political 
science consumed the profession's intellectual energies 
and led them away from issues that raised normative 
issues (political demography being evidently assumed
14 Clinton and Godwin op.cit., p.2.
U .
to be necessarily one of these). They also speak in terms 
of WissenSoziologie about the checks operating on the 
development of political demography within the profession 
itself:
"The serious aspect of the disciplinary parochialism
we have been describing is that the reward structure of
the profession is markedly skewed, and the resulting effect
is a mobilization of bias which inhibits political science
15research in population studies."
From the context it appears that what this passage 
refers to is that young academics building their careers 
find it harder to get jobs or publish articles if they 
specialize in subjects not yet firmly established and that 
devising and pushing through new university courses is 
time-consuming and otherwise fraught with difficulty.
Few of Clinton and Godwin's suggestions seem very 
persuasive. The Cold War might have been expected to 
heighten awareness of population statistics just as it 
heightened awareness of, for example, economic indicators; 
the lack of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization might 
equally well have prevented the behavioural revolution, 
and yet it did not; the mania for quantifying the 
unquantifiable flourished, while the tempting and much 
more manipulable (and meaningful) demographic data were
15 R. Clinton and R. Godwin "Political Science in 
Population Studies: Reasons for the Late Start 
in Clinton, Flash & Godwin, op. cit., p. 145.
17
left to their own devices; although there is no reason 
why demographic problems should not be treated normatively, 
there is equally no reason in logic why they must be; and 
the sociology of knowledge arguments seem equally applicable 
to any other "strangely neglected subjects". Why political 
demography has remained one of these until recently in 
Western political science remains for the present unclear. 1
In the Socialist countries, where there was a similar 
reticence about population policy until recently, the 
reasons, both for the reticence and the recent spread of 
interest, are a little more clear-cut and comprehensible. 
Soviet demography shared the fate of all social sciences 
under Stalin. For three decades or more it performed a 
residual and purely apologetic role as a neglected adjunct 
of government economic statistics. When it was not being
16 For another discussion of the reasons for the
paucity of literature on political demography, see 
N. Choucri Population Dynamics and International 
Violence Lexington 1974, Chap. 1. Choucri points 
out that the visibility of population problems is 
relatively recent, and asserts, a little paradoxically, 
that the recent interest in ecological questions has 
tended to obscure "the less spectacular consequences 
of population dynamics". She also puts the more 
persuasive argument that the connection between 
population and politics having always been an 
emotionally-charged subject, it has tended to be 
abandoned to those espousing some sensationalist 
or apocalyptic approach to the subject, as a 
result of which "a curious division between 
apocalyptical and apolitical orientations has 
developed", (p. 3)
18
neglected, it was being manhandled. At least one census
was suppressed and the results of another left largely
unpublished during Stalin's reign; and there were (and
still are) large gaps in even the most basic Soviet
17demographic statistics. The demographers themselves,
of course, ran the usual heightened risks to life and 
career characteristic of all scientific endeavour in the 
'thirties and*forties. Official demographic doctrine was 
crudely oversimplified. Certain Marxist dicta as glossed 
by Stalinist interpretation became normative writ. When 
and insofar as the trend of facts did not square with them, 
the facts tended to be dispensed with before the theory.
In these conditions it was difficult for any kind of 
demography to flourish, let alone that branch of it directly 
concerned with governmental decision-making. In addition, 
the Stalinist years saw a number of major demographic 
catastrophes befall the Soviet Union, so that considerations
17 W, Petersen Population London 1969, p. 633.
On the continuing gaps in our knowledge of 
vital statistics during the Soviet period, see 
David M. Heer " The Demographic Transition in 
the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union" 
Journal of Social History vol 1 (1967) p. 193 
at p. 206.
19
of prestige and national security were added to the usual
18Stalinist intolerance of objective information. When
demography began to re-emerge as a discipline in the early 
191960s, it did so in the context of such spectacular
18 The policy of concealing population losses from 
the West was successful. "...while Western 
analysts in 1950 accepted the Soviet statement 
that the USSR's population was about 200,000,000 
- the Soviet authorities had direct data showing 
the population to be only about 180,000,000".
M. Roof "Soviet Population Trends" Survey No. 37 
(July - September 1961) p. 35. For evidence of 
deliberate Soviet concealment, including an 
assertion by Stalin that the USSR had "lost" only 
7 million people during the war, see M. Roof 
"The Russian Population Enigma Reconsidered" 
Population Studies XIV (1960-61) p.3.
19 To my knowledge there is no satisfactory account 
of the history of Soviet demography through the 
dark decades of the 30s, 40s and 50s. Soviet bloc 
scholars are naturally cautious of even drawing 
attention to the large gap in the history of 
their discipline. One article (E. Mashikhin and 
B. Miasoedov "0 demograficheskoi literature"
in D. Broner and I. Venetskii Problemy demografii 
Moscow 1971) adopts the characteristic Soviet 
procedure of deliberately periodizing its material 
in such a way as to conceal the sharp edges.
(See the tables at p. 205 and 207-8). Even so, 
the attempt to maintain an appearance of normal 
development fails. In the earlier Brezhnev years, 
some allusions could be made to past disasters.
See for example G. Gerasimov "Demograficheskie 
neozhidannosti" Novy Mir 1967 No. 2, p. 267; B.Ts. 
Urlanis "The Problem of Demography and Planning" in 
E. Szabady (ed.) World Views of Population Problems 
Budapest 1968, at p. 349. Gerasimov quotes Oscar 
Wilde as having declared that if people don't speak 
of something, this must mean that the thing doesn't 
exist. "For a long time we didn't speak about 
demography," comments Gerasimov. "To many people it 
seemed that it didn't exist". Since Gerasimov's 
time the situation has changed in that now it would 
appear to be no longer possible to talk about the 
fact that it was once impossible to talk about 
demography.
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fertility decline that policy-oriented discussion, either 
open or veiled, was bound to ensue.
In some of the other Socialist countries, particularly
Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, demography and discussion
of population questions reemerged from the Stalinist phase 
20rather earlier. But there too, and for similar reasons, 
there has been a notable expansion in policy discussions in 
recent years.
Thus in both the non-Socialist and Socialist worlds,
we are presently confronted by a rapid increase in the
literature on population problems generally and population
policies in particular. The already rising tide was
given further impetus by the organization of the 1974 UN
World Population Conference in Bucharest, which had a much
stronger orientation both to international and domestic
population policies than any similar gathering held
previously. Large conferences devoted exclusively to
population policy were held in Warsaw (international,
21largely Socialist) in 1972 and Belgrade (domestic
22Yugoslav population policy only) in 1973 . Among the
20 By 1963, a year when Soviet publications on 
demographic themes were just beginning to appear 
systematically, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland 
all had flourishing demographic journals. Despite 
innumerable pleas from members of the demographic 
community, there is still no specialist demographic 
journal in the USSR.
21 The papers presented at the conference were published 
(with some omissions) in Polityka ludno£ciowa: 
wspdjbczesne problemy Warsaw 1973.
22 Savetovanje o izgradnji drustvenih stavova o 
populacionoj politici u Jugoslaviji. Some of the 
papers presented at this conference were published 
in the Zagreb journal Nase teme No. 4, 1974.
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numerous policy-oriented publications emerging from the
Soviet Union in 1974 was one collective tome actually
2 3entitled "Demographic Policy". In recent years, the
Socialist demographic journals have begun to reflect this
same growing interest; articles on policy issues are
starting to proliferate. Statements by party and state
officials on population matters are also becoming more and
more frequent, if still relatively rare in certain of the
Socialist countries. And as in the West, advisory
commissions on population are being either established or
widely postulated as necessary. Meanwhile in the Western
and Third Worlds, interest in population policy grows apace.
A most notable event during World Population Year 1974 was
the appearance of a large and comprehensive collective
monograph volume on population policies in the developed 
2 4countries. The leading Western demographic
publications are devoting more and more space to the subject,
both in relation to the "capitalist" and "Socialist"
countries. And political scientists are beginning to
25contribute rather more to the field as well. At the
23 V.S. Steshenko & V.P. Piskunov Demograficheskaia 
politika Moscow 1974.
24 B. Berelson (ed.) Population Policies in Developed 
Countries New York 1974.
25 Within the United States, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology and the University of North Carolina, 
Chapel Hill, seem to be particularly committed
to furthering political demography. See N.
Choucri, op.cit., esp. the Preface; and R. Clinton 
Population and Politics,Foreword, Preface and 
About the Contributors.
22
governmental level, there is an increasing awareness that
population growth is a legitimate or indeed a necessary
2 6sphere of state involvement.
While politico-demographic writing is expanding
rapidly in both the Socialist and non-Socialist worlds,
with many parallel features and for many of the same reasons,
there are also some important and fundamental differences
2 7between the two literatures.
26 In 1959, the then President Eisenhower said:
"I cannot imagine anything more emphatically a 
subject that is not a proper political or 
governmental activity or function or 
responsibility... as long as I am here this 
government will not have a positive political 
doctrine on birth control." In 1968, he said:
"Once as President of the United States I thought 
and said that birth control was not the business 
of the Federal Government. The facts changed my 
mind...I have come to believe that the population 
explosion is the world's most critical problem." 
(Quoted in R. Symonds & M. Carder: The United 
Nations and the Population Question London 1973 
p. 95, 133). In the Socialist countries (with 
the exception of Yugoslavia), a similar evolution 
has occurred, if for diametrically opposed reasons. 
Virtually all countries (with the notable exception 
of USSR, and also Yugoslavia) have some kind of 
central co-ordinating state body responsible for 
monitoring demographic development and proposing 
policies relevant to it. There has been a rapid 
multiplication of similar bodies in Western and 
developing nations as well. See Berelson 
Population Policy in Developed Countries pp. 775-777.
27 Here I am discussing the literature on domestic
population policies, not that relating to world 
population problems and efforts towards their 
solution.
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To begin with of course, there is no such field as
2 8political demography or population politics in the
Socialist countries, and it is unlikely that one will be
29recognized in the foreseeable future. What they do
have, on the other hand, is what is known in Russian as 
politika narodonaselenia, in the broader sense of the study 
or science of population policy. At least in relation to 
the Socialist countries, the main thrust of this discipline 
is not of course towards disclosing the political aspects 
of population development and policy, but rather towards 
mapping what is actually being done by Socialist governments 
to solve perceived problems and cautiously evaluating the 
merits of possible alternatives within the guidelines of 
currently established orthodoxy. As practised, the 
discipline has a fairly strong contemporary orientation; 
excursions into history have to be conducted with tact (owing 
to the strong distaste of Socialist authorities for being 
reminded of past volte-face^ , and are in general avoided. 
There is a relative paucity of discussion of such 
normative questions as the permissible limits of state
28 The terms "political demography" and "population 
politics" are being used more or less interchangeably. 
I have a preference for the latter, despite its 
relative inelegance, since it seems to direct 
attention more to the political rather than the 
demographic regions of the borderlands between the 
two domains. The former term is sometimes preferred 
to include possible reference to Socialist writings 
on "population policy" in the sense explained
below.
29 This does not prevent Socialist commentators from 
drawing attention to the political problems inherent 
in the demographic situations of non-Socialist 
countries. But clearly this type of analysis must 
remain covert or implicit in relation to the 
Socialist states themselves.
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power, the ethics of coercing or otherwise inducing particular
social or ethnic minorities to regulate their natural growth,
women's rights in relation to the foetus etc., all of which
play such a prominent and increasing part in Western
discussions of population issues; though just beneath the
surface one often senses a strong interest in these and
other similar questions, and a frequent and strong desire
to make empirical discussion serve normative ends. Another
characteristic feature of the Socialist literature is the
overwhelming dominance of pro-natalist values and
preoccupations, something which is largely absent from
Western demography at present and which therefore makes
the Socialist framework of discussion of policy issues
30virtually non-comparable with the Western. And finally,
note should be made of the technocratic and nationalist
30 Thus in a Czech text-book on demography, in a
brief definitional passage on population policy, 
we find the following characterization: "Population 
policy is a collection of measures (mostly of a 
long-term character) intended to regulate 
population development according to the established 
state doctrine of the society in question. Population 
policy is usually pro-natalist." (V. Srb, M. KuSera
and L. Ruzicka Demografie Prague 1971, p. 575, 
emphasis added). A recent Western source quotes 
a definition of population policy as policies of 
national governments "intended to decrease the 
birth rate or growth rate" (E. Driver, op.cit. p 7. 
quoting D. Nortman "Population and Family Planning 
Programs: A Fact-book" Reports on Population/Family 
Planning December 1969, p.12.) While it is clear 
in Nortman's original text that she is referring 
only to the developing countries, and framing a 
definition purely for the purposes of her own paper, 
Driver does not appear to be too troubled by the 
anti-natalist assumption in the definition, though 
he does suggest that it represents an over-narrow 
approach to the problem from other points of view.
25
style of Socialist writers on population policy: their 
concern is with their own countries and their objective to 
make their rulers understand what policies need to be 
adopted in the national interest. Though many of them seem 
to be concerned about the human aspect of the problems 
they are discussing, they will often go to considerable pains 
to conceal the fact and to present their case in the form 
of an empirical demonstration of the demographico-economic 
benefits that will surely flow from the course prescribed, 
or of the practical futility of policies in fact probably 
held in distaste for moral reasons.
Thus to sum up, while the Western and Eastern 
literatures on population policies are expanding equally 
rapidly, they are doing so in different directions.
Socialist writers are, at the surface at least, pragmatic and 
technocratic rather than normative, policy- rather than 
politics-oriented, and nationalist and natalist rather 
than neo-Malthusian and international in their perspectives.
26
1. b Population and Politics
Little systematic work has yet been done to 
map the areas of overlap between population and politics.
31 Since the relevant parts of this chapter were
written a new book has reached me reflecting some 
more recent work on the politics of population in 
the United States from which it clearly emerges 
that many of the comments I have made on the state 
of the field are being rapidly overtaken by events. 
Population and Politics/ edited by Richard L.
Clinton and published towards the end of 1973, is 
a much more substantial collection of essays than 
either of the two volumes edited by Clinton et al. 
and published the previous year. Both qualitatively 
and quantitatively it is obvious that significant 
development is taking place. People working in 
the field are becoming more aware of one another's 
contributions and there are more signs of a felt 
need to interrelate conceptual proposals and 
build on what has already been done. The essays 
of McCoy, Choucri, Stetson, Kraft and others 
suggest that systematization of various approaches 
to the subject will not now be long in coming.
For one of my own interests and prejudices, two or 
three shortcomings remain. Rather too much energy 
seems to be expended on attempts to dispel the 
political scientist's anxieties about the "scientific" 
status of himself and his "discipline". If 
political scientists could agree that what links 
them is a common concern for objective and 
systematic thinking about one of the most central 
facets of human life, and not some existing or 
emergent set of sectarian skills, they should 
all have a good deal more time and nervous energy 
available for more profitable pursuits. The other 
major deficiency I detect is the absence of any 
Soviet or capital S Socialist perspective on the 
problems being discussed. There is a wider dispersal 
of views than in previous volumes (with, for example, 
Third World anti-Malthusianism ably if vicariously 
represented); but the models proposed are not 
always apposite to mercantilist authoritarian regimes, 
and there is little apparent awareness of the special 
theoretical and practical problems their existence 
raises both for their own peoples and the world. 
Another book which has reached me too late to be 
effectively discussed is N. Choucri: Population 
Dynamics and International Violence Lexington 1974.
Cf. footnote 41, below.
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The little that has been done has usually been tentative or 
ad hoc. And frequently it has been done by demographers 
with a primary interest in policy or even in some particular 
demographic objective, in terms of which they then couch 
their definitions.
One of the very few sustained conceptual discussions 
of the subject to have been carried out by a political 
scientist is Myron Weiner's essay "Political Demography: An
32
Inquiry into the Political Consequences of Population Change".
3 3Weiner defines political demography as "the study of the
size, composition, and distribution of population in relation
to both government and politics". It is concerned, he writes,
with the political consequences of population change and
what he calls the political determinants of population change,
among which he includes, as key instances* the political
causes of migration, "the relationship of various population
configurations to the structures and functions of government"
and population policy. Then he adds, as though in a third
category, the "knowledge and attitudes that people have
34toward population issues", though a few pages later, this
32 Published in R. Revelle (ed.) Rapid Population 
Growth: Consequences and Policy Implications 
Baltimore 1971 pp 567-617.
33 It appears to have been Weiner who popularized 
the term "political demography". It is significant 
in itself that the term was coined or at least 
launched into circulation as late as the 1970s. 
Another author has actually claimed prior use
in 1968. See J. Dreijmanis "Political Demography 
and Population Policy" Population Review 1975,
p. 101,
34 At p. 574.
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same factor reappears in the more modest role of a point to 
be borne in mind (along with four others) when analysing the 
political effects of demographic changes. The classification 
into consequences and determinants is not without its 
difficulties either. Population policies and the politics 
of population policy-making may be equally well or indeed 
better regarded as consequent upon population change, as 
being a political response to demographic change rather than 
a cause of it; and the question whether and in what measure 
those policies in time become a determinant of demographic 
change seems more a question for technical demography than 
for political science to assess. Similarly the "relation­
ships of various population configurations to the structures 
and functions of government" do not seem happily cast as 
political determinants of population change. And in general, 
the bifurcation between consequences and determinants seems 
to divide what is, from the vantage-point of political 
analysis, a mountain from a molehill. Perhaps it was for 
this reason that Weiner chose to go on to discuss only the 
consequences and not the determinants. The discussion itself 
is full of stimulating ideas, and the core of it sensibly 
structured into a five-fold division according to the nature of 
the demographic change being considered: a) changes in the 
age structure; b) changes in family size: c) changes in the 
size and density of a population: d) differential population 
growth rates among different social classes and ethnic 
groups; and e) migration. But there is nothing manifestly 
exhaustive or definitive about this scheme. Instead of 
focussing on the demographic causes of the political
29
consequences the discussion might instead have been organized 
in terms of some classification of the consequences themselves: 
by area of policy concern; by their impact on political 
institutions, processes and systems; by geographical relevance 
- international, national, regional, etc. - and so on.
Weiner does not really discuss any of these possible 
classificatory alternatives. The choices he made in 
organizing his material were evidently made in a virtual 
vacuum.
35
Nash has presented another outline of
what he calls the "potential fields" which"political- 
science-in-population-studies" should "at least" be 
concerned with: 1) the indirect political implications
of demographic change; 2) the direct implications;
3) the political barriers to the adoption of particular 
population policies; 4) the implications for core political 
values; and 5) the politics of population policy-making.
The instances he gives to explain 1) and 2) leave some doubt 
in the reader's mind as to what these categories contain, 
just how they are distinguished from one another and in what 
relationship they stand to categories 4) and 5). In general 
one gains the impression that they are as tentative and 
inchoate as Nash's hyphenated characterization of the field 
itself would suggest.
W.B. Vosloo, in undertaking an overall review 
of the political implications of rapid population growth in 
the world distinguishes two main categories of domestic and
35 Review Symposium in Demography vol. 11 (1974) 
No. 1, p. 156, at p. 166.
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international implications. The former he further sub­
divides into a) demands on governments; b) urbanization; 
c) inter-group conflict and d) population policy. 
International implications are subclassified into a) effects 
on national power; b) external effects, and c) global 
effects, each of which contains in turn two sub-groups. 
Vosloo's paper is a brief one; and the logic of his break­
down is greater than merely quoting the sub-headings might 
suggest. But perhaps the most significant thing about the 
paper is that its author produced his classification without 
finding it necessary to refer to any existing received 
wisdom on the subject. And though the volume in which his 
paper was published appeared in 1972, this was no doubt for 
the excellent reason that no such received wisdom existed.
Volume IV of the research reports of the US
Commission on Population Growth and the American Future,
sub-titled Governance and Population; The Governmental
Implications of Population Change, attempts to gather
together a wide sampling of political science thinking on
"the significant relationships, if any, between population
growth and distribution, on the one hand, and the American
37governmental process, on the other". A fourfold sub­
classification is made into 1.) population, federalism and 
democracy; 2.) population change and state and local 
government; 3.) population change and foreign policy; and 
4.) population policy and the American political system.
36 "The Political Implications of the Population 
Explosion" in J. Barratt & M. Louw (eds.) 
International Aspects of Overpopulation London 1972 
p.143.
37 Governance and Population p. 13.
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Here, instead of taking demographic categories as the basic
principle of organization as Weiner did, the political
system and policy have been distinguished and each divided
into two sub-sections. For the rest, the approach is
probably similar enough: Weiner's consequences are replaced
by "implications", and there is a slightly greater orientation
3 8to political institutions, perhaps reflecting the origins 
and terms of reference of the Commission itself. Again, 
however, there is no sign of any methodological self- 
awareness, or any interest in earlier overall approaches to 
the problem.
The international implications of population
39
trends probably have received more attention in the past 
than the domestic ones. But that greater interest has not
38 A similar orientation forms the basis for an 
interesting little book by Robert Dahl and Edward 
Tufte: Size and Democracy,which attempts to 
review the state of theory and empirical research 
on the interconnections between a country's size 
(variously understood in terms of population, 
population density, area and to some extent, 
wealth) and democracy ( in terms
of citizen participation in political
decision-making, and the effectiveness of the 
political system in maintaining and defending 
itself and pursuing its objectives). Perhaps 
the single most significant theme in the 
Dahl-Tufte volume from the present perspective 
is their repeated emphasis on the paucity or 
complete absence of data on the successive 
problems raised: "quagmire of unknowns" (p 46),
"these scattered data are a fragile foundation"
(p.51) "the evidence, though fragmentary" (p 55),etc.
39 Dahl and Tufte, in discussing the international 
problems faced by small states, remark: "This is 
one of the few areas of our inquiry for which an 
extensive literature has recently developed".
Dahl and Tufte op.cit., p 118, note 1.
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40for the most part taken very systematic form. It seems
to have been only recently that attempts have been made by 
political scientists to provide some theoretical framework 
for this large, diffuse and complex area of enquiry, or 
potential enquiry. The crucial questions appear to be 
basically three: 1. to what extent, in what ways and with
what qualifications does population growth affect the power 
of individual nations to act in the international arena?
2. to what extent and in what ways can population growth 
tendencies affect the likelihood or nature of international 
conflict? and 3. to what extent and in what ways can 
population trends bring about problems that must ultimately 
be solved at an international as well as a national level 
(eg. pollution, mass poverty, starvation or other such 
chronic or acute catastrophes, large international migratory
40 One of the very earliest attempts at systematic
analysis, at least within the literature of 
modern Anglo-Saxon political science, was K. &
A. F. Organski's Population and World Power New 
York 1961. The Organskis appear not to have 
been aware of any direct predecessors. The style of 
the book is popular and the content seldom goes 
very much beyond the level of an accumulation 
of common sense views. For a critical review, 
see L.H. Day "Population Characteristics and 
World Power" Social Research vol 30 (1963) No. 3, 
p. 391. Another work similar in scope and style 
to that of the Organskis is P. Hauser (ed.) 
Population and World Politics Glencoe 1958 (see 
esp. Chapters 9 & 12 by Kingsley Davis and 
Quincy Wright).
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flows, depletion of world resources, etc)? Each of these
questions might be meaningfully discussed at very great length. 
In the present study, however, not even the most schematic 
outline of the main issues involved will be attempted. These 
are problems which have attracted even less explicit attention 
in the Socialist countries than in the West (where the 
reticence of political scientists has fortunately not been 
shared by observers from other spheres of interest). Moreover,
41 An excellent review of the literature on the
linkages between population and international 
politics is to be found in N. Choucri Population 
Dynamics and International Violence Lexington 
1974, pp3-85. (Though her discussion is 
focussed only on the second, and to a lesser 
extent, the first of the three general problem- 
areas I have distinguished.) Unfortunately,
Choucri's book became available only after this 
chapter was effectively completed. For another 
more recent attempt to deal with the first problem, see A.F.K. Organski et al. "Effective population 
as a source of international power" in Barratt and 
Louw op, cit. pp 161-178; and "The Effective Population in International Politics" in Clinton, 
Flash and Godwin op.cit.,pp 79-99. The notion 
of "effective population" represents an effort 
to reach a composite measure of human resources 
as an element in national power such that 
differing levels of economic development, political 
organization and social and psychological 
mobilization might be taken into account. Not all 
of these necessary modifications lend themselves 
readily to quantification however; and in any 
casQ even if they should one day be reducible to 
some kind of index, one might still ask the 
question whether "effective population" would be 
necessarily a better name for such an index than 
simply "national power" or something else. For 
a criticism of an earlier version of a similar 
index by Organski which actually was called an 
"index of national power", see S. Rosen "War,
Power and the Willingness to Suffer" in Bruce 
M. Russett (ed.) Peace, War and Numbers Beverly 
Hills 1972, p. 170.
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they take one away from the primary focus of interest of 
the present study, which is the domestic politics of the 
socialist countries, not their international relations with 
one another or the world. In the case of the Soviet Union, 
and to a lesser extent, Yugoslavia, the international 
population factor impinges on the domestic scene to such 
an extent that it cannot be ignored. Elsewhere, given the 
apparent stability of power relations in the area for the 
short term at least, and given the inevitable reticence on 
the matter of indigenous commentators, the international 
factor tends to surface rather as a quasi-national one, 
exclusively in terms of an ostensibly inward-looking or 
wholly pacific patriotism. The discussion of the 
international aspects of the problem will accordingly tend 
on the whole to be somewhat foreshortened.
Rather more of a conceptual or morphological
nature has been written on population policy. And while
this literature is, as was noted earlier, slanted in the
direction of demography and policy rather than politics,
and often dominated by implicit or explicit anti-natalist
preoccupations, some of it goes into the politics of
policy-formation quite extensively. Perhaps the most
promising classificatory proposal to emerge from this
literature is Berelson's sixteen-fold division of what
42he calls the problem-area of population policy. He
begins by distinguishing four demographic variables: size,
B. Berelson "Population Policy: Personal Notes" 
Population Studies XXV (1971) p. 173, at p. 175 
and ff.
42
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rates (birth, death, natural increase etc.)/ distribution 
(dispersal of existing populations and migratory trends) 
and composition (structure by age, sex, ethnic status and 
genetic character). These four demographic variables are 
then severally considered in relation to the four 
behavioural categories of economic, political, ecological- 
environmental and social, thus producing 16 problem-bundles. 
This scheme has the advantage of being simple, systematic 
and comprehensive at the same time. From the point of view 
of political analysis it may seem that the area specifically 
allocated to politics is too neatly restricted; after all, 
whatever relates to policy must in some sense be political. 
When enough people become conscious of a social, economic or 
ecological question, it becomes ipso facto a political one as 
well. With this modification, however, Berelson's scheme may 
well provide a useful starting-point for the systematic 
charting of the population politics area generally and not 
just that of population policy.
Turning then to the field of population policy 
(understood in some sense narrower than domestic population 
politics), it should be said at once, that though it has been 
more extensively and perhaps expertly discussed than political 
demography, no satisfactory definition or characterization 
of it has yet been devised in either East or West. The 
central problem is how to distinguish population policy from 
social policy, and following on from that, to determine 
whether or not unconscious or laisser-faire policies should 
be regarded as population policies at all. Leading Western 
authorities on population and social policies are not
agreed as to where the dividing line between the two should
36.
fall. As Driver has noted:
"Myrdal and Borrie regard population policy as
inseparable from a more comprehensive social policy.
Berelson, on the other hand, treats measures of social policy
as segments of a general population policy. T.H. Marshall
clearly separates the two types of policies, while Richard
Titmuss examines social policies in terms of their
4 3demographic consequences."
But quite apart from this central and unresolved problem, 
little progress has yet been made towards developing a 
universally-accepted framework for discussion and evaluation 
of population policy from any point of view. Three recent 
conceptual proposals by a demographer, sociologist and 
political scientist, which we shall now briefly consider, 
are united more than in any other way by a common failure 
to address themselves to any existing body of literature, 
and a common aspiration to define terms ab initio.
4 4Livi-Bacci, the demographer, begins by
accepting the broader notion of population policy which 
includes demographically-relevant policies which may have 
been adopted for other reasons, and proceeds to distinguish 
three categories of measures which he first classifies as
Driver op. cit., p. 133.43
44 M. Livi-Bacci "Population Policy in Western 
Europe" Population Studies XXV111 (1974)
No. 2, p. 191.
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those relating to individual human rights (abortion 
contraception, marriage law etc.); those designed to 
increase social justice (various egalitarian and welfare 
provisions); and those designed to encourage or discourage 
certain types of (demographic) behaviour (and here we are 
given a mixed bag of examples, some overlapping with those 
in category two, though not category one for some reason).
Thus we have a division into one category of deliberate 
population policies and two of social policies with demographic 
relevance. This classification, which is not without a 
certain appeal, he then tacitly abandons, (so quietly in 
fact, that one wonders whether he himself is fully conscious 
of what he has done) and substitutes a second tripartite 
scheme strongly similar to the preceding one in certain 
respects, but not identical with it and in fact reflecting 
different organizing principles: 1.) policies affecting
procreation and fertility; 2.) policies affecting the 
economic and social welfare of the people; and 3.) policies 
affecting migration and mobility. The first of these, though 
renamed, substantially corresponds to the earlier individual 
rights category and is concerned with the same issues of 
abortion, contraception, marriage law and so on. The second 
category also closely corresponds to its predecessor 
(egalitarian and welfare measures) except that it is, as its 
new name suggests, more narrowly focussed on family welfare, 
and that rather much in terms of pro- and anti-natalism. 
Provisions relating to minorities, the old, the handicapped,
38.
etc., which were mentioned as instances of the earlier 
category 2 are not now discussed. It might be asked whether 
in view of the bias of this revised second category, the designat­
ion of the revised first category (measures relating to 
procreation and fertility) is not a misnomer, since family 
welfare is clearly being considered above all from the 
point of view of marital fertility. The third category, 
of policies relating to migration and mobility, proves to 
be the previous category three, shorn of the examples relating 
to family policy.
If we regard population policy as being concerned 
with quantity and social policy as being concerned with 
quality, and if we accept the proposition that the two 
essential factors involved in quantitative changes are 
fertility and migration (on the grounds that welfare policies 
aimed at reducing mortality are really concerned with the 
quality of life rather than the number of lives or deaths 
as such), Livi-Bacci could be said to have opted for a 
classification into socio-demographic policies affecting 
fertility and socio-demographic policies affecting migration, 
with the former class being further sub-divided into two 
groups: policies relating to issues of individual freedoms, 
and likely to affect fertility; and policies relating to 
the family which are likely to affect fertility.
Livi-Bacci's purposes were purely pragmatic - to
set a framework for a discussion of population policy in
Western Europe. The sociologist, Driver, on the other hand,
4 5has attempted a conceptual analysis for its own sake. His 
approach, not surprisingly, is more systematic and sophisticated. 
He begins by distinguishing three aspects of population: size, 
distribution and composition. Viewed dynamically rather 
than statically, one can conceive further of positive or 
negative growth of the population unit as a whole, and 
changes in its spatial distribution and structural composition. 
Each of these properties of population is connected by 
reciprocally causative links to the demographic variables of 
fertility and mortality, and internal and international 
migration. And Driver points out that each of the population 
properties and demographic variables can be further analyzed.
The concept of policy is similarly analytically 
reduced. Driver distinguishes means and ends (or the 
purpose or philosophy of policy as he terms the latter) and 
to these two components adds a third which he calls policy 
evaluation, and which refers to the relations between the 
first two components. He then introduces a temporal 
perspective, differentiating between the origins and 
execution of policy or policy initiation and implementation, 
as he terms it. Policy means are next sub-divided into 
direct and indirect measures by both governmental and 
non-governmental institutions. Beyond policy goals or aims,
45. E. Driver; "Population Policy: A Conceptual Framework" in Driver op. cit., pp 7-13.
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Driver perceives further layers of population values and 
general values. And in diagrams accompanying the text, he 
adumbrates a host of further distinctions and subject- 
headings within the general areas of policy means, initiation 
and implementation which he does not actually discuss in the 
text proper.
Though tentative and incomplete in its presentation.
Driver's scheme, like Berelson's, appears to have considerable 
46promise. Actually his proposal for the demographic
side of things is not dissimilar to Berelson's: his three
aspects (or "connotations" as he chooses to call them) of
46 Though surprisingly, it has been curtly dismissed
by at least one reviewer. (T. Burch in Demography 
vol. 11 (1974) No. 1, p. 151) A second reviewer 
in the same symposium praises it as "eminently 
sane" (p. 157). Neither really elaborates on 
his praise or criticism, nor does either suggest 
any detailed alternative or supplementary 
approach. Burch simply states his preference for 
the proposals of Kingsley Davis and the head of 
his own organization, Bernard Berelson (whose 
proposal was reviewed above). This preference 
for Davis's discussion is somewhat surprising 
inasmuch that the article in question does not 
aspire to be a systematic structural outline of 
the subject-matter of population policy, but 
rather a discursive account of certain key aspects 
of population problems and policies over the last 
century or so, with a strong contemporary and 
anti-natalist focus. The definitional passage 
is a relatively small and less important segment 
of the article (K. Davis "The Nature and Purpose 
of Population Policy" in Kingsley Davis and 
Frederick G. Stykes California's Twenty Millions 
UCLA Population Monograph Series No. 10, Berkeley 
1971). And in general both reviews of Driver's 
book, as well as Driver's reply, seem more 
concerned to make ad hominem debating points than 
to address themselves seriously to the problems 
involved.
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population - size, distribution and composition - correspond 
to three of Berelson's four demographic factors; and his 
demographic variables of fertility, mortality, internal 
and. international migration correspond roughly to Berelson's 
fourth demographic factor of rates. But then in place of 
Berelson's four behavioural categories of economic, political, 
ecological-environmental and social, Driver directs our 
attention to the means-ends and process (initiation- 
implementation) dimensions. Obviously these are aspects 
of the problem which ought not to be neglected, and there 
is no reason in fact why a more comprehensive topology of 
the field might not employ both approaches complementarity.
For practical purposes, at least, it might be
argued that Driver's inclusion of indirect population
policies(by which he appears to mean social and other policies
of inadvertent demographic relevance) makes his framework
too all-embracing and unwieldy. And certainly his discussion
4 7elsewhere in the same volume of prison visiting regulations 
would appear to most people a far cry from anything they would 
be prepared to use the term "population policy" about.
However, from the viewpoint of demography if not from that of 
population politics, such matters are obviously of some 
importance, even if a better name for them would be 
"demographically-relevant social policies" or something of 
the sort.
47 E. Driver op. cit., pp 82-88.
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In his article "Population Policies and the
4 8American Political System" the political scientist,
Theodore Lowi, offers a definition and discussion of
population policy "from the point of view of the political
scientist, rather than that of the demographer, the biologist,
or the physician", (p.26) Whether for this or for some other
reason, however, his contribution is the weakest structurally
of the three here considered, and consists more of a series
of discursive comments on what population policy is not, until
he finally reaches the point of offering a classification of
policies in terms of the amount and kind of coercion involved
(this, he argues, being the element that is most likely to
make them politically relevant). While some of his schemes
and criteria may be of some utility, on the whole they suffer
not only from being too narrowly oriented to political
science, but also (as the title of his essay forewarns) too
narrowly oriented to America. His theoretical discussion is
couched in general terms, as though aspiring to be of general
application. But in fact, its normative, anti-natalist and
democratic bias makes it quite useless in a Socialist context,
and of limited value generally to any overall consideration
49of the matters raised by political demography.
48 In Clinton, Flash and Godwin op.cit., p. 25, 
at pp. 26-33.
49 It may not be being too harsh to suggest that the 
Lowi essay suffers from a scrappiness and spur- 
of-the-moment provisionalness characteristic of 
the entire volume, and also, perhaps, of the 
state in which political demography then found 
itself. One reviewer described the essays (with 
one exception) as being "slight - if sometimes 
heavily pretentious - statements of the axiomatic." 
and declared brutally that "This conference should 
have been regarded as a dry run, not worth 
printing and certainly not worth anyone's ten 
dollars." (W. Petersen in Contemporary Sociology 
May 1973 p. 271).
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One of the problems which constantly recurs in 
attempts to define the subject-matter of population policy 
is where to draw the line so as to incorporate all the 
relevant data without dragging the entire social sciences 
into consideration. Should population policy be taken to 
include both deliberate and inadvertent policy inputs?
Should it include all policies which are demographically 
relevant even if they were conceived with other goals in 
mind, either principally or entirely? Should it include 
policies made by default? And should it include policies 
seeking to affect the quality of the population as well as 
the quantity, and if so in what sense or senses of the word 
"quality"?
These problems have also exercised the minds of 
Socialist demographers. And as is the case with Western 
writers (cf p.35 above), they are not fully in agreement 
about where the lines should be drawn. In their societies 
of course, the scope and intermesh of governmental (and 
therefore ex definitione political) activity is so great, 
that the amorphousness of population policy in its broader 
sense is even more troublesome. At times, notably in the 
work of the prominent Moscow University demographer, D.I. 
Valentei, population policy seems to be defined in a sense 
broad enough to incorporate most of what a Western observer 
might have called social policy and a good deal of economic
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policy as well. Valentei draws a distinction between
what he calls "demographic policy" (demograficheskaia
politika) and "population policy" (Politika narodonaseleniia).
The second of the two in his interpretation is much broader
than the first which, he declares: "...in our opinion refers
only to the qualitative and quantitative reproduction of the 
51population" ( -already a broad enough definition probably, 
in the opinion of many.) Among the matters Valentei lists 
as falling within the scope of politika narodonaseleniiafon the 
other hand, are working conditions broadly conceived: (length
of working day, industrial safety and health regulations, etc.), 
technical education and vocational guidance, wages, services,
50 The following exposition of Valentei's ideas is
based on his article "0 sisteme demograficheskikh 
znanii" in Voprosy Ekonomiki 1973, No. 5, pp 74-84. Valentei has repeatedly developed the same theme 
in other places. Many of his articles seem to 
repeat themselves almost word for word and 
paragraph for paragraph.(Compare, for example, the 
third chapter of his Osnovy teorii narodonaseleniia 
Moscow 1973 with his contribution "Politika 
narodonaseleniia" to D. Broner and I. Venetskii 
Problemy demografii Moscow 1971). These recurring 
programmatic statements have a stately ex cathedra 
quality reflecting the fact that Valentei's 
authority is not so much, or at any rate, not 
merely academic. He was a crucial figure in 
reviving demography as a discipline in the 1960s 
and defending it against the attacks of its 
erstwhile sole custodians, the Main Statistical 
Office (whose mode of nurturing demography was to 
deny its existence), though his own academic works 
have not in general been very substantial or 
obviously trail-blazing (his two major monographs 
have been Bezrabotitsa - neizbezhny sputnik 
kapitalizma Moscow 1951 (Unemployment - The 
Inevitable Concomitant of Capitalism), and 
Reaktsionnye teorii narodonaseleniia perioda 
obshchevo krizisa kapitalizma Moscow 1963 
(Reactionary Demographic Theories of the Period of 
General Crisis of Capitalism). Cf. footnote 181 to 
Chapter 3.
Voprosy Ekonomiki 1973, No. 5, p. 79.51
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housing, leisure pursuits, public health in the broadest
sense, environmental preservation and social mobility.
While Valentei's broader definition may have some merits as
indicating the range of phenomena that are not demographically
irrelevant, many of these topics would seem to be best given
their primary location elsewhere. In fact, as noted earlier,
though Valentei has frequently repeated this and similar
formulations in magisterial tone from rather august forums,
most Soviet demographers seem to implicitly adopt something
more like the narrower of his two definitions, while pointing
out that any policy, to be effective, must take many other
things into account and be itself taken into account by
decision-makers in other policy fields. Another senior
Soviet demographer, Boris Urlanis, has actually explicitly
5 2criticized Valentei's ideas in a recent publication: Valentei,
he writes,
"treats the notion of 'population policy' (politika 
narodonaseleniia) in a very broad sense (ves'ma rasshiritel'no). 
including in it the length of the working day, real wages, 
social mobility and so on."
Urlanis goes on to deny the need for any distinction between 
demographic policy and population policy. But there may be 
some value in retaining a distinction of roughly this type.
There is an obvious need to distinguish conceptually between 
population policy in the narrow sense of measures seeking to 
affect the population growth rate and in the broader sense of 
policies serving whether deliberately or not, to affect any one
52 B.Ts. Urlanis Problemy d namiki naseleniia SSSR
Moscow 1974, p. 291.
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of the full range of demographic characteristics of a 
population. This, however, was not Valentei's intention and 
Urlanis was accordingly right in criticizing his version of 
the broader concept as being much too broad.
Regardless of its analytic merits, however, Valentei's 
definition is of considerable interest inasmuch that it may well 
foreshadow the approach to population policy that will be 
adopted by the Soviet administration in the future. If 
Valentei's contentions were indeed to be accepted, a veritable 
revolution would be wrought in Soviet social policy. Both the 
element of paternalistic benevolence and the tight web of 
social control and centralistic direction would be greatly 
strengthened. The net effects of such changes are not easily 
envisaged in advance.
Having briefly discussed the way in which the
overlap between politics and population has been seen by some
5 3observers in both East and West, it remains to reconsider 
the chosen scope of this thesis in the light of that 
discussion.
The main point which ought to have emerged from 
the foregoing is that population politics and population 
policy are fields for which no very satisfactory sign-posting
53 Valentei and Urlanis do not, of course, between
them, exhaust the range of thinking on the 
subject that has been going on in the Socialist 
countries. For other discussions of the problem 
of definition, see, for example: V. Steshenko and 
V. Piskunov Demograficheskaia politika Moscow 1974, 
pp. 7-14 (Valentei), 15, 52 and ff., 69 & ff.; 
Polityka ludno£ciowa: wsp6jczesne problemy Warsaw 
1973, p. 109 & ff., 430, 469, 480, 495; Srb, Kucera 
and Rüzifcka op. cit., pp. 575 & ff.; H. SvarcovA 
Populace Prague 1966, p. 227 & ff.; A. Wertheimer- 
BaleticS Demografija Zagreb 1973, pp. 359 & ff.
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has yet been devised. Being one of predominantly empirical 
interests myself, I do not feel challenged to overcome this 
deficiency in the present work.
Basically what I have done is to select for closer
discussion those areas of linkage between population and
politics which Socialist writers themselves most frequently
touch upon, or those areas which I suspect they would most
like to touch on if it were politically possible to do so:
in other words, I have tried to blend an objective with a
subjective criterion of importance and interest. This seemed
to be the only sensible way to approach the subject, the
more so given the lack of any received schemes of analysis.
Like Weiner, I have chosen to stress the consequences rather
than the determinants of demographic change; but unlike him,
I have adopted political rather than demographic categories
as an organizing principle. Unlike the contributors to the
US Population Commission Report, I have chosen to stress
politics in the sense of conflicts and dilemmas, rather than
governmental structure or political processes and institutions.
The greater emphasis on dilemmas and conflicts involves a
rather lesser degree of emphasis on simple description of
54established government policies. Of the foreign and
domestic implications distinguished by both Vosloo and the 
US Commission volume, I am stressing the latter to a greater 
extent than the former. Of Berelson's four demographic 
categories of size, rates, distribution and composition, I am
54 Descriptions of government policies are in any 
case already largely available.(Cf. footnote 2 
above).
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stressing the first, second and one particular aspect of 
the fourth (ethnic, rather than age- or class- structure).
Ideology, an element often overlooked in 
standard definitions and typologies, fits uneasily into 
Driver's sub-categories of "general value milieu" and 
"population policy values", two parts of his broader 
category of the philosophy (as opposed to the means) of 
population policy. The presence of ideology as one of a 
handful of categories in my pragmatic classification (like 
the prominence of labour supply and labour policy) is a good 
illustration of the extent to which standard Western 
expositions of the subject-matter of political demography are 
ill-fitting when applied to Socialist countries, where such 
a radically different socio-economic system and ideological 
and political tradition prevail.
It will now be appropriate to consider a little 
more closely some of the key aspects of that tradition as 
they bear on population problems.
1. c Population and the Marxist Classics.
(i) Marxism and Population Growth.
It seems that Marx and Engels might conceivably
have chosen to impart a strongly demographic slant to their
55central theory of historical materialism. Both in Marx's
For a discussion of this point see H. Kent 
Geiger The Family in Soviet Russia Cambridge 
Mass. 1968, p. 28 and ff.
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German Ideology and later and more explicitly in Engels'
The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, 
the suggestion is made that human reproduction forms part 
of the base, the underlying reality from which all other 
social phenomena ultimately take their rise. It would appear, 
in other words, that at different times, both inclined towards 
a demo-economic version of historical materialism rather than 
the more monistically economic one with which their names are 
now associated. Engels went so far as to say explicitly that 
the determining factor in history, the production and 
reproduction of the immediate essentials of life, is "of 
a twofold character. On the one hand, the production of the 
means of subsistence, of food, clothing and shelter, and 
the tools requisite therefore; on the other, the production 
of human beings themselves, the propagation of the species". 
And added: "The social institutions under which the people 
of a definite historical epoch and a definite country live 
are conditioned by both kinds of production; by the stage 
of development of labour on the one hand and of the family 
on the other. "
At other times, however, they were content to 
regard the social configurations arising around procreation 
as being determined by the base, and not as some independent 
causative force.
F. Engels The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State, Moscow FLPH n.d. p. 6.
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The Origin appeared late in Engels' life and
after Marx's death, but given Marx's plans to write something
on Morgan's work (referred to by Engels only a few lines
57before the passage quoted above), it seems unlikely that
Engels was thrusting an idea back onto Marx which Marx
himself had wholly and consciously rejected somewhere between
the first hints of it contained in German Ideology, and his 
5 8death. Be that as it may, the fact is that few of the
Marxist classics contain very much material that one could 
classify as demographic, and consequently it is difficult, 
generally speaking, to determine just what their attitudes 
to key population issues might have been. Moreover, most 
of what they do say on these subjects is said in the context 
of their recurring polemics with Malthus. The effect of this 
may have been to burden Marxism with a demographic doctrine 
which strictly speaking does not logically derive from the
57 F. Engels op. cit., pp. 5-6.
58 Scholars writing in the Soviet Marxist tradition 
have tended to blame Engels for this "aberration" 
insofar as they have acknowledged it at all. See 
Geiger op. cit.,p. 31-2; M. Sawer The Question
of the Asiatic Mode of Production: Towards a New 
Marxist Historiography unpublished Ph.D. thesis 
Australian National University 1974, p. 151 & ff., 
252 & ff. Stalin personally intervened in this 
matter to deliver an authoritative judgement on 
at least one aspect of the problem: "Of course, 
growth of population does influence the development 
of society, does facilitate or retard the 
development of society, but it cannot be the chief 
force of development of society, and its influence 
on the development of society cannot be the 
determining influence..."History of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short 
Course Moscow FLPH 1939, p. 119. For an apparent 
attempt to restore the demographic factor to a 
more important role in historical materialism, 
see A. Vishnevskii "Demograficheskaia revoliutsiia" 
Voprosy Filosofii 1973 no. 2, p. 53.
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main body of Marxian thinking at all. For it seems clear
that Marx and Engels were not objecting so much to Malthus's
empirical demographic errors as to what they perceived to be
his moral and political attitudes. Their response to Malthus
59has been aptly described as "apoplectic". Marx and Engels
were much given to forceful polemical prose, a field in
which they displayed no mean ability. Yet even judged by
their own exacting standards, in Malthus's case they seem
indeed to have excelled themselves: "The crudest, most
barbarous theory that ever existed", "a sin against science",
"immorality brought to its highest pitch", "shameless and
mechanical plagiarism", "this revolting blasphemy against
nature and mankind", "this libel on the human race",
"shameless sycophant of the ruling classes", "schoolboyish",
"superficial", "fundamental meanness of outlook", "the
contemptible Malthus...(who) always steals (his premises)",
"a very model of intellectual imbecility winding its way
casuistically through its own inner confusion", "difficult
and clumsy style", "absurd commonplace" - such were some of
the expressions chosen by Marx and Engels to characterize
6 0their adversary and his theoretical work. Neither of the 
main recurring charges - plagiarism and conservatism - 
seems to have been fully apposite. As Malthus himself says 
in the first chapter of his Principle of Population:
59 Anthony Flew Introduction to the Pelican edition 
of Malthus's Essay on the Principle of Population 
Penguin 1970, p. 51.
60 For the following list of expletives and further 
instances of Marx and Engels' vigorous style in 
disputation with Malthus, see Ronald L. Meek (ed.) 
Marx and Engels on Malthus London 1953, pp 59-60 
81, 83, 116-7, 118-9, 121, 123, 126, 138-9 and 
158.
52
"The most important argument that I shall
61adduce is certainly not new."
He then proceeds to acknowledgements, pointing out that the 
argument may well have been stated by other writers he does 
not know. Moreover, on his own admission, Malthus's reading 
on population matters had been very modest to that point.
His intention to represent the argument is modestly, even 
diffidently stated:"I should certainly therefore not think 
of advancing it again, though I mean to place it in a point 
of view in some degree different from any that I have 
hitherto seen, if it had ever been fairly and satisfactorily 
answered." ^
As to Malthus's alleged conservatism, it would
seem that Marx and Engels were characterizing Malthus the
6 3symbol rather than Malthus the man. For Malthus the man
advocated among other things free universal education, free 
medical care for the poor, state assistance to emigrants, and 
direct relief to large families; and opposed child labour in 
factories, ^  something which Marx saw as being an essential
61 Malthus An Essay on the Principle of Population 
1970, p. 69.
62 Ibid.
63 See W. Petersen "Marx versus Malthus: The Symbols 
and the Men" in The Politics of Population London 
1965, pp 72-89.
64 W. Petersen "Malthusian Theory: A Commentary and 
Critique" in Petersen op. cit., pp. 26-45, at p. 39. 
See also J. Overbeek History of Population Theories 
Rotterdam 1974, pp. 44-48.
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65feature of the capitalist law of population. Malthus
undoubtedly shared some of the moral blindness of his time 
and class; and no doubt too he expressed himself at times 
with a deliberate anti-sentimentality that may well have 
contributed both to his fame and his notoriety. But to 
regard him as the arch-apologist of the most reactionary 
sections of the monied classes as Marx and Engels consistently 
did, is at least an oversimplification. And as was suggested 
earlier, and will be further explained later, it is an 
oversimplification, which, in subsequent and even more 
oversimplified and ossified forms, has had and continues to 
exert a momentous influence. ^
Malthus's great and enduring merit was to 
dramatically call attention to the fact that either in the 
short term, or in the long term, growth of population would, 
unless checked, outstrip any possible growth in the resources 
available to support that population. The Marxist reply to 
the alleged short-term danger varied from occasion to occasion.
65 See the passage from Capital reproduced in 
Meek op. cit., p. 98-99.
66 See the section headed "Ideology" in the chapter 
devoted to the Soviet Union. The traditional 
antagonism between Marxist and Malthusian 
approaches to population questions is a most 
regrettable historical millstone around humanity's 
neck, but one which has been and is very seldom 
regretted. For an interesting attempt to 
reconcile and conjoin the two, see H.E. Daly
"A Marxian-Malthusian View of Poverty and 
Development" Population Studies 1971 No. 1, 
p. 25.
5 4
At times it was emphasized that population did not grow 
geometrically ( Malthus had never said it did as a matter 
of empirical fact, merely that it would unless checked) and 
that Malthus had grossly overstated his case; at other times, 
that irrespective of how fast the population might be growing, 
productive capacity was growing faster, and that only the 
irrationalities of capitalist economic organization prevented 
this from being reflected in a steady growth of general 
well-being:
"But science increases at least as fast as
population;" wrote Engels "the latter increases in proportion
to the size of the previous generation, and science advances
in proportion to the body of knowledge passed down to it by
the previous generation, that is in the most normal
conditions it also grows in geometrical progression - and
6 7what is impossible for science?"
As to the long-term prospects of absolute or 
global overpopulation, Marx and Engels tended to be
Engels Outlines of a Critique of Political 
Economy, quoted in Meek, op. cit., p. 63.
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6 8insouciantly or even jocularly evasive. Their basic
concern, despite their utopian visions, was with the present. 
Observing the onward march of the industrial revolution (as 
they were in better position to do than Malthus had been), 
they had no doubts about the ability of productivity to win 
the population-production race within any meaningful time- 
span. Over-population was for them a non-problem. They 
did not want to be bothered about vague hypothetical 
situations which might not arise at all, or if so, only 
at some future time after they would both be dead and buried. 
At a stage when Kautsky was expressing the keenest concern 
about the impending problem of overpopulation, the most 
explicit comment that could be coaxed from either of the
68 Engels on one occasion declared roundly that
"we are forever secure from the fear of 
overpopulation" (op. cit., p. 62). On another 
occasion he referred to the inexhaustible 
regions fertilised by nature herself in South- 
Eastern Europe and Western America and commented 
"If all these regions have been ploughed up and 
after that a shortage sets in, then will be the 
time to say caveant consules". (letter to Lange, 
March 29, 1865, quoted in Meek, op. cit., p. 82).
In fact, of course, given the nature of 
demographic dynamism, it would by then be much 
too late to sound any alarms. One makes this 
somewhat humourlessly pedantic observation since 
it is a common lay illusion that demographic 
processes can be reversed by five minutes of 
thought and ten minutes of evasive action; an 
illusion that was evidently shared by Engels, and 
more importantly, by many more directly influential 
figures who claim to be his intellectual legatees. 
In his reply to Kautsky, quoted in the text below, 
Engels comments on an extrapolation of population 
growth by saying that it is of no greater worth 
than an estimate of the compound interest yielded 
by a kreutzer invested in the year 1 A.D., which 
by the 19th century would amount to the 
equivalent of a lump of silver larger than the 
earth. (Letter to Kautsky, February 1, 1881, 
quoted in Meek op. cit., p. 108) .
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founding fathers was this:
"There is of course the abstract possibility
that the number of people will become so great that limits
will have to be set to their increase. But if at some
stage communist society finds itself obliged to regulate the
production of human beings, just as it has already come to
regulate the production of things, it will be precisely this
society, and this society alone, which can carry this out
without difficulty. It does not seem to me that it would be
at all difficult in such a society to achieve by planning a
result which has already been produced spontaneously, without
planning, in France and Lower Austria. At any rate, it is for
the people in the communist society themselves to decide
whether, when, and how this is to be done, and what means
they wish to employ for the purpose. I do not feel called
upon to make proposals or give them advice about it. These
people, in any case, will surely not be any less intelligent
69than we are."
Elsewhere in this same letter, Engels refers to the massive 
growth of food production in America, remarks of the 
population there that it will take more than thirty years 
to double itself, and adds: "That doesn't scare me!" The 
whole tone of the letter is one of jocular and robust common 
sense self-consciously contrasted with the chimerical fears
69 Engels' letter to Kautsky of February 1, 1881, 
Meek, op. cit., p. 109.
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of nervous intellectuals. As Petersen observes, "By such 
a comment, Engels avoided having to discuss in any detail 
either the economic significance of population growth or
70the moral system of the socialist society he was advocating."
And in consequence, it might be added, contemporary Marxist
theorists and policy-makers have virtually no political,
economic or ethical guidelines within which to shape a
71specifically Socialist population policy.
Similar references to the untapped bounty of
the New World (and the Old) can be found elsewhere in the
72classic Marxist texts. It is evident that the contemporary
expansion of science and land-use both exerted a powerful 
impact on the founding fathers' minds - so powerful in fact 
that they seem to have experienced the greatest difficulty 
in conceiving of the earth's resources as in any sense finite. 
This extreme form of rationalist optimism was one of their
70 W, Petersen "Notes on the Socialist Position on 
Birth Control" in Petersen, op. cit., p. 90.
71 The Engels quotation has, however, been put to 
very good use by liberal Socialist demographic 
commentators who have been seeking to break 
down Stalinist orthodoxy on population growth*
72 Engels once cited a work which argued that Great 
Britain's agriculture could be developed to 
produce corn for 6 times its then population 
within a decade, and added, apparently from 
himself, that 30 million acres were lying waste, 
(in the Outlines of a Critique of Political 
Economy, reproduced in Meek, op. cit.,p. 58).
See also note 68 above.
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more sturdy legacies to Soviet Marxism.
Thus, briefly and colloquially, Marx and Engels
pooh-poohed the short-term population/production dilemma
(and in the days before population growth-rates of more
than two per cent per annum had really established themselves
may have been right to do so) and simply laughed off the
long-term one. In doing so, however, they showed only a
limited interest in demographic facts as such. To the
Malthusian theory of an eternal conflict between inherently
prolific reproduction and inherently less prolific production
they counterposed the historical materialist doctrine that
the laws of population growth depended on and derived from
74the nature of the socio-economic base, so that in 
successive historical epochs, quite different patterns might 
obtain. This allocation of demography to the superstructure, 
however, was not developed very much more than the 
conflicting theoretical strand which tended to identify 
population as in some sense belonging to the base. Marx
73 This boundless confidence about the possibilities 
of nature as harnessed by man survived virtually 
unscathed in the Soviet period until well into the 
1960s. As late as the Belgrade World Population 
Conference in 1965, some Soviet delegates were 
still making extravagant claims - as for example, 
that "our planet could provide the food fgr four 
million million people". For some instances of 
this kind of thinking, see Robert C. Cook "Soviet 
Population Theory from Marx to Kosygin" Population 
Bulletin XX111 (1967) No. 4, pp 91-2, 97-99.
74 The locus classicus on this point, much quoted and 
beloved by Socialist textbook writers, is "...every 
special historic mode of production has its own 
special laws of population, historically valid 
within its limits alone. An abstract law of 
population exists for plants and animals only, and 
only in so far as man has not interfered with them." 
from Das Kapital vol 1, in Meek op. cit., p.88.
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and Engels do not seem ever to have displayed any systematic 
interest in the overall demographic development of earlier 
periods, or indeed in macro-demographic statistics of any 
sort. Even a Communist commentator has felt it necessary 
to make this point. Ronald Meek, the compiler of a most 
valuable compendium of Marxist obiter dicta on population 
questions, having noted that Marx and Engels maintained 
that every stage of historical development has its own law 
of population, goes on to comment:
"It was not enough, of course, merely to assert 
this - it had to be proved (Meek's emphasis). Marx and 
Engels do not seem to have made any direct attempt to 
formulate the laws of population appropriate to earlier 
forms of class society; had they done so, they would 
probably have framed these laws in terms of the particular 
form of pressure of the direct producers against the "means 
of employment" which was generated by each of these types of 
society". ^
Meek here puts his finger on another crucial 
feature of the Marxist writings on population. Not only 
were they not sufficiently interested to gather information 
about the demography of pre-capitalist societies, their 
interest in capitalist population problems was not strictly 
a demographic one either. The Marxist "law of capitalist 
population", if such it can indeed be called, was essentially
75 R. Meek "Malthus - Yesterday and Today: An 
Introductory Essay" in Meek, op. cit., p. 26.
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a theory of employment under capitalism, a rider of the
theory of the declining share of variable capital. The law
says nothing about the actual movement of population as such
- births, deaths, marriages, etc. And the comments made
about these specifics by the masters en passant tend to be,
from the theoretical point of view, unsystematic and rather 
7 6elusive. While the theory of the reserve army of the
proletariat and the theory of growing immiseration (in some
at least of their formulations) might be taken as suggesting
that sooner or later population might be checked or indeed
decline, their view appears to have been that the solid
increase characteristic of the Western Europe and more
particularly the Anglo-Saxon world of their time would 
7 7continue. It is not altogether clear why they thought so.
Marx did note, along with many others, that the rich get
richer and the poor get children, and even formulated the
principle that "not only the number of births and deaths,
but the absolute size of the families stand in inverse
7 8proportion to the height of wages". But he does not
appear to have made any systematic attempt to explain why 
this should be so, beyond suggesting that it reflected the 
greater employability of minors and the high mortality of 
labourers exhausted by their brutal exploitation, which in
76 See the passages from Das Kapital, translated 
in Meek op. cit., p. 85-105.
77 For a discussion of this point, see Petersen 
op. cit., p. 84.
Das Kapital vol 1, transl. in Meek, op. cit., 
p. 100.
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combination created a social need for "rapid renewal of
the generations of labourers", a need which the labourers
obligingly met by marrying early. Early marriage, it is
suggested, represents an attempt by the working classes "to
conform to these circumstances", i.e. their own relatively
high mortality. It is not clear whether Marx is here
implying some kind of drive for species survival by the
working classes or rather asserting that early marriage,
"a necessary consequence of the conditions in which the
79labourers of modern industry live" stems quite independently
from the sociological patterns of working class life, the
drunkenness and sexual excesses so vividly described by Engels
8 0in his The Condition of the Working Class. The fragments
of a theory that we find here are ingenious and suggestive.
But apart from the obvious objection from hindsight (that 
class differentials in fertility and mortality alike have 
since flattened out without capitalism collapsing), it is 
also less than clear what is meant to be cause and what effect. 
Do the working classes reproduce to meet the requirements of 
the law of diminishing profits as Marx seems at times to be 
suggesting? If so, is it just an accident that their life 
patterns tend to favour the kind of reproduction that the 
capitalists require? Or are the requirements of the latter 
an independent causative factor? If so, in what relation to
79 Ibid., p. 99.
80 Engels The Condition of the Working Class in 
England in Marx and Engels on Britain Moscow 
FLPH 1953, pp. 159 & ff. , 181 '& ff.
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one another do the two (or more than two) causative factors 
stand? 81
The fact is that the Marxist theory of population
was never more than a sketch for a theory of population; and
a sketch in which few of the elements were truly demographic.
But what Marx and Engels did say was sufficient to establish
a strong and surprisingly durable prejudice within the German
Social Democratic tradition against Malthusianism or anything
8 2that might ever be taken or mistaken for it. The view
that Malthus was a scoundrel and a fraud to attribute all 
the ills of capitalism to population growth (itself an 
oversimplification) somewhere merged into the view that 
population growth in itself was a good thing and proletarian, 
and efforts to restrain it wrong and bourgeois or petty- 
bourgeois. Lenin seems to have absorbed this strand of the 
German Marxist tradition in its more virulent form ( a point 
to which we shall recur a little later). Apart from that,
81 This is the kind of embarrassment of riches which
teleological, historicist theories tend to fall 
into. On the one hand, the onward march of 
history or its agents requires something to happen, 
and therefore it happens; and on the other hand 
there are good positivist, factological reasons 
why that something should be so, which may indeed, 
be quite sturdy enough to maintain the full weight 
of causal explanation without any assistance from 
the historicist theory. And if the two levels of 
explanation seem in ill accord, the historicist 
is left saying a little lamely that History some­
times moves in mysterious ways its wonders to 
perform.
Petersen op. cit., pp. 91 & ff.82
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he does not appear to have added very much to Marxist
8 3teachings on population, Socialist commentators notwithstanding. 
His principal writings on demographic matters are actually 
concerned with the Russian social structure of his time and 
migration, particularly internal migration. As this is not 
relevant to the central natalist concerns of this thesis, 
there is no point in discussing his contribution any further 
in the present context.
(ii) Marxism and Demographically-relevant Social 
Issues.
As has already been noted more than once, the 
list of social phenomena that might be regarded as 
demographically relevant is virtually endless. For present 
purposes, however, the discussion shall be limited to a few 
summary observations on three somewhat untidily overlapping 
topics: the institution of the family; the rights and role
of women in socialist society; and the question of fertility 
control and the means to its achievement.
The classical Marxist writings on the place of 
the family in the socialist society of the future are
83 W. Przelaskowski "Problematyka demograficzna
w pracach W. Lenina" Studia Demograficzne No. 24 
(1970) pp. 3-31. This is a purely exegetical 
essay, which in fact concentrates on Lenin's 
writings on the social structure of pre­
revolutionary Russia. Many demographers might 
feel there was virtually no demographic content 
in the article at all - merely a few pedestrian 
details of economic and social statistics. For 
a vain struggle to find something to say about 
Lenin's contribution to demographic theory (a 
struggle sustained over several pages), see D.I. 
Valentei (ed.) Marksistsko-leninskaia teoriia 
narodonaseleniia 2nd edition Moscow 1974, pp. 5
& ff.
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ambiguous on certain key issues. Engels, the main contributor
to the classical opus on this subject, was whether for personal,
intellectual or other reasons, most ambivalent about marriage
as an institution. His disdain for bourgeois marriage and
his interest in primitive women-sharing arrangements seem
at times to suggest that he might have gladly consigned
marriage to the category of impermanent superstructural 
84phenomena. At other times, he betrays a romantic not to
say ingenuous enthusiasm for the joyous potentialities of
marriage if and when it were to be stripped of economic
calculation and based on what he called individual sexual 
8 5love. On the whole, however, he leaned definitely towards
radical revision of the institution. In particular he 
foresaw the disappearance of the indissolubility of marriage 
ties. "If only marriages that are based on love are moral, 
then also, only those are moral in which love continues. The 
duration of the urge of individual sex love differs very much 
according to the individual, particularly among men; and a 
definite cessation of affection, or its displacement by a 
new passionate love, makes separation a blessing for both 
parties as well as for society. People will only be spared 
the experience of wading through the useless mire of divorce 
proceedings." ^
Another feature of traditional marriage which
Engels The Origin7 p. 71 & ff. 
Ibid. , p. 123 & ff.
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86 Ibid., p. 134.
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8 7Engels felt sure would vanish was patriarchal male dominance.
In the family, wrote Engels, the husband is the bourgeois,
while the wife represents the proletariat. Whereas once
"in the old communistic household" the woman's economic role
had been a public one, with the advent of monogamy and the
emergence of the family as an economic unit, her work ceased
to be the concern of the society: "The wife became the first
domestic servant, pushed out of participation in social 
8 8production." While the diversification of the economy and
employment opportunities brought by industrialization 
presented her with some opportunity for economic independence, 
this independence could only be seized by her if she were 
prepared to neglect her family duties. The solution to this 
dilemma lies in the recommunalization of the family as an 
economic and social unit:
"Private housekeeping is transformed into a
social industry. The care and education of the children
becomes a public matter. Society takes care of all children
equally, irrespective of whether they are born in wedlock or 
8 9not." The precise extent of the communalization of the
87 But compare the somewhat different view he took 
earlier of situations in which the wife went out 
to work and the husband was reduced to the 
humiliating role of performing the housework.
"Can anyone imagine a more insane state of things 
than that described in this letter? And yet this 
condition, which unsexes the man and takes from 
the woman all womanliness without being able to 
bestow upon the man true womanliness, or woman 
true manliness - this condition which degrades, 
in the. most shameful way, both sexes, and through 
them, Humanity, is the last result of our much- 
praised civilization..." Engels The Condition of
the Working Class in Marx and Engels on Britain, p.179.
88 Engels The Origin , p. 119.
89 Ibid., p. 123.
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family as a social unit, however, was something that Engels 
left unclear. As if in trepidation before the changes he 
seemed to be endorsing, he chose at this point to add his 
celebrated excursus on the emergence of the higher value of 
individual sexual love, which he saw as being the basis of 
sexual, if not progenitive relations in the society of the 
future. What patterns might be expected to emerge from the 
application of these principles can only be a matter for 
conjecture. Would lovers live with one another, and if so, 
would their children live with them, and if so, to what age? 
Would all household functions be taken over by society, and 
if so who would perform them? If any disputes did emerge in 
the sphere of sexual or family relations, on what basis 
would they be resolved? Engels conceded that all that could 
be safely conjectured at that stage were improvements of a 
negative kind, then asked:
"But what will be added? That will be settled 
after a new generation has grown up ... Once such people 
appear they will not care a rap about what we today think
90they should do. They will establish their own practice..."
These were in the event prophetic words, perhaps 
the most prophetic of all Engels's comments on the family, 
if Soviet developments are to be taken as any test of their 
validity. For while the writings of the two founding fathers
90 Ibid., p. 135. It will be noticed that here, as
with the population question, Engels is eager to 
avoid commitment. One might be forgiven for 
suspecting that in both cases the difficulty of 
the social and moral questions raised was part of 
the reason why he was so reluctant to offer even 
a speculative view of how they might be solved.
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were somewhat ambivalent, it is clear that their basic 
orientation was towards radical change. And this indeed was 
the path that Soviet policy-makers took at the outset. That 
they later retreated from this path cannot, however, be simply 
categorized as Thermidorian betrayal. For not only did Marx 
and Engels themselves shrink before condemning the institution 
of marriage outright; Lenin also spoke on the issue. And 
while it is not clear that his views directly affected the 
course of policy on these issues, they were sufficiently 
unequivocal for us to assume that they may have had some 
restraining force during his lifetime; and they were quite 
certainly very influential after his death.
91It is probably true to say (as Geiger does) 
that Lenin was not greatly interested in problems of family 
policy. Indeed this must have been true^ since the libertarian 
strand in Bolshevik policy during the first 15 years or so 
(which was later to be identified as the left-wing deviation 
on family matters) could scarcely have endured had Lenin 
regarded the issue as of first importance. He was certainly 
in favour of liberation of the woman within the family and 
her absorption into economic activity; and he certainly 
recognized that to this end far-reaching communalization of 
domestic labour would be necessary. But he was most impatient 
about any attempts to introduce radical new sexual notions 
into party policy. While he did pay lip-service to the
91 Geiger op. cit., p. 43.
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traditional Engelsian doctrine on the subject, it seems 
fairly clear that he regarded the whole question as being 
one that should be rated as of marginal importance; and in 
so far as it was not, he seems tacitly to have felt 
classical doctrines to be rather an embarrassment. In 
non-public discussions with some of the sexual radicals 
among the female members of the Bolshevik movement, he 
made his impatience and his essentially conservative 
approach to these questions clear.
92In two letters to Inessa Armand, he 
characterized "women's demand for free love"as a 
bourgeois demand; indicated that he understood this slogan 
as at best excluding any question that there might be such 
a right as freedom from childbirth and freedom to commit 
adultery; and suggested that she ought to contrast the 
base and vile marriage without love of the bourgeois not 
with any fleeting poetic passions, but rather with "a 
proletarian civilian marriage with love". The line ought, 
in any case, to be subordinated to the political needs of 
the moment.
In his celebrated conversation with Klara Zetkin
some five years later, by which time he had become the
92 V.I. Lenin Polnoe sobranie sochinenii vol. 49 
Moscow 1964, pp. 51-52 and 54-57.
93 Klara Zetkin Reminiscences of Lenin London 1929, 
excerpted in Women and Communism Lawrence and 
Wishart, London 1950. Though Lenin's remarks to 
Zetkin have acquired a good deal of posthumous 
fame, it needs of course to be borne in mind that 
neither they nor any similar airing of his views 
were published during his lifetime.
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leader of a successful but still beleaguered revolution, this
same approach was spelt out even more clearly. He deplored
the interest shown by women comrades (and indeed the public
in general) in sexual matters, dismissed Freudianism as
typical of the kind of fashionable theory that "flourishes
94luxuriantly in the dirty soil of bourgeois society",
admitted that the Russian youth movement was equally
preoccupied with sexual matters and that he himself had been
accused of philistinism in his attitude toward them, but made
clear nonetheless that if this was modernity, he wanted none
of it. Zetkin reports him as saying that "nothing could be
more false than to preach monkish asceticism," then a
moment later as characterizing himself as "Nothing but a
9 5gloomy ascetic". Kollontai's celebrated doctrine of the
glass of water he rejects with the equally celebrated 
rejoinder that no normal person in normal circumstances will 
"lie down in the gutter and drink out of a puddle, or out 
of a glass with a rim greasy from many lips." Then he says:
"Drinking water is, of course, an individual 
affair. But in love two lives are concerned and a third, a 
new life arises. It is that which gives it its social 
interest..." ^
Having again protested that he has no intention 
of preaching asceticism, Lenin goes on in scoutmasterly
94 Women and Communism
95 Ibid., p. 96.
96 Ibid., p. 97.
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fashion to recommend healthy sport and bodily exercises as
a substitute for sexual excesses. All energy should be
concentrated on the revolution. The revolution cannot
tolerate orgiastic conditions. "Dissoluteness in sexual
life is bourgeois, is a phenomenon of decay. The proletariat
is a rising class. It doesn't need intoxication as a narcotic
or a stimulus. Intoxication as little by sexual exaggeration
9 7as by alcohol."
Lenin's views on divorce were very much what one
would expect. He did on one occasion assert that "one
cannot be a democrat and a socialist without immediately
demanding full freedom of divorce, for the absence of such
freedom is an additional burden on the oppressed sex, woman";
however, he went on at once to add that "the recognition of
the right of women to leave their husbands is not an
invitation to all wives to do so!" ^  One is therefore led
to wonder what might have been Lenin's reaction in a situation
in which the "freedom" of divorce was seemingly being regarded
as an invitation to divorce; a situation in which more and
more young people were "reeling and staggering from one love
9 9affair to the next", to the detriment of their revolutionary 
obligations.
While most of Lenin's observations on sex and the
97 Ibid., p. 98.
98 V.I. Lenin "0 karikature 
sobranie sochinenii vol.
na marksizm" Polnoe 
30 Moscow 1962 p. 125
99 Women and Communism p. 97.
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family were made in a context of intense political struggle^
to the dictates of which many other matters had to be
temporarily subordinated, it seems doubtful that he would
have had any stomach for free love or any version of it
even in more placid times. He seems indeed to have been
the kind of person who feels uneasy when the subject of
sex is raised. It is not necessary to agree with any of
the more extravagant psychohistorical speculations that
have been hazarded about his personal make-up to conclude that here
he represented a view well to the right of the overall trend
of party policy and thinking at this time. And if this
discussion of his views has given them greater weight than
his own estimate of them or his contemporary influence on
the course of social policy might appear to warrant, this
has been done consciously, and for two reasons; firstly, to
indicate that in sexual and family matters the Marxist-Leninist
tradition, if not the Marxist one, had a definitely
conservative as well as a radical face; and secondly,
because it would appear that his views were typical
of the kind of thinking that was subsequently to become
party orthodoxy in the High Stalinist phase of Soviet family
and population policy.
Having briefly glanced at the views of the 
pioneers of Marxism-Leninism on women and the family in general 
terms, it remains to say a few words about their attitudes 
towards the most demographically-relevant question of all, 
namely fertility control and the means to its achievement.
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While their attitude to Malthus and his views 
on overpopulation might suggest that Marx and Engels 
regarded birth control as unnecessary if not positively 
undesirable, it would seem that in actual fact they 
adopted a neutral position. Despite the fact that the 
neo-Malthusians were already very active (particularly in 
England) in the last decade of Marx's life (the celebrated 
Besant-Bradlaugh affair took place in 1876-77), neither 
Marx nor Engels seem to have ever explicitly commented on 
the movement. Similarly, they appear to have
maintained a discreet, Victorian silence on the technical 
aspects of the problem. Lenin's sparse observations 
accordingly represent the only scriptural authority on the 
subject. As was noted earlier, whatever the provenance of 
the anti-neo-Malthusianism of the German Social-Democratic
100 W. Petersen "Notes on the Socialist Position on 
Birth Control" in Petersen op.cit., p. 90.
101 On first principles, of course, it seems quite 
inconceivable that Marx and Engels could have 
ever opposed the distribution of contraceptive 
devices (as some of their modern followers have 
done). Presumably Engels' reference to the 
"spontaneous" decline in fertility in France and 
Lower Austria (see note 69, above), despite the 
unfortunate use of the term "without planning"
(by which, it is clear from the context, Engels 
meant "without planning by the state"), can be 
taken to indicate that he had no objection to any 
methods that might have been used to achieve such 
a state of affairs.
As Petersen has pointed out, it is rather 
surprising, given Malthus's moral rejection of 
contraceptive practices, that the birth-control 
movement should ever have been identified with his 
name. The term neo-Malthusianism is in that sense 
a misnomer. But while some birth control advocates 
were in fact Malthusians in their social doctrines, 
there is no reason in logic why the use of 
contraceptive devices should necessarily be linked 
with Malthusian attitudes.
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movement, it appears to have been something which Lenin
accepted without question and injected into the Russian
tradition. The classic text here is Lenin's article "The
10 2Working Class and Neo-Malthusianism". In it, Lenin
makes a forceful assault on those who would justify 
legalized abortion in terms of preventing the suffering 
of the future offspring. The point he makes in the 
article is not so much the Marxian one that this kind of 
argument puts the blame for social evils on the wrong 
shoulders, but rather that this represents a miserable and 
petty-bourgeois pessimism which Lenin contrasts with the 
life-affirming vigour of the proletariat:
"...why not have children so that they may 
fight better ... than we against the living conditions 
which are deforming and destroying our generation. ... We 
are already laying the foundations of the new building and 
our children will finish its construction."
Having thus justified rapid demographic growth 
among the proletariat in terms of the heroic tasks awaiting 
them, Lenin goes on to say:
"That is why - and that is the only reason - we 
are unconditional enemies of neo-Malthusianism, which is a 
trend proper to the petty-bourgeois couple, hardened and 
egotistical ...
102 Published in Pravda June 16, 1913. V.I. Lenin
Polnoe sobranie sochinenii vol. 23 Moscow 1961, 
p. 255-57. The quotations in the text follow 
the translation contained in Women and Communism 
pp. 81-2. (The semantic content of the original 
has been checked).
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"It stands to reason that such an approach does 
not in any way prevent us from demanding the unconditional 
repeal of all laws persecuting abortion or laws against the 
distribution of medical works on contraceptive measures and 
so on. Such laws are simply the hypocrisy of the ruling 
classes. These laws do not cure the ills of capitalism but 
simply turn them into especially malignant and cruel diseases 
for the oppressed masses.
"The freedom of medical propaganda and the 
protection of the elementary democratic rights of men and 
women citizens is one matter. Quite another is the social 
doctrine of neo-Malthusianism."
While Lenin shows himself in this article to
10 3have been conscious of a distinction between the
practice oj: advocacy of birth control and the theory that 
excess births are the root cause of all working-class misery; 
or, to paraphrase, between what he at one point calls 
"neo-Malthusianism (artificial measures to prevent conception)" 
and at another "reactionary and impoverished'social neo- 
Malthusianism' ", the distinction seems to be in constant
danger of disappearing. Small wonder that the literal-minded 
neophytes of later years failed to perceive any distinction
103. Cf. note 101 above.
104 "Most speakers ... raised the question of
so-called Neo-Malthusianism (artificial measures 
seeking to prevent conception), and in the 
process touched on the social aspect of the 
matter as well." "It would be hard to find a 
more graphic illustration of the reactionariness 
and impoverishment of 'social Neo-Malthusianism' ". 
Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, p. 255, 256, (author's 
translation).
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whatever. People should be allowed the right to birth- 
control by various means, up to and including abortion 
(though Lenin made clear that he regarded a high incidence 
of abortion as a very bad thing); and this right should 
certainly be made available to the working classes, since 
the existing laws turn the already serious ills of 
capitalism into "especially malignant and cruel diseases".
At the same time, Lenin enjoins the working classes not to 
make use of any such right, but rather to multiply and go 
forth to the construction of a new society, and leave 
birth control to the moribund classes. Given this strange 
and somewhat contradictory combination of attitudes, it is 
difficult to say what policy measures Lenin might have felt 
necessary were he to have survived at the helm of the Soviet 
state to the 1930s, when abortions in Moscow were outrunning 
live births by three to one. My own inclination is toward 
the belief that other things being equal he would have sided 
with the conservatives on population and related social- 
policy issues. And were he to have felt that the 
circumstances amounted to an emergency situation, it is 
all the more likely that he would have done so. As with 
divorce, there is just a hint that Lenin's approach to the 
problem is basically instrumentalist, that is to say that 
he was more concerned with what the party line should be 
from the point of view of his general political goals than 
the inherent rights and wrongs of the particular issue at 
hand: "It stands to reason that such an approach does not
in any way prevent us from demanding ..." If Stalinism was 
indeed Leninism-when-the-chips-are-down writ large (and 
indelible), it could be argued that the subsequent development
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of Soviet family and population policy represented a 
retreat from Engels, and presumably from Marx also; but 
not from Lenin.
1. d. Population and Soviet Social Policy
In this section I shall present a schematic
outline of the course of Soviet social policy in areas of
direct demographic relevance from the time of the
105Revolution up to the mid-nineteen-fifties, then 
attempt to assess its significance from the point of view 
of numerical or quantitative population policy. Policies 
on population matters throughout the bloc were broadly 
uniform up to about 1956, and it is for this reason that 
one can regard everything done to that time in the USSR as 
forming in some sense part of a common tradition, of 
influence both in the USSR and elsewhere in the Socialist 
world.
Despite Lenin's relative conservatism on family 
policy, the period before and just after his death saw the pass­
age of some of the most far-reaching if not the most far-reaching 
reform legislation that has ever been passed anywhere on these 
matters. This legislation seems all the more remarkable when it
105 For a recent Soviet exposition of the evolution
of social policy in this general area, with 
citations of original legal sources, etc., see 
A.M. Beliakova and E.M. Vorozheikin Sovetskoe 
semeinoe pravo Moscow 1974 Ch. 3,
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is borne in mind that Russian pre-revolutionary laws on 
family and related matters had been strongly conservative. 
Within weeks of the October Revolution, ecclesiastical 
control over civil status had been withdrawn, and within 
a year, a new codified family law was introduced providing 
for rigorous equality between the partners to a marriage, 
including the right to seek divorce.
At the same time, the status of illegitimate
10 6children was greatly improved. In 1920, abortion was
legalized and the medical profession apparently enjoined to
10 7perform the operation for anyone wanting it. In 1926,
a new Family Code was enacted for the RSFSR which among other 
things accorded de facto relationships equal rights with 
legally registered marriages, and made divorce dependent
106 For a description of this legislation, see 
Beliakova & Vorozheikin op.cit.,pp. 63, & ff.
107 The law did not amount to an expression of 
enthusiastic support for the practice of abortion 
however. The preamble to the decree described 
abortion repeatedly as an evil. For an English 
text, see R. Schlesinger The Family in the USSR 
London 1949, p.44. For comment on the decree and 
a description of its subsequent implementation, 
see Mark G. Field "The Re-Legalization of Abortion 
in Soviet Russia" New England Journal of Medicine 
vol. 255 No. 9, pp. 421 & ff.
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108simply upon one or other party registering a desire for it.
During this same period there were many other measures taken
and statements made which clearly indicated an official
determination to radically alter the institution of marriage
and the family if not positively to abolish it. Thus bigamy,
adultery and even incest ceased to be crimes, familial rights
10 9of inheritance were restricted, efforts were made to
encourage women to enter into economic and political life on 
an equal footing with men, communal household services were 
established, and in the Komsomol and elsewhere, an ethos 
was allowed to develop, in which it became acceptable if 
not actually praiseworthy to do all one could to overturn 
the old norms of sexual and family life. Geiger has 
summarized the situation as follows:
"In the first decade or so after the Revolution 
it was rather generally though vaguely agreed that the
108 The most radical aspects of this legislation
were not extended to the Central Asian 
republics: Schlesinger op.cit., p. 349. For 
a text of the Code, see Ibid., pp. 154-168.
See on these points V. Gsovski "Family and 
Inheritance in Soviet Law" The Russian Review 
vo1. 7 (1947) p. 71.
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family was not worth much as an institution and would 
eventually disappear. "
While Geiger's formulation may perhaps err slightly on the 
side of overstatement, broadly speaking it does capture the 
trend of official thinking, at least in the early years 
after the Revolution. Kollontai, the radical feminist 
associated with the so-called "glass of water" theory, has 
since been retrospectively identified as belonging to a left- 
wing deviation on this question also. Nonetheless, both she 
and another of Lenin's erstwhile adversaries on family policy, 
Inessa Armand, occupied for a time the position of secretary 
of the Women's Department of the Central Committee. And
Kollontai may well have continued in that position beyond 
1920 had she not incurred the party leadership's displeasure 
by her left-wing activities on other and more crucial issues.
But though in terms of legislation, 1926 marks 
the high water-mark of radicalism, already by the mid-twenties, 
voices of caution and even downright dismay were beginning to
110 Geiger op.cit., p. 43.
111 Cf. the entries for Armand and Kollontai in 
Sovetskaia Istoricheskaia Entsiklopediia vol 1, 
Moscow 1961, p. 739 and vol. 7, Moscow 1965,
____________________r> qn 9
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make themselves heard. The 1926 legislation itself was
passed against considerable if not very politically weighty
opposition from speakers representing what might be
schematically described as traditional views and rural and
112feminine interests. But even before that, well-known
party and state leaders had made attacks on certain
consequences of the reforms, notably the alleged spread
113of abortions and sexual indulgence.
As the 'twenties wore on, there was a tendency 
for more conservative views to gain in official favour and 
currency. Thus in 1923, Lunarcharskii was defending the 
sphere of private relations not only from state 
interference, but also even from pressure of public opinion; 
and in 1927, the same Lunacharskii was deploring sexual 
inconstancy and urging greater attention be paid to "that 
which until the present has been called private life".
112 See the lively discussion of the Code that 
took place in the RSFSR Central Executive 
Committee, in Schlesinger op.cit., pp. 81-153.
113 The critics included Trotskii, Bukharin and 
the Minister for Health, Semashko. See E.H. 
Carr Socialism in One Country vol. 1, London 
1958, pp. 31-34.
See Geiger op.cit., p. 61, 62, 68.114
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Then, coinciding with the full blooming of Stalin's personal
dictatorship in the mid-thirties (and presumably, therefore,
in some measure reflecting his personal approach to these
matters), there came a complete reorientation of official
policy. After an extensive press campaign lasting for about
two years, during which lax morals in sexual and family
relations were pilloried in fairly traditional terms, legal
innovations began to reflect the new approach. A 1934 law
held parents responsible for their delinquent children. Then
in 1935-6, legal fees were introduced for divorce to underline
the official disapproval of marital instability. In 1936,
115abortion was made illegal, penalties for non-payment
of alimony were increased, various forms of state aid to 
mothers were introduced or expanded, and a large program of 
creche, kindergarten and maternity ward construction was 
foreshadowed. In 1941, a tax was introduced on the earnings
115 Significantly, no move was made contemporaneously
to increase the availability of contraceptive 
devices, the distribution of which has never in 
fact received more than qualified official 
approval. See, for example, David and Vera 
Mace The Soviet Family London 1964, p. 224;
W. Petersen "The Evolution of Soviet Family 
Policy" in Petersen op. cit., p. 106; H.P.
David "Abortion and Family Planning in the 
Soviet Union: Public Policies and Private 
Behaviour" Journal of Biosocial Science vol. 6 
(1974) at p. 424-5.
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116of single people and married couples without children.
And in 1944 there was further legislation substantially
extending family allowances and similar benefits, introducing
a string of honorific titles for fecund mothers, rendering
divorce much more difficult and costly to obtain, increasing
the taxes imposed on childless adults, and withdrawing the
legal recognition of quasi-conjugal rights formerly accorded
117to de facto wives and single mothers.
Concurrently with these legislative developments 
there occurred a marked shift in the overall propaganda 
approach towards sex and family matters. The Bohemian 
experimentalism of the early post-revolutionary years was 
totally expunged and the Victorian decorum so attractive to 
many Western clergymen took its place. Sex became a taboo 
subject, and premarital or extramarital breaches of
118.traditional monogamous morality were now frowned upon.
116 J. Dreijmanis "The Soviet Pro-Natalist Policy" 
Population Review 1972, p. 20.
117 For an English text of the 1944 Family Law, see 
Schlesinger op. cit., p. 367.
118 The new approach found very clear reflection in 
Soviet literary production. See Vera S. Dunham 
"Sex in the Soviet Union" The Russian Review vol 
10 (1951), pp. 199-209; Louise E. Luke "Marxian 
Woman; Soviet Variants" in Ernest J. Simmons 
Through the Glass of Soviet Literature New York 
1961, p. 27.
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The simple family virtues were much extolled; children 
were exhorted to respect their parents, while the latter 
were entrusted in large measure with the ideological as 
well as the material welfare of their offspring. Though 
women were not encouraged to abandon their jobs for the 
home (a development which neither they themselves nor the 
state could afford), traditional sex roles within the family 
were by and large reasserted. The purpose of marriage was
declared to be the creation of a "strong, many-childrened
119family", unmarred by the "obscenity" of bourgeois
120divorce; a family which was at once loyal to itself and
loyal to the state. Sexual licence of any kind was a sign
119 The phrase is that of the prominent Soviet 
expert on family matters, G.M. Sverdlov, quoted 
in A. Inkeles Social Change in Soviet Russia 
Cambridge Mass., 1968, p. 217.
120 S. Wolffson "Socialism and the Family" Pod 
znamenem marksizma 1936, tr. in Schlesinger 
op.cit.,p. 302. Wolffson had once been a 
radical on family policy. The article cited was
a desperate attempt by him to erase his own life's 
work. "Assertions that socialism leads to the 
extinction of the family," he now wrote "are 
profoundly mistaken and harmful...The family 
does not become extinct under socialism: it 
grows stronger." Then in a footnote, he added:
"In my book, The Sociology of Marriage and the 
Family, published in 1929, the entirely 
erroneous thesis is developed that socialism 
entails the extinction of the family. Considering 
these ideas harmful I have completely disowned 
them". Ibid., p. 315.
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of bourgeois corruption. Insofar as such phenomena continued
to exist in the Soviet Union, they were survivals of the
121capitalist past. In a word, the "revolutionary
sublimation" of Zalkind and the benevolent parental despotism
122of Makarenko had become received - and mandatory - orthodoxy.
The 1944 legislation was probably the climactic
point in the Stalinist policy of restabilizing the family, at
least from the point of view of its demographic objectives.
In 1947, the generous family allowances of 1944 were halved,
123and not thereafter increased. In other respects however,
121 "The roots of any looseness of sex relations 
must consequently be sought in the existence 
of survivals of capitalism in family life, in 
the tenacity of the old bourgeois attitude to 
women..." V. Svetlov "Socialist Society and the 
Family" Pod Znamenem Marksizma 1936, tr. in 
Schlesinger op.cit., p. 343.
122 On Zalkind and Makarenko and their contribution 
to the new ideological approach to the family, 
see Geiger op.cit., pp. 84 & ff.
123 H.P. David estimates that for families having
a fifth child while the fourth was still eligible 
for monthly payments,the total family allowance 
in 1944 amounted to 51% of the average annual 
wage, only 19% in 1948, and 12% in 1964. David 
Abortion and Family Planning, p. 50. Leedy
has calculated that the average recipient of 
family allowances (i.e. the average mother of 4 
or more children) was by 1969 receiving a sum 
equivalent to less than 10% of the average wage 
or salary in the socialized sector of the economy. 
F. Leedy "Demographic Trends in the USSR" in US 
Congress Joint Economic Committee Soviet Economic 
Prospects for the Seventies Washington 1973, p. 
464.
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existing policies were maintained. In 1949, all remaining
legal rights and duties arising from de facto marriage were
annulled; and divorce was made a good deal harder to obtain
by an authoritative Supreme Court interpretation of the law
which directed lower courts in effect to be much less lenient
124than they had been prior to that date.
Soon after Stalin's death, however, the authoritarian
structure of his family legislation began to crumble. In early
1954, there was a public attack on the discriminatory aspects
of the 1944 legislation whereby men were granted impunity from
125paternity and support suits. Later in the same year,
126certain exemptions to the tax on the childless were introduced,
women were exonerated from criminal responsibility for abortions
127performed upon them, and simultaneously a groundswell of more
general criticism of the 1944 provisions on divorce and
128paternity began. Then in 1955, abortion was abruptly
124 Dreijmanis op. cit., p. 21.
125 P. Juviler "Family Reforms on the Road to 
Communism" in Morton and Juviler op.git.,p. 33.
Dreijmanis loc. cit.
Field op. cit., p. 426.
126
127
128 Juviler op. cit., p. 36.
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relegalized without prior public discussion or any accompanying
129official comment. In 1956, the public debate on the Family
Code blossomed into forthright criticism of many of its aspects 
by a number of well-known Soviet figures. After a number of 
vicissitudes, the divorce reformers were finally triumphant, 
partially in 1965, and more substantially, though not completely, 
in 1968. 130
During this post-Stalinist phase, a good deal of the 
earlier ideological ballast surrounding the family was 
jettisoned: there was less talk of the holiness and purity of 
Soviet marriage, rather less rigorous prudishness and 
repressiveness about matters relating to sex, a greater 
emphasis on women's rights and correspondingly lesser degree
129 Field loc. cit♦
130 Juviler characterized the 1965 divorce edict as
a "stopgap". See his discussion of the 1965 reforms 
in Morton and Juviler op. cit., pp. 52-3. For an 
assessment of the 1968 Code from the standpoint of 
a Western feminist, see B. Januar "Women and Soviet 
Politics" in H. Morton and R. T#k£s Soviet Politics 
and Society in the 1970's New York 1974, pp. 134-5. 
Soviet legislators seem particularly reluctant to 
remove the financial disincentives to divorce. A 
tax of from 50 to 200 rubles is still imposed on 
the parties after a court hearing, and of 50 rubles 
after a ZAGS (registry office) hearing. E.M. 
Vorozheikin Brak i sem'ia v SSSR Moscow 1973 p. 18, 
19-20.
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of tolerance of the old patriarchalism and double standards. 
Sound family life and concomitant values continued to be 
favoured, but without the politically-tinged fanaticism of 
the later Stalinist period.
At this point it will be appropriate to break 
off this sketch outline of the main historical trends in 
Soviet family and population policy, and to make some 
attempt at assessing the significance of those trends in 
terms of our central natalist point of reference.
The reforms introduced in the early years of 
Soviet rule represented the implementation of a platform 
that might have been realized by a number of other radical 
movements, not necessarily Communist or even Marxist, had 
they only succeeded in conquering state power as the Bolsheviks 
did. The thrust of the legislation was towards increasing the 
civil rights of the oppressed minorities of patriarchal class 
society, and in some measure, towards deliberately weakening 
the family as an institution. It seems clear that no 
populationist considerations of any kind entered into the
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initial reckoning. The legalization of abortion and the
tolerance extended to family planning activities (at a
time when they were illegal in most of Europe) were certainly
not intended to restrict population growth. Indeed in a
certain sense, they appear to have been policies adopted
without any very great inner conviction or commitment.
Abortion was legalized in response to what was described as
an epidemic emergency, and was never greatly encouraged
thereafter. And observers seem to be agreed that the use
131of contraceptives was never actively fostered either.
If, however, natalist considerations were not 
prominent at the outset, they seem definitely to have 
become so subsequently, most probably in the early 1930s,as fall­
ing birth-rates and the demographic consequences of the 
Collectivization began to penetrate the official consciousness.
Reference was made earlier to the difficulty that 
is often experienced in disentangling demographic from social
131 Cf. notes 107 and 115 above.
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considerations in the analysis of motives underlying
particular policies. There is probably a universal tendency
for governments to downplay any quantitative as opposed to
qualitative demographic ambitions they may have. Be that as
it may, it is certainly true that the Soviet authorities have
often been less than fully explicit about their populationist
motives. There is a good deal of evidence to support the
view that these were a major influence, if not the major
influence on several of the key policy decisions taken or
not taken in the 1930s and afterwards. In relation to the
1936 and 1944 legislation, Juviler cites several official
statements in support of the view that, as he says, these
edicts "marked an extension of Stalin's social engineering
for a strong family, and, especially, for a higher birth 
132rate". But much of Soviet comment on these issues has
tended to be evasive, preferring to stress that the main 
concern of the Soviet state is to care for the interests of
132 Juviler op. cit. , p. 32.
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its citizens. The family planning expert, Dr. Abraham Stone,
has said that whenever he asked Soviet officials to explain
the reasons for this or that shift in abortion policy, the
reply was always the same irrespective of the direction of
133the shift: "For the benefit of our Soviet women". Wolffson,
the erstwhile liberal on family matters explained in an article 
published in 1936 that the birth-rate was rising in the USSR, 
but in virtually the same breath justified the prohibition 
of abortion on the grounds that this practice had been 
"depriving the country of its posterity". Another
commentator on the 1936 legislation, Svetlov, referred to an 
alleged rise in the Soviet birth-rate (itself a falsehood or 
at best, a distortion),arguing that this was a clear sign 
that abortion had come to be felt to be unnecessary under
135Soviet conditions, and accordingly could be safely abolished. 
Juviler also cites a number of instances of reluctance on the 
part of those debating family law reform in the'fifties and
133 D. & V. Mace op. cit.,p. 224. The Maces are 
charitable enough to be inclined to accept this 
versatile explanation.
134 Schlesinger op. cit., p. 310-11.
135 Schlesinger op. cit., p. 330-31, 338.
'sixties to refer to natalist considerations in public,
though these were evidently very prominent in discussion
136behind the scenes and between the lines.
Both the 1936 and 1944 parcels of measures were
introduced after dramatic and simultaneous declines in
137natality and increases in mortality. It would be naive
in the extreme to regard this circumstance as accidental.
Given the great brutality of the measures that were being
taken against the population contemporaneously, and given
the relatively low priority social welfare enjoyed under 
138Stalin's rule it would again be naive in the extreme to
accept the official Soviet claim that the principle purposes 
of that legislation were humanitarian. Western commentators 
have usually inferred that the population issue was paramount.
136 Juviler op. cit., pp. 48-52.
137 Cf. David M. Heer "The Demographic Transition" 
Journal of Social History 1 (1967) p. 210-11.
138 For an account of the evolution of family 
welfare legislation and activities in the Soviet 
Union, see Bernice Q. Madison Social Welfare in 
the Soviet Union Stanford 1968, Chs. 3-5. On 
the humanism of Stalinist family welfare policy, 
see also note 142 below.
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Significantly, this was the view taken by the well-informed 
Western Communist observer, Rudolph Schlesinger, who, in 
introducing his collection of documents on Soviet family 
policy declared his overall approach to the subject in the 
following terms:
"We shall concentrate most of our attention upon 
the original issue, the emancipation of women and the over­
coming of the traditional institutional framework which 
prevents that emancipation, and on the modifications of
the attitude taken on this issue in connection with the
139growing preponderance of the population question."
While the population factor does indeed appear 
to have been paramount, it should be emphasized that other 
important issues and problems were involved. The radical 
family legislation of the 1920s had evoked considerable 
discontent among wide segments of the population which had 
not (and indeed have not yet) accepted the new sexual morality 
which most of the original Bolsheviks advocated. If that
139 R. Schlesinger Introduction to op. cit.,p. 7 
(emphasis added).
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morality were not "bourgeois" in the doctrinaire sense
apparently intended by Lenin, it was certainly urban and
non-proletarian, inasmuch that workers and peasants usually
either rejected it (especially if they were female) or
140naively abused it. And among those that abused it,
there was wide-spread recourse to rationalization in terms 
of traditional male double standards. Their perception of 
the new freedoms was that these were the old illicit 
freedoms now sanctioned by official approval. Their 
misinterpretation was naturally widely resented by victims 
and deplored by moralists; and not only by those still under 
the influence of the church. Nor was abuse of the new laws 
confined to men, and resentment confined to women. Many
women took advantage of the new and generous provisions for
♦
alimony to father their children on the nearest and best-off 
males with whom they could claim to have been in some fleeting 
union. Moreover, there had been in the early years, a marked
See, for example, the Central Executive Committee 
discussion of 1926 referred to earlier, in 
Schlesinger op. cit., pp. 81-153; and Geiger 
op. cit.,Chaps. 3 & 4.
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tendency for the authorities to distrust the family as an 
institution and to seek to set children against their parents. 
This "Morozovism" was no doubt universally resented by the 
adult population, irrespective of sex. Thus as Stalin's 
plans for gigantic destruction and reconstruction developed 
in the 1930s, together with the massive resentments they 
must have unleashed, he may well have deemed it discreet to 
adopt a policy which would tend to diminish discontent in 
areas of life less relevant to his main economic and political 
purposes.
But more important than that was the need to 
bring stability to the basic social unit of society. If it 
were not to be or could not be reconstructed along with 
everything else, it was better to strengthen it and make 
of it a prop for the regime, the moreso as it was now unlikely 
that the family would nurture opposition to the new order in 
quite the same degree as it was believed to have done just 
after the Revolution. As things stood, the loosened family
ties were bringing the authorities nothing but trouble. Already
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in the twenties, there were numerous social problems that 
were the direct result of, or had been severely aggravated 
by the new legislation. An article published in 1926 
referred to the courts as being "buried under alimony cases". 
War, the abolition of the institution of adoption and the 
spread of evanescent liaisons were producing armies of 
besprizornikif or vagrant children. The public facilities
like canteens, laundries, orphanages and daily child-care
141 Quoted in Geiger op. cit., p. 56.
142 Krupskaia reported in 1923 that there were 
seven million children on the official register 
of the homeless. The institutions entrusted 
with caring for these children had, at their 
peak in 1922, an accommodation capacity of 
600,000. (Madison op. cit., p. 39, 41). 
Improvements were claimed in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, but given the public and 
private chaos of the period, this seems scarcely 
credible. In any case, qualitatively, if not 
quantitatively, the problem evidently became a 
critical one again by the early 1930s, leading 
to the decree of 1935 rendering children of 12 
years of age and older criminally responsible
in full degree and subject to all measures of 
punishment. (For the text of the decree, 
see James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera Materials 
for the Study of the Soviet System Ann Arbor 1953, 
pp. 219-20) Rauch comments on the results of this 
decree in the following way: "Some landed up in 
prisons and camps, and the rest were accommodated 
in reformatory colonies. From the age of twelve 
on children could also be condemned to capital 
punishment. Die ’Besprizornye' verschwanden damit 
aus der Öffentlichkeit." G. von Rauch Geschichte 
der Sowjetunion Stuttgart 1969, p. 267.
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institutions that were supposed to be making the old-style 
family economy obsolete were in fact hopelessly inadequate 
in numbers and quality; and their oft-projected massive 
expansion was for the foreseeable future economically 
unfeasible, particularly given the magnitude of the tasks 
accorded priority by the leadership. Easy divorce
encouraged irresponsibility not only towards one's family 
but also towards one's work: the husband skipping about 
the country to avoid his obligations towards his family 
or families was obviously a less reliable and conscientious 
worker than one tied to one spot, and with mouths other than 
his own to feed from the proceeds of his struggle with the 
norms. The best guarantee of a disciplined and reasonably 
healthy labour force was to have a sound family structure 
in which both parents and children would find social 
security and strong motivation to endeavour.
Thus the restabilization of the family served
143 Geiger op. cit., pp. 57-60 contains an account
of some of the shortcomings of the domestic 
services sector of that period.
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important objectives of social and economic policy as well 
as purely demographic policy in the narrower, numerical 
sense. But the protestations of some Soviet sources 
notwithstanding, it was probably the latter element that 
was decisive.
It may be helpful now to make some brief 
assessment of the overall significance of the Soviet 
population policy tradition. It might appear at first 
sight that it has now described a more or less complete 
circle from radically liberal beginnings through a phase of 
Victorian conservatism back to something more akin to the 
starting point, where society is left to order its sexual 
and family life with only a modest degree of state regulation. 
This appearance may yet prove to have been illusory. The 
official mood of the 'fifties and 'sixties on these matters 
has nothing of the ideological strain of social laissez- 
faire-ism of the early years of the revolution. At a time 
when official and unofficial attitudes on sex and the family
are undergoing extensive liberalization throughout the world,
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the trends in Soviet official opinion represent something 
less than an avalanche. The most recent reforms to family 
law were introduced after a long hard struggle against 
tough opposition. The attitude towards contraception remains 
cautious and unenthusiastic. Abortion has been relegalized, 
but the official view of it has always tended to be that it 
is basically a regrettable and temporary necessity. For the 
rest, official policy on sexual matters remains conservative. 
The chances of a reversion to the Stalinist approach seem to 
be diminishing, but slowly and not very surely. One wonders 
whether the slender element of principled liberalism within 
it might not again be eclipsed some day by raison d'etat.
This having been said, it remains true that 
since the demise of Morozovism, sexual and family relations 
have always represented an important pocket of autonomy 
within the Soviet system. And after Stalin's death, the 
reintroduction of "Leninist norms" into the relevant area of 
social legislation has resulted in the significant further 
expansion of that area of autonomy. Rigby speaks of "an
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acknowledged personal-family-domestic sphere, to which the
system concedes a major influence over such societally
144important matters as quantitative and qualitative changes
in the population, child-rearing, personal consumption and
14 5leisure activities." In the light of the far-reaching
claims made on the individual at the height of the Stalinist
period, the truly noteworthy thing is perhaps that these
claims were not extended to complete control of human
reproduction (as they were, for instance in the otherwise
less totalitarian or mono-organizational - to use Rigby's
146term - Nazi Germany); that the claims that actually were
144 Though the problems of eugenic controls and 
genetic engineering will not be systematically 
discussed in this thesis, their inherent 
importance and their relevance to any consideration 
of what Driver calls the "philosophy" of population 
policy are obviously great. See the Note on 
Eugenics below, p. 101.
145 T.H. Rigby "Stalinism and the Mono-organizational 
Society" typescript 1975, p. 12. For an interesting 
literary reflection of wariness on the part of 
Soviet women about the prospect of state intervention 
in procreatory matters, see Natalia Baranskaia 
"Nedelia kak nedelia" Novy Mir 1969 No. 11, esp.
pp. 25 & ff.
146 On the population policy of the Third Reich, see 
for example, H.P. Bleuel: Sex and Society in Nazi 
Germany Philadelphia 1973, Ch. 5, and passim;
Richard Grunberger A Social History of the Third 
Reich Penguin 1974, Chaps. 15-17 and passim; David 
V. Glass Population Policies and Movements in Europe 
London 1967 Chap. 6, (for domestic policy in the 
period before 1939); and Robert L. Koehl RKFDV:
German Resettlement and Population Policy 1939-1945 
Cambridge Mass. 1957 (for the colonial and genocidal 
aspects of the later phase).
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made at the height of the Stalinist phase have since been 
withdrawn, or at least have become markedly less obtrusive; 
and that both in the tradition of Marxist-Leninist theory and 
the practice of the Soviet state, there is strong authority 
with which this sphere of personal autonomy can be defended.
101.
A Note on Eugenics in the USSR
Contrary to the beliefs of many who tend to identify 
totalitarianism automatically with bold biological experi­
mentation and regimentation in the manner of Brave New World 
and 1984 , the successive Soviet leaderships have never shown 
any inclination to accept any form of eugenic doctrine or 
practice. As in the case of numerical population
controls, Kautsky, the one-time Social Darwinist, seems to 
have been the only prominent Marxist theorist to have devoted 
much thought to the subject. In the early years of the 
Soviet regime (about the first decade or so), a qualified 
tolerance was granted to various schools of eugenic theor­
izing, and both a Russian Eugenics Society and a Russian 
Eugenics Journal existed, as well as a bureau within the 
USSR Academy of Sciences'*". However the movement was burden­
ed with tactlessly and naively elitist advocates who made 
its inherent drawbacks (in the context of the anti-elitist
and anti-biologizing traditions of Bolshevism) even more 
2crippling . For a time the eugenists seemed to enjoy the 
qualified support of the first Soviet Commissar for Health,
1 For an excellent short account of the rise and 
fall of Soviet eugenics in the 1920s and 1930s, 
see David Joravsky The Lysenko Affair Cambridge 
Mass. 1970, pp. 253-270.
2 Russian eugenists were particularly prone to the 
Eastern European assumption that the worth of any 
nation is concentrated in its intelligentsia.
One prominent eugenist even attributed the presence 
of positive genetic endowment among the lower orders 
to the fact that men like Pushkin and Tolstoy were 
known to have fathered illegitimate children on 
peasant girls. Joravsky op. cit., pp. 259-60.
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Semashko, but by the end of the 1920s it was evident that 
the movement had little future in the Soviet Union. Then in 
the 1930s, the spread of Lysenkoism and the negative example 
of Nazi experiments with sterilization, euthanasia and so on 
completed the work of discrediting all eugenic thinking in 
the eyes of official Soviet ideologists. Thus in a Societ 
encyclopaedia published in 1943, we find eugenics defined as 
a "pseudo-scientific direction in biology" of which "the most 
repulsive form" is racist theory. Eugenists are accused of 
trying to prove the lesser worth of the proletariat with a 
view to justifying their exploitation. Soviet scholars, we
3are told, conduct a determined struggle with such ideas .
In the Cold War phase, there was a marked tendency for 
eugenics and Malthusianism to be tossed together into the
4same polemical bag (though in reality, however surprisingly, 
there had never been much more than tangential contact 
between the two movements). One of the advantages of this 
approach was that it became possible to establish a direct link bet 
een the crimes of Nazism generally and the legislation on 
eugenic sterilization and marriage restriction passed in 
many states of the U.S.A. In fact, whatever the evils of 
that legislation, it had never embraced euthanasia, nor
3 Kratkaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia Moscow 
1943 '‘Evgenika"
4 See, for example V.M. Romanenko "Bor'ba L.I. 
Mechnikova protiv mal'tuzianstva, sotsial- 
darvinizma i rasizma" (The Struggle of L.I. 
Mechnikov against Malthusianism, Social- 
Darwinism and Racism) Voprosy Filosofii 1956 
No. 5, p. 100.
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explicitly sanctioned racism. From the date of passage of the 
first state legislation on sterilization in 1907 up to the year 
1958, fewer sterilizations had been performed in the United
5States than in Germany in the one year of 1935 . Apart from the 
factor of polemical convenience, it seems likely that the post­
war Soviet attacks on Malthusian and other sterilizers were a 
quite genuine response not only to Nazi atrocities in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe, but also to an apprehension as to what 
might be the results were the confident reforming ardour of left- 
wing Western biologists like H.J. Müller coupled with the arb- 
itrary might of the Stalinist state . It is indeed a daunting
5 M.H. Haller Eugenics New Brunswick 1963, p. 141,
180. On the social and moral history of eugenics
in the U.S., see also D.K. Pickens Eugenics and the 
Progressives Nashville 1968; and K. Ludmerer 
Genetics and American Society Baltimore 1972.
6 Müller's ardour seems to have only been slightly dampened by his stay in the Soviet Union in the 1930s 
(where one might have expected proximity to the awe­
some power of the Soviet police machine to finally 
tu*rn him against genetic engineering, even if the argu­
ments of Lysenkoism ascendant could not). See his 
"Genetic Progress by Voluntarily Conducted Germinal 
Choice" in Gordon Wolstenholme (ed.) Man and his Future 
London 1963 pp. 247-262. Despite the commitment to 
free choice enshrined in the title of the paper, there 
are several signs in it of the old root-and-branch 
utopian. "Man as a whole must rise to become worthy of 
his own best achievements." (p. 255) "Most eugenists 
of the old school believed they could educate the pop­
ulation so as to lead the better endowed to have larger 
than average families and the poorly endowed to have 
smaller ones. However, people are notoriously unreal­
istic in assessing themselves and their spouses." (256) 
Müller concludes by looking forward to bold new experi­
ments by artificial insemination, semen banks, storage 
of eggs and clonal reproduction. Müller's contribution 
was viewed with scepticism by some other participants in 
this particular conference. P.B. Medawar and M. Klein 
drew attention to the fact that he was now proposing 
rather different donors than he had once done. Klein 
recalled that he had in an earlier work asked rhetoric­
ally what woman would not be eager and proud to have in 
her womb a product of Lenin or Darwin (p. 280) On the 
subject of Soviet apprehensions about state interference 
in the private sex lives of citizens, compare footnote 145, above, and footnote 159 to Chapter 3.
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thought. The defective ideological heredity of eugenics (so 
to speak) might not have been sufficient in itself to perm­
anently preclude adoption of strong eugenic measures by the 
Soviet government. And had the Nazis restricted their eugenic 
fantasies to domestic policy and not extended them to justify 
their behaviour in occupied territories, Soviet abhorrence 
might never have become so great for imitation to be fore­
stalled. Other aspects of Stalin's population policy, notably 
the glorification of prolific mothers and the wholesale award 
of state decorations for their exploits, seem to reflect a 
German influence. In general, Stalin seems to have felt at 
times a good deal of disinterested admiration for the Hitler 
rdgime.
This being so, it is perhaps the more significant
and a cause for considerable relief that no version of eugenics
ever gained any official support or even toleration in the
7Stalinist period . Also, perhaps, that the rehabilitation 
accorded to various fields of social and biological science 
in the post-Stalinist period has been extended to eugenics 
only partially and with the greatest reserve. An attempt by 
a Soviet developmental biologist to present genetic engineer­
ing as something which capitalism would inevitably give rise
7 The article "evgenika" in Entsiklopedicheskii
Slovar1 (B.A . Vvedenskii editor-in-chief) published 
in the last year of Stalin's reign (1953) contains 
denunciations which are only marginally less 
emphatic than those in the wartime source cited 
above in note 3.
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to and which by implication should therefore be given prior 
attention in the Soviet Union was condemned by a commentator
Q
as "elitist" . The present official view of these things 
seems to be the very understandable one that they are best 
shelved. As a word and concept, however, eugenics has been 
accorded a partial rehabilitation, particularly since the 
fall of Lysenko in 1964 and the revival in the study of 
genetics that ensued. A 1967 textbook on genetics contains 
a small section entitled "The Significance of Eugenics", in 
which an attempt is made to clear eugenics of its earlier 
racist associations:
"Certain cardinal errors were committed in the
study of eugenics and the very term itself became
discredited. We, however, regard it as essential
that this branch of science should have its rights
restored to it, its pseudo-scientific trappings
9having been stripped from it."
Having said that the task of eugenics is to study 
ways of relieving mankind of unfavourable hereditary charact­
eristics, Lobashev continues:
"Since experiments to multiply man are impossible, 
it becomes necessary to seek other ways of controlling 
human evolution."^
8 See V. Zorza "Spectre of a Genetic 'Arms Race'" 
Guardian Weekly December 13, 1969, p. 6.
9 M.E. Lobashev Genetika Leningrad 1967, p. 716. 
This work is described on the fly-leaf as an 
approved text-book.
10 Ibid., p . 717.
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The possible measures which he then enumerates are 
mild enough and not elaborated in very great detail. Emphasis 
is placed on the importance of social control and forced 
selection (nasil'stvennyi podbor) is again rejected.
The E volume of the third edition of the Bol1shaia 
Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia which appeared in 1972 contains an 
entry on eugenics quite unlike similar lexical entries for 
decades past. It adopts basically the same approach as the 
genetics textbook quoted above; and indeed the author of 
that textbook is one of the article's signatories. Eugenics 
is again distinguished from the reactionary theories with 
which it had been identified in the past, though it is con­
ceded that even the term itself remains controversial. The 
question of possible ways of improving the human race by 
deliberate intervention is also said to be one on which there 
exist various points of view (and here, as before, there is 
an apparent implication that these differences also exist 
within the Soviet Union itself). The distinction is drawn 
between preventive measures (the only instances of which 
that are mentioned being consanguinity limitations on 
marriage and pre-marital medical consultations) and positive 
measures which seek to increase the numbers of people with 
superior attributes by various forms of selective breeding 
like artificial insemination, semen banks, etc. These, says 
the article, are "as a rule regarded as a matter for the 
future" (obrashcheny v budushchee), and comments:
"These kinds of methods of improving the human race 
have often been criticized and have not been recognized
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or disseminated."^^
Again the implication is that resistance to them is 
continuing in the Soviet Union and that their possible 
application is not imminent. Thus in summary, what appears 
to have happened is that with the revival of genetics in the 
Soviet Union, some limited degree of rehabilitation has been 
accorded to eugenics as well, which for the present, however, 
falls short of conceding to it any important influence on the 
making of social policies.
In the last two or three years, there have been
quite a number of articles in the Soviet periodical press
deling with ethico-biological problems. Most of them have
appeared in Voprosy Filosofii, whose editor-in-chief, I.T.
12Frolov, a ''resolute opponent of Lysenko", has a particular
interest in the philosophy of science, and has done a good
deal to popularize various contemporary issues like world
trends in population, resources, pollution, etc., most of
13which had been greatly neglected in the USSR.
11 Bol1shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia Moscow 1972 
"Evgenika" p~! 1739-40.
12 The description is that of A. Partashnikov "Soviet 
philosophy of biology today" Studies in Soviet 
Thought vol. 14 (1974) p. 3.
13 See the round table discussions: "Chelovek i sreda
evo obitaniia" Voprosy Filosofii 1972, no. 11 and 
197 3, no. 1; "Sotsial'no-f ilosof skie problemy
demografii" Voprosy Filosofii 1974, nos. 9 & 11, and 
1975, no. 1; and also Frolov's own two-part article 
on the social implications of genetic advances 
"Perspektivy cheloveka" Voprosy Filosofii 1975, nos. 
7 & 8, where other works on the same theme published 
by Frolov's journal are cited. Of these, see in 
particular the articles by Turbin 1974, no. 2 and 
1975, no. 1; Timakov and Bochkov 1973, no. 6; and 
Dubinin 1973, no. 4.
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Basically, this discussion has reaffirmed the 
traditional Soviet view that eugenics is a harmful and 
reactionary doctrine. As Frolov wrote:
"It is clear, however, that Marxists cannot accept 
the notion of neo-eugenics even in its "ennobled" form. 
And not only because it has compromised itself in the 
past. The Marxist-Leninist doctrines on man and the 
paths of his development have no need of any such 
'supplement* ."^ "4
Frolov indicates that among other reasons for the 
rejection of eugenics, the fact that it endangers such human 
values as "love, parental feelings, etc." occupies a promin­
ent position. While he does conceive that medical genetics
15opens up the possibility, that in the "distant future", 
some real opportunity may emerge for man to improve his 
biological nature, he seems glad that this is not a practical 
proposition for the time being.
The discussion in Soviet journals was to some extent 
evoked by the events surrounding the XIII International 
Genetics Congress held at Berkeley in 1973, before and during 
which some of the participants sought to draw public attention 
to the dangers which current biological research raises and 
the problems of achieving international control over such
14 Frolov "Perspektivy cheloveka" Voprosy Filosofii
1975, no. 7, p. 94.
15 Ibid., p. 95.
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research to reduce the risks of its misuse for aggressive
16political or criminal purposes. The attitude of the Soviet 
scholars seems to betray some concern about this prospect, 
and it is, of course, highly probable that intimately many 
of them wonder whether their own government can be trusted 
with the full potential of the new knowledge. While there 
are traces in what they say of a desire to form some kind of 
solidary links with their overseas colleagues to further the 
cause of international controls, the effects of their 
ideological knee-jerks on a Western reader are rather dis­
concerting. Thus Turbin, the leader of the Soviet delegation 
to the Berkeley Congress writes that the achievements of 
molecular science, while opening up possibilities for great 
positive advances, also contain the danger that they might 
be used
"only for increasing the wealth and power of a few 
representatives of the exploitative ruling class, 
and that simply for malevolent, criminal purposes. 
Everything depends on in whose hands the power and
16 For a recent review of the problems of political
misuse of genetic research, see F. Ausubel, J.
Beckwith and K. Janssen "The Politics of Genetic 
Engineering: Who decides who's defective"
Psychology Today June 1974, pp. 30-42. The authors 
draw attention to the fact that there has been some­
thing of a resurgence of radical eugenic thinking in 
the last 10 or 15 years after its temporary eclipse 
following on public exposure of Nazi crimes. The 
article concentrates on developments in America, which 
is perhaps not unnatural given that the authors and 
the journal are all American, and given the vigorous 
and somewhat dubious traditions of American eugenics. 
However, it is perhaps characteristic of contemporary 
American social dissent that the problems of controlling 
abuse in authoritarian states are not discussed, but 
merely mentioned in passing as though no such states yet 
existed, (p. 30).
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17material resources are to be found."
Frolov declares, even more explicitly, that:
"... these abuses may continue for as long as 
we live in a politico-economic system which depends 
on a small number of people, who exploit the rest of 
the population and surrounding environment in the 
interests of their own maximum comfort. Only with 
the destruction of capitalist ideology can we hope 
for the creation of a society in which every human 
being will be equally valued and receive his fair 
share of all benefits."^
And:
"In socialism, where social (obshchestvennyi) 
control over scientific experiments, including 
genetic experiments, is genuinely ensured in various 
forms - both by the state and by society (obshchestvennost1), 
the study of human genetic problems is advancing on a broad 
front, [i.e.] the study of medical genetics, with as its 
objective the curing and preventing of hereditary dis­
eases. The network of genetic consultation clinics is 
being expanded, and experiments in genetic engineering 
are being conducted, with a view naturally to their 
possible application to man. Here, however, the aims 
of the research and means of its realization are pro-
17 I. Turbin "Geneticheskaia inzheneriia: real 'nost1,
perspektivy i opaseniia" Voprosy Filosofii 1975 
no. 1, p. 47.
18 Frolov "Perspektivy cheloveka" Voprosy Filosofii 
1975 no. 8, p. 136.
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foundly humanist in their nature, and subordinated to
the higher purpose of socialism, to its main social
objective, the well-being of mankind and his free and
19multi-faceted development."
Even making allowance for the exigencies of public
2 0discussion in the Soviet Union, remarks like these scarcely 
augur well for international controls in this new potential 
Armageddon battle-field.
19 Ibid., p. 137.
20 There are frequent moments of ambiguity in Soviet 
writings on these matters. Thus Frolov, for example, 
writes that "Many scholars believe that on the basis 
of published work one can already conclude that there 
have been an enormous number of violations of socio- 
ethical norms in experimentation on human beings.
How many such instances remain unknown, since many 
such experiments are not reported in the press?"(Voprosy Filosofii 1975 no. 7, p. 87). Turbin 
comments on an article by the Soviet scholars Baev 
and Engelhardt that the information they present 
about proposals for a moratorium on certain types
of genetic experiments "evoked significant interest 
in the problem among broad circles of Soviet society 
(obshchestvennost1)". These proposals, it should be 
said, emanated from the West, in particular the 
United States, and were not directed specifically 
towards the USSR. Turbin then goes on to say that the 
purpose of his article is to "attract the attention of 
Soviet philosophers, particularly specialists in the 
field of ethics, towards the discussion of the very 
pressing and by no means easy socio-ethical problems 
associated with genetic engineering". (Voprosy Filosofii 
1975 no. 1, p. 47-8) Timakov and Bochkov, while also 
making the assertion that the problems involved can only 
be solved in the most advanced social systems (peredovoi 
obshchestvennyi stroi), conclude their article with the 
following grim caveat: "It is well-known that catastrophes 
can be brought about by primitive interference with the 
environment; but an even greater catastrophe could be 
unleashed if unjustified activities are carried out on 
human heredity". "Social responsibility", they say 
"requires of every scientist that he should constantly 
strive to preserve man's heredity and struggle decisively 
against any ignorant attempts at interference with it."
And in this context, the recurring phrases about social­
ism's innate superiority are missing. (Voprosy Filosofii 
1973 no. 6, p. 64, 69).
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CHAPTER 2
POPULATION TRENDS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE1
2.a The Soviet Union before 1945
The Soviet Union is a vast country of great 
ethno-cultural, and hence, demographic diversity, which its
1 For more detailed general discussions of demographic
developments in the Soviet Union and East Europe, see, 
for example: F. Lorimer, The Population of the Soviet
Union (Geneva, 1946); J.N. Biraben, 'Essai sur 
1'evolution demographique de l'U.R.S.S.' in Population 
XIII (June, 1958), p.29; W. Petersen, Population 
2nd ed. (New York, 1969), pp.630 & ff; David M. Heer, 
'The Demographic Transition in the Soviet Union' in 
Journal of Social History I (1967), p.193; Milbank 
Memorial Fund, Population Trends in Eastern Europe,
USSR and Mainland China (New York, 1960) ; Paul F.
Myers, 'Demographic Trends in Eastern Europe', in US 
Congress Joint Economic Committee, Economic Developments 
in Countries of Eastern Europe (Washington, 1970) ;
'La population des pays socialistes Europeens' in 
Population XXI (1966), p.939; F.A. Leedy, 'Demographic 
Trends in the USSR1, in US Congress Joint Economic 
Committee, Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies 
(Washington, 1973); J. Berent, 'Causes of Fertility 
Decline in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* in 
Population Studies XXIV (1970), p.35 (part I) and 
p.247 (part II); H.P. David, Abortion and Family 
Planning in the Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe 
(Washington, 1970); 'Determinants of Labour Supply 
in Europe 1950-80' in United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe (UNECE), The European Economy in 1968 (New 
York, 1969), pp.182-216; L. Kosinski, 'Migration of 
Population in East-Central Europe 1939-1955* in 
Canadian Slavonic Papers XI (1969), p.359; V. Srb,
* Obyvatelstvo <*eskoslovenska v letech 1918-68', 
in Demografie X (1968), no.4, p.289; Razvitak 
stanovni^tva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu (Belgrade, 
1974) (for World Population Conference, Bucharest,
1974); K. Dziewonski and L. Kosinski, Rozwoj i (cont.)
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political uniformism has not eliminated, but rather, if
2anything, enhanced. It is also a country which has seen 
more demographic disturbances and disasters in this century 
than almost any other in the world. These two circumstances 
make generalization difficult. But the overall figures 
for the USSR, though they are misleading as regards the 
non-European peoples, do nonetheless give some picture of 
the developments that have taken place in the numerically 
dominant European populations.
Just before World War I, both birth and death 
rates in Russia were very high, oscillating around 46 and 
28 per thousand respectively, and having been at even 
higher levels only a decade or so earlier. In recent 
years, these same two measures for the USSR as a whole 
have been hovering around 17 and 8 per thousand. Imperfect 
as they are statistically, these figures speak for themselves. 
East Slav fertility was undoubtedly higher than was known 
anywhere in Western Europe. Now, it ranks among the lowest 
in West or East Europe. A good deal of this decline had 
already occurred by the outbreak of World War II, though
1 (cont.) rozmieszczenie ludnosci Polski w XX wieku. vol.I
(Warsaw, 1967); E. Rosset, Demografia Polski, 2 vols,
(Warsaw, 1975); J. Sveton and Z. Vavra, Reprodukcia 
obyvatel1 2stva £eskoslovenska po druhej svetovej vojne 
(Bratislava, 1965); A. Maryanski, Problemy ludnosciowe 
kraj6w socjalistycznych (Warsaw, 1974). See also the 
respective demographic journals of Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary.and Yugoslavia: Studia Demograficzne (Warsaw),
Demografie (Prague), Demografia (Budapest) and 
Stanovnistva (Belgrade).
2 The gap between the vital rates prevailing in different 
parts of the Soviet Union has increased in recent decades.
Rapid centrally-directed modernization has had the effect, 
broadly speaking, of greatly lowering birth rates in the 
European areas and greatly lowering the death rates in the 
Asian areas. The centralization of social policy-making,
in turn, has been an obstacle to the adoption of differentiated 
population policies which might have counteracted these trends.
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this was to some extent masked by the temporary fertility
revival achieved by the restoration of restrictive abortion
legislation in 1936. The birth and death rates per thousand
for 1935, the only ones available for the years just
preceding the policy change, were 28.6 and 16.3. Fertility
appears to have been declining in this period faster than
mortality, so that before the pro-natalist measures of 1936,
natural increase must have been diminishing. Far more
important than fertility trends, however, were the effects
of the World Wars, the Civil War, the Collectivization
campaign and famine and the Great Purge. No even approximate
figures are of course, available, but statistical inferences
suggest staggering total losses, particularly if allowance
is made for temporary declines in birth rates. Petersen
has estimated the total population deficit 'correct to the
3nearest 10 million' at 80 million. Even if we assume
that half of the 'non-births' and extraordinary infant
mortality he includes in his total were later effectively
'replaced' (which is very unlikely), and that his lower
4margin of error is the correct one, we are left with 
losses amounting to substantially more than the present 
population of Great Britain, and equivalent to about one- 
half the number of Russians at present living in the USSR. 
Though certain of the nationalities suffered particularly 
heavily from aberrant Stalinist policies, it would probably 
be safe to assume that a disproportionately high percentage
3 See Petersen, op.cit., pp.660-64.
4 The estimate of Michael Roof, another leading expert
on Soviet demography (for the period 1913-59 and including 
net emigration) is '70 to 80 million'. See Robert C.
Cook, 'Soviet Population Theory from Marx to Kosygin' 
in Population Bulletin XXIII, no.4 (October 1967), p.93.
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of the total came if not from the Russian, then at least 
from the European population.
2.b Eastern Europe before 1945
It is customary to emphasize the social, cultural 
and economic diversity of the East European countries when 
lumping them together for political analysis. The usual 
warning is no less apposite in the demographic context.
Before World War II, the Czech lands and the region now 
known as East Germany were, demographically as in many 
other respects, similar to the countries of Northern and 
North-Western Europe, with low birth and death rates, and 
relatively small natural increase. Hungary occupied 
intermediate positions while Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, 
at least at the outset of the inter-war period, had only 
just embarked on the process of demographic transition from 
high to low birth and death rates. By the end of the 
inter-war period, however, they too had changed considerably, 
with crude birth rates below 30 per thousand, and in the 
case of Bulgaria, nearer 20 per thousand. Yugoslavia 
then, as now, encompassed virtually the entire range of 
demographic phenomena observed throughout the area, whilst 
Albania appears to have been following a pattern of high 
fertility and relatively high mortality, with natural 
increase substantially less than it has since become.
The economic effects of the Great Depression 
(which were felt longer and more sharply in the area than 
in Western Europe) accelerated the secular trend towards 
fertility decline, and by 1938, natural increase rates were 
everywhere (Albania excepted) of the order of 1% per annum 
or less, a modest enough rate, though roughly twice the 
average for the countries of Northern and Western Europe 
at that same time.
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The War produced enormous loss of life and touched
off major migratory movements in Eastern Europe. Civilian
losses amounted to four times the European average (even
5excluding the murder of the Jews). With some notable 
exceptions (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary), birth 
rates also declined during the war years. The immediate 
post-war migrations also tended, in general, to involve 
net population losses. The peace negotiations resulted 
in considerable territorial revisions. It is impossible 
to recapitulate even the broad outlines of these developments 
here.k Perhaps their most important feature was to greatly 
increase the national homogeneity of the countries of the 
region, which before the war had with few exceptions been 
plagued by apparently insoluble ethno-political problems.
Until recently, observers of the area were sometimes apt 
to think that the combination of mass migration and centralist 
policies and controls had gone a long way towards solving 
these problems. More recently it has been forced on our 
attention that this may not be the case. And as shall be 
indicated elsewhere, current demographic trends are not, 
in general, conducive to their solution.
2.c Population trends in the USSR and East Europe since 
the War
I Fertility and natural increase
As elsewhere in Europe, the post-war years saw 
birth rates in general higher than those prevailing in the 
1930s. In Poland, which had suffered the greatest losses
5 See Paul F. Myers, op.cit., p.71.
6 For a discussion, see Kosinski, op.cit.
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in total population of any country in the region, there
was a spectacular baby-boom which persisted for a full
decade before subsiding. In the Soviet Union too, the
drastic post-war shortage of young males was more than
7compensated for by extremely high male fertility.
By the mid-fifties, however, this wave had all 
but exhausted itself, and the secular trend towards fertility 
decline apparent throughout the area before the war had set 
in again. This trend seemed to be sharply accelerated by 
the liberalized abortion legislation introduced first in 
the Soviet Union, in 1955, and adopted by almost all the 
other Warsaw Pact countries - Bulgaria characteristically 
leading the way - before the end of 1957. East Germany, 
in catastrophic demographic plight owing to the heavy 
outmigration of young men via West Berlin, did not liberalize 
its abortion arrangements till 1972 (by which time many of 
its neighbours were reverting to restrictive regulations). 
Presumably thanks in some measure to this, its age-specific 
fertility rates remained steady and for a time even improved 
slightly. Yugoslavia liberalized its abortion laws decisive!/g
in 1960. Albania, stubbornly independent in all things, 
did not alter its legislation; and it too - though probably 
not mainly for this reason - has maintained very high and 
stable fertility levels almost to the present.
7 See J.W. Brackett, 'Demographic Trends and Population 
Policy in the Soviet Union', in US Congress Joint 
Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet Economic 
Power (Washington, 1962), pp.529-30.
8 David, op.cit., p.232.
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The areas occupied by Moslem peoples in the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia apart, a spectacular slump in birth
rates now ensued, matched in the opposite direction by
burgeoning abortion rates. The prevalence of abortion
differed substantially from country to country, but the
upward trend till well into the sixties at least was
9everywhere the same. Hungary had and has the highest 
recorded abortion rate, which for some years was 
running well in excess of its birth rate. In Rumania and 
the Soviet Union, though no adequate statistics have been 
published, the rates must be (in the case of Rumania must 
have been)'*'0 very much higher. Elsewhere abortion rates 
were more moderate, but the same tendency towards increase 
in its incidence and the same decline in fertility were 
apparent.
By the mid-sixties, the Socialist countries were 
starting to break world records for low birth and natural 
increase rates. Hungary recorded an average of 13 births 
per thousand population over the years 1962-65, and in 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Rumania, crude 
rates also fell below 15 per thousand in at least one year.
More recently, the Soviet Union has been saved from indignities 
of the kind only by the fecundity of its ethnic minorities. 
Similarly low natality has been confidently predicted for 
Poland by many of its demographic experts for the not too 
distant future. And comparable rates have for some time 
now been a common-place in the relatively more developed 
republics of Yugoslavia.
9 Ibid., p.20.
10 The Rumanian government greatly restricted their 
abortion legislation in 1966.
Since the introduction of more restricted indications 
for legal abortion in 1974, Hungary's abortion rate 
appears to have fallen below its birth rate.
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To some extent the declining crude birth rates 
reflected reductions in the proportion of women in the 
main fertile age-groups (as the relatively depleted cohorts 
of the depression period of the thirties and in some countries 
of the war years entered the child bearing age-groups 
And as age-structures began to improve in the late 1960s, 
a certain steadying of the crude rates became perceptible. 
Alarmed by the drastic deterioration of the situation, 
some states initiated pro-natalist measures, which have 
contributed to checking fertility declines and in some cases 
may even be bringing about substantial recoveries, at least 
in the short term.^ But in large areas of the bloc, net 
reproduction rates remain around or below unity; and in 
several cases (Hungary, Bulgaria and parts of Yugoslavia 
and the USSR) have probably been hovering in that area for 
a number of years.^
The fertility decline, dramatic in the more 
developed areas, has not affected all regions of the bloc.
In many of the traditionally Moslem areas of settlement, 
fertility has actually increased since the post-war years, 
and is only now beginning to show signs of falling from 
its very high levels. This is most notably true of Soviet 
Central Asia and the Caucasus region, parts of Yugoslavia 
and Albania. In these same areas, the application of public 
health measures and improved medical and hospital facilities
11 Substantial increases in the birth rate have been
achieved in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in particular.
12 See K. Dzienio, 'Polityka ludnosciowa w europejskich 
krajach socjalistycznych* in Polityka Ludnosciowa: 
wspolrczesne problemy (Warszawa, 1973), p.416.
120
have brought a simultaneous reduction of mortality levels 
down to those prevailing in the more advanced regions.
Thus in the bloc as a whole and in Yugoslavia and the 
Soviet Union individually, one is confronted in effect 
with something approaching the full gamut of vital rates 
existing in the Eurasian land mass today.
From what has already been said, it will be clear
that there must be large discrepancies in natural increase
rates between the different countries, regions and peoples
of the bloc. Thus in 1972, the range within the Warsaw
Pact countries was from -2 per 1,000 in East Germany
through 9.6 per 1,000 in Rumania to 27.8 per 1,000 in 
13Albania. The range within the Soviet Union in 1972 by 
individual republics (and be it remembered that virtually 
all of them have a substantial Russian minority which will 
serve to damp down extremes) was 3.2 per 1,000 in Latvia 
through 6.3 per 1,000 in the RSFSR (which comprises over 
half the total population and contains four-fifths of all 
ethnic Russians) to 29.0 per 1,000 in Tadzhikistan; all
14this within a deceptive national figure of 9.3 per 1,000.
In Yugoslavia, the spread is no less extreme, from 2.1 in 
the Autonomous Province of the Vojvodina, through 4.6 and 
5.5 in the Republic of Croatia and inner Serbia respectively
13 The Rumanian figure is from Anuarul demografic al
Republicii Socialiste Romania 1974, p.133, and the East 
German and Albanian ones from Rocznik demograficzny 1973 
(Warsaw, 1973), p.421. The Albanian statistic refers 
to 1969 actually, but more recent evidence from Kosovo 
(see footnote 15 below) would suggest little has 
changed in the intervening period.
14 Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 godu, pp.48-9.
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to 27.4 per 1,000 in the heavily Albanian Kosovo Autonomous 
15Province. It should be noted that both the Vojvodina and 
Kosovo provinces are a good deal more populous than one 
of the six constituent Yugoslav republics and comparable 
with two others, so that no locally-concentrated freak effect 
is involved. Moreover, Kosovo has a large (c.18%) and 
much less fertile Serbian minority, which again tends to 
derogate from the contrast that is really involved.
It may bring out the magnitude of the differentials
better to consider changes in the population of the principal
national groups within individual republics/provinces of
the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia as between the last two
censuses of 1961 and 1971 and 1959 and 1970 respectively.
16Thus whereas the Russians increased by 13% in the USSR
as a whole (the Russians being especially prone to outmigration
from the RSFSR, to take the figure for their 'own' republic
would be slightly misleading), the numbers of each
of the five major Central Asian republican nations increased
within their respective republics by almost 50% or more.17
The Serbs increased by 4.3% and the Croats by 5.4%, whereas
18the Albanians increased by 43.1%.
15 Statistical Pocket-Book of Yugoslavia 1974, p.34.
16 Naselenie SSSR, Spravochnik (Moscow, 1974), p.96.
17 R. Szporluk, 'The Nations of the USSR in 1970', in 
Survey, XVII (1971), no.4 (81), p.98.
18 'National Structure of the Yugoslav Population', 
Yugoslav Survey, XIV, no.l, p.13. The percentage 
increase of the Serbs is somewhat deflated by changed 
self-identification of Bosnian Moslems (who at the 
1961 census had declared themselves as Serbs).
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A word or two should perhaps be added to the above
remarks on the fertility decline in the socialist countries
to put them in some kind of overall European perspective.
In the early and mid-sixties, as mentioned earlier, all the
low birth rate records were going to the socialist countries,
and the overall post-war fertility recovery in the Western
world seemed only just beginning to falter slightly. Since
then, while crude rates, and in some measure, actual fertility
has steadied or shown tentative signs of recovery in many
of the low-fertility Socialist countries, there have been
spectacular fertility plunges in many Western countries,
with crude birth rates frequently slumping despite age-
structure changes that would lead one to expect a demographic
19echo of the post-war baby boom. Two of the most
20spectacular drops have been recorded in Finland (where
crude rates have gone from 28 to 12.2 per thousand between
211947 and 1973) and West Germany, which has recently wrested 
the world record from Hungary's grasp and seems bent on 
disappearing off the graph paper. Things have come to such
19 For a wide-ranging discussion of the recent fertility 
decline in Western countries, see F. Marchal and 0. Rabut, 
'Evolution recente de la fecondite en Europe occidentale', 
in Population,XXVII (1973), p.838. See also J. Bourgeois - 
Pichat, 'La deuxieme conference demographique europeenne 
de Strasbourg' in Population, XXVII (1972), pp.422-32.
For the earlier post-war phase see D.V. Glass, 'Fertility 
Trends in Europe since the Second World War' in 
Population Studies XXII (1968), p.103.
20 See J. Lindgren, 'Finland's Declining Fertility' in 
Yearbook of Population Research in Finland, XXII (1971), 
p .21. The 1973 figure comes from Rocznik Demograficzny 
1974 (Warsaw, 1974), p.353.
21 See K. Schwarz, 'Ursachen und Folgen des Geburtenrückgangs 
in der BRD', in European Demographie Information Bulletin, 
vol.II, no.1-2, pp.1-11.
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a pass in fact that France oh paradox', has reaped the
rewards of pro-natalist virtue to an extent it could never
have dreamed possible. As M. Jean Bourgeois-Pichat exclaimed
exultantly in a recent issue of Population, 'Mis a part
l'Espagne et le Portugal, pays nettement moins industrialises
que les autres, la France arrive en tete...' - adding, a
little ominously, 'Entre la France et la Republique federate
2 2d'Allemagne, l'ecart est considerable'.
France in fact is one of the few countries in which 
there has not been a considerable decline in fertility in 
the last six or seven years. The steep and general downturn 
in Western birth rates ought to be of some consolation to 
the Socialist countries. After their giddy burst of overtaking 
the West in the early and mid-sixties they must be cheered 
to find so many capitalist nations rejoining them on the 
slippery slope down to demographic perdition.
II Other population trends
For present purposes, less needs to be said about 
trends in other demographic indicators. Mortality rates 
are low throughout the area, and given normal circumstances, 
are unlikely to vary much in the future. Infant mortality 
rates remain high enough in Albania and Kosovo Province in 
Yugoslavia, for further major improvement to be possible.
This would temporarily dilute the effect of inherent 
fertility declines (assuming that they come) on natural 
increase rates. In the more developed countries, particularly 
East Germany with its aged population and its middle 
generations depleted during the pre-Wall era, mortality is
22 J. Bourgeois-Pichat, op.cit., pp.426-27.
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relatively high in absolute terms, though not according to
age-specific rates. The general tendency in the area as
a whole is towards moderate increase in crude mortality 
23rates. In recent years this same tendency has extended 
to age-specific rates for males in the older age-groups, 
suggesting that the socialist countries are entering the 
phase of affluent mortality patterns. Up till the early 
sixties much was made for propaganda purposes of the 
Soviet Union's (then) unusually low death-rate, which was 
felt to indicate, like vigorous natural growth, the beneficent 
operation of the 'socialist law of population'. Since 
then, with a general ageing of the society and (perhaps) 
improved death registration in some republics - so that 
more dead souls actually enter and bulk out the statistics - 
Soviet death rates have ceased to be in any way remarkable. 
Echoes of the old pride in longevity are still sometimes 
to be heard in population pronouncements, but less frequently 
than at one time; and the ring of assertive confidence 
now seems to lack real conviction.
The ageing process has been proceeding everywhere
except in the countries and regions of continuing high
fertility. So far, the growing numbers of pensioners have
been compensated as it were by declining cohorts in the
younger age groups, so that dependency ratios have on the
24whole deteriorated little. There is a general tendency 
to ageing within the labour force, though not in every case.
23 See Leedy, op.cit., p.444, and Myers, op.cit., p.82.
24 See A. Elias, 'Magnitude and Distribution of the
Labour Force in Eastern Europe', in Economic Developments 
in Countries of Eastern Europe, p.155.
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In East Germany there has even been a marked improvement
in the age-structure of the able-bodied section of the
population latterly, as the pre-Wall migrating generation
25approaches middle age.
The abnormalities produced in the sex-structure 
of certain of the populations (notably the USSR, East 
Germany and Poland) are also of course working themselves 
out. The massive post-war Soviet deficit of twenty million 
or so males is gradually diminishing, and passing up the 
pyramid to age-groups where it is economically, militarily, 
reproductively and perhaps generally less keenly relevant. 
Thus while the Soviet Union's able-bodied age structure, 
for example, has been in continuous and major decline in 
recent years, this has been counteracted to some extent 
by improvements in the sex ratio of the work-force.
With forced-draft industrialization programs being
implemented throughout the area, and collectivization
introduced everywhere (though discontinued and largely
disbanded in Yugoslavia and Poland), there have been
massive flows of population from country to town and
extensive urban development. The proportions of urban
and rural population have been drastically altered everywhere
26in very short time. Despite the simultaneous feminization 
of the rural work-force, female employment ratios in the 
socialized non-agricultural (i.e. urban) sectors are running 
high and tending to increase further. Intolerable strains
25 See UNECE, op.cit., p.209.
26 See A. Elias, op.cit., pp.196-200; and P.F. Myers, 
op.cit., pp.101-08.
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have been placed on urban housing stocks; severe housing
shortages are endemic to Eastern Europe. All these factors
have an impact on the demographic situation. As to housing,
recent enquiries into planned numbers of children in various
of the countries come up unfailingly with the conclusion
that housing conditions are a major subjective factor
involved in family limitation. High female labour force
participation rates are also contributing to fertility
decline, the more so as domestic services to aid the
housewife (from creches to supermarkets) are uniformly
unsatisfactory. One urban study carried out in Bucharest
in the 1960s, for example, revealed an average number of
wanted children of 1.3, and 0.7 for women with higher 
27education. Such remarkable results almost invite
paraphrase of Lenin's celebrated aphorism about voting
with the feet. Small wonder, perhaps, that Ceausescu
shortly afterwards embarked upon the Great Demographic
Leap Forward of 1966. Turning to collectivization, it is
perhaps 'not accidental' that Poland and Yugoslavia, the
two non-collectivized countries, have had higher levels of
fertility than the other countries. And while Yugoslavia's
position in this respect undoubtedly owes something to its
partial membership of the Moslem world, this is not true
of Poland, where for a decade or more rural fertility has
been supporting overall rates hindered by very low urban 
28indices.
27 Finding reported by K.-H. Mehlan, 'The Socialist 
Countries of Europe' in B. Berelson (ed.), Family 
Planning and Population Programs (Chicago, 1966), p.223.
28 The rural Net Reproduction Ratio has been some 70 to 
75% higher than the urban one for the last decade or 
so. See Rocznik Demograficzny 1974, p.107.
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Since the massive population movements following
on World War II to which reference has already been made,
not a great deal of external migration has occurred in the
area. East Germany's flooding outmigration has now been
staunched to a trickle (nonetheless, East Germany is not
expected to regain its post-war level of population in
this century). There have been some spasmodic flows of
deportations and exchanges, or permitted emigration of
ethnic groups: Turks from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, Jews
from Rumania, Poland, Bulgaria, and more recently, the
Soviet Union; Germans from Czechoslovakia and Poland; a
substantial inflow of Poles repatriated from the Soviet
Union in the late fifties. All of these movements were
so to speak exceptional. No state in the area (apart
from Yugoslavia) has extended toleration to emigration as
such. And apart from inflows of ethnic groups identifying
with the metropolitan nation concerned, none has any
problem with immigration. Thus paradoxically, during a
period when intra-European migration movements reached a
level of unprecedented intensity, with labour moving across
state frontiers almost as freely as goods, Soviet bloc
rigidity continued to box up relative labour shortages and
29surpluses in autarkic national cells. There is now some 
official realization of the benefits of international 
movements of labour, and the first cautious beginnings 
have been made. But like non-swimmers at the water's edge, 
the Social governments have confined a large proportion
29 In the fifties, of course, an analogous situation 
prevailed throughout the national economies of the 
Socialist countries. Autarky seems to be one of the 
more tenacious features of international communist 
economics.
128
of their experiments to daily commuting between border-
towns. It seems quite conceivable that by the time any
bolder plans are approved, the general and growing labour
shortages throughout the area will smother them at or
30soon after birth.
30 For some details of existing international mobility
in the bloc from a Socialist source, see, e.g., G. Halmai, 
'The Passport: Working Hands', Esti Hirlap. 18 August 
1973 (tr. in Radio Free Europe, Hungarian Press Survey 
2270). For an instance of cautious advocacy of greater 
movement of labour among the Socialist countries, see 
I.G. Ushkalov, 1Nekotorye predposylki vozrastaniia 
mobilnosti trudovykh resursov v ramkakh S E V , Vestnik 
MGU Geografiia 1973, no.6, p.97. Recently there has 
been markedly greater freedom in discussing these 
matters, but the watchword for policy remains caution 
and there is a clear resolve, for whatever reason, to 
avoid letting large numbers of nationals of any country 
run loose in another. * For the time being, as for the
forseeable future, priority is given to those forms 
of coordinated utilization of labour resources in the 
Comecon countries which do not involve their inter­
national movement.’ (T. Vais 'Sotrudnichestvo stran 
SEV v ispol'zovanii trudovykh resursov', Voprosy 
Ekonomiki 1975, no.9, p.106.) One of the problems 
involved is, of course, that there is a strong ideological 
presupposition that any socialist country can find 
rational and productive employment for all its citizens 
and that the bad old days of economic emigration are 
over. Another is the fact that fewer and fewer countries 
have labour surpluses to dispose of. The one exception, 
Yugoslavia, is reluctant to participate fully for 
political reasons (and in any case, it is difficult to 
conceive Yugoslav workers who have seen Paris or Stockholm 
being content with Pilsen or Katowice). The Rumanians, 
reportedly, have refused to join in (Economist, 18 January 
1975). See also, e.g., K.I. Mikulskii, Trudovye resursy 
i nauchno-tekhnicheskaia revolutsiia; T. Vais and L.
Degtiar* 'Sotrudnichestvo stran SEV v ispol'zovanii 
trudovykh resursov', Planovoe Khoziaistvo 1973, no.12, 
p.95 (tr. in Osteuropa 1975, no.2, with commentary);
M. Kabaj, 'Integracja a zatrudnienie', 2ycie Gospodarcze,
22 September 1974. There is a good review of the
problem in J.L. Kerr 'Gastarbeiter in Eastern Europe' (cont.)
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If not, however, the demographic and political 
consequences of such a development could be no less momentous 
than the economic. On this particular issue, bureaucratic 
rigidity may be masking sober pragmatism, as the Yugoslav 
case illustrates.
Here, as in so many other things, Yugoslav events
help us to imagine what could conceivably happen elsewhere
in the bloc if circumstances or policies were to change.
The Yugoslav economic emigration has in a very short time
assumed massive proportions. Estimates vary, but it is
clear that there are at present about a million Yugoslavs
'temporarily' (as official documents have always maintained)
employed outside the country. The economic and political
strains caused continued for long to be outweighed by the
very tangible benefits reaped in the form of hard-currency
capital inflow (remittances in 1973 totalled nearly one and
31a half billion US dollars) and mitigated (rather than 
reduced) domestic unemployment. Only recently has there 
been some change in official policy towards emigration.
These matters will be discussed more thoroughly later.
For the moment, however, by way of briefly illustrating 
the kind of demographico-political problems that can be 
unleashed by free emigration from a Socialist country,
30 (cont.) Radio Free Europe RAD Background Report 169,
4 December 1975; and an unfortunately rather poor 
one marred by elementary errors in International
Migration XIII (1975), no.4, p.190. Radio Free Europe 
Situation Reports for the different East European 
countries regularly contain a mine of current information 
on these matters.
31 Z. Antic, 'Further Liberalization of Foreign Exchange 
Registration in Yugoslavia', Radio Free Europe Research 
Yugoslavia, 12 December 1974, p.3.
130
perhaps it might be mentioned that before the change of
policy (or perhaps more relevantly, before the recent
downturn in Western economy and the consequent decline in
the demand for labour in the Common Market countries) , the
annual outflow from Yugoslavia was of dimensions comparable
with those of the country's natural increase; that Yugoslav
observers are highly sceptical as to how many of these
emigrants will return; that the overwhelming majority of
them are in the fertile age-groups; that the national
composition of the emigrants does not reflect that of the
population as a whole (although the margins in this respect
have evidently been narrowing more recently); and that
the recent measures to increase domestic employment and
reduce the outflow of workers have been less than wholly 
32successful.
32 These matters will be discussed in greater detail 
in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 3
POPULATION POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION
The discussion will be divided into the following 
five sub-headings:
1. labour force
2. ethnic relations
3. international politics
4. ideology
5. population policies: issues and dilemmas
Particular attention will be devoted to the second of these 
items.
3.a The Labour Force
While it was once held that socialism virtually 
automatically assured that everyone could work and work 
productively, Soviet bloc countries now admit to both 
labour shortages and surpluses. Labour shortages have 
actually become endemic to the whole bloc in some form or 
other. Soviet-type economy is notoriously profligate with 
labour resources for systemic reasons."'' There are also 
strong ideological pressures militating against dismissal 
of redundant workers, which reinforce the inbuilt tendency 
to hoard labour. Various measures undertaken with the 
aim of releasing labour power for use where it is most
1 For a discussion by a Socialist economist of the
reasons for this, see M. Kabaj, Elementy peinego i 
racjonalnego zatrudnienia w gospodarce socjalistycznej 
(Warsaw, 1972), Ch.6.
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needed do not seem to have yet produced radical improvement; 
nor has automation. The secular tendency appears to be 
for the problem to become more rather than less acute.
The declining birth rates in the late 'fifties and 'sixties 
may bring this problem to near crisis point by around 1980,
3as annual increments to the work force drastically diminish.
Planners are becoming increasingly aware of the need to
budget carefully for what they have always previously regarded
4as virtually a free good. One gains the impression that
2 The Shchokino experiment has been given little chance 
to spread its wings and has not; accordingly, obviated 
pressures on managers to maintain excessive levels
of manpower. See M. Feshbach and S. Rapawy, 'Labour 
Constraints in the Five-Year Plan' in US Congress 
Joint Economic Committee, Soviet Economic Prospects 
for the Seventies (Washington, 1973), p.489.
3 See Appendix Table
4 In fecent years there has been a flood of articles in 
Soviet economic journals dealing with the growing 
problem of labour shortage and proposing means of 
overcoming it (better utilization of existing reserves, 
activation of pensioners and invalids, increasing
the birth rate, etc.). See, for example, K.A. Novikov 
in Communist, 1969, no.13; V. Guseinov and V. Korchagin,
'Voprosy trudovykh resursov', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1971, 
no.2, p .45; R. Ivanova, 'O razvitii vostochnykh raionov 
i obespechenii ich rabochei siloi', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 
1973, no.l, p.40; R. Galetskaia, 'Demograficheskaia 
situatsiia i trudovye resursy SSSR', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 
1973, no.10, p.155; V. Kostakov, 'Zaniatost* naseleniia 
v usloviiakh intensifikatsii proizvodstva', Voprosy 
Ekonomiki , 1974, no.4, p.36; N. Novitskii and M. Babkina, 
'Rezerv uvelicheniia trudovykh resursov', Voprosy 
Ekonomiki, 1975, no.8, p.57. For a recent Western 
review of manpower problems in the USSR, see Feshbach 
and Rapawy, op,cit.; see also Feshbach's 'Manpower 
management' in Problems of Communism XXIII (1974), 
no.6, p.25 .
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it was pressure from this group above all that provided
the necessary political context for public calls for pro-
natalist policies in the Soviet Union and Poland and their
5adoption elsewhere. It may seem an illogical response 
to a present labour shortage to lay plans for increased 
numbers of work-force entrants 20 years or so hence. But 
this time-lag and other elementary demographic calculations 
are often overlooked. And in any case, the influence 
involved need not have been one of tightly logical cause 
and effect; the apparent 'disappearance' of manpower 
(itself often not due to past fertility decline but rather 
to long-term policies of extensive rather than intensive 
development) may simply have oriented policy-makers more 
towards demographic concerns.
5 Throughout Socialist Eastern Europe (with the exception 
of Yugoslavia), discussions of demographic trends are 
closely tied up with discussions of economic policy 
and strategy, in particular, with questions of labour 
supply. (See, for example, the titles of the books 
cited in note 6 below). Most pro-natalist advocates 
argue in terms of economic, especially manpower, factors. 
Prominent pro-natalists include among their number such 
men as Kasimovskii (Head of the Labour Resources 
Research Laboratory of the RSFSR Gosplan - see, for 
example, his article in Ekonomiki i Orqanizatsiia 
Promyshlennocfo Proizvodstva, 1972, no.l, p.74) and 
Kazimierz Dzienio, the head of a unit responsible for 
manpower planning in the Polish Planning Commission, who 
has become a noted authority on population policy matters 
both within Poland and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc.
East Germany refrained from adopting abortion reforms 
at a time when it was the only European Socialist country 
with a labour shortage. Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Bulgaria all adopted pro-natalist policies as labour 
shortages began to affect them in the 1960s. It may be 
significant that in Poland and the Soviet Union, the two 
main countries where strong pro-natalist policies have 
not yet been adopted, the latter half of the 1960s saw a 
large inflow of manpower on to the labour market as their 
large respective post-war 'baby booms' reached school­
leaving age.
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The quantities and distribution of the Soviet 
labour force is a vast and intricate subject. The general 
picture is, briefly, that the Soviet Union is threatened 
by a demographically-accentuated overall labour shortage, 
acute in some regions, and tempered by looming unemployment 
in others. The problem of labour scarcity is particularly 
pronounced in the Baltic states (where natural increase 
has been very low for decades), certain urban and rural 
parts of European Russia (where there has been heavy 
outmigration of the young and where population stagnation 
or decline has set in) and virtually all of Siberia and 
the Far East (where migration policies have foundered on
6 In addition to the literature previously cited, see, 
for example, P.P. Litviakov (ed.) Demograficheskie 
problemy zaniatosti (Moscow, 1969); Osnovnye problemy 
rat^ional'nogo ispol* zovania trudovykh resursov v SSSR 
(Moscow, 1971); Naselenie, trudovye resursy SSSR 
(Moscow, 1971); Narodonaselenie; Naselenie i trudovye 
resursy (Moscow, 1973). Numerous monographs have 
also been published on the labour reserves of particular 
regions of the USSR. The Western literature on the 
subject is also considerable. In addition to the works 
previously cited, see, for example, K-E Wadekin, 'Manpower 
in Soviet Agriculture', Soviet Studies, XX (1969), 
p.281; S. Prociuk, 'The Manpower Problem in Siberia', 
Soviet Studies (1967), p.190; M. Feshbach, 'Manpower 
in the USSR: A Survey of Recent Trends and Prospects'
in US Congress Joint Economic Committee, New Directions 
in the Soviet Economy (Washington, 1966), p.704;
B. Lewytzkyj, 'Einige Probleme der Arbeitskräfteversorgung 
im laufenden Sowjetischen Fünfjahrplan', Österreichische 
Osthefte XI, p.335; m . Destefanis, 'La population active 
sovietique: structure et evolution', Population, 1971,
no.2, p.241. On the development of research on labour 
supply in the USSR, see Lewytzkyj, op.cit., and also 
'Die Schwerpunkte der Sowjetischen Arbeitsreservenpolitik', 
Österreichische Osthefte, vol.5, p.109.
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the reluctance of Europeans to travel there, or having
7done so, to remain there).
The labour shortages are associated with a number
of other chronic labour problems in a relationship of
dialectical aggravation. The Soviet press expresses regular
concern about excess labour turnover and poor labour
discipline. Efforts to curb these phenomena tend to be
frustrated by the eagerness of industrial managers to take
on new workers irrespective of their performance in earlier
jobs or their reasons for having left them. Similarly
'elemental' migration movements in (centrally) undesired
directions are facilitated by labour shortages. It is
difficult to police measures aimed at holding workers in a
labour shortage area when there will be no lack of
employers elsewhere quite ready to turn a blind eye to0irregularities. And of course, even in areas where labour 
resources are plentiful, as in Central Asia, there may 
nonetheless be an effective shortage of industrial labour,gof workers with the right skills and dispositions.
7 See, for example, Literaturnaia Gazeta, 8 August 
1973, p.10. There is, in fact, a vast literature in 
both West and East on this subject. See Prociuk, 
op.cit.; and Paul Dibb, Siberia and the Pacific (New 
York, 1972), Chs 8 and 9.
8 For some candid reporting on evasion of migration and 
labour controls, see the article by D. Ivanov and
V. Trifonov in Krokodil, 16 June 1971, p.2.
9 The Soviet economist L. Chizhova has said of the 
indigenous populations of Central Asia, Kazakhstan 
and the Caucasus area that 'Practice has shown that 
some of them still adapt badly to industrial labour 1 . 
'Regional'nye aspekty ispol'zovaniia trudovykh 
resursov' in D. Valentei (ed.) Narodonaselenie: 
Naselenie i ekonomika (Moscow, 1973), p.25.
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The authorities have responded to the growing
shortages by a variety of measures aimed at increased
utilization of existing labour reserves, in particular of
housewives and old-age and invalid pensioners. While it is
still hoped to further exploit reserves of this kind,
work-force participation rates have already reached such
high levels in most of the country, that little further
increase would seem feasible.^ Meanwhile the systematic
siphoning of the younger age-groups from rural areas has
so drastically altered the age-sex structure of the
agricultural work force, that that source too is virtually
exhausted in most areas. Thus it would seem that the only
future possibility for augmenting the labour force will be
natural increase. But the last of the more numerous
post-war birth cohorts are now entering the work force,
and it can be expected that after about 1975, the annual
increments from this source will begin to drastically diminish.
To make matters worse, the proportion of these increments
12concentrated in Central Asia will grow spectacularly.
Pressures seem to be mounting on the labour market from 
all sides more or less simultaneously.
10 T. Khachaturov in Voprosy Ekonomiki (1971), no.3, p.8.
11 According to A. Kvasha in Literaturnaia Gazeta,
22 March 1972, p.10, the work-force participation rate 
had increased from 78% in 1959 to 92% 'now*.
12 According to computations presented in Fesbach and 
Rapawy, op.cit., p.492, by the quinquennium 1986-90, 
Central Asia and Kazakhstan will be providing annual 
labour force increments greater than the net national 
figure.
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In Soviet writings, the word unemployment remains 
13taboo; however the subtly different concept of 'surplus
labour' has been gaining acceptance and its presence in
various areas commented on. Though some of the Western
border regions of the Soviet Union (notably Moldavia,
Western Ukraine, Belorussia and Lithuania) continue to
have some rural overpopulation, the main concentrations
of underemployment are in the Caucasus and Central Asian
areas, both of which have high rates of population increase
and at least until recently substantial net immigration
balances. In fact in the 1960s trends in migration worked
towards enhancing the demographic imbalances that differential
fertility and the distribution of natural resources were
creating in Siberia and Central Asia. Siberia, where
Soviet plans required an enormous accession of manpower,
was by and large an area of emigration, whilst Central
Asia and the North Caucasus, where apart from in Kazakhstan
there was already a manpower surplus (at least in agriculture),
14were registering a net inflow. Meanwhile, as noted 
earlier, the numbers of able-bodied in Central Asia have 
been increasing very much more rapidly than elsewhere 
and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.
13 See, for example, D.I. Valentei, Osnovy teorii 
narodonaseleniia (Moscow, 1973), p.65.
14 See table of interregional migratory flows 1959-70 
in V. Perevedentsev, 'Population Distribution and 
Migration' tr. in Soviet Law and Government XIII 
(1974), no.2, p.88. However, the 1970 Census results 
indicate that by the end of the decade, the net trend 
had been reversed in the case of the Central Asian 
and Northern Caucasus areas, from which there were 
net outflows (of European returnees presumably).
See Itogi Vsesoiuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia 1970 goda 
vol.7 (Moscow, 1974), p.6-7.
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The numbers actually seeking employment there could increase
even faster if hitherto reluctant rural-dwellers and
housewives begin to join the urban work-force at increased
rates. Given the growing pressure on what are for the most
part scarce fertile land resources in the area, and also
the Soviet emphasis on liberating women from 1 feudal
survivals', both developments seem bound to transpire
sooner or later. For the moment, however, there have been
and are, paradoxically, shortages of industrial labour in
various parts of Central Asia, and even - in some parts
of Kazakhstan - of rural labour. These shortages have in
the past been filled by Europeans, for a combination of
political and economic reasons. The first realizations are
dawning or at least being made public that this policy may
be unwise and that it would be better to recruit local
people into urban jobs, and improve their qualifications 
15as necessary. It should be emphasized that the Central
Asian peoples have the worst command of Russian of any of
16the major national minorities. This no doubt increases 
their reluctance and inability to enter the urban work-force. 
Outside the northern regions of Kazakhstan, however, they 
are in a majority overall, a majority, which, as we shall 
see, is increasing with dramatic speed. It is possible,
15 See, for example, the article by T. Arbuzova and
L. Evdokimova in Voprosy Ekonomiki (1972), no.6, p.156; 
L. Chizhova, 'Nekotorye voprosy planirovaniia trudovykh 
resursov1, in Planovoe Khoziaistvo (1971), no.4, p.37; 
see also V. Zorza in The Guardian, 7 January 1970.
16 See the table in Naselenie SSSR: Spravochnik, p.84-8.
The term 'Central Asian' is used here in the narrow 
sense, excluding the Kazakhs. Generally, throughout 
this thesis, 'Central Asians' and 'Central Asia' are 
used in the wider sense including Kazakhstan and the 
Kazakhs.
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that as this and other demographic and sociological trends 
deepen, the indigenous peoples may come to see the present 
terms of their acceptance into the work-force as onerous.
Most of the problems created by manpower shortages 
and maldistribution can be tackled in either of two ways: 
in Soviet parlance, by economic or administrative methods.
The essential difference between them is of course that 
the first method seeks to manipulate economic values and 
indicators so as to make sufficient numbers of people 
perceive as being in their own best interests the kind 
of behaviour the government wishes to encourage; whereas 
the second castigates undesired patterns of economic 
behaviour as harmful or even wrong, selfish, philistine, 
etc., and proposes legal penalties for them. Soviet 
commentators on social and demographic policy frequently 
distinguish a third approach, namely moral exhortation. 
However given the by all accounts declining impact of 
purely moral exhortation on Soviet citizens, and bearing 
in mind that moral exhortation is not infrequently combined 
with or apt to merge into 'administrative measures', we
17can probably safely pass it over in this brief discussion.) 
While there is no logical reason to assume that government 
measures would adhere to one of these approaches to the 
exclusion of the other, it is obviously a matter of the 
greatest moment for the future of Soviet society which 
of them will tend to become predominant in the years that 
lie ahead.
See, for example, A.Kvasha, 1 Demograficheskaia politika 
v sotsialisticheskom obshchestve' in D. Valentei,
Osnovy teorii narodonaseleniia (Moscow, 1973), p.295.
17
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At first glance it might seem that the present 
situation of serious and growing labour shortages favours 
the proponents of economic measures and the emergence of 
some measure of de facto or even de jure employees' 
sovereignty. If the manpower is simply not there, production 
increase can only be achieved by increasing productivity.
And in turn, productivity can only be increased in a 
sophisticated economy by essentially economic stimuli.
Any orientation towards raising productivity and efficiency, 
it has often been claimed, must lead to decentralization 
of economic decision-making and hence to a general 
liberalization of economic and social arrangements. Be 
that as it may, if labour is a scarce commodity, its 
value is bound in some sense to rise, and the bargaining 
power of the labourer to increase. And indeed, it could 
be argued that this enhanced bargaining power is already 
evident in the official tolerance (however reluctant) 
of the flitting, weak industrial discipline and 'anarchical' 
migratory flows which mark the scene at present.
On the other hand it is evident that every 
'economic' or 'liberal' solution to a problem has a 
potential administrative or illiberal counterpart. In 
place of pay-loadings to attract or retain workers in 
labour-scarcity areas, one can employ central job allocation 
of school-leavers and a labour-book system; and if the 
latter already exist but are not achieving satisfactory 
results, one can simply sharpen their teeth. One can raise 
kolhoznik wages, or one can write restrictive clauses 
into the collective-farm charter. One can offer long- 
service benefits; or one can attempt to penalize both the 
worker defecting from his place of work and any subsequent 
employer he manages to find.
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Perhaps on balance the indications are at present
that the Soviet leadership have chosen or have been driven
to adopt a basically more economic approach. But the
possibility cannot be excluded that in the future the choice
may fall on a thorough-going and detailed system of labour-
control with computerized record-keeping, centralized
allocation of manpower and an elaborate network of sanctions.
18The Leningrad-Kaluga experiment may yet make a comeback. 
3.b(i) Some theoretical considerations
A very large literature has developed on the
sociology of plural societies and ethnic politics. Despite
this, unity of conceptual approach, or indeed, of basic
19terminological usage has not yet been achieved. The 
term 'ethnic relations' is variously applied. Some use it 
to denote an area separate from and complementary to that 
of racial relations within the broader field of communal
18 The experimental system of labour controls introduced 
in Leningrad, Moscow, Ufa and Kaluga (see Feshbach and 
Rapawy, op.cit., p.541-43 for a description) may
have seemed to herald a return towards Stalinist norms 
of labour law. However, these agencies have apparently 
been effectively shorn of their powers. See A. Tenson, 
'The Curtailment of the Powers of Public Employment 
Agencies', Radio Liberty Research 210/73, 9 July 1973. 
Compare the discussion in Chapter 4, p.284 and 
footnote 52.
19 The terms 'plural', 'pluralism' and 'pluralist' are 
themselves a good illustration of this. For discussion 
of the ambiguities in their use and the conflicting 
traditions from which they have emerged, see L. Kuper 
and M.G. Smith, Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley, 1969), 
Ch.l; and R.A. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic 
Relations (New York, 1970), Ch.4.
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relations: others use it in a more generic sense to refer
to all of what followers of the first definition would 
identify as 'racial and ethnic relations', i.e. relations 
between communities within a state that are conscious of 
belonging to different racial or national groups; and 
others again use it in a still broader generic sense to refer 
to almost any social group within a state or community that 
is not defined in terms of age, sex or non-ascriptive 
socio-economic function or status (thereby including, for
20example, caste groups, tribes and confessional communities).
In this thesis, the term is being used in the second of 
these three senses (i.e., the less sweeping of the two more 
generic usages). Accordingly, no attempt will be made, 
for example, to examine the extent or importance of religious, 
regional or residual tribal affiliations in the Socialist 
countries. Discussion will be restricted to and largely
20 A.H. Richmond, for example, explicitly identifies
caste as an ethnic division. See his Readings in Race 
and Ethnic Relations (Oxford, 1972), p.16. Some 
definitions are couched in such sweeping terms that even 
class, status and occupational groups are not effectively 
excluded, e.g.: 'An ethnic group is a distinct category
of the population in a larger society whose culture 
is usually different from its own.' (emphasis added)
H.S. Morris, 'Ethnic Groups' in International Encyclopaedia 
of the Social Sciences (New York, 1968), vol.5, p.167.
Even overlooking the self-defeating caution in the use 
of the word 'usually', one still feels impelled to ask 
questions like 'Is the English working class not a 
distinct category of the English population with its 
own distinct culture?' In fairness, it should be said 
that in this area, definitions are a good deal easier 
to criticize than to formulate. In choosing the 
narrower of the two more generic definitions of 'ethnic' 
for my own purposes, I am making a purely pragmatic 
and not substantive decision.
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framed in terms of the 'nations' and 'nationalities' recognized
21by the regimes in question.
Another shortcoming of the literature on the
political sociology of ethnicity from the point of view of
present concerns is that it has not hitherto devoted a great
deal of attention to systematic treatment of the demographic
factor. Observations made on the matter tend to be brief
and axiomatic. Among writers that do make reference to the
demographic factor, there is a tendency to dismiss it as of
lesser importance. It is often pointed out that small
minorities can dominate a polity, and that therefore no
very strong correlation between demographic and political
strength can be established. One well-known authority
on plural societies (M.G. Smith) even suggests that demographic
expansion is more likely to reflect the pattern of inter-
22ethnic accommodation than to independently influence it.
Obviously the demographic ratios of ethnic groups 
within a state are not likely to correspond precisely to
21 Partial exceptions will be made in the case of Soviet 
Moslems and Eastern European Gipsies. Because of 
their strong cultural and linguistic links (and also 
because of the attempts made in the past - and yet to 
be made in the future? (cf. footnote 48 below) - to 
bring about their unification), the Soviet Moslems 
and the 'Central Asians' - Uzbeks, Kirgiz, Karakalpaks, 
Tadzhiks, Turkmen and Kazakhs - are for certain purposes 
treated as entities. This procedure, however, could be 
justified on 'ethnic' as well as on religious grounds.
In the case of the Gipsies, who tend not to be treated 
as an ethnic minority for national statistical purposes 
by East European states, a conscious decision has been 
taken to reject the official classification.
22 Kuper and Smith, op.cit., p.139-40.
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their relative political strength. But perhaps there is a
tendency in the existing literature to overemphasize the
lack of correspondence between the two. Most of the
instances of domination by a tiny majority are drawn from
societies which have not yet been touched by the world-wide
rise of ethnic awareness, or in which the ethnic groups in
question represent quite different levels of socio-economic
organization. The ongoing process of modernization and
the to some extent independent ethno-nationalist revolution
23seem likely to make such power structures obsolete.
The confidence felt by outsiders that in South Africa' white
24supremacy may well continue indefinitely' is not widely 
shared by the South Africans themselves, who tend, moreover, 
to be keenly aware of the discrepancy between white and
23 For an excellent historical perspective on the spread 
of 'ethnonationalism', see Walker Connor, 'The 
Politics of Ethnonationalism', Journal of International 
Affairs, vol.27 (1973), no.l, p.l.
24 N. Choucri, Population Dynamics and International 
Violence (Lexington, 1974), p.76. The above observation 
was written some months before the Soweto riots of 1976.
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coloured numerical strength. And Smith's suggestion that 
demographic patterns only repeat and reinforce power relations 
previously established, whatever its empirical validity outside 
pre-modern African situations, seems to overlook the point 
that power reinforced is effectively new power acquired.
As no established typology of ethnic politics 
systematically incorporating the demographic factor has yet
25 A South African clergyman named M. Steyn was reported 
in Die Zeit (1 June 1973, p.2) as proposing that the 
pill be banned to the white population and given to 
the blacks (whose morals were in any case so low that 
even the pill could do them no further damage). And a 
Dr Van Rensburg has been reported (Canberra Times,
1 January 1975) as warning a South African sociological 
conference of 'annihilating chaos' unless a birth 
control campaign for blacks were introduced. For an 
account of South African population policy which, while 
seeking to maintain that the government is moved by 
purely humane concerns, nonetheless between the lines 
clearly betrays the extent of official anxiety about 
the possible political impact of differential fertility, 
see the chapter entitled 'South Africa' in B. Berelson, 
Population Policy in Developed Countries (New York,
1974), pp.385-402. In its disingenuousness, the South 
African contribution to this volume rivals that of the 
Soviet Union . Compare the following, unequivocal 
conclusion of two specialist analysts of multi-ethnic 
polities: 'In the case of the dominant minority situation,
one consideration especially stands out: the overriding
fear held by the minority, whether rightly or wrongly, 
that they stand to be overwhelmed by a vastly larger 
majority.' A. Rabushka and K.A. Shepsle, Politics in 
Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability
(Columbus, Ohio, 1972), p.158.
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emerged, the discussion that follows here and in later 
chapters will not pursue any precise, pre-determined contours, 
but rather attempt to describe those features of the topology 
which seem most striking to the unaided eye. Obviously, 
the term ethnic relations, even in the slightly restricted 
sense indicated above, covers some fairly disparate phenomena. 
I shall not attempt to draw clear-cut boundaries for the 
concept, which is quite remarkably resistant to definition.
But I shall make a distinction within this general category
26 One of the relatively few proposals made so far is
to be found in Rabushka and Shepsle (op.cit., pp.88-91). 
They divide plural societies into four ‘configurations' 
with reference to 'relative community size' (apparently 
defined in terms of a head-count): 1. balanced
competition; 2. dominant majority; 3. dominant 
minority, and 4. fragmentation. While this scheme is 
not without its attractions, it is clearly in need of 
a good deal of further elaboration, particularly in 
relation to marginal cases. If the Russian percentage 
of the Soviet population does decline below 50% in 
the decades that lie ahead, when will it cease to become 
a dominant majority and start to become a dominant 
minority? Does a majority mean an absolute majority 
or a strong first-past-the'post lead? How does one 
account for, and where does one locate, cases like 
Czechoslovakia, where despite the firm socio-economic 
and demographic dominance of the majority (the Czechs), 
the relative strength of the minority (the Slovaks) 
is continually on the increase? Can not fragmentation 
be an important element in situations other than the 
fourth configuration, enabling, let us say, a strong 
minority to dominate the remainder? And, of course, 
allowance must be made for the effects of differential 
levels of socio-economic development, regional resource 
patterns, historically inherited patterns of power, 
and so on. It is symptomatic that in outlining their 
scheme, Rabushka and Shepsle refer to only one prior 
work, Clifford Geertz's classic essay 'The Integrative 
Revolution' (in Geertz, ejd., Old Societies and New 
States (New York, 1963)), where a roughly similar 
classification is proposed.
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between potential or actual nationality conflicts and racial
ones. Such a distinction, though often made in the specialist
literature (and nearly always made in the less specialist 
27literature), is not an easy one to maintain with a high 
degree of precision and consistency. In addition to the
27 Pierre van den Berghe, for example, having identified 
race as 1 a group of people who in a given society are 
socially defined as different from other groups by 
virtue of certain or putative physical differences' 
distinguishes other groups for whom the relevant 
criteria are cultural and to which he applies the term 
ethnic (corresponding roughly to what I am calling 
'national' or 'non-racial ethnic'). The distinction 
between multi-racial and multi-ethnic societies, declares 
van den Berghe, is an important one, for all that they 
have much in common. (P.L. van den Berghe, Race and 
Ethnicity (New York, 1970), p.10.) Many writers who 
do not draw the distinction explicitly nonetheless 
show that they implicitly accept it by using expressions 
like 'ethnic and racial' or 'ethnic or racial' over 
and over again. Other writers, while preferring to 
adopt a broad and inclusive definition of 'racial' 
or 'ethnic' relations, nonetheless go on to recognize 
a distinction of sorts into two categories. Thus G. 
Franklin Edwards defines 'race relations' as the 
interaction of people with varied physical and cultural 
characteristics, but shortly afterwards uses the phrase 
'Minorities are ethnic or racial groups,..1 ('Race 
Relations', International Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences (New York, 1968), vol.13, p.269). And Ernest 
Krausz, who prefers the term 'ethnic* for the more 
generic function, says 'Whilst I adopt a broad definition 
for "ethnic minority", I fully recognize that some 
characteristics, such as the racial factor, may lead to 
special situations.' (Ethnic Minorities in Britain 
(London, 1972).) One gains the impression at times, 
that the distinction between racial and non-racial 
would have even more adherents were it not for the 
disrepute that all forms of 'racialism' have fallen into 
in the intellectual community in recent decades, and 
the desire felt by representatives of problem-solving 
social science to define some part of their problem 
out of existence. Contrast note 39, below.
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difficulty of defining the outer limits of ethnic, as opposed 
to other inter-group tensions, one has the further problem 
of the word 'racial'. Like 'ethnic', 'racial' tends to be 
used in a variety of senses. Sometimes it is used
2 8co-terminously with what I have chosen to call 'ethnic';
sometimes it is used to refer almost exclusively to black-
white situations; sometimes in a scientific sense to
refer to biologically-identifiable human types; and
sometimes to refer only to those situations in which one at
least of the contending groups consciously and explicitly
uses pseudo-scientific 'racial' arguments to justify its
29attitude towards the other or others. Here the term will 
be used to refer to that sub-group of ethnic relations in 
which in- and out-groups are recognized on the basis of 
certain perceived physical characteristics (as opposed to 
cultural characteristics, in the case of 'national' 
distinctions). Racial conflicts, it is suggested, have a 
number of features which tend to differentiate them from 
other kinds of ethnic conflict. Where nationality conflicts 
tend to derive from rational (if mistaken) apprehensions 
concerning the sharing of power, wealth or prestige within 
a community, racial conflicts characteristically involve an 
element (on at least one side) of disinterested revulsion. 
Where racial feelings are involved, there tends to be
28
29
As, for example, by Edwards. Cf. note 27, above.
See Michael Banton, 'The Concept of Racism' in 
S. Zubaida (ed.), Race and Racism (London, 1970).
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stricter spatial or social segregation. Where members
of an in-group may see certain positive or at least respectworthy
human qualities in an out-group perceived as being of the
same race, in racial antagonisms, one side at least is
likely to view the other as almost totally without human 
31virtues. Indeed, in racial conflicts it is common for one
30 Cf. Fanon, quoting Mannoni: 'It is no exaggeration to
say that the majority of South Africans feel an almost 
physical revulsion against anything that puts a native 
or a person of colour on their level.' (Frantz Fanon,
Black Skin White Masks (London, 1970), p.62.) Obviously 
the physical revulsion does not occur at all times and 
for all purposes. Van den Berghe suggests that most 
racial situations pass through a phase in which social 
rather than spatial segregation is the organizing 
principle (van den Berghe, op.cit., Ch.l). As long as 
'the nigger knows his place', it would seem, physical 
contacts of various, even intimate kinds can occur 
without inducing revulsion. Revulsion only appears to 
arise individually and collectively when the symbiotic 
superiority-inferiority nexus or the physical or social 
apartheid system breaks down.
31 Sexual prowess may be an exception here. Calvin C.
Hernton's Sex and Racism (London, 1970, passim), for 
example, confirms the familiar proposition that whatever 
patterns of inherent moral, social, economic, intellectual 
or other superiority and inferiority may be maintained
by the received myths of any racially-organized society, 
sexual curiosity about the outgroup is likely to be 
enhanced by the taboo, producing a paradoxical readiness 
to impute superiority in this one rather specialized 
field. In the case of members of the lower-status race 
feeling greater sexual desire for members of the upper- 
status race, this may seem less surprising, though 
Hernton also cites numerous cases of well-educated and 
belligerently 'proud' blacks who have a strong covert 
ambition to bed or indeed marry a white. This may well 
indicate enduring inferiority anxieties. But the point 
is that in racial situations infected with the competitive 
bacillus, such anxieties are endemic, and tend to be felt 
by members of both the 'superior' and 'inferior' 'race'.
If sexual prowess is indeed an exception to the proposition 
stated, however, it should be remembered that for most 
societies, sensual skills are seen as morally dubious at 
best, and a sign of intimacy with the devjil at worst.
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side at least to question the very humanity of the other.
In non-racial conflicts, competition is the predominant 
mode of interaction, whereas in racial ones, there tends 
to be a clear demarcation between superior and inferior,
33recognized either positively or negatively by both sides. 
Racial conflicts tend to have their origins more typically 
in a history of colonial subjugation or slavery, rather 
than autonomous migratory movements; hence the genealogy 
of conflict tends to be rather more embittered. Racially 
plural communities are more likely to be composed of large 
majority and small minority rather than roughly equal 
numbers. Owing to the high visibility of physical, racial 
differences, as opposed to cultural ones, there is a tendency
32 Cf. the well-known Hitlerian propaganda likening 
Jews to vermin, aimed both at influencing public 
opinion and strengthening the resolve of trained 
murderers. Nor was it merely manipulative, as a reading 
of Hitler's own outpourings on Jews readily demonstrates. 
This is a widespread form of socio-psychopathology, 
and there is no a priori reason to suppose Soviet 
peoples to be above it. In this connection it is 
interesting that John Barron, in his book on the KGB 
(KGB, London, 1975), esp. pp.45, 61) cites instances 
of Soviet employees in Middle Eastern countries describing 
Arabs variously as 'yellows' and 'blackbums' (chernozhopy) 
and declaring them to be 'subhuman'. Barron rather 
undermines his own credibility as a witness by elsewhere 
in the book describing FBI agents in terms of a comic- 
strip lyricism, but the passages referred to have a 
strong flavour of authenticity nonetheless.
33 'Positively' in the sense of acceptance, or 'negatively' 
in the sense of resentment. While relations remain 
harmonious, the superior-inferior relationship is often 
perceived as legitimate by both sides. When as a result 
of socio-economic changes or fresh exogenous influences 
the stereotypes are challenged, conflict tends to 
develop.
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for group perceptions in racial situations to be sharper
and more strongly and more frequently reinforced by experience.
And despite the potentially blurring effects of miscegenation,
those differences and perceptions of them tend to be less
mutable over time. Finally, I believe it can be laid down as
a general proposition that racial relations are often marked
34by a greater degree of hostility than ethnic relations.
But paradoxical as it may seem, while racial 
tensions may tend to involve a greater degree of hostility, 
they do not necessarily lead to a greater amount of hostilities. 
Whether and in what conditions ethnic or other inter-group 
tensions reach the stage of violent conflict is another 
extremely complex question in itself. Without going into 
the matter too deeply, from the point of view of the 
demographic aspects of inter-ethnic relations, one point 
should be made. That is that while in the case of nationality 
tensions, the development of rivalry or conflict will be 
related to the relative power positions of the groups concerned,
34 Cf. Krausz, op.cit., p.10: 'Two Government White
Papers in 1964 emphasized that in the case of Commonwealth 
immigrants "the evidence laid more stress on the 
hostility towards [them] stemming directly from colour 
prejudice"'; and (p.58) 'The amount of discrimination 
and prejudice immigrants have to endure seems to vary 
even by the shade of their skin colour.' (evidence 
cited).
35 If, that is, hostility can in this case be taken as 
referring to the negative affect attaching to a taboo. 
Thus, you might go to bloody war with another people, 
and yet, ten years later, you might already be a bigot 
not to countenance marriage between your child and a 
member of that particular outgroup. But with racial 
outgroups, you would not let your daughter 'marry one', 
whichever side he (or they) had fought on.
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and therefore to some extent to the demographic ratio between
them (and in particular, to large or decisive changes in that
ratio), in the case of racial tensions, no real objective
threat need yet be presented to the dominant partner for
the situation to ignite. While in the first case, we have
3 6basically a '50-50' problem, in the second any increase in 
numbers (or even an apparent increase in numbers created by 
a change in migratory and settlement patterns) may be
36 By a 50-50 situation, I mean one in which the relative 
demographic and/or political strengths of two peoples 
within a state are fairly evenly balanced, and the 
question thus arises kto kogo (who is to (dominate) 
whom), whether by war, the ballot box or other process 
of decision (cf. R. Schermerhorn, Comparative Ethnic 
Relations (New York, 1970), p.144-5). The 50-50 should 
not be taken too literally. Depending on the degree 
of socio-economic difference between the two communities, 
a demographic balance of 35-65 might equally well raise 
a 50-50 type problem. And, of course, the regional 
sub-distribution of a population may lead to what is 
overall a majority-minority situation acquiring 50-50 
dimensions in particular areas. Thus, for example, in 
the context of Soviet Central Asia (a case to be discussed 
at some length below), we have a dominant Russian 
minority at the regional level, a dominant Russian 
majority in most larger urban areas, and a 50-50 
situation maturing in the city of Tashkent.
153
critical. The types of extreme violence that occur in 
the two cases also tend to differ: on the one hand civil
37 Thus, the growing urban visibility of Jews in many
parts of Europe led to the great waves of anti-Semitism 
of the 19th and 20th centuries, even though there were 
few regions where Jews threatened to present anything 
approaching even a localized 50-50 problem (unless, of 
course, one takes the analysis to the level of urban 
district or occupational group). In several countries 
of European culture, the proportions of Catholics in 
the community have risen to, or towards, the 50-50 area 
without provoking much more than Masonic mutterings.
And before too much is made of the spectacular counter­
example of Northern Ireland, it ought to be remembered 
that despite the fact that men of demonstrably Irish 
cultural stigmata have been living among the British 
and in numerous well-publicized cases blowing up the 
British for many years (reports of bombing phone-warning 
almost invariably mention the Irish accent of the 
caller), migration from Ireland to Great Britain is 
still completely unrestricted, an4 indeed, completely 
uncontrolled. Given the status of Northern Ireland, 
restrictions would be difficult to introduce, but in 
other tricky cases, like the Asian British of East 
Africa, British ingenuity has been resourcefully applied 
to the task at all levels from government to grass 
roots (See D. Humphrey and M. Ward, Passports and 
Politics, Penguin, 1974). Meanwhile, as the bombs go 
up, Enoch Powell ponders before a police audience on 
the links between the growing coloured community in 
Britain and the incidence of mugging (The Times,
10 April 1976).
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war, on the other the lynching or the pogrom. However 
the damage done to the fabric of society may be equally 
great in both types of cases. Scapegoating of despised 
minorities seems to be closely associated with (whether 
causally or epiphenomenally) destruction of the rule of 
law and the spread of police state methods and the underlying 
social patterns that support them. Insofar as differential 
fertility can easily lead to the greatly increased visibility 
of a pariah or scapegoat group, the importance of demographic 
factors in racial conflicts may be even greater than in the 
case of non-racial ones.
The distinction between racial and non-racial 
ethnic conflicts, though widely recognized and employed,
38 This follows logically from the earlier proposition 
that multi-racial states tend more typically to 
consist of communities of widely differing size.
Evenly balanced multi-racial societies are probably 
rarer because they are more unstable than other kinds.
And most multi-racial mixes have arisen from partial 
European settlement of non-European areas, complete 
European overrunning of areas of non-European settlement, 
or the import of non-European slave labour. Both 
pogroms and lynching are only really practicable where 
there is a strong overall strategic majority, or an 
effectively concentrated local one. The aggression 
involved is bullying rather than defiant or competitive. 
While the majority group may be beginning to fear 
rather than despise the minority involved, the fear is 
coupled with a realistic certainty that the aggression 
will achieve its objectives. Civil wars are a more 
'valorous' undertaking. Cf. Pettigrew and Cramer's 
interesting finding that in the Southern States of the 
US, the incidence of lynching is inversely related to 
the relative size of the Negro population. Thomas F. 
Pettigrew and M. Richard Cramer, 'The Demography of 
Desegregation', Journal of Social Issues, 1959, no.4, 
p .62-3.
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39is not one that appeals to all students of these matters.
And it must be acknowledged that it is indeed not without 
its difficulties. It would appear, for example, that one 
is not dealing here with some kind of clear dichotomy, but 
rather with a dispersed bi-polar distribution, or even 
perhaps some kind of spread along a continuum. In any one 
case, all the potential elements of ethnic distinction (both 
physical and cultural) may work to reinforce one another; 
or they may tend on the whole to cancel one another out. 
Alternatively, they may be reinforced by socio-economic 
cleavages, or cross-cut and thereby attenuated by those 
cleavages. Racial differences may also vary both in their 
objective, physical and in their subjective, psychological, 
salience. There is, moreover, the usual difficulty of neatly 
categorizing the incidence of irrational subjectivity.
For the ultimate definition of 'racial' (like that of 
'national' or 'ethnic') must be in terms of 'racial is as
39 For a contrary view, see, for example, D. Horowitz,
'Three Dimensions of Ethnic Politics', World Politics 
vol.23 (1971), no.2, p.232; J. Rex, 'The Concept of 
Race in Sociological theory' in S. Zubaida (ed.), 
op.cit.; and N. Choucri, op.cit., p.77. Marxists 
are reluctant to accept that any kind of ethnic 
stratification can be of 'decisive' importance anywhere; 
a fortiori that there might be a sub-category of ethnic 
divisions that are even more important again. For a 
remorseless critique of the fragilities of Marxist 
theory in the face of ethnic facts, see L. Kuper,
'Race, Class and Power: Some Comments on Revolutionary
Change' in Comparative Studies in Society and History 
vol.14 (1972), p.400. (Though he maintains a 
terminological distinction between 'racial' and 'national' 
or 'ethnic' throughout, Kuper does not, unfortunately, 
develop the distinction analytically.) There is a rather 
less than lethal riposte to Kuper's article in D. Lane,
'Ethnic and Class Stratification in Soviet Kazakhstan 
1917-1939', in Comparative Studies in Society and 
History, vol.17 (1975), p.165.
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racial does'. Individuals may believe they are Napoleon; 
and social groups moved by analogous 'pathological' thought 
disturbances may, despite the absence of any distinguishing 
physical stigmata, nonetheless believe themselves to be 
racially different from and superior to some among their 
neighbours; and in such an event, cultural stigmata may 
be perceived and responded to as though they were physical. 
Such a development is particularly likely to take place 
under the pressure of socio-economic collapse or an ongoing 
ethnic conflict which acquires a momentum and escalating
40 Cf. Hitler discussing the origins of his own anti- 
Semitism: 'one day, when passing through the Inner
City, I suddenly encountered a phenomenon in a long 
caftan and wearing black sidelocks...' Since Germans 
often have dark hair (the possibly part-Jewish Hitler 
among them), it is evident that Hitler was here being 
struck by a cultural rather than a biological difference 
from what he conceived to be a decent norm. A. Hitler, 
Mein Kampf (London, 1939), quoted in A. Bullock,
Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (Pelican, 1962), p.39.
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ferocity of its own. Thus, the division between racial 
and ethnic is not clear-cut either theoretically or empirically; 
and particular situations may be hard to allocate unequivocally 
to either type. But while some cases, like that of Serbs 
and Albanians, or Ukrainians and Jews, may contain some 
elements of both, there is an obvious and basic difference
41 Some writers, struck by the example of Hitler's Germany, 
and understandably and quite rightly reluctant to 
exclude it from the purview of 'racism', conclude that 
racism can arise in cases where the observable differences 
are purely cultural (Rex, op.cit., p.37, 39). While 
this formulation may on the one hand underestimate the 
extent to which the Jewish community in German lands was 
biologically recognizable in the early 20th century, it 
is also open to criticism inasmuch that anti-Semitism 
of the kind one would want to call 'racial' continues 
to exist even when and where the Jewish communities 
cease to be as culturally 'visible' as they once were, 
and indeed after they have become largely indistinguishable 
on any criteria. Then it may become necessary to conduct 
genealogical enquiries and pin Stars of David to the 
breast of the 'vermin' for them not to cunningly escape 
one's notice. Sometimes, in fact, the ethnic bigot 
explicitly denounces the perfidy of an outgroup that is 
adroitly making itself invisible or upsetting the bigot's 
stereotypes. Cf. the comments by Jelenski on Polish 
anti-Semitism before World War II; 'Poles did not attack 
Jews "because they were Jews", but because they were 
dirty, greedy, lying, wore their hair in corkscrew 
curls, talked patois and didn't want to assimilate, and 
also because they were assimilating, ceasing to talk 
patois, dressed well and wanted to be Poles. Because 
they were uncouth, and also because they were very 
cultured. Because they were superstitious, backward and 
benighted, and also because they were devilishly able, 
progressive and ambitious. Because they had long hooked 
noses, and also because often you couldn't tell them 
apart from "pure Poles"...' Konstanty Jelenski,
'"Hanba" czy wstyd?', Kultura 1968, no.5 (247), p.52. 
Perhaps a good term for this type of racially-intense 
ethnic distinction based largely or exclusively 
on cultural stigmata (particularly in phases when those 
stigmata are rapidly being erased) would be 'quasi- 
racial'?
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between, for example, the relations between Czechs and 
Slovaks, Croats and Serbs or Flemings and Walloons on the 
one hand, and that between Slovaks and Gipsies, Russians 
and Central Asians or White and Black Americans on the other.
If one accepts the general division between racial 
and non-racial types of ethnic antagonism, and some broad 
categorization of the two types along the lines suggested 
here, it remains to be considered where the patterns of 
interaction formed by the main ethnic constituents of the 
Soviet Union should be located. Are ethnic tensions likely 
to be more or less racial in type? And what circumstances 
are likely to mitigate or exacerbate their intensity?
It is often emphasized that Russians were never 
racially prejudiced in anything like the manner that other 
European colonizers were. And sometimes, also, that whatever 
the vices of the Tsarist regime in this respect, the policies 
and structural reforms that have been carried into effect 
by the Soviet regime have so radically altered the situation 
that ethnic tensions have ceased to be a significant problem 
in the Soviet Union. The latter of these two views is most 
prevalent among fundamentalist pro-Moscow Communists, the 
uninformed, and those whose principal concerns are not with 
Soviet affairs. However, it is undoubtedly true that the 
pattern of development of inter-ethnic relations in Russia 
and the USSR is almost without parallel outside the Soviet 
bloc (and without exact parallels within it).
If we compare the situation in Tsarist Russia 
with our model of a racial situation, we find that Russo- 
Turkestani relations seem to be something of a borderline case. 
In some of the northern areas of what is now Kazakhstan, 
where Russians appeared as early as the 16th century, 
intermarriage became common and the peasants there of Russian
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stock could scarcely be distinguished from the indigenous
42steppe-dwellers. Even later after Russian conquest of
the area, the Russian attitude seems generally agreed to
have been less overbearing and superior than that taken by
43other European colonists elsewhere. And while the degree
of intermingling that occurred in most of the area in the
late Tsarist period (as since) was minimal, this was not
so much a consequence of Russian as of Moslem attitudes.
Tsarist administrators, like their Soviet successors, were
44eager to promote sblizhenie (ethnic rapprochement), but
the autochthonous peoples resisted it. The rare cases of
intermarriage did not necessarily lead to Christianization
and Europeanization: Russian women tended to adopt the
45Islam of their husbands. Russian peasant settlers were 
not always noticeably better off than Central Asians; and 
sometimes they were worse off. Economic exploitation of 
the indigenous peoples tended to take the form of selective 
dispossession rather than serfdom, slavery, or complete 
expulsion. And Tsarist administrators seem, in some periods 
at least, to have displayed a degree of genuine tolerance 
towards the Moslem religion. Moreover, the physical 
differentiation between Slavs and Central Asians is less 
marked than that observable in other racial and colonial
42 Edward D. Sokol, The Revolt of 1916 in Russian Central 
Asia (Baltimore, 1954) p.33; G. Wheeler, The Modern 
History of Soviet Central Asia (London, 1964), p.50.
43 G. Wheeler, Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia 
(London, 1962), p.8.
44 Richard A. Pierce, Russian Central Asia 1867-1917 
(Berkeley, 1960), pp.203-24, 249.
45 E. Bacon, Central Asians under Soviet Rule (Ithaca, 
1966), p.215.
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contexts. Thus, all in all, there are reasons for expecting
the Central Asian racial context to be less volatile than
many others. This having been said, it should nonetheless
be emphasized that certain other features of the situation
point in a different direction. The distinguishable and
relatively unchanging physical stigmata are there, and so
is the recent history of colonial subjugation and administration.
And despite the efforts of the Russians and the partial
exception mentioned above of the Kazakh steppe-lands, spatial
and social segregation existed in the past and, as we shall46see, persist into the present. There is, moreover, a 
history of recurring violence between Europeans and Central
47Asians, during the period of annexation in the 19th century, 
during the Basmachi revolt of 1916, and again during the 
collectivization period and the purges of the 1920s and 1930s.
Similar considerations probably apply, if in lesser 
measure, to the Azeri and the other Moslem peoples of the 
Caucasian and Transcaucasian regions. In the case of the 
Armenians and Georgians, it can probably be maintained that 
the ethnic tensions involved, being mitigated by common 
cultural traditions, are less racial than national in 
character (however intense). With two exceptions, the 
remaining major nationalities seem best classified as 
identifiably 'European' and therefore only nationally, and 
not racially, distinct. The two exceptions are the Tatars
46 A. Bennigsen and C. Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in 
the Soviet Union (London, 1967), p.197. Compare the 
discussion in 3.b(iii), pp.201-08, below.
47 Cf. the racially-tinged dictum of the Tsarist General
Skobelev: 'I hold it a principle that in Asia [emphasis
added] the duration of peace is in direct proportion
to the slaughter you inflict on the enemy.' Quoted in 
0. Caroe, Soviet Empire (London, 1967), p.79.
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and the Jews. It is quite possible that the Tatars
(particularly the Crimean Tatars) may again turn their
undoubted political skills to some Soviet variant of
48pan-Turkic, or pan-Islamic, activity. Moreover, the
hostility of some of the Tatar communities to Soviet Russia
is well documented, and not likely to abate. All in all,
it seems that the Tatar communities can generally speaking
49be classed with the Central Asians, with the proviso that 
some at least of them have, like the Kazakhs, traditionally 
displayed a relatively greater readiness to .intermingle 
with Russians and assimilate to Russiandom. To that extent, 
of course, we may be nearer the border-line area between 
racial and ethnic differences. The Jews, on the other hand, 
must be classified as being in very large measure a racial
48 For an account of the Tatar role in the Muslim revival 
in Tsarist Russia, see Hans Bräker, 'The Muslim Revival 
in Russia' in G. Katkov, E. Oberländer, N. Poppe and 
G. von Rauch (eds), Russia Enters the Twentieth Century 
1894-1917 (London, 1971). 'Pan-Islamic' activity need 
not be taken in the strictly religious sense, though in 
this context it is interesting that Bräker cites a 
Soviet source according to which religion has more 
adherents in the 'Eastern' republics than elsewhere in 
the Soviet Union (p.182). If there is to be some fresh 
pan-Moslem or Pan-Turkic movement in the USSR, the role 
of the astoundingly resolute and solidary Crimean Tatars 
could again become crucial, just as it was in the pre- 
Revolutionary Moslem revival. In this connection see tie 
extremely interesting Crimean Tatar samizdat documents 
translated in Osteuropa XXV (1976), no.l, pp.AlO-31. 
Despite the emphatic (though at times somewhat pro- 
Peking) Marxism-Leninism that the Crimean Tatar protesters 
profess, it is noticeable that they do not hesitate to 
speak of the Moslem peoples of the USSR as forming an 
emergent national group (p.A22) , or to accuse their 
adversaries explicitly of 'racism' (e.g., p.A30-31).
49 The majority of Tatar dialects are to greater or lesser 
degree mutually comprehensible with the Turkic languages 
of Central Asia.
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or quasi-racial minority in the Soviet context, despite 
their greatly diminished physical visibility as such.
Thus, while the Russians may be less prone to
racial (if not national) animosities than Anglo-German or
50even Latin peoples have been, there are excellent reasons
to believe that they are not free from these widespread human
failings. And there is ample evidence that the USSR is not
the emergent paradise of ethnic harmony and integration that
it has at times been presented as approaching. Any attempt
at more precise evaluation of Soviet propensities in this
regard is difficult or even pointless given the almost
complete blotting out of information on the subject after the 
511920s. Some evidence bearing on these matters has been
collected again in recent years by Soviet scholars. Reference 
will be made to some of that evidence in the pages ahead. 
However, in general it will be simply assumed that the peoples
50 There is a popular belief that the French in Africa 
and the Spanish and Portuguese in America were more
'liberal' or at least less rigidly racialist than other 
West European colonists were. One authority at least 
believes that these differences have been overstated; 
that the relatively better racial relations of South 
America do not reflect any greater humanity or racial 
tolerance on the part of the original colonizers; and 
that there is a good deal of evidence of racialism in 
some contemporary Latin American societies (P. van den 
Berghe, op.cit., Chs 4 and 6) .
51 There is relatively little evidence on the state of 
ethnic relations in Russian Central Asia before the 
revolution. Wheeler remarks 'It is difficult to describe 
the relationship subsisting between the Russians and 
their subject Asian people on the eve of Revolution 
with any degree of precision.' G. Wheeler, Racial 
Problems, p.8. For a sanguine view of the course of 
events after 1917 in one part of our area, see David 
Lane, 'Ethnic and Class Stratification in Soviet 
Kazakhstan 1917-1939'.
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of the Soviet Union share some of the ethnocentric vices 
of humanity, with those probable modifications to the general 
pattern that have been outlined in the preceding discussion; 
and that although these vices may not always find overt 
expression, they can nonetheless be reasonably assumed to be 
present where other evidence would suggest it. In what follows, 
attention is focussed rather on the demographic aspects of 
ethno-demographic problems in the Soviet Union; here, at 
least, some relatively plausible and precise-looking information 
is available. In the subsequent course of the discussion, 
however, due consideration shall be given to the possibility 
that in the future severe national or racial conflicts may 
arise, worsen or emerge in the Soviet Union, aggravated by 
demographic developments which in themselves are already, 
within a certain margin of error, safely predictable.
3.b(ii) Ethnic relations in the USSR: the demographic factor
Partly, perhaps because of their once very high birth
and natural increase rates, the Russians tend to have been
thought of in the past as a people of virtually unlimited
52demographic capacity. And though their settling of Siberia
52 This image seems to have been shared by the Russians 
themselves. Cf. Blok:
Mil'ony - vas. Nas - t'my, i t'my, i t'my.
Poprobuite, srazites' s nami'.
Da, skify - myl Da, aziaty - my, - 
S raskosymi i zhadnymi ochami'.
It has been suggested to the author by a Soviet bloc 
demographer that the cliche motion 'Nas mnogo' embedded 
in the Soviet Russian consciousness has been a 
considerable obstacle to efforts to achieve a more 
active pro-natalist policy in the USSR in recent years.
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has actually always proceeded at rather a slow pace, they
have indeed applied first military and then demographic
force majeure to a considerable number of peoples and
extensive areas in the east of their empire. As late as
the early 1960s, the trend still seemed to be all in
one direction, with the Russians further increasing their
advantage all the time, and all the other peoples apparently
doomed to cultural extinction, or sblizhenie (convergence)
and then sliianie (merging), to use the Soviet formulation
53that held sway in the later Khrushchov years. Then between 
the censuses of 1959 and 1970, it became apparent that the 
earlier picture of universally advancing Russification was
53 The following discussion will assume rather than
expound the basic patterns of interethnic relations in 
the USSR and the main lines of official policy on 
nationality questions. Among the more significant 
Western expositions, see, for example: Problems of
Communism, September-October 1967 (special issue on 
Nationalities and Nationalism); B. Lewytzkyj, Die 
Sowjetische Nationalitätenpolitik nach Stalins Tod 
1953-1970 (Munich, 1970); E. Goldhagen (ed.) Ethnic 
Minorities in the Soviet Union (New York, 1968);
E. Glyn Lewis, Multilingualism in the Soviet Union 
(The Hague, 1972) . For Western discussions of the 
vexed questions of sblizhenie, sliianie and rastsvet, 
see Elliot R. Goodman, 'Die künftige Verschmelzung 
der Völker', Osteuropa XI (1961), p.738, and 'Von der 
Völkerverschmelzung zur Assimilierung in Nationalstaaten 
und Hegemonialmächten', Osteuropa XIV (1964), p.830;
Peter Howard, 'The Definition of a Nation: A Discussion
in Voprosy Istorii', Central Asian Review, vol.15 (1967), 
p .26; Grey Hodnett, 'The Debate over Soviet Federalism', 
Soviet Studies XVIII (1967), p.458; V.S. Vardys, 
'Verschmelzung der Nationen?', Osteuropa XVIII (1968), 
p.524; E. Oberländer, 'Der Sowjetische Nationsbegriff 
heute', Osteuropa XXI (1971), p.273. A recent and 
presumably fairly carefully authorized statement of the 
official line on these matters is to be found in 
E. Bagramov, 'Razvitie KPSS Marksistsko-Leninskogo 
ucheniia o natsional'nykh otnosheniiakh' in Kommunist 
1973 no.4 (March), p.34.
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by no means the whole truth. Demographic trends which had 
earlier seemed capable only of slowing down the process, 
now threatened to halt or reverse it. Russia's manifest 
destiny suddenly began to seem less manifest. I shall now 
discuss some of the salient features of those trends.
The declining USSR fertility has been largely
declining Russian and Slav fertility. The population of
the Russian Republic, the RSFSR (which contains 83.5% of
all Russians) has declined from being 56.3% of the population
54in 1959 to 53.8% in 1970 and 53.0% in 1974. There is no 
reason to suppose that this trend will be reversed; on the 
contrary it seems more likely that it will intensify.
By 1990, the RSFSR will probably contain less than half of 
the total Soviet population. The immediate result of this 
milestone being passed will doubtless not be the automatic 
issuance of a constitutional charter for the nationalities. 
But that this prospect has political significance is borne 
out by the fact that the simple statistic relating to 1970 
given above was not included in any of the volumes of the 
official 1970 Census results.
The proportion of Russians within the USSR as a 
whole has also declined, from 54.7 in 1959 to 53.4 in 1970, 
another detail which was not found worthy of inclusion in
54 M. Feshbach, 'Population' in US Congress Joint Economic 
Committee: Economic Performance and the Military
Burden in the Soviet Union (Washington, 1970), p.61.
The 1974 figure is calculated from estimates given 
(for 1 January) for the populations of USSR and RSFSR 
in Naselenie SSSR 1973: statisticheskii sbornik
(Moscow, 1975), p.9.
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the 1970 Census Results. Setting aside for a moment the 
question of whether or not there might be any tendency to 
over-count Russians in censuses conducted under present 
Soviet conditions, there are two points which should be made. 
Firstly, that the total of Russians evidently includes some 
proportion of assimilation gains. And secondly, that 
Russian increase rates in the first years of the 1959-1970 
period were relatively high and unlikely to be reattained.
It follows from this that we can expect the Russian decline 
over this decade to be greater barring an increase in 
assimilation gains (which is possible) or the application 
of Soviet experience in conducting elections to census 
procedures. To my knowledge, no Soviet projections of 
population by republic (much less by nationality) have
55
55 Before the census results were published there was
speculation in the Western press that the Russians might 
emerge as a minority. In an article entitled 'Census 
shows [sic] Russians soon will be minority', the Herald 
Tribune International of 30 May 1969, reported that 
the Lithuanian Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities,
Justas Paleckis, had publicly reminded Western journalists 
that the old Tsarist empire had been less than 50%
Russian and that for this reason (emphasis added - JB)
Lenin had proposed a multinational structure for the 
young Soviet state. The writer of the Herald Tribune 
article described Paleckis's statement as 'a hint 
that the country is being prepared for a changing 
population balance'. This would seem to be an instance 
of the totalitarian fallacy at work. Given Soviet 
discretion about these statistics since the census, it 
is surely more plausible to argue that Paleckis was 
simply betraying a leaning towards what might be called 
the minorities-autonomist extreme of the currently 
permissible range of expression.Postscript: Paleckis was criticized in 1975 for bourgeois
nationalism expressed in his memoirs 'V dvukh mirakh'
(Moscow Politizdat 1974). See Kommunist, October 1975, pp.75-86. See also Radio Liberty Research, 24 March 1976.
'High Lithuanian Official Reprimanded for Ideological Deviation
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been published, which is itself suggestive.
A further basic point to note is the decline in
the relative strength of the Slav population within the
Union as a whole, from a total of 77.1 in 1959 to 74.6 
57in 1970. This trend too is likely to accelerate, and is 
less likely to be padded by assimilation, since the great 
bulk of the assimilation going on in the Soviet Union at 
present is occurring among the Slavic population. This 
statistic is scarcely explosive as yet, but if present 
trends are maintained or even enhanced, it could begin to be 
so within a couple of decades, given the recent extreme 
dominance of Slavs in the Soviet political leadership.
It may seem to some that the 'if present trends 
are maintained' is an extremely problematical 'if'.
It is much less so than it may appear. High fertility 
societies in contemporary medico-demographic conditions 
have a kind of inbuilt spring mechanism which, barring 
natural or other catastrophes makes further dynamic natural 
increase in the short term inevitable. Even if inherent 
fertility rates were to decline rapidly over the next two
56 Reticence on matters of this kind is not confined to 
the Soviet Union. The Report of the US Commission on 
Population Growth and the American Future also seems to 
avoid passing on any information about the likely future 
proportions of Black Americans and other minorities 
within the total population. The statistics that 
actually are presented seem designed more to reassure 
than to enlighten. See Population and the American 
Future (Washington, 1972), p.71-2.
57 Cf. A. Bohmann, 'Russen und Russisch in der UdSSR', 
Aussenpolitik, 1971, p.757. Bohmann's figures include 
Poles, Bulgarians, Czechs and Slovaks as well as the 
larger Slavic groups.
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decades in the high-fertility areas of the USSR (and the 
indications are rather that the decline will be gradual), 
the present age-structure of those populations will ensure 
that rapid increase will continue and last decades longer 
than the fertility-mortality pattern which originally set 
it in motion. Central Asians have been exposed to 
contraception and abortion for some time now, and also to 
propaganda aimed against early marriage and other socio­
cultural factors tending to maximize fertility. The results 
to date have been only modest, and there is no very good 
reason for supposing that a dramatic transformation is 
about to occur. Moreover, Soviet population policy seems 
for the present to be hamstrung on the nationalities issue. 
But even if the government were to adopt and press with 
reckless abandon a differential fertility policy aimed at 
reversing the existing trends, by the time their policy 
began to bite (assuming that it was successful) the pattern 
up to the year 2000 (and indeed beyond) would largely have 
been set anyway. The time for the Soviet government to 
have acted in this matter was a decade and a half ago, if 
not earlier.
The pattern of development in the individual 
republics is often more striking than that in the country 
as a whole. Between the 1926 and 1959 Censuses, the 
proportion of Russians in the different union republics 
(including the RSFSR itself) increased universally; ; and 
over the same period, there was a dramatic accession of new 
Russian settlers into the newly acquired republics of 
Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania and Moldavia. In many republics, 
the increases were very steep. This was particularly true 
of Latvia, Estonia, Kazakhstan and Kirgizia, where the 
proportion of Russians between the mid-thirties and 1959 
increased from 12% to 26% (Latvia), 7% to 22% (Estonia),
20% to 43% (Kazakhstan), and 12.0% to 39% (Kirgiz).
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The increases were substantial also in the Ukraine (9% to
18%), Turkmenia (8% to 11%), Tadzhikistan (from an insignificant
percentage to 13%), Uzbekistan (6% to 14%) and the RSFSR
itself (73% to 83%); whilst the Moldavians and Lithuanians
suddenly found themselves with 10.2% and 8.5% of Russians
respectively. Only in Belorussia and the Caucasian republics
5 8were the changes of modest dimensions.
Since 1959, the pattern has been radically
transformed at a number of points. The Russian proportion
of the population has, it is true, increased in all the
Western republics, i.e. in the Baltic states, Belorussia,
Moldavia and the Ukraine. But in every case except Belorussia
(where the earlier rate of increase had been very small),
the rate of further relative increase of Russians has been
59greatly reduced; and while the respective periods involved 
are not strictly comparable, the drop in the rate of increase 
is too sharp not to reflect a trend. Several different 
factors are involved here. A key one is the declining numbers 
of underemployed Russians physically available for colonial 
settlement or transfer as urban workers. In the case of 
Estonia and Latvia it would appear that some caution may 
have been exercised for a time in deference to the national
58 All the earlier percentages refer to 1926 except for 
Lithuania and Moldavia (both 1936), Latvia (1935) 
and Estonia (1941). The figures have been taken from 
F. Lorimer, op.cit., p.63-64 and B. Lewickyj, 'Sowiecka
polityka narodowosciowa', Kultura (Paris, 1960), no.152,
p .80-2.
59 Pravda, 17 April 1971.
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sensibilities of the peoples concerned. In Lithuania, 
the indigenous population has staged a considerable demographic 
recovery after the ravages of war and successive occupations. 
And in Moldavia, a rate of natural increase well above the 
USSR average makes it difficult for the inflow of Russians 
to make very much impression on the overall percentages.
As for the Ukraine, the statistics do not bear out any 
picture of galloping Russification enveloping pockets of 
intelligentsia and rural resistance. The numbers of 
Russians and more particularly Russian-speakers are going 
up substantially - much faster than in the RSFSR itself; 
but the percentage of people choosing to identify themselves 
as Ukrainians for census purposes declined only from 76.8% 
to 74.9%. And in this case, unlike in the case of changes 
of similar magnitude mentioned earlier, it is by no means 
certain that the trend will continue.
In the Caucasian republics, where Russian demographic 
inroads have always been relatively modest, there have 
been declines in the proportion of Russians in every case.
In Armenia, the proportion has dropped to 2.7% and is still 
falling; this seems scarcely enough even as a flag-showing 
mission. In Georgia, the proportion of Russians is even 
declining in the capital, Tbilisi, as the Georgians reported
60 There was a report in Iunost, 1967, no.10, p.90, to
the effect that mass immigration into the Baltic states 
had grown so intense that the authorities had been 
forced to close the borders. This may have been a 
concession from the post-Khrushchov leadership. If 
so, it has evidently been since withdrawn. Immigration 
into Estonia at least rose dramatically again in 1969 
and 1970. See T. Parming, 'Soziale Konsequenzen der 
Bevölkerungsveränderungen in Estland seit 1939' in 
Acta Baltica XI (1971), p.21.
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in their republican newspaper in 1971 (though there was no 
need to do so). This is indeed a noteworthy development 
though not as exceptional as earlier trends towards 
Russianization of the Republican capitals might have suggested. 
In Azerbaidzhan, the percentage drop was the largest in 
the Caucasus - from 13.6% back to 10%. The absolute total 
of Russians in the three Caucasian republics as a whole 
has stagnated, which would suggest that the policy there is 
not to strive for ultimate demographic domination as would 
seem to be the case in Latvia and Estonia. There are 
obvious geo-political reasons why this should be so.^
61 The initial census results published in the various
republican newspapers in April, May, June and July of 
1971 contained interesting differences in the amount 
of detail presented on national composition. Where 
the trends favoured the indigenous nationality (as in 
Georgia and Kazakhstan for example) more information 
was made available. Where the trends were less 
favourable, a policy of least said soonest mended was 
followed; thus the only republican paper not to provide 
nationality structure data in percentage form for its 
own republic for 1959 and 1970 was Sovetskaia Estoniia 
(18 May 1971). Those reports which included ethnic 
breakdowns for the capital city in 1959 and 1970 were 
invariably able to record a relative improvement in 
the position of the republican nationality. This group, 
a surprisingly large nine (of the fifteen) includes 
Kiev, but does not include Tallin, Riga (where there 
is now a Russian majority), Kishinev, Dushanbe or 
Frunze.
62 Given the pattern of interwoven settlement and keen
ethnic hostility between the main nations in the area 
(and on the other side of the Soviet border), it ought 
not to tax the diplomatic skills of the Soviet leadership 
too greatly to maintain their dominant control there 
by traditional imperial methods. In Central Asia, 
by contrast, the peoples involved, whatever their 
differences, have much stronger linguistic and cultural 
ties, and a much more formidable extra-mural ally in 
China.
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In the Central Asian republics where Russiandom 
registered some of its most spectacular advances before 
1959, there has also been a decline in the proportion of 
Russians in every case. For the time being, the continuing 
flow of immigration into the area plus the relatively high 
natality of the still young, but ageing immigrant population 
are succeeding in keeping the figures respectable. But 
there seems little prospect that this position can be 
maintained for very much longer. With the exception of 
some of the northern and eastern oblasti of Kazakhstan, the 
Russian hold in the area is tenuous, and confined to the 
cities. Whether Russian social and economic (as distinct 
from political) dominance of the area can be maintained 
when the major influx of indigenous people into the cities 
gets unde;: way seems dubious. Any any attempt to detach 
the region of demographic conquest in the north will not 
be a simple undertaking.
Writing just after the 1959 Census, Boris Lewytzkyj
said:
The Central Asian republics are in the worst 
situation. The Kazakh Republic is now Kazakh 
only by name.. .whilst the Kirgiz ^too7 are on 
the way to becoming a national minority in 
their own republic.63
This statement undoubtedly reflected the general trend 
of opinion at the time. And yet even in Kazakhstan, where 
the inflow of Russians and Ukrainians (who assimilate to 
Russiandom very quickly away from the Ukraine) after the 
1959 census was probably more intensive than anywhere 
else, the proportion of Russians and Ukrainians together 
has declined from 50.9 to 49.6, whilst the Kazakh figure
63 Lewickyj, op.cit., p.82.
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has gone up from 30.0 to 32.6. By the 1980s, barring
untoward developments, these two statistics can be expected
to be racing in opposite directions. The Kazakhs have
evidently recovered from their colossal losses during
the collectivization era (there was an absolute decline
of nearly one quarter in the Kazakh population between 1926 
64and 1939), and are now engaged on a peaceful reacquisition 
of their own land in accordance with the best traditions 
of Stalinist population doctrine; for which they can 
scarcely be subjected to open censure.
Elsewhere the picture in similar. In Kirgizia,
the Kirgiz have increased from 40.5 in 1959 to 43.8% of
the population in 1970, while the Russians and Ukrainians
65have together declined from a total of 36.8 to 33.3%.
The Tazhiks in Tadzhikistan have gone up from 53.1 to 56.2%,
whilst the Russian and Ukrainian combined total is down
from 14.7 to 13%. In Turkmenistan, the titular nationality
has increased from 60.9% in 1959 to 65.6% in 1970, whilst
the Russians' and Ukrainians' combined proportion declined
from 18.7 to 16.1%. And in Uzbekistan, the Uzbeks have
increased from 62.1 to 65.5% of the total, while the Russians
and Ukrainians are down from 14.6 to 13.4%. It should be
reemphasized that these developments have taken place
despite the fact that the total number of Russians in Central
66Asia as a whole increased by 36.9%, a figure which is 
of course far and away higher than the overall Russian
64 Cf. Lorimer, op.cit., p.138.
65 This and the immediately following statistics are 
taken from Pravda, 4 April 1971.
66 Szporluk, op,cit., p.98.
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increase of 13.1% for the same period. Thus Russiandom has
been committing more forces to the battle as it were than it
can really afford to lose, without being able to turn the
tide. All the massive Russian influx into Central Asia is
likely to achieve in the long-term is a growing aggravation
of the employment problem (as local demographic pressure on
the job market builds) and probably, increasing resentment
among the indigenous peoples. Only in northern Kazakhstan
have the foundations been laid for a Karelian-type annexation.
6 7And there it may be more prudent to be forbearing.
In some ways, perhaps, the most surprising decline
of all, though modest in dimensions, is the diminution of
the percentage of Russians within the RSFSR from 83.3 to 
6 882.8%. For here the Russians might be expected to make 
their largest gains from assimilation. Moreover, with one 
or two exceptions, they are not confronted in their own 
republic by any strong national groups with large net
67 Despite the acquisition of substantial tracts of Finland 
in the intervening period, the total number of both 
Karelians and Finns declined between the 1926 and 1970 
censuses from 248,000 to 146,000 and from 139,000 
to 85,000 respectively. (Cf. Lorimer, op.cit., p.139 
and Itogi vol.IV, p.ll). The Karelian SSR which was 
established in 1940 was demoted to ASSR status in 1956, 
presumably partly in consequence of the small and 
diminishing proportion of representatives of the titular 
nationality. In six of the seventeen oblasti of 
Kazakhstan, the Kazakhs form less than 20% of the 
population (in 1959, the Karelians formed 13.1% of the 
population of the Karelian ASSS). But nowhere are they 
in significant further decline. (Cf. Kazakhstanskaia 
Pravda, 9 June 1971) . Moreover, a Karelian solution 
for the northern oblasti would obviously severely strain 
the situation in the south. For these reasons, it does 
not appear likely.
68 Pravda, 4 April 1971.
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increase rates. If observers were once ready enough to
dismiss the chances of Central Asian peoples surviving as
anything other than half-assimilated rump minorities in their
own homelands, their attitude towards the future of the
ethnic groups in the RSFSR was even more peremptory. And
yet even this does not seem to be being borne out by events.
Of the 16 autonomous republics of the RSFSR, the proportion
69of Russians declined in all but five. In two of those five, 
the increase was marginal. In the remaining three, with 
the arguable exception of the Yakut Autonomous Republic, 
Russian demographic, as well as political domination of the 
area was not really in doubt anyway. In some potentially 
not unimportant areas on the Volga and in the North Caucasus 
area, the indigenous peoples have made significant gains.
I shall enlarge on this point later.
Two other general statistical perspectives may be 
worth reviewing at this stage. In the period before the 
Stalinist Gleichschaltung of the nationalities, and during 
it, considerable concern was expressed about pan-Moslem and 
pan-Turanian tendencies. As the nations which are now 
staging rapid demographic advances almost all belong to one 
or other op both of the Moslem and Turkic families, it 
may be valuable to consider the collective magnitudes 
involved in each case. Some people are inclined to assume 
that as religion has been suppressed for so long in Soviet 
Asia, the old cultural and potentially political affinities 
have been or soon will be permanently obliterated. This 
seems a rash assumption. Concerning pan-Turanianism, suffice 
it to note, in justification of the exercise, that a Soviet
69 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 20 May 1970, p.3.
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linguist has seen fit to claim that nearly all the Turkic
70speakers of the USSR can understand each other; and,
also, that there have been some moves towards undoing some
of the cellularization of the Turkic languages that was
71wrought in the Stalin period.
Between the 1959 and 1970 Censuses, the total 
number of those belonging to the Moslem nations, according 
to my reckoning, increased from 24,785,000 to 35,004,000, 
whilst that of the combined Turkic peoples rose from 23,050,000 
to 32,108,000, of which all but 2,504,000 also belonged to 
the Moslem community. As the two groups do overlap to a 
large extent, it will be economical to consider the demographic 
prospects vis-a-vis the European population of just one of 
them, the Moslems.
70 N. Baskakov in lazyki narodov SSSR Vol.II. Tiurkskie
iazyki, reviewed by G.K. Dulling in Central Asian Review, 
Vol.XV (1967), p.160. Dulling expresses some scepticism 
about this claim. The more dubious it is linguistically, 
however, the more significant it is from other points 
of view. Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay (op.cit., 
p.2Q7) assert that 'Linguistic kinship is still very 
much alive - an Uzbek has little difficulty in 
understanding a Kazakh, a Turkmen or an Azeri.' A 
leading world authority on Turkic languages, Professor 
S. Wurm of the Australian National University, suggests 
thatin fact there are significant differences of degree 
of mutual comprehensibility, Turkmen, Azeri and Turkish, 
for example, being very close, and Kazakh and Kirghiz 
a good deal closer to one another than either is to Uzbek 
or Turkmen. An Uzbek would have relatively little 
difficulty in understanding a Turkmen, but much greater 
difficulty in communicating with a Kazakh, or more 
expecially, an Azeri - Turkmen constituting a kind of 
link between the Turkmen-Azeri-Turkish group and the 
one to which Uzbek belongs. (personal communication)
71 See, for example, the evidence cited by G. Sultan:
'Demographic and Cultural Trends Among Turkic Peoples 
of the Soviet Union', in E. Goldhagen (ed.), Ethnic 
Minorities in the Soviet Union (New York, 1968), p.268.
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As was mentioned earlier, no Soviet projections
of population by republic or nationality are apparently 
72available. What might be done, however, is to improvise 
a single simplified projection for the Moslem population 
to the year 2000 just to ascertain roughly what order of 
magnitude is involved.
The increase from the 1959 to the 1970 Census
(35.0 million - 24.8 million = 10.2 million) implies an average
annual increase of 3.16% per annum. Taking this figure as
the starting point and assuming that natural increase will
have declined linearly to 1.0% per annum by 2000 (which
is a rather strong assumption, and one which should more
than compensate for any tendency to overstate the 1970
natural increase level by taking the average for the previous
decade when rates were probably declining slightly), estimated
Moslem population in the year 2000 will be about 65 million.
Baldwin's 1973C series projection of the total Soviet
73population for 2000 is 307 million. The roughness of 
the procedures adopted to assess future Moslem population 
should not be contrasted with any mysterious prescience
72 Feshbach and Rapawy, op.cit., p.492, refer to unpublished 
estimates and projections prepared by the Foreign 
Demographic Analysis Division of the US Bureau of Commerce 
for the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, but it
is not clear how detailed these are. Moreover, they 
relate to the able-bodied population and seem to be 
based on simplifying assumptions that would make them 
unsuitable for other purposes.
73 G. Baldwin, Estimates and Projections of the Population 
of the USSR by Age and Sex 1950 to 2000 (Washington,
1973) reproduced in Leedy, op.cit., p.473. The C 
series is based on the assumption of a mild decline in 
fertility over the period (GRR from 114 in 1972 to 108 
in 2000).
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imputed to the Census Bureau's projections. The major 
defect of the whole operation consists in a tendency to 
understate probabilities on the Moslem side and slightly 
overstate them on the overall Soviet side. What has been 
done in effect is to assume a very modest decline in the 
fertility of A plus B, whilst assuming a very solid decline 
in the fertility of B. Given that B (i.e. the Moslem part 
of the Soviet population) is probably contributing a good 
two-fifths of total Soviet annual population increase at 
present, this could easily cause significant underestimation 
of relative Moslem strength by 2000. I am following this 
procedure in order to forestall any impression that might 
otherwise be created that the case is being overstated.
Taking these very cautious rough estimates for 
what they are worth, we can now compare the proportion of 
members of the Moslem peoples within the total Soviet 
population for 1970 and 2000: for 1970, the percentage
is 14.5; and for 2000 it is 21.3. And be it emphasized 
once more; these figures are so cautious as to be almost 
foolhardy.
The Russian increase of 13.05% between the 1959 
and 1970 Censuses was one of the lowest of any major people 
within the Soviet population, despite their presumable 
assimilation gains. Even that figure was achieved largely 
thanks to the relatively high natality of the early sixties 
before the fertility decline really took full effect. Future 
increases are not likely to be relatively as great, not 
even in the present decade, despite the fact that the 
age-structure is at present particularly propitious. But 
even assuming that the Russian element were to cling tenaciously 
to its present 53% of the total Soviet population to the 
year 2000 (a quite unreal assumption on present indications),
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that would give it a total of some 163 million in our 
hypothetical population of 309 million.
There is a tendency for observers to juxtapose 
the likely Russian and Moslem or Central Asian figures and 
conclude that the Russians may not be expanding very fast, 
but that nonetheless they have the numbers and are not 
likely to be overrun. Thus Mr Geoffrey Jukes, for example, 
write s:
...even if the present trends should continue, 
a drastic change in the balance between races 
will not occur. Should the present differential 
rates of increase continue for the rest of the 
century, the Soviet population would rise to 
about 320 million of which Central Asians (a 
smaller group than 'Moslem peoples' - J.F.B.) 
would constitute about 63 million, while there 
would be about 170 million Russians. It is 
therefore unlikely that the Soviet leaders have 
yet begun to have nightmares over the prospect 
of being swamped by their internal segment of 
the 'teeming masses' of Asia.^
Mr Jukes indicates by his use of the word 'even' 
that he feels that the trends are bound to tilt back towards 
the Russians before 2000. While I suspect that his calculation 
is at least as likely to overestimate future Russian numbers 
as future Central Asian numbers, it is the political evaluation 
he makes of those magnitudes which seems least convincing.
To begin with, it implies a false juxtaposition 
of 170 million Russians and 63 million Central Asians.
In fact the juxtaposition will be of 63 million or whatever
74 G. Jukes, The Soviet Union in Asia (Sydney, 1973), p.56.
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Central Asians and 11 or 12 million Russians in the 
relevant area. It is not necessary to postulate any Central 
Asian march on Moscow. It will be sufficient if they march 
(metaphorically) on Tashkent, the 'capital of Central Asia'
7 6as a Kirgiz (n.b. not an Uzbek) poet recently apostrophized.
The confrontation is likely to be worked out in a local 
context. French numerical superiority on the mainland was 
not sufficient to maintain the position of the colons in 
Algeria. The Russians have the advantages of contiguous 
borders and an efficient central control system; but the 
capacity of the latter to contain racially-tinged socio-economic 
confrontations of the type which seem to be maturing in Central 
Asia is yet to be demonstrated.
75 It might be objected that the use of generic notions 
like 'Moslems' and 'Central Asians' is an indefensibly 
loose procedure. However, for the most part, the 
propositions being made in collective form about their 
demographic behaviour and ethno-political attitudes 
are equally valid for each individual nation. And,
in addition, it is reasonable to assume that some such
collective self-identification is made by many
representatives of those peoples themselves (cf. notes
48 above, and 76, below). It is not being suggested
that the 'Moslems' or 'Central Asians' are bound to
form a tightly-knit bloc in all matters of socio-political
relevance. But there is a good deal more basis in
language, history, culture and current political experience
for some kind of Moslem 'negritude' concept to take
hold in the USSR (implicitly or explicitly) than
there is in Africa itself.
76 'Greetings to you, my Uzbek, our thoughts and reveries 
are one, you are the closest kin, the right hand of a 
Kirgiz, and Tashkent is the capital of Central Asia.' 
Baydilda Sarnogoev, 'Salat saga', in Ala Too no.2, 1970, 
quoted in A. Procyk, 'The Search for a Heritage and
the Nationality Question in Central Asia' in E. Allworth 
(ed.), The Nationality Question in Soviet Central Asia 
(New York, 1973), p.130.
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The relative quietism of the Central Asian educated
classes in the recent past ought not to be presumed a
permanent feature. The Russian domination of the urban work
force, and with it, the key sectors of social and economic
life is likely to be challenged in the next decade or two,
particularly as the increasingly massive indigenous birth
77cohorts of 1950 onwards come onto the labour market.
Moreover, the number of educated Central Asians is increasing
even more explosively than the population as a whole, and
7 8will continue to do so. Arutiunian's much commented-on
77 Cf. van den Berghe: 'In the competitive case, prejudice
against groups seems to build up to a point of dangerous 
tension in response to such conditions as rapid influx 
of lower-caste migrants or rising unemployment'.
P. van den Berghe, op.cit., p.30.
78 Education of less privileged minorities of any kind tends 
to be politically destabilizing. A sophisticated Soviet 
rejoinder might be that if education is coupled with 
opportunities for social mobility as in Soviet Central 
Asia, there should be no problem. Quite apart from the 
specific questions of (a) to what extent the Central 
Asian peoples have really been fully admitted to all 
fields of socio-economic endeavour and (b) whether Soviet 
planning will be able to provide adequate employment for 
the enormous bulge in the labour force that is currently 
developing, it is not clear as a general proposition 
whether or not social mobility does in fact tend to 
reduce ethnic resentments. Cf. L. Kuper '...mobility 
may have very different consequences... In a racially 
structured society... appreciable upward mobility may in 
fact stimulate revolutionary change.' 'Race class and 
power', p.414 (Kuper was not using the term 'racially' in 
a restrictive sense here.) Where social mobility is 
blocked, of course, the situation is likely to be worse 
again. For some sober reflections on the benefits 
modernization has brought to the Central Asians, see Robert 
A. Lewis et al. 'Modernization, Population Change and 
Nationality', Canadian Slavonic Papers 1975, nos 2-3, p.286. 
The authors point out that the levels of urbanization 
achieved by the Central Asians according to the 1970 Census 
are only comparable with those of such countries as Liberia, 
Zambia, Paraguay and West Malaysia; and that in certain 
respects, the educational gap between the Russians in 
Central Asia and the Central Asians themselves is
widening (pp.294-98).
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finding that the Tatar intelligentsia of the Tatar ASSR
79is more prone to chauvinism that the working class is 
likely to be equally applicable to Central Asia. And here, 
as in so many other things, the reasonable expectation 
surely is that the numbers of chauvinists are going to grow.
The problem is unlikely to be relieved by
outmigration of the Central Asians in large numbers. For
one thing, they seem the least inclined of all the Soviet
81national groups to leave their homelands. It is similarly 
unlikely to be relieved by assimilation. The Central Asians 
have hitherto also been the least assimilable of all the 
nationalities. Their level of proficiency in Russian remains
79 Iu. Arutiunian, 'Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie 
natsional'nykh otnoshenii' in Voprosy filosofii, no. 12,
1969, p.129.
80 Soviet writers usually maintain of course that 'bourgeois 
nationalism' is diminishing and destined to ultimately 
disappear. Experience elsewhere, however, would seem
to suggest that as societies grow more socially and 
economically sophisticated, far from abating, ethnic 
tensions and chauvinist excesses actually tend to increase: 
Belgium, Yugoslavia, Uganda, Ireland, Canada - to name a 
few instances almost at random. Nor would these phenomena 
appear to be confined to any particular type of socio­
economic system. The efficient Soviet control system may 
keep such stresses in check or even wholly out of sight; 
but they may still exert a concealed influence in normal 
times, or flare into overt prominence when circumstances 
change. For most illuminating discussions of instances 
of the latter type occurring in the Socialist bloc , 
see Grey Hodnett and Peter Potichnyj, The Ukraine and 
the Czechoslovak Crisis (Canberra, 1970), and Robert 
R. King, Minorities under Communism: Nationalities as a
Source of Tension among Balkan Communist States (Harvard 
U.P., 1973), esp. Chs 4 and 6.
81 See, for example, V. Perevedentsev, 'O vliianii
etnicheskikh faktorov na territoriialnoe pereraspredelenie 
naselenia' in Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Seria Geografia IV 
(1965).
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very low. Other than among the Kazakhs very few advance
Russian as their native language or as a competently spoken
second language. And statistics on mixed marriages confirm
that most of the Moslem peoples are more likely to intermarry
82among themselves than to marry Europeans.
Perhaps the most difficult and singular feature 
of the Central Asian situation however is that there trends 
seem to point to an inevitable future change in the dominant 
national group. In the cities of the Western Republics (with 
the partial exceptions of Ukraine an4 more recently, Latvia), 
the Russians have been at most politically and not demographically 
in the ascendant. In Central Asia, on the other hand, they 
have formed an overwhelming majority in the cities. 
Demographically this pattern is bound sooner or later to 
change radically. While the Soviet government may or may 
not deem it expedient to reduce the numbers of Russians 
and Russian-speakers in Riga or Tallin at some time in the 
future, they will not be outnumbered there as a result of 
future trends in fertility or migration among the Baltic 
populations. In the cities of Ukraine and Belorussia, even 
if their demographic presence were to be weakened (which 
does not seem imminent) , their assimilatory gains could quite 
possibly continue to offset any losses. In the Caucasian 
republics they have never seemed likely to outnumber the 
indigenous populations. But in Central Asia they will have 
to resign themselves to rapidly becoming a minority in 
urban areas which in some instances must once have seemed 
as Russian as Novgorod or Vologda. The social position of 
the Kirgiz in Kirgizian cities is clearly not the same as 
that of the Georgians in Georgian cities. But as the
82 For a closer discussion of these problems, see 3.b(iii) 
below.
184
Kirgiz begin to move into their cities in greater numbers, 
they are bound sooner or later to aspire to such a status, 
and then a destabilizing transformational phase must 
inevitably ensue. Irrespective of whether any implicit 
or explicit challenge is issued to central authority, a 
great many economic, administrative, and most important 
of all, psychological adjustments will have to occur on 
both sides. In analogous situations elsewhere in the 
world, the European element has politically and often 
demographically withdrawn completely. This last-resort 
defusing technique would not seem a realistic possibility 
in the Soviet case for the present. But it could be 
argued that something analogous has been happening in 
the Kosovo province of Yugoslavia in recent years. There 
would seem to be, therefore, no inherent reason why similar 
developments could not occur in the USSR as well at some time 
in the future.
Currently the internal political koniunktura 
in the USSR favours the Great Russian element. This seems 
likely to continue for the foreseeable future. But should 
the demographic or the political situation change sufficiently, 
and in particular should some future leadership opt for a 
substantial degree of decentralization, the relative strength 
of the Central Asian factor could greatly increase as 
developments in Yugoslavia after the decline of the 'Great
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Serbian chauvinist'Rankovic suggest. The international 
political situation may also work increasingly to the benefit 
of the Central Asians. Indeed, it has already done so.
The Sino-Soviet conflict has unleashed propaganda campaigns 
on both sides aimed at the Central Asian and Sinkiang minorities 
of the respective adversaries. Third World pressures (oil- 
powered?) on behalf of the Central Asians could also emerge 
as a factor, particularly if the Sino-Soviet rivalry in 
this domain were to intensify. For demographic reasons, the 
Soviet Union is likely to become more and not less vulnerable 
on this point.
Similar considerations apply to the Turkic peoples 
as have been expounded in the context of the Moslems. Only 
the Finno-Ugrian family seems to be supplying a steady flow
83 Cf. note 26 above. While one would not wish to argue 
that the Serbs lost the position of dominant (large) 
minority-cum-near-majority which they held in pre-war 
Yugoslavia (and to a lesser extent up to 1965 in 
Socialist Yugoslavia) due to their relative demographic 
decline (they claimed to form over 50% of the population 
after the 1931 census, were 42.1% according to the 1961 
census, and only 39.7% according to the 1971 census), 
it is probably true that their demographic behaviour is 
making it difficult for them to hope to reachieve 
hegemony in the future; and also that the Russians are 
stronger in the USSR than the Serbs are in Yugoslavia 
partly because the Russians were and still are a real 
majority, whereas the Serbs were at best a phoney majority.
In fact, the Serbs' relative decline at censuses reflects 
their growing political weakness rather more than their 
declining fertility. But the longer the relative demographic 
decline of the Russians lasts, the more conceivable it 
becomes that political decentralization will emerge as 
a serious possibility. Should such a decentralization 
occur, of course, we may well learn after the 
event that Russian demographic strength had also been 
exaggerated by previous censuses, just as Serbian 
numbers were. See Ch. 5, below.
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of assimilated Russians to the point where its own (probably
higher) fertility does not represent any kind of local 
84threat. Though there again, it is interesting, and 
perhaps significant that most of these ethnic groups are 
now showing net gains rather than losses. The Finno-Ugrians 
remain substantial and in some cases rapidly increasing 
communities which could yet experience a renaissance of 
national identity.
To date, although there have been guarded hints 
from demographers and journalists, including some apparently 
writing with official sanction, that there is a need for 
a differential population policy that would counteract some 
of the 'unfavourable' trends that have been described above, 
nothing very much seems to have happened. An important 
part of the problem is of course that official ideology at 
the present stage of its development does not permit expressly 
nationalist justifications for policy. Nor can it be admitted 
that ethnic relations in the Soviet Union can by their very 
nature be anything but harmonious. Thus while tacit deviations 
from this norm can of course be practised or tolerated, it 
is difficult to launch full-scale propaganda and administrative 
campaigns that fly directly in the face of it. While policy­
makers hesitate, events move inexorably onward. They have 
in any case gone too far for major future changes to be 
averted. In this situation, the leadership seems to have 
placed its money (with what conviction can only be conjectured) 
on the only wager available, namely linguistic and cultural 
assimilation. The results of the 1970 census and official
84 A study has revealed that Komi women at least are more 
fertile than Russian women (including those resident in 
the Komi ASSR). The standardized fertility index of the 
Komi women was 58% above the RSFSR average (cf. 29.4% 
in the case of Russian women resident in the Komi ASSR). 
Zdravookhraneniie Rossiiskoi Federatsii 1972, no.2, p.7.
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pronouncements on population developments contain innumerable
indications of the official hope that while the number of
Russians may decline, that of Russian-speakers will increase.
This seems a forlorn prospect. The number of Russian-speakers
is increasing at a more satisfactory rate. But the difference
for the time being is marginal, and not enough to indicate
a trend. The number of Russians, as was mentioned earlier,
dropped from 54.6% to 53.4% between 1959 and 1970. The number
giving Russian as their native tongue also dropped in the
same period, from 59.5% to 58.7%. The fact that this decline
is smaller than the other, and that the number of non-Russians
giving Russian as their native language showed a solid
absolute increase seems scarcely sufficient to warrant optimism.
And in conditions where the great Russian language is being
ceaselessly extolled, it may well be that this modest increase
is more indicative of a stiffening of national resistances
8 5than anything else. In any case, the nationalist speaking
86the colonial language is a sociological cliche. Official 
Soviet pronouncements on numerical population developments
85 For a different view on this and related issues, see 
Rein Taagepera, 'The 1970 Soviet Census: Fusion or 
Crystallization of Nationalities?' in Soviet Studies 
XXIII (1971) no.2, p.216. For another analysis, see 
R. Szporluk, op.cit.
86 Cf. Walker Connor; 'Care must be taken not to confuse 
assimilation regarding overt characteristics, such as 
language and dress, with psychological assimilation; 
advances in the former need not be accompanied by 
advances in the latter.' 'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', 
p.20. Warnings against overestimating overt compliance 
with assimilatory norms seem particularly apposite to
the Soviet case. It is, of course, also true that 
spreading Russian may have the paradoxical result of 
further facilitating contact among speakers of Turkic 
languages who might otherwise have found communication 
slightly more difficult.
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show in fact a considerable degree of bemusement, and a 
strong tendency to evade issues, by seeking refuge in what 
are really sociological rather than demographic statistics 
(i.e. the number of doctors and hospital beds per head of 
population, the number with higher education in this year 
and that year and so on)j
The present situation confronting Soviet Russian 
policy-makers in the nationalities sphere is rather like 
that of a thrifty woman seeking to patch holes in a patchy 
pair of trousers using patches drawn from those trousers 
themselves. To prevent exposure at one point involves 
the necessity of exposure at another. In such a situation, 
it is evident that there must be an allocation of priorities.
The behaviour of the Soviet government to date, however,seems to 
suggest that it has not fully grasped this fundamental truth; 
or, alternatively, that population policy considerations 
are still given low priority. They have made onerous 
population investments (to avoid the already pre-empted term 
'demographic investments') in areas where the interest rate 
is negative, and where the only final net yield is likely to 
be trouble. It is true that they have shown themselves 
eager to populate their crucial western and far eastern 
border areas as well. But whilst in the west they are forced 
to proceed with some caution because of the keen resentment 
felt by the autochthonous Baltic populations, in Siberia 
and the Far East, where the demographic and political threat 
is more external than internal, their policies have misfired, 
and sponsored immigration has been rendered virtually nugatory 
by spontaneous emigration. To the external observer, it 
would seem that they are also confronted by a danger that 
a band of continuous non-European (and largely Moslem) 
settlement might redevelop right across from the North
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Caucasus area to the Turkestan-Sinkiang border. With the
impending reKalmuckization of the Kalmuck ASSR on the north
88coast of the Caspian, only Astrakhan oblast, with its 
solid Russian majority is left holding the lines. Developments 
in the Turkic (both Moslem - Tatar and Bashkir and non- 
Moslem - Chuvash) and Finno-Ugrian autonomous republics in 
the Volga-Urals area are not wholly without their dangers 
either. This area is only separated from the north of 
Kazakhstan by a narrow neck of territory formed by Orenburg 
and Chelyabinsk oblasti where there are modest but by no 
means negligible non-Russian minorities. 'Elemental' 
migratory tendencies in the area would need to be kept 
under control. Presumably this much is being done.
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about current 
demographic trends in the context of the nationalities issue 
is the way in which certain Asian peoples vanquished long 
since, are now staging a revival, and by virtue of economic 
advance coupled with demographic dynamism reasserting a 
claim to some part at least of the lands in which they were 
once the masters, regaining thanks to the pax sovietica 
what they once had been forced to cede in military defeat.
87 See the national composition by republic, ASSR and 
oblast of the relevant regions in Itogi, vol.IV.
88 Sovetskaia Rossiia, 20 May 1971. Between 1959 and 
1970, thanks in substantial measure to the return of 
Kalmucks from Central Asia following their rehabilitation, 
the Kalmuck percentage of the Republic's population
rose from 35 to 41% while the Russian component fell 
from 56 to 46%. Even if few of the remaining 27,000 
Kalmucks outside the Kalmuck ASSR were to succeed in 
returning, the greater demographic dynamism of those 
already there should make them a simple majority at least 
by the early 1980s.
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Where previously the demographic strength of economically
weaker peoples tended to be held in check by warfare and other
Malthusian checks stemming from conditions imposed on the
losers, currently the reverse applies. Political and economic
strength no longer imply demographic strength; quite the
contrary. In the context of multi-ethnic states this may
lead to curious results. In the international arena a similar
development is being observed, but there national military,
economic and strategic considerations may, at least in the
short term, prevent the growing populations of Latin America
or Asia from generating any corresponding increase in political
weight. But not all these considerations need be relevant in
the case of multi-ethnic states. If the non-white component
in the US population were to rise from its present 12% to
25% or 30%, say, and its incidence to be largely reconcentrated
in a relatively few states, would this, politically, be a
89matter of indifference? Obviously the American system is 
more conducive to minority politicking in many ways. But 
the American system does not as a matter of principle seek 
the relatively more rapid social and cultural development of
89 The example has been chosen because of its capacity 
to stimulate the imagination. The conditions stated 
are quite unreal. Fertility differentials between white 
and coloured in the USA are actually much less than those 
between European and Moslem in the USSR, and on present 
indications appear likely to diminish further. See 
'Family Size and the Black American', Population Bulletin, 
vol.30, no.4.
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the minority peoples in the way that the Soviet system 
90does. Moreover, it deprives ethnic minorities of their 
language with an alacrity and lack of effort that must 
excite the keenest envy in Moscow.
It would seem that the importance of the problem 
of the nationalities in the Soviet Union will grow at a speed 
at least commensurate with their demographic advance; and 
that the major problem area in the future will be Soviet 
Central Asia. It is ironic that this should be so, when, 
numerous brutal episodes notwithstanding, the record of 
Tsarist and Soviet administration has been better there 
than in most other places. And it is, of course, thanks 
to the relative Soviet tolerance of linguistic and cultural 
heterogeneity and their efforts at least partially to bridge 
the gap in development between different parts of the country, 
that the necessary bases for Central Asian 'nationalism of 
a new type' exist. A relatively good record, however, has
90 There has been a tendency recently for per capita GNP 
differentials between the republics to increase; and 
less emphasis is placed in official statements on 
equalization, and more on rational utilization of 
productive forces. Nonetheless capital redistribution 
continues on the whole to favour the poorer republics 
and were it not for their more rapid population growth 
and lower productivity, this would find greater reflection 
in relative per capita growth rates. For further discussion 
of these problems see H.-J. Wagener, 'Die RSFSR und die 
nichtrussischen Republiken: Ein ökonomischer Vergleich'
in Osteuropa Wirtschaft II (1969), p.113; V. Bandera 
and Z. Melnyk, The Soviet Economy in Regional Perspective 
(New York, 1973), esp. Chap.7, 'Regional Differences 
in Incomes and Levels of Living in the USSR' by Gertrude 
E. Schroeder; P. Wiles, 'Recent Data on Soviet Income 
Distribution', Survey, vol.21, no.3, pp.36-7;
V. Holubnychy, 'Some Economic Aspects of Relations among 
the Soviet Republics' in E. Goldhagen, op.cit., pp.50-120.
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not yet been an effective guarantee for any colonial power.
As pressures build up in the Central Asian demographic
cauldron, several things might conceivably happen. As the
indigenous element in the cities grows and competition for
jobs (with competence in Russian one of the factors) grows 
92with it, Russian re-emigration from the area may set in
amid harsh feeling all around (as has happened in Kosovo in 
recent years, where the Serbian population, originally in 
significant measure a political immigration, has been stagnating 
in the last decade because of net migration losses). Apart 
from the local impact of any such denouement, which can 
readily be imagined, it may have the effect of sharpening 
Russian distaste for ‘Asians', already reported to be running
91 Compare the following dictum of Shibutani and Kwan:
'In many cases subjugated peoples have enjoyed material 
advantages as a result of the contact, but they have 
invariably dwelled upon the indignities'. T. Shibutani 
and Kian m . Kwan, Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative
Approach, quoted in Robert A. Lewis et al. 'Modernization, 
Population Change and Nationality in Soviet Central 
Asia and Kazakhstan', Canadian Slavonic Papers 1975^ 
nos 2-3, p.300.
92 Competition for jobs (particularly in industry) and 
discrimination against Central Asians on linguistic or other 
grounds have already been frequently commented on. See the
evidence cited, for example, in Teresa Rakowska- 
Harmstone, Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia: The
Case of Tadzhikistan (Baltimore, 1970), pp.286-88; 
and V. Holubnychy, 'Spatial Efficiency in the Soviet 
Economy', in Bandera and Melnyk, op.cit., p.6. Rywkin 
has challenged this view, emphasizing that Central 
Asians are often in fact given preferential treatment 
to maintain nationality quotas in particular spheres 
of activity. This practice, however, does not appear 
to apply to industrial labour; nor probably does it 
benefit the vast proportion of Central Asians who do 
not know Russian. M. Rywkin, 'Religion, Nationalism 
and Political Power', Canadian Slavonic Papers 1975, 
nos 2-3, pp.278-79. See also footnote 9, above.
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high in the wake of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the rather
heady propaganda that has sometimes been circulated in
93connection with it. This in turn might be expected to 
have a strong impact on the Soviet Russian view of the world 
in general, leading quite possibly to some measure of 
reorientation towards Europe and the West. Perhaps we are 
already witnessing something of the sort in detente (if for 
different reasons). Moscow might also respond by effecting 
a closing of ranks among the European or possibly the Slav 
or simply Russian element in the population, as during
93 Instances are quoted, for example, by P. Berton in 
'The Border Issue: China and the Soviet Union',
Studies in Comparative Communism, July-October 1969, 
p.137. The Chinese appear to have been the first to set 
this particular fuse alight: cf. H. Brahm, 'Pekings
Spiel mit der Rassenfrage' in Osteuropa XV (1965), p.813. 
See also H. Salisbury, The Coming War between Russia 
and China (London, 1969), passim. It would appear that 
the blanket definition of 'Asian' to include Soviet 
Central Asian peoples as well as Chinese is something 
with which Soviet Asians are prepared to identify. 
Shafarevich writes: 'More than once - and it has
happened to more people than me - I have had occassion 
in our Central Asian cities to hear the cry "Just 
wait till the Chinese come - they'll show you* 1."'.
I. Shafarevich, 'Obosoblenie ili sblizhenie?' in A.I. 
Solzhenitsyn et al. Iz-pod glyb (Paris, 1974), p.97. 
Shafarevich goes on to remark that the kind of people 
who say it are usually 'not totally uncultured' people, 
the kind who ought to know what would happen to them 
should they ever have to suffer the rigours of Chinese 
nationalities policy. They know, and yet it makes no 
difference to them, just as it made no difference to 
those Ukrainian nationalists and others who collaborated 
with the Nazis against the Soviet Union and were later 
themselves arrested en masse. He also refers to samizdat 
proposals to solve the national question by extensive 
deportations, and ponders why history has taught people 
so little. Unfortunately the remainder of his essay 
suggests (like his use of the term 'our Central Asian 
cities') that history has not taught him all it might 
either.
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World War II, perhaps too, with some of the same religious 
and traditionalist concessions. This, one suspects, if 
coupled with an appropriately reformulated 'Soviet' 
traditionalism could appeal much more strongly to the 
Russian population than the rather watery ideology they 
are being offered at present.
Alternatively, if the Europeans on the whole were 
9 4to stay, and the Central Asians were to be forced to seek 
work in European USSR (something which they have been extremely 
reluctant to do voluntarily), their eventual appearance in 
rather large numbers in the cities of European USSR might 
lead to tensions of a different sort. Soviet Europeans are 
not likely to love them very much more than the Swiss, for 
example, love their economic immigrants. The result might 
be similar to that triggered by the arrival of coloured 
Commonwealth immigrants to liberal, tolerant England. An 
'unshakable brotherhood' line would surely be maintained 
at first, but if popular resentment of the newcomers rose to 
high enough levels, it might well find tacit approval in 
the same way that popular anti-Semitism does now. The 
overall result might be much the same as in the paradigm 
described earlier in which the Central Asians stayed at home 
and the Russians returned: growing indigenous socio-economic
strength in Central Asia and growing European resentment 
of the Central Asian peoples both there and elsewhere.
Even if five to 10 million Central Asian workers were to 
make their appearance in the European parts of the USSR by
94 Given the growing demographic pressures on arable land
and the labour market in the area, it is of course quite 
possible that indigenous outmigration could occur in 
the future irrespective of what the European settlers 
should choose to do.
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the 1990s, their numerical preponderance in their homelands 
would not be materially altered. Such a situation - with 
large but demographically not dominant settlements of 
colonizers in the colonies, and large minorities of the 
colonials in the (still-ascendant) metropolitan country - 
wauld probably be without precedent in the history of European 
colonialism. Elsewhere, in Britain, France and Holland, for 
example, the main influx of racially distinct colonials began 
flowing into the metropolitan country only after the sensitive 
issue of national independence had been resolved. Thus if 
the Central Asians do migrate in substantial numbers to the 
European parts of the USSR/ we will have, so to speak, 
a potentially Wolverhampton situation at home, and a Salisbury 
situation abroad, simultaneously. What the cumulative impact 
of such a combination might be can only be a matter of 
speculation at this stage. It may be that race relations in 
the USSR are inherently better than elsewhere (though I doubt 
it); perhaps they lack some of the key stigmata of racial, 
as opposed to ethnic tensions (though again I doubt it); 
and the Soviet Union may conceivably display superior 
political wisdom or a greater degree of efficient ruthlessness 
in handling the situation. But the situation itself will be 
structurally unique. It is difficult to escape the conclusion 
that in this matter discretion would be the better part of 
wisdom; that the Soviet authorities should at least ensure 
that only limited numbers and selected sociological samplings 
of Central Asians ever arrive in European USSR. In respect 
of this objective, at least, the regime is as well-equipped 
as any that has ever existed. But it may prove beyond them 
to hold the Central Asians in their own republics through 
the 1980s and 1990s without accepting widespread unemployment 
there.
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In general, few viable policies seem obviously
available to help forestall the dangers implicit in the
present differential ethnic growth rates. The current line -
avoiding wholly overt Russian chauvinism while pursuing
mildly repressive policies in respect of nationalist threats
as they arise, furthering intermingling in the hope of
95thereby spreading assimilationist trends, imposing the 
use of Russian wherever possible in schools, journalism, 
science and public life, maintaining and within demographic 
limitations increasing the Russian physical presence in all 
the Union Republics (outside the Caucasus), making the means 
of family limitation available and hoping the Central Asians 
will sooner or later come round to using them, speaking 
meanwhile loudly and often of fraternal relations, Soviet 
patriotism, and, hopefully, of an emergent Soviet people in 
the singular - though it may be the product of inertia, 
bemusement, stalemate or lack of imagination or concern, may 
not nonetheless be the worst alternative. More pessimistic 
and more optimistic prognoses of future trends in Soviet 
policy both suggest themselves as plausible up to a point.
Perhaps the greatest danger inherent in the 
situation is the possibility of further radical deterioration 
of the Soviet polity. Soviet constitutionalism is a tender 
plant, but the cautious re-Stalinization of recent years
95 Furthering intermingling between the different ethnic 
groups - though often proposed as a palliative or cure 
for racial tensions - seems at best a hazardous treatment. 
If it succeeds, it of course succeeds; but if it does 
not succeed, it must inevitably make things worse.
Cf. Connor, 'Intergroup contacts are at least as apt 
to lead to increased discord as they are to mutual 
understanding: a review of ethnopolitical history
strongly suggests discord is the more likely'. 'The
Politics of Ethnonationalism', p.20.
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notwithstanding, it would probably be true to say that for
the first time in Soviet history, established ways of doing
things are starting to emerge, group interests of a kind to
be regularly affirmed, and the place of experts (including
social scientists) recognized. The present de facto Soviet
constitution seems to debar riding too rough-shod over the
interests of any one major nationality, for instance. It
also debars Russification that is both brutal and overt,
repression on purely racialist or nationalist lines without
ostensibly non-racialist or non-nationalist justification, or
the preservation or fostering of economic inequality between
nations and republics. This fragile rule of law wears very
thin at certain points and is sometimes openly flouted with
institutional authority, as the World University Games
96excesses of 1973 illustrate. And in general, the case
of Soviet Jewry would seem to suggest that the society is
currently generating both elite and popular needs for a
convenient and ethnically more or less visible scapegoat.
If and when Central Asian industrial workers come to live
cheek by jowl with Slavs and others in European cities of the
USSR, and not in their traditional quarters in the cities
97of Central Asia they may well assume certain of the Jews'
96 According to reports (Newsweek, 3 September 1973, p.24), 
the sweat-suited vigilantes who threw their weight around 
at the Israel-Cuba basketball match were supplied by
the army. Cf. also M. Agurskii, 'Neonatsistskaia 
opasnost1 v Sovetskom Soiuze1, Samizdat article published 
in Novy Zhurnal no.118 (March 1975), p.199.
97 It would appear that there is not a great deal of ethnic
intermingling in the residential areas of Central Asian 
cities, though unequivocal evidence on the point is not 
available. See Robert J. Osborn, Soviet Social Policies: 
Welfare Equality and Community (Homewood, Illinois, 1970), 
p.261-2. See also T. Rakowska-Harmstone, op.cit., p.275; 
Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire: The Turks of Central Asia
and Stalinism, 2nd ed. (New York, 1967), xxiii.
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social functions, particularly if large numbers of the 
latter were to emigrate. As both the intense idealism and 
the intense hostility towards the capitalist enemy seem to 
have largely disappeared from Soviet communism, it is in 
need of psychological and emotional fuel to recharge its 
batteries and restore some of its earlier dynamism. Once 
resident in European USSR in sufficient numbers, whilst 
presumably pressing for more voice in their own homelands, 
the Central Asians could be the kind of part-scapegoat, part- 
real-but-manageable-enemy that could encapsulate and serve 
as a convenient focus for anti-Chinese sentiments and 
anxieties.^
The liberal alternative in anything seems unlikely 
in the Soviet Union at present. But this may be only a 
transient perspective. In any event, at least as far as 
the Central Asians are concerned, relative liberalism may 
make pragmatic good sense in the context of foreign policy. 
Reference was made earlier to the propaganda war that has 
been raging across the Sino-Soviet border with both sides 
aiming at influencing the national minorities of the other. 
While this does not affect all the peoples involved equally, 
as long as the two sides continue to be adversaries, certain 
limits are placed on their conduct of nationality policy
98 It should be remembered, however, that scapegoating
requires a consciousness of overwhelming superiority.
This is more likely to be felt by the popular masses 
than their rulers in the kind of situation that has 
been adumbrated. Any Soviet government, however 
chauvinist, would remain aware that bad ethnic relations 
at the centre would strain the political situation at 
the periphery (where the hypothetical metropolitan 
minority would, of course, be a solid majority). For 
this reason, they would be fearful of applying Black 
Hundreds methods to the 'Asians'; would be, that is, 
as long as political modes remained more or less rational.
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in the vicinity of their common border. The Soviets have
shown particular tenderness towards the small community
of Moslem uighurs (most of the 179,000 of whom are recent
refugees from China), even allowing them to publish large
amounts of various kinds of literature in their Arabic
script, a most significant, and, one would have thought,
risky deviation from their usual linguistic policy in Central 
99Asia. The Chinese, meanwhile, are proceeding to Latinize 
their Uighurs as a countermeasure.'*'^ Though the Chinese 
have shown considerable sensitivity about the members of 
their minority groups having been, as they always allege, 
abducted across the border by the Soviets, demographic reasons 
at least would suggest that on the whole, this is an area of 
policy in which the Soviet Union has the lesser freedom 
of manoeuvre. The Chinese minorities only amount to some 
5% of the total population of the CPR; and the relative 
overall proportions are likely if anything to change in favour 
of the Han Chinese. The latter, moreover, are having and 
will have little difficulty in demographically swamping the 
minority areas adjoining on the Soviet Union. The Russians 
have pursued similar resettlement policies, but if one of 
their purposes in doing so has been to achieve demographic
99 See Osteuropa XXI (1971), no.12, p.A749-53 for excerpts 
from three most interesting articles about the Uighurs 
which appeared in the Soviet German-language paper 
Freundschaft. For a recent review of the role of the 
Uighurs in Sino-Soviet relations, see R. ?ilde-Karklins,
1 The Uighurs between China and the USSR* 1, Canadian Slavonic 
Papers, 1975, nos2-3, p.346.
100 See Current Scene, vol.XI, no.12, pp.19-20.
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dominance in Central Asia, they will manifestly not succeed.
In this situation they may perceive that it is in their 
interest to make a virtue of necessity by keeping their 
nationalities positively happy as well as fostering disaffection 
among the minorities on the other side of the border. If 
so, they may then find it expedient to give the Central 
Asians more say in their own affairs; they might also decide 
to refrain from hindering tendencies towards national 
consolidation among the Turkic peoples of the area, possibly 
even sponsoring a little more international and internal 
Moslem religious activity than has hitherto been permitted.
The Soviet leadership seems to be aware that the 
most dangerous time for any government is when it begins to 
improve. However they may formulate this adage in their 
own minds they are unlikely to forget its wisdom completely 
within a generation or so of 1956. If they do opt for 
liberalism in their nationalities policy, it is likely to 
be restricted geographically to the areas of greatest need.
And of course, the three alternatives of continued immobility, 
liberalism and neo-nationalist radicalism, are only three 
cardinal points within a multitude of possibilities. Actual 
future policies may well prove to be a hybrid of them or of 
others I have failed to anticipate. All I have been concerned 
to do was sketch some possibilities which seem to be inherent 
in the present situation, in order to bring out the full 
importance of contemporary demographic trends.
201
3.b(iii) A note on ethnic assimilation in the Soviet Union
At several points in earlier discussions, I have 
made reference to assimilation tendencies within the Soviet 
Union without systematically elaborating. This, of course, 
is another enormous subject in itself, but perhaps it would 
be useful to briefly summarize some of its main features as 
they affect, or are likely to affect, the relative numerical 
strength of the peoples of the USSR.
It has been pointed out earlier that the regime does
in fact pin a good deal of hope on the beneficent workings
of assimilation processes. It has also been indicated that
the main sources of Russian 'converts' are the Ukrainians and
Belorussians, and in lesser measure, various other mainly
European national groups, notably the Finno-Ugrian peoples.
It was noted that the proportion of people identifying
Russian as their native language was declining more slowly
than the proportion of people identifying themselves as
Russians. Russian is being pressed on the national minorities
102to an increasing degree. Particularly determined attempts
are being made to expand Russian-teaching especially as a 
second language, but also, de facto, as a first language at
101 For a thorough discussion of assimilation trends in the 
USSR (not updated to embrace the 1970 census results, 
however) see B. Silver, 'Social Mobilization and the 
Russification of Soviet Nationalities', American Political 
Science Review, vol.68 (March 1974), p.45.
102 For a discussion of the relative position of Russian 
and the minority languages in Soviet education, see 
B. Silver, 'The Status of National Minority Languages 
in Soviet Education' in Soviet Studies XXVI (1974), 
no.l, p.28. The minority languages appear in general to 
be losing ground in the sphere of book and periodical 
publishing as well. Rywkin, however, reports an increase 
in circulation of Central Asian language newspapers. 
'Religion, Nationalism and Political Power', p.275.
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points where resentment and resistance is weakest or most
fissiparated (in Dagestan schools, for example, where the
multitude of local languages provides reinforcing practical
103reasons for the move). Census materials are always
presented in such a way as to underscore the importance
and popularity of Russian as the (a) language of international
communication in the Soviet Union and beyond, as the language
of science and culture, and also as an adopted language.
Much sociological research on nationalities problems is now
104being organized, within which a good deal of attention 
is devoted to the subject of mixed marriages, whose incidence,
it is always emphasized, is increasing greatly. 105 No less
a person than Brezhnev himself has commented on the importance
106of this beneficent development.
103 Sovetskaiia pedagogika no.6, 1972, p.40-6.
104 Istoriia SSR, no.l, 1970, p.222, reported the creation 
of a Scientific Council for Nationality Problems within 
the USSR Academy of Sciences. The new Council's stated 
areas of research interest betray a clear policy 
orientation. In general, the quantity and quality of 
sociological writing on nationality questions advanced 
considerably in the late 'sixties and early 'seventies.
105 Most of the mixed marriage studies and statistics that 
have been published relate to Caucasian or Central Asian 
areas, where high indices are bound to be recorded. While 
there are obviously good scientific reasons why this 
should be so, the strong official interest in the subject 
makes one wonder whether it is entirely accidental.
See, for example, Trud, 22 October 1965; Sovetskaia 
Etnografiia 1971 no.4, p.80; and no.6, p.112;
Izvestiia AN Turkmenskoi SSR Seria Obshchestvennikh nauk 
1969, no.5, p.16; Sovetskaia Etnografiia 1967, no.4, p.137.
106 In a speech in celebration of the fiftieth anniversary 
of the establishment of the USSR - Kommunist 1972,
no.18 (December) p.15.
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There is a very large degree of wishful thinking
or displaced anxiety in the confident assertiveness shown
in Soviet press comment on this subject. In fact assimilation
trends hitherto have not been particularly favourable to
the Russians, certainly not when one considers their dominant
position in the Soviet Union as a whole. The Ukrainians and
Belorussians have always been a good source of additional
Russian increase. It may well be that they are now 'defecting'
in smaller numbers than they did in the 1920s and 1930s
(between the 1926 and 1939 Censuses, the number of Belorussians
increased much more slowly than that of the Russians, and the
107Ukrainians registered a 10% decline; some of this
difference may have been due to the greater damage inflicted there
by the collectivization and subsequent upheavals; but much
of it may also have been due to assimilation). The decline
in the proportion of Belorussians and Ukrainians who gave
their national language as their native language between the
1959 and 1970 Censuses is significant (from 84.2 to 80.5%
108and 87.7 to 85.7% respectively), but the absolute numbers 
of native-speakers continue to show a solid increase and 
in the case of the Belorussians, the rate of increase of 
Belorussian-speaking Belorussians is only slightly slower 
than the overall increase (including assimilation gains) 
of Russians. Neither nation is showing any signs of 
disappearing as is not infrequently suggested, although both 
are obviously exposed to great pressure and a real, if 
long-term, threat.
107 cf. Lorimer, op.cit., p.138-39.
108 Itogi, vol.IV, p.9.
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Few other major nationalities have registered
similar declines of native speaker proportions within their
ethnic group totals over the same period. Of the 22 nationalities
numbering over one million, the only other such exceptions
are the Germans, the Jews and the Poles. The Germans, it
should be remembered, are exposed to particularly repressive
cultural conditions as well as physical dispersal, and may
well feel, moreover, that not to give Russian as their
native language would be unusually imprudent. The Poles form
a bizarre exception among the major national groups in that
they tend to give as their native language the language of
their host nationality rather than Russian or Polish: in
the Ukraine, more than four times as many give Ukrainian as
either Russian or Polish, whilst in Belorussia, the corresponding
109figure is roughly six times as many. As for the Jews,
they are, of course, the classic illustration of how 
fallacious it can be to mechanically identify language 
with ethnic identity. Over four-fifths are now self-declared 
native-speakers of Russian with results in terms of ethnic 
identification that we read about daily in our newspapers.
In Central Asia, the chances of large-scale 
assimilation seem virtually zero. The native peoples' command 
of Russian is (outside parts of Kazakhstan) worse than 
anywhere else in the Soviet Union, and their devotion to their 
own language as measured in the proportion of people giving 
their own national language as their native language, higher. 
Though much is made of the allegedly high incidence of mixed 
marriage in the area, there is good reason to suppose that
109 Itogi, vol.IV/ p .152-53, p.192-93. See the discussion 
of the Soviet Polish minority in Ch. 4.e.
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the great bulk of it is between European and European or 
non-European and non-European.110 Cross-cultural intermarriage 
is certainly increasing, but from such low levels as to be 
virtually negligible outside a few urban centres - where it 
is minor. Rather significantly, the great bulk of the 
cross-cultural marriages are between indigenous men and 
European women.111 There is evidence that the offspring 
of these marriages more frequently identify themselves as
indigenes than as Europeans. 112 There tends to be a large
measure of informal apartheid in Central Asian cities (the
113only place where assimilation has any chance at all),
110 For an excellent discussion of the whole problem, see
Ethel and Stephen P. Dunn, 'Ethnic Intermarriage as an 
Indicator of Cultural Convergence1 * in Soviet Central 
Asia', in E. Allworth, op.cit., p.45.
111 887 Turkmenian men married non-Turkmen women in Ashkhabad 
in the period 1950-62, but only 162 Turkmenian women 
married non-Turkmenian men. Izvestiia AN Turkmenskoi 
SSR Seriia obshch. nauk, no.5, 1969, p.16. Not 
surprisingly this same pattern is repeated in all parts 
of Moslem USSR where analogous statistics are available.
112 A study in Dushanbe revealed that 82% of adolescents 
in families with a Tadzhik father and Russian mother 
adopted the father's nationality. A.V. Kozenko and 
L.F. Monogarova, 'Statisticheskoe izuchenie pokazatelei 
odnonatsionalnoi i smeshannoi brachnosti v Dushanbe', 
Sovetskaia Etnografiia, no.6, 1971, p.112.
113 Cf. note 97 above. See also Wheeler, Racial Problems, 
Ch.6. Ethnic mingling has not, of course, taken 
place on a very significant scale in rural areas 
either, a fortiori (as the rural figures for knowledge 
of Russian among indigenes and similar statistics bear 
out). The earlier frontier mingling of Russians and 
steppe-dwellers seems to have no modern equivalent.
See Bennigsen and Lemercier-Quelquejay, op.cit., 
pp.197 and ff.
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dating from Tsarist times, when the tendency was to build
separate cities for the European settlers away from the
existing ones. The Russians seem to have the usual European
knack of not endearing themselves to non-Europeans. It
seems unlikely that floods of mutual passion will suddenly
be undammed by exhortatory Kazakhstanskaia Pravda editorials.
The most that could reasonably be hoped for in the distant
future, one would have thought, would be decorous relations
marked by a kind of some-of-my-best-friends tolerance. Had
the cultural repressions of the 1920s and 1930s been directed
more towards language and had they been followed up by
resettlement programes, the regime might have achieved a
better distribution of Russian-speakers among the Central
Asians (as it has done, for example, with the displaced
114Koreans of Central Asia); but this would not necessarily
mean assimilation. Very probably the racial factor introduces
additional barriers whose surmounting cannot be measured
by linguistic affiliation anyway. If the Central Asians
are to be viewed by the Europeans as an inferior people, i.e.,
if tensions are to be more racial than national, intermarriage
will always produce more Central Asians no matter what language
, 115the progeny speak.
114 Well over one third of the Koreans in Kazakhstan gave 
Russian as their native language (and only a negligible 
proportion Kazakh) at the 1970 Census. Itogi vol.IV, p.223.
115 'The powerful fictions invented through application of 
a descent principle are further demonstrated by the 
treatment of children of mixed marriages. Regardless of 
phenotype, such children are affiliated with the racial 
group of the lower-ranking parent.' Marvin Harris, 'Race', 
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol.13 
(New York, 1968). Harris is speaking of the United States. 
The Soviet Central Asian situation may develop differently, 
but this remains to be proved. Compare also Walker Connor's 
conclusion that 'The progeny of ethnically mixed marriages
do not necessarily exhibit less national consciousness 
than do either of their parents; they often exhibit more.' 
'The Politics of Ethnonationalism', p.21.
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Even in the Baltic states, where Russification seems 
to be making great inroads, and where the racial factor is 
absent, assimilation trends are not all in the one direction. 
Taking all three republics together, we find 36,192 self- 
identified members of the respective titular nationalities 
giving Russian as their native language, whilst 18,671 
Russians give one or other of the Baltic languages as their 
native language. These figures are difficult to interpret 
with confidence. But they are consistent with substantial 
degrees of assimilation away from Russiandom as well as to 
it. And whatever their precise meaning, they diverge sharply 
from the equivalent pattern in Belorussia or Moldavia. It 
may be, in other words, that if Russia is to dominate the 
Baltic states, it cannot rely on assimilation processes to 
do the work for it unaided.
Among the numerous minor (less than one million) 
ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, the degree of linguistic 
tenacity displayed in recent years is no less surprising 
than their demographic expansion. Few apart from the Finno- 
Ugrian groups have shown declines of more than a few decimal 
places in the proportions giving the national language 
as their native one in 1959 and 1970. In many cases, that 
proportion has actually increased. Here, too, on present 
indications, the sources of potential Russians are small as 
a proportion of the whole, and almost negligible in absolute 
terms.
The spread of fluency in Russian to wider sections 
of the Soviet population and tie growth of ethnic inter-marriage
116 Itogi, vol.IV, p.273, 280 and 317; the arithmetic is
mine.
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may bring certain benefits including perhaps greater cultural 
tolerance and stability to the Soviet Union. There is little 
reason at present to expect that they will set up a landslide 
of assimilation that could counteract the demographic 
landslide in the opposite direction. And they are least 
likely to precisely in those regions where counteraction, 
from a Russian point of view, is most required.
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3.c International Politics 117
Now it is true that international migration is 
not an important factor for the Soviet Union, 
though it has been so at times for Tsarist Russia.
(...) But there can hardly be any doubt that 
migration would help to solve some of China's 
economic problems, and if directed towards the 
Soviet Union it might also help in the development 
of that country's Far Eastern areas.
In proceeding on the assumption that differing rates 
of population growth may be relevant to the relative power 
positions of the nations concerned, I should perhaps emphasize 
that I am not thereby attributing any very definite importance
117 In the following discussion I have for the most part 
avoided reference to the existing literature on the 
connections between population and international 
politics. Thus far this literature has been limited 
in large measure to occasional essays and reflections 
and has perhaps for this reason accumulated relatively 
few undisputed maxims, other than those that were in 
any case largely familiar to most thoughtful students 
of international politics. (For some typical essayistic 
contributions, see, for example, the chapters by Quincy 
Wright and Kingsley Davis in P. Hauser (ed.) , Population 
and World Politics (Glencoe, 1958), and Hauser's own 
'Demographic Dimensions of World Politics', in L. Mudd 
et al. (eds) The Population Crisis and the Use of 
World Resources (The Hague, 1964). The significant 
new work that has been done in this area (see the 
discussion in Ch.l,b, and in notes 40 and 41 to Ch.l) 
has not yet, I believe, reached the point of producing 
new truths and maxims of universal applicability.
From an account by a Western observer of the Soviet 
participation in the 1954 United Nations Population 
Conference in Rome. Soviet Studies VII (1955-56),
pp.220-21.
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to military manpower as such. In the age of mutual assured
destruction, mere numbers may be of limited value, if not
obsolescent. Insofar as they are not, the Soviet bloc seems
to have them for all relevant purposes. For much of the 1950s
and 1960s the tendency seems to have been to reduce numbers
in the Soviet armed forces. While this undoubtedly
reflected Khrushchov's personal views as well as extreme
shortages of young manpower as the depleted World War II
birth cohorts entered workforce and military age, it was
surely of some significance that the decision was taken to
prefer economic to military use of the available manpower
reserves. And when the need seemed to arise, in the late
1960s, the Soviet Union was able to quickly raise its forces
(including manpower) on the Eastern border to such effect
that the Chinese shortly thereafter felt constrained to seek
new and powerful friends. In any case, projections indicate
(rather surprisingly) that Soviet prime-age military manpower
120will go op increasing until 1984, by which time manpower 
as such may be even less important in the military context; 
whereas ip the case of the economy, Western experience seems to 
suggest that technological advance as such does not necessarily 
reduce the demand for labour.
119 Compare the table presented in Feshbach and Rapawy, 
op.cit., p.520-21.
120 E. Brubaker, 'The Opportunity Costs of Soviet Military 
Conscripts', in Soviet Economic Prospects for the 
Seventies, p.167.
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The military-strategic aspects of population
growth are both highly technical and problematical. For both
reasons I would prefer to couch the discussion in more general 
121terms. In an age of mutual deterrence, margins of overkill
may not be of inherent strategic importance; but because 
of their psychological impact, it is often argued, they may 
seem so, and therefore become so. Similarly, though it may 
be difficult to foresee in what way differential densities, 
magnitudes or rates of growth of population might affect 
the outcome of any armed conflict between, say, USSR and 
China, it is clear, that they are likely to be felt to be 
of importance, if the numbers involved are large.
Extremes in population growth may also cause or 
contribute to changes in relative economic potential if 
trends are maintained over a period of time. While rapid 
population growth is held to be an obstacle to economic 
development, it is evident, for example, that if, say, by 2025,
121 I am assured by competent experts on strategic studies
generally, and on Soviet strategic thinking in particular, 
that very little advanced theorizing exists on the 
connections between national population size and military 
capability in the nuclear age. It is significant, perhaps, 
that the most thorough discussion of linkages between 
population and international conflict (Choucri's 
Population Dynamics and International Violence) devotes 
relatively little attention to this point, and appears 
not to cite any military opinions. The Australian National 
Population Inquiry devoted just one paragraph and one 
footnote to security implications in its official 
Report released in 1975, despite the fact that Australia's 
exposed position as an 'underpopulated' continent is 
almost proverbial. The Australian Defence Department 
did not, apparently, present any submission to the 
Inquiry. See Canberra Times, 15 March 1975, p.2.
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122East Germany is still languishing at its 1946 level of 
18 million while Poland has increased its population from 
23 million to 50 million, there is likely to have been a 
shift in their relative economic weight in favour of the 
latter that is at least partly due to the manpower factor.
The size of a country's population is, in any 
case, an important element in determining relative prestige. 
And this is an element which makes itself clearly felt in 
demographic writing at all levels throughout the Socialist 
bloc. Where other forms of national expression are inhibited, 
Olympic Gold Medals or census results may acquire an even 
greater significance. And though the Soviet Union (or, if 
one prefers, Soviet Russia) has relatively greater outlets 
for nationalism, it too is susceptible to the prestige aspect 
of population growth.
Finally, in the case of the relationship between 
the Soviet Union and China (if not Japan), there is the 
question of whether population pressures building up in one 
country are not bound sooner or later to 'spill over' into 
another, thereby unleashing political or military conflict. 
Here again we are dealing with what are ultimately still
122 A ZPG advocate might say a more appropriate word than
'languishing' would be 'flourishing'. Here as elsewhere 
in this essay, however, I would prefer to avoid discussion 
or criticism in terms of the possible effects of population 
growth of current East European dimensions on pollution, 
resource exhaustion etc. I am doing so partly because 
these arguments remain for the present somewhat problematical; 
and partly because they are virtually never raised by 
Socialist economic or political demography.
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imponderables, though ones about which a great deal has been
123and no doubt will be written.
Having drawn these blurry guidelines, it remains 
to consider the Soviet Union's position in terms of them.
It seems clear, to begin with, that population trends as 
between the Soviet Union and either Eastern Europe or the 
West are unlikely to exert much influence on the course of 
events in the immediate future. The demographic strength 
of the Moldavians is obviously not irrelevant to the future 
of Rumanian-Soviet relations. Some Poles may feel an important 
moment has been reached if and when they overtake (numerically) 
the Ukrainians. As the number of home-born Poles grows in 
the Western Territories, the hopes of German revanche grow, 
perhaps, ever slimmer. The brief period in which the US 
population seemed to be overtaking the Soviet one raised
123 See, for example, E. Stuart Kirby, The Soviet Far East
(London, 1971), p.ixv: 'Still deeper, more primitive or
primary motivations underlie the matter. 800 million 
Chinese, rising soon to over 1,000 million, are in dire 
need of Lebensraum; in the direct sense of more land 
for settlement of huge numbers, or the less direct sense 
of access to natural resources which would sustain China's 
industrialization. One of the simplest and most immediate 
directions in which the Chinese may look...is the whole 
area called Siberia, largely unpopulated and with huge 
untapped resources.' It is not a disqualification of this 
kind of view to demonstrate that the density of China's 
population is less than that of Europe, or that migration, as 
a solution to overcrowding, is likely to be economically 
more expensive and demographically less effective than 
domestic birth control measures (cf. N. Keyfitz,
'Migration as a Means of Population Control', Population 
Studies, vol.XXV (1971), p.63). For it is sufficient 
that either the Chinese or the Russian leaderships be 
deceived by such a 'great illusion' for it to become an 
effective influence on the course of events.
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something of a flutter in the breasts of some US demographers -
12 4and their Soviet counterparts no doubt. But basically,
taking the USSR, the USA and East and West Europe as blocs,
their relative positions of strength seem destined to remain
the same insofar as demographic factors can influence the
outcome. The fertility decline in the USSR has been matched
by that in East Europe (and, after a pause, by that in West
Europe and the USA as well). If the Soviet Unon can no longer
place itself at the top of developed countries population
increase league-tables as it still could when the 1959 Census
125results were published, this is a prestige item of 
predominantly domestic significance.
To the south of the Soviet border, demographic 
trends seem more or less matched on the Soviet side, and the 
Russian core of the USSR (i.e. the RSFSR) is not in any case 
exposed. Moreover, there are no major political threats 
stemming from that quarter. One can conceive of a Persian 
Pan-Iranianism aspiring to expanded relations with Soviet 
Tadzhikistan or a Pan-Turanianism reaching out from Turkey
124 See, for example, J. Brackett and J. De Pauw, 'Population 
Policy and Demographic Trends in the Soviet Union' in
US Congress Joint Economic Committee: New Directions
in the Soviet Economy (Washington, 1966T~, p. 60 7-10.
125 Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda: 
svodny tom SS~SR (Moscow, 1962) , p. 280, contains a league 
table of curiously heterogeneous composition, with USSR 
and the major capitalist countries arranged in descending 
order according to their natural increase rates per 
thousand in 1961. The USSR heads the list. It has 
evidently been found possible to dispense with this 
table in publishing the 1970 Census results.
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to Yakutia which might be more than mere nuisance value in 
12 6the future. But neither is likely to be created by extra-
Soviet demographic trends alone, nor perhaps even exacerbated
by them. To be effective, they would depend heavily on
demographic and other domestic developments within Soviet
Central Asia itself. If the latter were not conducive,
external pressures from the South would probably not amount
to much. In any case, the Soviet Union would not be wholly
bereft of possible counter-measures.
This leaves Siberia and the Far East. Here one
has on the one hand the USSR struggling to get its numbers
up but in vain; and on the other China straining intermittently
127to keep its numbers down, but also experiencing difficulties. 
Then there is Japan, a country with a relative surplus of 
population and capital, and by tradition eager to find a home 
for both if the conditions are right. The similarities 
between the Soviet situation and that which has produced 
the Australian psychological syndrome of 'the vast unpopulated
126 Some observers believe that there is a possibility that 
a unified Turko-Iranian Moslem state might emerge in 
Soviet Central Asia were circumstances propitious.
This argument is based on the fact of extensive bilingualism 
among the Iranian speakers in the area, and the common 
historical and cultural traditions which the two groups 
of peoples share. See 0. Caroe, Soviet Empire, p.xxii.
127 Cf. note 132, below. Of course, China is not eager to 
reduce her numbers in the area bordering on the Soviet 
Union, where, reportedly, the latest anti-natalist 
rigours are not applied, and where in any case the Chinese 
government is bent on greatly increasing the Han Chinese 
component by fostering in-migration. (On this latter 
point, see M. Freeberne, 'Demographic and Economic Changes 
in the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous Region', Population 
Studies, vol. XX (1966-67), p.103.)
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north' and 'populate or perish' are very striking. Australia,
however, does not have 60 million of its potential adversaries
12 8living adjacent to an exposed strip of strategic territory.
The vital question here is whether or not population 
pressures are bound to or likely to issue forth into political 
conflict. And secondly, if so, whether relative manpower 
strengths are likely to affect the outcome of any future 
conflict. In other words, once the Chinese have achieved the 
level of nuclear deterrent sufficient to constrain the USSR 
from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against them, 
will their relative manpower superiority be a crucial factor? 
There are far too many issues involved in these questions for 
even a sketch summary to be worth attempting. In any case 
they exceed this writer's competence. Perhaps it is enough 
to say that the USSR feels it to be of the greatest importance 
to build up and populate its border areas with China. A 
Council of Ministers decree of May 1973 offered special 
financial and other inducements (including the promise of 
motor vehicles specially suited to primitive border terrain)
129for settlers prepared to go and live along the Chinese border.
If anything like population parity throughout the area is aspired 
to, however,.official hopes must be doomed to frustration.
128 It is interesting and perhaps symptomatic that Soviet
scholars are apparently not unaware of certain parallels 
between Australia and Siberia. cf. Jukes, op.cit., 
Foreword.
129 For the text of the decree see Sobranie postanovlenii 
no.13,1973.
217
It could perhaps be achieved locally in some of the less 
habitable parts of the Asian hinterland, but certainly not 
in the Far East section of the border. There, and in general, 
the demographic trends in favour of the Chinese are so 
colossal as to paralyse the imagination. This may be worth 
bringing out with a few rough statistics relating to overall 
population (in the absence of official regional breakdowns 
for China). They cannot be anything other than rough, 
since most people, including Chinese politicians, tend 
to be a few years out of date with their Chinese population 
estimates; and those estimates themselves are unlikely to 
be very precise.
The entire Russian (i.e. not Soviet) increase 
between 1959 and 1970 (which, it will be remembered, probably 
includes a solid element of assimilation) is, on a fairly 
cautious estimate, only about the same as the current annual
130 Until very recently, the figure of 700 million has
still been in official use though all observers agree 
that the real figure must be least in the vicinity 
of 800 million if not more. Huang Shu-tse, China's 
chief delegate at the UN Population Conference in 
Bucharest in 1974, asserted that the Chinese population 
had increased from 1949 by 60% 'to nearly 800 million' 
in 1974. If earlier official statistics were correct, 
however, a 60% increase would have made the Chinese 
population about 880 million by 1974. See Current Scene 
XII (1974) no.10, p.19. This is only the latest 
of a long series of outdated or misleading statements 
made by high-level Chinese spokesmen. See, for example, 
John S. Aird, 'Population Policy and Demographic Prospects 
in the People's Republic of China' in US Congress Joint 
Economic Committee: People's Republic of China: An
Economic Assessment (Washington, 1972), pp. 238 , 2 76 , 288 
and passim. A member of the Press party which toured 
China with the Australian Prime Minister in 1976 reports 
that the figure of 900 million was often used by Chinese 
spokesmen as an estimate of national population. John 
Shaw, formerly Time correspondent in Moscow (personal 
communication).
increase in China; and unlike the latter, it is positively
132known to be declining fast.
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131 The Russian increase 1959-70 was just under 15 million.
To give an estimate of annual increase for China's 
population is a hazardous undertaking. Two of the leading 
authorities on the subject, Leo Orleans and John Aird, 
suggest widely disparate figures for 1974, Orleans 
proposing a rate of 1.4% (Current Scene XII, no.3, 
p.15), and Aird 2.2% (Aird-] op. clt ~  pT326) ; Aird's base 
figure, moreover, would be much higher. Orleans arrives 
at a net annual increase of about 11.2 million, whereas 
all of Aird's four variants are in excess of 20 million. 
Orleans' reasoning seems slightly more engage' than 
Aird's and one suspects it may reflect in some measure 
either his own optimism or that of the Chinese officials 
he spoke to. In any case, a compromise figure of 15
or 16 million seems not unreasonable for the purposes 
of the exercises which are about to follow. See also 
P. Paillot and A. Sauvy, 'La Population de la Chine', 
Population, May-June 1974, p.535.
132 It is curious the extent to which all kinds of people 
are inclined to credit the Chinese with spectacular 
successes in fertility control. The Chinese themselves 
seem more cautious about their own claims, as is 
illustrated by their extraordinary action in trying to 
suppress all data relating to their population in the 
UN publications prepared for the Bucharest World 
Population Conference. Many of the assertions that have 
been made by local Chinese spokesmen are plainly nonsense (e.g. birth rates of 5 per thousand mentioned by J. Parsons 
in Planet, 22 August 1974; Planet was the unofficial 
Conference newspaper at Bucharest) and cast doubt on
the validity of all the others. One would have thought 
the only statement about Chinese population that can be 
made confidently and exactly is that very little is known.
For two comprehensive accounts of the evidence available, 
see Aird, op.cit., and Leo Orleans, Every Fifth Child 
(London, 19/2). For a shorter general survey, see, for 
example, 'China: Population in the People's Republic',
Population Bulletin XXVII (1971) no.6. Recently there 
have been reports of new and more stringent population 
control measures in China (Sydney Morning Herald,
20 September 1973, p.4). Even if the reports are reliable, 
however, and the measures successful in their object 
(enforcing the two-child family on all parents, willing and 
unwilling), this will not dramatically affect relative rates 
of natural increase much before the end of the century, as 
China's demographic dynamism is largely a function of its 
youthful age-structure. Again, the draaticness of these 
measures would seem to suggest that the successes claimed 
thus far in reducing fertility were exaggerated. For an 
up-to-date review of the vexed question of China's 
population size and the reliability of estimates concerning 
it, see Leo Orleans, 'Chinese Population Figures: Can
the Contradictions be Resolved?' Studies in Family Planning, 
vol.7, no.2 (February 1976), p.52.
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The total population of West and East Siberia and 
the Far East (some 25 million in 1970) could probably be 
exceeded by the Chinese in natural increase in about a year 
and a half, give or take a month or two.
The Chinese could accumulate a natural increase 
equal to the entire Russian population in less than a decade 
even if we assume a large decrease in estimated current 
levels of natural increase between now and the end of the 
decade, and take the Russian figures for the end of it rather 
than the beginning.
It should be noted that there is nothing known to 
demographic science that would enable the Russians to 
materially alter this situation in the foreseeable future; 
though the trend could well become or be later proved to 
have been more unfavourable. Even if the Soviet government 
were to adopt a pro-natalist policy of Rumanian severity, 
and even if we were to assume that it would be equally 
successful (and there are reasons for doubting this), it 
would thereby only elevate its fertility to a level which 
would probably still be well below current Chinese crude 
birth rates. After the initial surprise effect had worn off, 
there would probably be a rapid decline back to about half 
the present Chinese levels (within five years or so), and 
the prospect of further decline.
Little is definitely known about the Chinese 
population other than that it is very big, and probably
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increasing rather fast. There has been no census since 
1953/ and official statements tend to be conflicting, non­
technical and sometimes inherently implausible. Estimates 
attempted by outside sources for 1970 range between 753
million and 871 million. For 1980 preferred projections by
13 3these same sources range between 887 and 1,060 million.
It seems to me obvious that these figures at least 
must be disturbing to the Soviet leaders. While their 
precise political or military meaning is extremely difficult
133 See the juxtaposition in Population Bulletin XXVII 
(1971) , no.6, p.23.
221
134to assess, the probable Soviet attitude towards them can 
be more readily conjectured. They have been quoted here 
because they form a crucial part of the Soviet geo-political
134 One's hesitancy on precise evaluation of the population 
factor in Sino-Soviet relations is not shared by all 
observers: 'In extensive but preliminary statistical
analyses of Chinese and Soviet Russian reactions to each 
other's capabilities and power over the past 20 years, 
we found that Soviet conflict behaviour toward the 
People's Republic (defined in terms of actions and 
events and measured systematically over time) is 
associated first and foremost with the size of the 
Chinese population rather than with indicators of 
technological growth and economic development. The 
correlation between Russia's actions toward China and 
the size of the Chinese population is .71... At the 
same time China's behaviour toward the Soviet Union is 
strongly associated with the Chinese population size.The correlation is .86.' '...The correlation between
China's violence behaviour toward the Soviet Union and the size of the Russian population is .89...' (Robert 
C. North and Nazli Choucri, 'Population and the Inter­
national System: Some Implications for United States
Policy and Planning' in Governance and Population, vol.
IV of the Report of the US Commission on Population 
Growth and the American Future, p.266.) If 'preliminary 
analyses' are capable of producing such impressive 
precision of judgement about what some might have 
regarded as imponderables, then the non-computerized 
among us can presumably only join the Russians in quaking 
before the inevitable. However, queries do suggest 
themselves. What counts as evidence of Soviet awareness 
of Chinese population size and increase rates and vice 
versa? Is the course of the Sino-Soviet split related 
to the (virtually non-existent) Chinese demographic 
statistics available at that period, and if so, in what 
way? Tantalizingly we are offered no details of how 
these and other problems were overcome. A footnote 
(no.82) tells us that further details on the matter will 
be published in North's The Foreign Relations of China 
(Belmont, 1972). But a perusal of that work, as of 
several other publications by Choucri and North has not 
yielded any explanations.
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context, if one that is usually left implicit.
It is surprising that the military have not yet 
apparently made any very great public contribution to the 
demographic debate. A passage in a recent book by Boris Urlanis 
might even be read as a reproach to the military, or at least 
as an attempt to secure their support for an active population 
policy.
All this indicates that neither at present nor, 
it would seem, over the next decades, will human 
resources cease to be an essential element in 
the military potential of a country. Indeed, 
as technology develops and becomes more complex, 
the role of the fighting man will increase still 
further.
From the foregoing it follows that defence 
interests cannot remain indifferent to the flow
135 For more detailed surveys of that context, see E. Stuart 
Kirby, op.cit., and W.A. Douglas Jackson, Russo-Chinese 
Borderlands (New York, 1962) (a work the more remarkable 
in that it antedates clear evidence of the Split).
136 The point that 'other things being equal, a country's 
position in the world is determined by the size of its 
population' has been made explicitly by the forceful 
Soviet demographic commentator, V.I. Perevedentsev,
'Prodolzhenie spora', Literaturnaia Gazeta, no.12, 1968. 
Perevedentsev calculates that i£ existing-growth rates 
are maintained, the USSR, from constituting 8.6% of the 
world's population in 1940, will have declined to 5% 
by the beginning of the 21st century. Ia. Guzevaty, 
'Population and World Politics', Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn', 
October 1967, translated in Studies in Family Planning 
No.49, January 1970, at p.6. is even more candid, referring 
to the 'senseless territorial claims of the present leaders 
of the Chinese People's Republic' in the context of 
'the notorious living space theory earlier adopted as 
an idedogical weapon by the German, Italian and Japanese 
fascists'. Usually the nameki are a little more oblique 
than that.
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of demographic processes (interesy oborony ne
mogut stoiat' v storone ot techenia demograficheskikhprocessov).137
Perhaps when the Russo-Ukrainian Soviet officer 
corps begins to be confronted by recruit detachments, a good 
quarter of which are comprised of representatives of the 
Moslem peoples, they will become more energetic in their
137 B. Urlanis, Problemy dinamiki naseleniia SSSR (Moscow,
1974), p.27. The slightly stilted Russian no doubt 
reflects the delicacy of the subject matter. A rare 
contribution to the demographic debate by someone 
identified with the armed forces (a staff-member of the 
Lenin Military Academy, in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo 
1975, no.l, pp.34-5) makes no reference to either the 
question of military manpower or the inter-ethnic balance.
Of course, it may well be that these matters are adjudged 
so delicate that all reference to them in the military 
context is either avoided or suppressed. In this connection, 
a remark made by the sociologist Levada in a sociological 
house journal is of particular interest: 'When the Supreme
Soviet passed the new military law (voennyi zakon),
Marshal Grechko, in explaining the reasons for the change 
in call-up age, said that it ensured that young 20-year- 
olds would return to civilian life which would in turn 
have a favourable effect on family relations. This 
factor, as we can see, is also taken into account, and 
it is natural that specialists, in particular military 
specialists, are interested in the normal development of 
the population'. Iu. A. Levada, 'Lektsii po sotsiologii' 
in Informatsionnyi Biulleten, no.2 (Moscow, 1969), 
p.123-4. cf. footnotes 10 8 and 268 to Ch.5, below.
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support of the demographic lobby. 138
138 The data on age-structure by nationalities given in 
Itogi, vol.IV, make calculation of future military 
contingents by national group rather difficult. Data 
are not given for the lesser nationalities except by 
republic. Also the use of a break-down for 0-10 rather 
than 0-4 and 5-9 (as is used in vol.II) makes it more 
difficult to compare the depleted Slavic cohorts of the 
later 1960s with those of the Moslem peoples. The section 
giving age-structure by nationality in vol.IV is arranged 
chiefly with a view to demonstrating that the younger 
members of the various nationality groups display a 
greater proficiency in Russian than their elders. No 
doubt all of this is accidental. So to resort again to 
more primitive calculations: the Moslem peoples, it was
said earlier, numbered some 35 million in 1970. Their 
natural increase in the intercensal period had been of 
the order of 3.1 to 3.2% per annum. Assuming that this 
increase rate was declining towards the end of that period, 
let us take it that by 1970, their natural increase rate 
was roughly 26 per thousand. This implies an average 
annual birth rate of some 33 per thousand. For a total 
population of 35 million, this would give a Moslem birth 
cohort in 1970 of just over one million. The total 
number of live births in the USSR in 1970 was 4.225 million. 
These calculations probably err on the side of caution.
And as the absolute size of the Moslem populations 
increases, of course, unless there is a sharp fall in 
the birth rate (not to be excluded; it has already 
occurred in Azerbaidzhan), the Moslem/non-Moslem 
proportions in annual birth cohorts would be further 
swayed in the Moslems' favour.
225
3. d Ideology
Actual population trends since World War II have
wrought havoc with the Stalinist version of the Marxist 'laws'
of population. Marx's original pronouncements on the subject
were sporadic, unsystematic and conveniently flexible.
Basically, he had held that population movements were dependent
on the underlying socio-economic reality: that different
patterns might therefore be expected to prevail in different
socio-economic systems; that overpopulation was a purely
relative thing; that, in the capitalist context, overpopulation
was no more than an ideologically-distorted apprehension of
the reserve army of the unemployed; and that with the demise
of capitalism, the 'problem' of overpopulation would disappear.
Though he declared that different laws of population were
applicable to different systems, Marx in fact confined his
attention to capitalism. He seems to have been inclined
to assume that the numerical growth of the 19th century was
likely to persist, but he wisely refrained from dogmatic 
139commitment.
140Not so his Soviet successors. In the 1930s
as the capitalist countries experienced sharp declines in
139 For fuller discussion of Marx and Engels' views on 
demographic matters, see Ch. l.c., above, and the 
literature cited therein.
140 For further discussion of the evolution of Soviet 
idedogical attitudes on population matters, see Ch.l.d., 
above.
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birthrates, they drew the inference that higher rates of 
growth must be one of the essential features of socialist 
population development. And finding Marx's polemical outbursts 
against Malthus strangely congenial, they petrified their 
slightly obsessive accusations into base dogma: that there
could never be any absolute overpopulation; and that fertility
14control was unnecessary and to enjoin it upon people 'barbaric'
142and 'cannibalistic'.
Whatever plausibility the Stalinist 'law of population' 
may have had in the 1930s, it was decisively rebutted by the 
course of vital events after 1945 as (a) Western birth rates 
rose substantially in most countries; (b) Soviet bloc birth 
rates, after initial resurgences, fell; and (c) Third World 
natural increase rates slid inexorably upward from high to 
higher, and future world population estimates began to resemble 
science fiction.
The Soviet idological response to all this was a
Pauline immobility till about the mid-sixties; then in
14 3late 1965 a sudden switch to a more flexible line was
141 A Soviet delegate to the UN Population Commission in 
1947 used this term in the course of asserting that 'with 
an adequate social organization, it is possible to face 
any increase in population'. Quoted by Petersen, 
Population, p.635.
142 The word is Khrushchov's. Pravda, 8 January 1955.
143 'Sudden' here should be understood in a relative sense
of the term (if that is semantically possible). Articles 
and even official statements cautiously hinting at the 
existence of a world population problem had appeared 
before. The American UN diplomat, Richard N. Gardner, 
commenting on the course of the debate in the General 
Assembly in December 1962 on the 'Population Growth and
(cont.)
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negotiated.144 Ideological statements on the subject since
143 (cont.) Economic Development' resolution, makes the
following observation: ‘This Communist line [needless
to say: anti-Malthusian, J.F.B.] was poorly received 
by the Assembly. At least one representative of a less 
developed country chided the Soviets for favouring 
planning in all sectors of economic life except the 
human sector — the one most important in its implications 
for economic and social growth. [This 'planning' 
argument is now often used by Soviet demographers 
for various purposes, J.F.B.] The negative Soviet 
statement in the population debate was followed by a 
significant shift in the Communist line. When it came 
time to vote, the Soviet bloc did not oppose, but 
merely abstained on the General Assembly resolution.
What is even more surprising, the Soviet representative 
at the recent meeting of the Economic and Social Council 
commended the United Nations for its work in the population 
field, agreed that population growth is an urgent problem 
for less developed countries, and announced the willingness 
of the Soviet Union to provide technical assistance in 
the demographic field.' Gardner goes on to suggest, 
rather surprisingly, that this change in line may have 
been connected with Khruschchov's alleged personal 
interest in the dangers of overpopulation. As of 1961, 
Khrushchov had still been an emphatic anti-Malthusian 
(see the statement attributed to him in Filosofskaia 
Enhsiklopediia 1964, vol.III, p.549). Gardner does not 
cite any source on Khrushchov's change of heart, but he 
may of course be right. Gardner's comments are contained 
in an essay entitled 'The Politics of Population' 
published in L. Mudd et al., The Population Crisis and 
the Use of World Resources (The Hague, 1964), p.355.
For other evidence of waverings and second thoughts 
before 1965, see, e.g., p. Mouches, Demographie (Paris, 
1964), p.208; D. Morison, 'Recent Soviet Interest in 
Population Problems of the Developing Countries',
Mizan, vol.9 (1967), pp.183-4; and footnote 146, below. 
Nonetheless, it would seem that the decisive break­
through came only at the time indicated (late 1965 to 
early 1966, when efforts began to be made by official 
sources to publicize the new trend in official thinking, 
and a consistent pattern in UN voting emerged (on this, 
see J. Brackett 'The Evolution of Marxist Theories of 
Population: Marxism recognizes the Population Problem',
Demography, vol-V (1968), no.l, p.167 and 171-2).
144 The shift emerged clearly in a series of articles on 
world population problems published in Literaturnaia Gazeta
(cont.)
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then have been rather more pragmatic, though strong traces
of the old myths persist, and have evidently not entirely
145lost official favour. To what extent they continue to
bedevil constructive thought at the policy-making level is 
not clear.
It is fascinating to speculate on which factors 
were most decisive in bringing about the change of line.
Many were undoubtedly involved. As already noted, theory 
and reality had been split far asunder. But this in itself 
was unlikely to have forced a change. One element clearly 
involved was the belated recognition that Third World countries 
increasingly preferred to receive assistance from the UN 
or elsewhere to keep down their populations rather than 
be reassured that they had no problem and that all they
144 (cont.) nos 133, 139, 142 and 152 for 1965; and nos.
23, 27, 62 and 68 for 1966. The change of line was 
widely commented on in the West. See, for example, the 
articles by Brackett and Morison cited in note 143.
See also Robert C. Cook, 'Soviet Population Theory from 
Marx to Kosygin: A Demographic Turning Point?' in
Population Bulletin XXIII (1967), no.4. S. Kra^ovec,
1Stihijnost ili kontrola kretanja stanovnistva',
Stanovnistvo VIII (1970), p.5, provides an interesting Yugoslav view.
145 See, for example, 'Nas 250 millionov', Sovety Deputatov 
1973, no.9, p.20-1, for an interview with the Deputy 
Director of the Central Statistical Agency, L.M. Volodarskii, 
in which Volodarskii suggests that the Soviet population 
('we') is growing rapidly, and refers contemptuously
to attempts in 'bourgeois' countries to 'frighten' 
people with the prospect of overpopulation and starvation. 
The Central Statistical Agency has in fact been the 
stronghold of demographic conservatism in the USSR 
throughout recent decades. In this connection it is 
perhaps significant that Volodarskii headed the Soviet 
delegation to the World Population Conference in 
Bucharest in 1974.
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need be on their guard against were scheming Malthusian 
146sterilizers. Soviet-type social reforms had by then
been urged on them for at least a decade as a remedy for
all ills (including population pressures) with only partial
success. More and more Third World countries, meanwhile,
147were going over to the Malthusian enemy. It was high
time to hedge bets and cut losses. In this connection, it 
is most interesting, and probably significant, that the
146 Cf. notes 143 above and 147 below. For a comprehensive 
account of trends in world opinion as reflected in 
politicking and debates at the UN and its agencies,
see R. Symonds and G. Carder, The United Nations and the 
Population Question 1945-1970 (Sussex University Press, 
1973).
147 See Br la. Smulevich, 1Demografiia i politika' in
A .G. Volkov (ed.), Voprosy demografii (Moscow, 1970), 
pp.29-31. Having characterized the earlier Soviet 
posture on population matters and the advice Soviet 
commentators traditionally gave to Third World countries, 
namely to forget about population policies and concentrate 
all their efforts on social and economic reforms,
Smulevich says bluntly: 'This incorrect and inflexible
position often harms us politically.' Though it is 
clear from the context that Smulevich is thinking 
principally about the international arena, it is 
significant that he should also have found it necessary 
to remind his readers in this same context that the 
traditional line, in citing Soviet experience as a 
model for emulation, ignored 'the inappropriateness 
of using average data for the Soviet Union as a whole', - 
a delicate allusion to the political damage being done 
within the Soviet Union by differential rates of 
population growth.
Another hint that the pressure to revise policy came 
from those concerned with or about relations with Third 
World countries can be seen in the fact that one of the 
first Soviet spokesmen to sound a liberal note on 
population issues at the UN was a Soviet diplomat 
stationed in New Delhi and seconded to a UN Population 
Conference held there in December 1963. See Symonds 
and Carder op.cit., p.136-7.
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break came just after the Belgrade World Population
Conference of 1965, to which the Soviet Union sent a large
delegation. While the fact that the USSR sent a delegation
of 27 (compared with one of 3 at the previous World Conference
in Rone in 1954) might be taken as suggesting that a change
of line was already in the process of taking place, it seems
likely that those who were present were impressed by the
pressure of international and Third World opinion and later
fulfilled an at least catalytic role in bringing about the
politico-ideological reorientation. It must have been
becoming increasingly embarrassing to the Soviet authorities
on such occasions that they were rubbing shoulders almost
exclusively with Spains and Portugals, and finding even
148Latin American spokesmen moving to their left.
Another event at the Congress which might conceivably 
have made an impact on the Soviet delegation was a paper 
presented by Roderich von Ungern-Sternberg on the consequences 
of future population growth in (among other places) China. 
According to the published abstract of his paper, he argued 
that:
...Thus the people of China will continue to 
suffer heavy population pressure, and, in 
times of poor harvests, shortage of food.
History demonstrates that such conditions can
148 It should be borne in mind, of course, that although 
the USA has been one of the strongholds of neo- 
Malthusianism, governmental attitudes took a very 
long time to evolve in the same direction. It is 
possible that the US Government's entry onto the scene 
of financial aid for population programs and the positive 
response to these initiatives by many Third World 
countries was another factor forcing the USSR to revise 
its dog-in-the-manager stance. For the evolution of 
official US policy, see Symonds and Carder, op.cit., 
esp. pp.92-6 and Chs 10-12.
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easily degenerate, causing an explosive exodus 
towards countries offering attractions to 
space-starved and hungry people. Such a 
movement may take place...peacefully if access 
to suitable countries is open to them. But it 
can also degenerate into a military migration.149
What the Soviet delegation thought of this paper 
is not, to my knowledge, recorded. But it is very possible 
that similar thoughts had been occurring to the Soviet 
political leadership for some time past. In the context 
of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the ideological shift again 
came at a significant time. The first fully public airings 
of dissension had occurred not long before, in 1963. Then 
with Brezhnev's accession in 1964, there was a brief period 
in which it seemed that some kind of accommodation was being 
sought, after which, however, the Chinese reaffirmed their 
attitude towards 1Khrushchovism without Khrushchov'. It 
was shortly after this again that the Soviet government 
let it be known unequivocally that it was no longer necessarily 
opposed to fertility control campaigns in underdeveloped 
countries. It is not being suggested, of course, that the 
Soviet Union may have varied its position in the hope of 
somehow affecting the course of demographic events in China; 
merely that political and population developments in China 
in combination exerted some influence on their overall frame 
of mind. Soviet ideology had always been basically optimistic 
about general economic and social trends in world development. 
China's joining the Socialist bloc made all kinds of 
international statistics seem like dramatic confirmation 
of the spread of Socialism. (Even today, Soviet reluctance
149 United Nations World Population Conference 1965, 
vol.II, p.61.
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to abandon hope for Chinese socialism is nowhere more
150evident than in statistics). Two articles which appeared
151in Literaturnaia Gazeta early and late in 1965 (before 
and after the ideological shift) neatly illustrate the 
change that seems to have occurred in official thinking 
somewhere in the interim. The first was ostensibly a 
comment on a typically neo-Malthusian piece that had 
appeared in Readers' Digest. The author of the comment, 
one Cheprakov, conceded that in some parts of the world 
population growth was a serious problem at present. But 
with social and economic reforms, he assured his readers, 
the 'unlimited1 capacities of science and technology would 
speedily solve it. The article contained strong denunciations 
of capitalist Malthusians and bore the splendidly characteristic 
title 'A Threat - but for Whom?' Equally characteristic 
were the author's limited interest and uncertain competence 
in basic demography; and his special field of academic 
concern, which was described in an editorial introduction 
as contemporary monopoly capitalism. The second article, 
by the demographer Boris Urlanis, was in effect a not very 
muted polemic against the first. It treated the population 
problem at length and with considerable seriousness, 
mentioning China as having the highest absolute annual 
increase of population in t^ he world, and supplying illustrative 
statistics. From the article, the impression emerged that
150 See, for example, Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR v 1972 g ., 
p . 84.
\
151 'UgrozaL No komu?' Literaturnaia Gazeta, 13 March
1965; and 'Sushchestvuiut li prpblemy narodonaseleniia?1, 
Literaturnaia Gazeta, 23 November 1965.
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Urlanis agreed that there was a threat but was agnostic 
as to whom it could most affect. The note of strident self- 
confidence and pugnacity that radiated from Cheprakov's 
article was wholly absent from Urlanis's.
Another element which was maturing jin the situation 
during the 1960s, of course, was the population pressure 
within the Soviet Union itself. Rapid, though declining 
Russian increase had always tended to reduce the visibility 
of Central Asian and Caucasian fertility (between 1926 and 
1939, in fact, only four peoples exceeding 100,000 in 
number - of which, at the time there were 35 - registered
152population increase rates higher than that of the Russians). 
Apart from that, the growth of the Asian nationalities of the 
USSR actually began to further increase after about 1950.
As was mentioned earlier, it seems to have been only in the 
1960s that the full scope (if not the implications) of this 
development began to be noticed either in the Soviet Union 
or outside it. There is no clear evidence known to me that 
the turn-about in Soviet population doctrine affecting the 
Third World stemmed from any arriere-pensee as to its own 
domestic explosion. But it does seem inherently likely.
And it is significant, that some of the demographers 
associated with the overturn of the Stalinist dogma on 
population in 1965-66 have also been among those who have 
cautiously raised their voices in favour of a differentiated
152 The Azerbaidzhanis, the Armenians, the Ossetians and 
the Dagestani . peoples (the latter regarded for 
convenience as one ethnic unit). See the table in Lorimer, 
op.cit., p.138-39. It will be recalled that by contrast, 
between 1959 and 1970, of the 23 most numerous 
nationalities, only six registered smaller increases 
than the Russians.
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population policy to damp down the present inter-ethnic
153extremes in fertility. And no less significant perhaps,
that the head of the Census division of the Central Statistical
Agency (the main centre of opposition to the new doctrinal
tendency), P.G. Pod'iachikh, has argued most forcefully
154against any differential population policy.
One other important development connected with 
the change of line was the re-emergence in the mid-1960s of 
a thriving school of Soviet demography, after a recess of 
some three decades. Though the demographers remain scattered 
through various ad hoc subsections of other departments, 
and though their long campaigns for a specialist demographic
153 See, for example, B.Ts. Urlanis, Problemy dinamiki 
naseleniia (Moscow, 1974), p.302-3; D. Valentei, 
Teoriia i politika narodonaseleniia (Moscow, 1967), 
p.163-4.
154 P.G. Pod'iachikh, 'Statistika naseleniia, nauka o 
narodonaselenii i nauka demografiia (o novykh popytkakh 
likvidatsii statistiki, kak obshchestvennoi nauki)‘ 
(Moscow, 1969), mimeograph. In this tract aimed at 
the re-emergent demographic profession in general,
and D.I. Valentei and his associates in particular,
Pod'iachikh makes this trenchant attack on proposals 
for a differentiated population policy: 'This would
mean that large families in Central Asia where the 
standard of living is still lower than in the Baltic 
states would not receive as high allowances, whilst in 
the Baltic states, where the standard of living is 
higher, families would receive high allowances. It is 
easy to see that this arrangement places the peoples 
of the Baltic states and those of Central Asia in an 
unequal position, and is not in accord with the 
existing policy of raising the welfare of all members 
of socialist society.' (p.25). Whatever Pod'iachikh's 
motives in putting this argument, it certainly is one 
that is difficult to refute in Soviet conditions.
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journal and a central demographic institute have not yet
155been rewarded with success, their general level of
activity since the mid-sixties has been impressive.
Khrushchov personally seems to have been an unreconstructed
156vulgar anti-Malthusian, and it is unlikely that the
relevant party authorities could have been readily persuaded
of the need for the radical expansion of academic demography
during his time. It seems probable, therefore, that it
was his political demise that created the kind of open
situation which permitted the atomized demographic fraternity
157to close ranks and apply effective sectional pressure.
Since the watershed year of 1965, the Soviet 
ideological stance on population matters has been more 
flexible, but it has remained ambivalent. Generally it is 
held that the world population problem can only basically
155 Cf. note 183 below.
156 Though compare the suggestion made by Gardner that
Khrushchov may have been converted to a concern about 
rapid population growth (population growth where? 
one wonders) late in life: footnote 143, above.
157 For a brief but evocative description of the development 
of sociology under the new post-Khrushchov leadership, 
see L. Churchward, The Soviet Intelligentsia (London,
1973), pp.119-21. Churchward's account suggests that 
the period of flux in which new alliances and lines of 
influence were being formed lent itself to sectional 
pressure by those eager to institutionalize the new 
discipline. The re-emergence of demography in the 
1960s very probably described a similar course. The 
new leaders seem also to have initially had a slightly 
more receptive attitude towards social science than that
of their predecessors (cf. the Central Committee resolution 
of 14 August 1967, 'On Measures for the Further Development 
of the Social Sciences and Increasing their Role in 
Socialist Construction').
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be solved by thorough-going economic and social reforms, 
but that appropriate demographic policies can make some 
contribution. Accusations of Malthusian cannibalism have 
disappeared, but less drastic hard-line versions continue 
to make their appearance, if less frequently.
Thus, for example, a report on the 1972 ECAFE 
population conference held in Tokyo expresses great distaste 
for the emphasis on birth control introduced into the 
proceedings by US and Western European delegations. No family 
planning programs could 'seriously' affect the level of 
fertility:
When the imperialists were forced to clear out 
of their former colonies they left behind them 
nothing but the poverty and deprivation of the 
masses. And now they are trying everything to 
hinder the economic and cultural development of 
these countries, intimidating them with talk 
about 'the demographic explosion' and seeking to 
persuade them that their poverty stems from 
excessive population growth.158
This small sampling contains several typical 
features of the old Stalinist line: the suggestion that
imperialism is solely responsible for the present-day poverty 
throughout the Third World; the denial that any such thing 
as a 'population explosion' exists; the attribution of 
bad faith and devious cunning to all advocates of family 
planning; the use of the opprobrious term 'birth control' 
to describe it (which in Russian suggests bureaucrats or
158 Ekonomika Sovetskoi Ukrainy, no.3, 1973, p.95-6.
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indeed policemen stationed by the bedroom door); and
Ithe failure to mention DDT or penicillin as having played
or as playing any role whatever. While versions quite as
crude as this one are rare, it would probably be true to say
that Soviet participation in recent international population
politics has been less 'liberal' (for want of a better
word) than the development in the mid-sixties might have
led one to expect. One important reason for this is probably
the somewhat opportunistic and demagogic stance adopted by
China, which, while introducing Malthusian rigours at home,
continues to take the most vigorous 'anti-imperialist' line
internationally, a line which has shown itself to be popular
with some Third World countries at least, particularly in
160Africa and Latin America. The Soviets may feel obliged
in this situation to maintain a 'radical' position.
At the national level, the notion that there is 
a specifically socialist law of population is usually still 
clung to, but its actual content tends to be reduced to a 
few general propositions illustrating growth in popular
159 Cf. G. Gerasimov's most interesting observations on this 
perhaps very important semantic detail in Literaturnaia 
Gazeta no.27, 1966. Anyone who spent any part of his 
post-pubertal years in Stalin's Russia might be forgiven 
for harbouring great suspicion of "kontrol* nad rozhdaemost' 
iu" .
160 For excellent accounts of the political divisions between 
different groups of countries on demographic issues,
see: Jason L. Finkle and Barbara B. Crane, 'The Politics
of Bucharest: Population, Development, and the New
International Economic Order' , Population and Development 
Review, vol.l, no.l (September 1975), p.87; and W. Parker 
Mauldin et al. ‘A Report on Bucharest', Studies in 
Family Planning, vol.5, no.12 (December 1974).
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well-being, the spread of education, high levels of employment 
and so on. Despite the very low birth rates prevailing in 
the RSFSR and the other European republics, attempts are
sometimes still made to present the USSR as a land of flourishing
161fecundity. It should be emphasized, however, that much
of Soviet demography is free of this kind of equivocation 
and claptrap, and addresses itself in a straightforward 
manner to real problems, not hesitating at many points to 
implicitly challenge official policy and suggest modifications. 
Though the reemergence of Soviet demography came well after 
similar developments in the East European countries, and 
although its practitioners have to practice verbal genuflexion 
to a bureaucratic Marxism rather more often perhaps than 
their bloc colleagues, the science is now flourishing 
vigorously.
Thus the picture here, as elsewhere in post- 
Stalinist idology, is one of disarray, with a mingling 
of official pragmatism and dogmatism uneasily poured over 
strong currents of potentially competitive professionalism 
that are alternately dammed and released, and at times channeled 
into use with watchful caution.
161 See almost any of the numerous articles published in 
the Soviet press in August and September of 1973 in 
honour of the arrival of the 250 millionth Soviet 
citizen. From a reading of these articles it emerges 
clearly that the topic was made the subject of a 
mandatory recommendation to editors and that certain 
lines of approach to it were fairly clearly mapped 
out for them.
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3.e. Population Policy; issues and dilemmas
For present purposes, population policy is being 
taken to mean those measures adopted by a government (or, 
where appropriate, party) aimed at affecting the numbers, 
distribution and ethnic composition of the population.
Obviously, as was pointed out in Ch.l, many social policies 
might influence population developments without that having 
been the intention; and many observers include social policies 
with incidental demographic impact under population policy.
Here, however, I shall be speaking about population policy 
in the narrower sense of deliberate and conscious pursuit 
of demographic ends. And given the absence of any clear-cut 
governmental policy line in the USSR at present, the discussion 
will focus on problems and debates concerning policy formulation.
As the power of the state to increase life expectancy 
is limited in normal circumstances and is in any case not 
usually exercised for demographic reasons or objectives,
162 See Ch.l.d. for a historical account of the evolution
of Soviet population policies. For an excellent account 
of the current Soviet population policy dilemma, see 
Helen Desfosses Cohn, 'Population Policy in the USSR' 
in Problems of Communism, July-August 1973, p.41. See 
also David Heer1s valuable articles: 'Abortion,
Contraception and Population Policy in the Soviet Union', 
Demography, Vol.II (1965), p.531; 'Family Allowances 
and Fertility in the Soviet Union' (with Judith Bryden), 
Soviet Studies, XVIII (1966), no.2, p.153; and 'Recent 
Developments in Soviet Population Policy1 in Studies in 
Family Planning, vol.III, no.11 (November 1972) , p.257. 
For an interesting Marxist critique, see S. Kra^ovec, 
op.cit. Since a good deal of work has appeared on 
Soviet population policy, the present discussion will 
take certain things as read and seek to avoid unnecessary 
repetition.
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population policy may be said to boil down to two issues:
(i) pro- versus anti-natalism; and 
(ii) migration policy, both external and internal.
Of these, the secon4 though briefly referred to in 
some sections of this study, has not been made a central 
theme and accordingly attention will be concentrated on the 
first.
A distinction is now always drawn, though it 
should be, between Soviet population theory or doctrine and 
population policy. As they correspond roughly to theory and 
practice, it should be evident that they may diverge; and, 
in fact, in the Soviet case, they have very frequently done 
so. Thus in the 'thirties, while averring at the ideological 
or doctrinal level that Socialism was conducive to high 
fertility, the Soviet Government introduced measures designed 
to prop up fertility which had already begun to sag.
And without dethroning the Leninist pronouncements that 
it was a mother's right to decide how many children she 
should have, or the numerous earlier expressions of concern 
for the damage done by illegal abortion, the authorities 
nonetheless proceeded to promote fertility by abolishing legal 
abortion. Similarly, the mid-'sixties shift in doctrine 
discussed in the previous section did not, or at least has 
not yet led to any reformulation of domestic population policy. 
In the international sphere, the USSR has withdrawn from 
its previous alliance with the Roman Catholic Church, and now 
gives some, if limited, support to UN initiatives in the 
population field. But the approach to the key domestic 
issue - to be or not to be pro-natalist, and if so by what 
means, to what extent, and in what parts of the country - 
remains cautious and apparently irresolute, though a variety 
of opinions and suggestions are being permitted to be heard.
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It would probably be true to say that it is only
recently that the concept of 'population policy' as a
distinct and autonomous sphere of public concern has gained
acceptance in the socialist bloc. Whilst in Hungary,
Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent, Bulgaria, the notion
has been freely in use for well over a decade, and politicians
are prone to speak in terms of it, elsewhere there is
caution. Though Soviet demographers frequently use the
163phrase, Soviet politicians do not.
While the term may be of uncertain status, and 
the practice ambiguous and inconsistent for the time being, 
there can be no doubt that the Soviet Union has followed 
very vigorous and unequivocal population policies in the past. 
After the collectivization disasters of the 1930s, as noted 
in Ch.l.d, the Soviet government abolished legal abortion 
and introduced unmistakeably pro-natalist measures, which 
were further strengthened in the wake of the drastic human 
losses and fertility decline of the 1941-44 period by a 
combination of moral and material incentives strangely 
reminiscent of Stakhanovism. After the war had ended and the 
birth rate evidently (no birth rates were published until 
1950) been restored to acceptable levels, the financial 
inducements were reduced and later left unchanged as average 
wages rose, and thus allowed to decline into relative 
insignificance as a proportion of family income.
163 Nor, in general, do their colleagues in Poland and
Yugoslavia. Thus a recent usage by the Polish premier 
Jaroszewicz, for example, subsumes it under social 
policy and conveys the impression that the speaker has 
suffered it to be added to his baggage without being 
convinced of its utility. Trybuna Ludu, 6 June 
1972, quoted in Studia Demograficzne, no.31 (1973).
For more detailed discussions, see Chs 4, 5 and 6.
There may now be some movement towards more explicit 
discussion of population policy by political figures 
in Poland, Yugoslavia and USSR. See note 189, below, 
and the discussion in Chs 4.g and 5.g.
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The official■attitude towards birth control measures
has usually been divorced, at least ostensibly, from national
population considerations. That this is at least sometimes
disingenuous is clearly demonstrated by the circumstances
of the abortion restrictions of 1936 and the legislation on
164the family that accompanied them. But the fact remains
that there is a strong tradition in Soviet social policy, 
supported by unequivocal and well-known statements by Lenin, 
that it is a woman*s right to decide whether she will or 
will not have a baby, and that this is probably one of the 
factors militating against the present pressures for a more 
active pro-natalism.
There are other and stronger obstacles to decisive 
action on population policy, however. One is that any effort 
to increase fertility involves present sacrifices. Either 
the mothers are to be given financial support sufficient to 
make them want to spend more time raising families than 
working and earning money; or the network of creches 
and kindergartens and other auxilitary services must be 
extended radically so that child-bearing need not interfere 
with the mother's work for more than a few months, and she 
will feel more able to combine the two. Either solution is 
bound to be costly; and if in the short term the first of 
the two is less expensive in that heavy capital outlays 
are not involved, and easier to apply instantaneously, it 
must also be remembered that it involves a greater drain on 
the female labour force if successful. As labour shortages 
are already acute, it is difficult to reach a decision to
164 Cf. Ch. l.d., pp. 90-92 * footnotes 134 to 139.
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plan for more plentiful supplies in the relatively remote
future by accepting aggravation of the shortages of the 
165present. If planners and economic administrators have
somehow contributed to the climate of pro-natalist agitation 
that has been much in evidence in recent years, they probably 
also include in their ranks formidable opponents of any 
solutions involving the expenditure of mpch money, or the 
removal from the work-force of large numbers of young women.
A crucial* if not the crucial, factor inhibiting
166decisive action appears to be the nationality issue.
Economic, social and political reasons would all prompt the 
Moscow leadership to wish to restrain fertility in Central 
Asia and the Caucasus while promoting it almost everywhere 
else. Ideally, of course, they would like to reduce non- 
European numbers while stimulating larger European families 
wherever they might be resident. This second variant is 
scarcely practicable. But even the first seems to have run 
up against political objections. The issue has certainly 
been referred to in public, but so far it would appear that
165 It is interesting to note that in Hungary, where generous 
child-care allowances were introduced leading to the 
withdrawal from the work-force of 80% of those eligible 
to receive it, pressure from industry has led to 
further measures meant to encourage the women to return 
to work. See Radio Free Europe Hungarian Situation 
Report 1976/no.2, pp.9-10. In such a situation, of 
course, where a concession has already been given, the 
only politically and economically acceptable way to 
right the damage is to make a further concession; and 
this appears to have been the course the Hungarian 
government took - giving women the added incentive of 
working for wages and receiving the allowance.
166 Cf. the discussion in 3.b. above, pp.186 and ff.
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no such proposals have been made by ranking politicians,
as opposed to academics and publicists. And as was noted 
167earlier, there is evidence of explicit opposition to any
such proposals in official circles. A recent Kommunist
article celebrating the passing of the 250 million mark steers
a precarious tight-rope course between various possible views
of the situation and commends all in turn, apparently
168contradicting itself more than once in the process.
Though the writer refers only to 'differences of opinion* 
among demographers, one can probably assume, given his 
gymnastics, that the differences of opinion are to be found 
at higher levels as well. The compromise Boldyrev's 
diplomatic equivocation seems to point to on balance is a 
mildly pro-natalist policy, oriented in some way that is not 
made clear towards the low-fertility areas of the country. 
However, the only measures that actually have been taken 
lately (of which more in a moment) do not point in that 
direction. And in any case, after so many years of 
unsuccessful agitation, it is to be expected that any new 
initiatives wrung at last from the reluctant allocators of 
finances will be too parsimonious to have any decisive 
effect.
A further factor involved may be demographic 
ignorance in leading decision-making circles, or putting 
essentially the same point another way, the inability of 
the demographic lobby to succeed in making the leadership 
sufficiently aware of the seriousness of the demographic 
situation. How many Soviet policy-makers are aware of even
167 Cf. note 153, above.
168 V. Boldyrev, 'Dvesti piat'desiat millionov', Kommunist 
1973, no.12, pp.85-87.
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the current state of crude demographic indices by republic?
And how many are able to grasp the difference between net
population increase and more analytic measures of fertility?
Conversations with Soviet bloc demographers suggest that
169ignorance is in fact still widespread.
But a lot of what may look like ignorance could 
of course equally well be bemusement before the complexity 
of the dilemma, coupled with a desire to keep the matter quiet. 
Certainly not the least important aspect of current Soviet 
population policy is the evident official determination to 
keep the unfavourable trends of overall and differential 
fertility away from the public's notice. To some extent we 
are dealing here with the Cheshire cat's smile of the old 
ideological tenet, now half-abandoned, that socialism is 
conducive to fertility and that Socialist populations develop
169 Even official spokesmen on demographic matters sometimes 
convey the impression that they have a less than vivid 
perception of the existing demographic situation in 
the USSR. See, for example, the discussion in Voprosy 
Filosofii 1974, no.11, and in particular, the remarks 
of the prominent Central Statistical Administration 
official (and Pravda commentator on demographic matters) 
Boldyrev. Boldyrev's grasp of demographic realities 
seem at best to be one that might be termed 'bureaucratic 
commonsensism'. The reasons he gives there against 
adopting a pro-natalist policy probably represent a 
good deal of prevailing official orthodoxy. Interestingly, 
he seems to be under the impression that America is 
officially anti-natalist (an evident misreading of the 
politics of the setting up of the Commission on Population 
Growth and the American Future), and believes this to 
reflect official concern about finding jobs for the 
postwar baby boom. 'This,' he concludes, 'is evidently 
the reason for the population stabilization program 
currently being pursued in the USA.1 Boldyrev implies 
that what is good enough for the mighty USA should be 
good enough for the USSR. The ways of detente are many 
and bizarre.
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according to their own immanent and beneficent laws.
In popular articles by government or Central Statistical
Office spokesmen, statistics are presented to the general
reader with the manifest intention of misleading him if 
170possible. Whether this is a measure of the concern felt
or merely force of habit is difficult to say. But the 
tendency to gloss over probably does again suggest that 
no very decisive new policy steps are to be expected for 
the time being.
The measures that have been actually taken in the 
area of population policy recently have the same apparent 
tendency to avoid the most crucial issues. The two main
170 Examples of this could be multiplied almost at will.
In the interview article 'Nas - 250,000,0001' in 
Sotsialisticheskaia Industriia, 8 August 1973, p.4, the 
Deputy Director of the Central Statistical Agency was 
asked what the explanation was for the different rates of 
growth in different regions. The reply ran as follows:
'The areas with the highest birth-rates are the industrial 
centres in the East of the country. This is the result of 
the rapid growth of industry and the large influx of 
young people into these regions. Or take another instance, 
During the period when the Virgin Lands were being 
developed, many workers from all Republics in the Union 
went to live in Kazakhstan. There too new cities sprang 
up and hundreds of settlements were constructed. This 
too affected the birth-rate.'
'One ought not to forget the consequences of the war 
either, [which, he explains, particularly affected the 
population in the contested areas, i.e. the European areas 
In 1942-5 many fewer children were born than before the 
war. That means that the people of that generation will 
also have fewer children. And another serious consequence 
the imbalance between males and females...' etc.
Nearly all the positive assertions are inaccurate or 
inapposite. And in addition the ethnic factor is not so 
much as hinted at. Elsewhere in the article, the 1973 
population is compared with the 1922 one (despite the 
incomparability of the borders) and the reader given to 
understand that the difference (increase of 80%) is very 
large; the increase is attributed to high fertility and
low mortality. Elsewhere again, it is implied that the(cont.)
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ones - the extension of full maternity leave entitlements
171to kolkhoz women irrespective of length of employment,
and the introduction of child allowances for families whose
172total income amounts to less than 50 roubles a head 
both appear to be egalitarian measures of social policy 
rather than population policy as such. Insofar as either 
of them should have a pro-natalist effect (which was probably 
not specifically intended), that effect will tend to be 
greater in those areas of the country where fertility is 
already relatively high. The Central Asian and Caucasian 
areas are both strongly rural and relatively less well-off 
(particularly in terms of family income per head since 
dependency ratios there are much less favourable). It seems 
unlikely that advocates of a planned and differentiated 
policy will be pleased by this development. To them it must 
seem like a dissipation of scarce funds where they are least 
needed.
Given the evident official reluctance to spend too
173much money on population policy measures, the question
170 (cont.) Soviet Union is teeming with 'Heroine-Mothers' in
undiminished profusion, though in fact their numbers are 
declining sharply and disproportionately concentrated in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus.
171 Sobranie postanovlenii, no.18, 1973, item 102.
172 Sobranie postanovlenii, 1974, no.21, item 121. For a 
detailed commentary on this legislation (which, incidentally 
describes and evaluates it purely in terms of social,
and not demographic policy), see V.A. Acharkan, 1 SotsialVio- 
pravovaia priroda posobiia na detei maloobespechennym 
sem'iam', Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo, 1975, no.10, p.34.
Significantly, the new child allowance is only for 
children under the age of eight. Ibid., p.39.
173
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arises whether or not more economical and necessarily
therefore coercive measures might not be resorted to. For
the time being, Soviet policy remains liberal: divorce and
abortion rates exceed and probably exceed (respectively)
those prevailing anywhere else in the Socialist bloc; and
while both are not infrequently deplored, there do not seem
to be any campaigns which would presage their prohibition
174as in Rumania in 1966. Nor has one heard any reports
of withdrawal of contraceptive devices from sale, though
175their use continues to be rare by Western standards.
174 Another declaration of principle (not necessarily
highly official) to the effect that the government would 
not interfere with abortion legislation appeared 
recently in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, no.8 
(V.S. Tadevosian, 'Demograficheskaia politika i pravo', 
at p.24): 'The legal norm banning abortions, issued
without profound study of the demographic situation 
and without due consideration being given to the natural 
causes of natality decline in that period [Tadevosian 
is referring to the 1936 legislation, J.F.B.] could not 
have been sufficiently effective (quite apart from the 
question of principle involved), and accordingly was 
revoked in 1955. In changing the law, the legislator 
correctly pointed out that reduction in the number of 
abortions could better be ensured by further expansion 
of state measures supporting motherhood... From the 
foregoing it can be concluded that in such matters of 
demographic policy, it is essential to apply not 
prohibitions, but rather measures designed to encourage 
a particular pattern of behaviour on the part of citizens 
by improving the nation's living conditions; this 
follows directly from the CPSU's directives that are 
consistently carried out in our country.'
175 See, for example, Henry P. David, 'Abortion and Family 
Planning in the Soviet Union: Public Policies and
Private Behaviour*, Journal of Biosocial Science, 
vol.6, p.417, at pp.423-25.
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And while there has been some stalling on the pill, the
1V 6stated reasons at least were ones of medical caution.
On the other hand, the overall trend within the 
bloc seems to be quite clearly towards more decisive measures, 
particularly in the sphere of abortion legislation. While 
the extreme Rumanian solution may be felt to have misfired 
(or even backfired), the Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Bulgarian 
governments have successively introduced more moderate 
restrictions on the availability of abortion; and at least 
in the case of the first two, it would seem that these 
measures may be succeeding where others have been at best
176 See the statements made by B. Petrovskii, the Soviet 
Minister of Health, and representatives of the 
pharmaceutical industries in Literaturnaia Gazeta 
1968 no.50 (11 December), p.10. The real reasons, of 
course, may be different. Contraceptives are likely to 
strike Soviet planners as being almost as far removed 
from virtuous heavy-industrial producer goods as anything 
could be. And there may well also be some apprehension 
as to what the consequences might be for the sagging 
birth rate if even further methods of averting births 
were to be made available. Scepticism about the 
sincerity of medical objections to the pill and other 
contraceptives is surely justified given the known 
deleterious effects of abortion, particularly when it 
reaches epidemic forms as in the USSR. Such scepticism 
has in fact found its way into official Soviet 
publications: 'The problem of an effective, reliable
and absolutely harmless contraceptive has not yet been 
solved anywhere in the world. But it would appear 
nonetheless to have been solved a great deal more 
effectively than one might suppose judging by the 
quantity, quality and assortment of contraceptives that 
are available for sale in our pharmacies.' A.G. 
Vishnevskii, 'Demograficheskie protsessy v SSSR',
Voprosy Filosofii, 1973, no.9, p.115, at p.125.
250
palliative or inconclusive. And while we have the rather
surprising counter-example of East Germany which has finally
legalized abortion despite its very low fertility and acute
178labour shortage, and Poland, where agitation for the repeal
of liberal abortion legislation seems to have been (temporarily
179at least) defeated, the overall climate of opinion does 
seem to be shifting towards robust solutions.
Most demographers and commentators generally seem 
to agree on the need to forestall any attempts to apply
177 It may still be too early for precision on this point, 
but it is noteworthy that Czechoslovak fertility (both 
crude and age-specific rates) apparently increased 
rapidly in the three years (1972-74) as abortion was 
progressively more restricted. (see, e.g., 1'ZaHiname
mladnout', Rude Pravo, 21 May 1974). Czech commentators 
at least frequently assert (admit?) that the two are 
linked. (e.g., K. Zajic^ ek: 'Changes in Regulations
Concerning Interruptions' in Demosta VI (1973) no.2, 
p.57. More recently again, since 1974, Hungarian crude 
and age-specific rates have shown a marked improvement 
(and abortion rates a marked drop) after the introduction 
of restrictions on the availability of abortion. And 
Rumanian birth-rates, though falling, have not yet 
returned to the low point of 1965 (14.3 per thousand) 
or anything very close to it.
178 In the first two years after abortion was legalized, the 
birth rate in NRD fell from 13.8 to 10.6 per thousand
( 197 3) Rocznik Demograficzny 197 4 (Warsaw, 1974) , p.353.
179 Despite wide press support for revision of abortion 
legislation, the Sejm committee for Health and Physical 
Culture nonetheless decided to reconfirm and endorse 
the existing regulations in 1973. (Biuletyn Sejmowy,
27 March 1973) A more recent article in the Party 
newspaper defending existing practice would seem to 
indicate that opposition to free abortion continues,but 
that the official view has not changed. S. Klonowicz,
1Sztuczne poronienia', Trybuna Ludu, 15 June 1974, 
p.3. For more detailed discussion, see Ch.4.g.(iii) 
below.
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'administrativnye mery' (administrative measures - a standard
Soviet euphemism for repressive policies), which, they
emphasize, are counter-productive. They proclaim loudly
and prophylactically the Soviet Union's allegedly steadfast
policy of always leaving decisions about family size to the 
180parents. It may also be, that in adopting a parcel of
administrative measures, the Rumanians (who ideologically 
speaking have been sent about half-way to Coventry just at 
present) have made their wholesale adoption elsewhere in the 
bloc just that little bit less likely. Certainly the response 
of Socialist demographic opinion elsewhere to the Rumanian 
solution has been cool. Perhaps on balance the most likely 
thing is that policy will continue to muddle along in its 
present inconclusive style for some time to come.^^
180 'Demographic policy in the socialist state is based on 
observance of the principle of 'family sovereignty'.
This means that the fullest freedom is extended to 
citizens in deciding matters relating to family formation, 
the freedom in other words, for parents to decide on the 
number of children they will have. It follows from that 
that all children should be born wanted children in 
families and to mothers who await them with joy.'
B. Urlanis, 'Demograficheskaia politika v sovremennom 
mire', Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia,
May 1975, p.106, at p.lll.
181 One possible development which could decisively 
influence the course of events would be the accession to 
power in Moscow of more or less overt Russian chauvinists. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that the 
editor of the right-wing Samizdat journal, Veche,
Vladimir Osipov, in an interview given to some American 
correspondents (who apparently did not get it published), 
declared that the Russian people might die both morally 
and physically; the latter, because the contemporary 
Russian woman is having only one or at most two children. 
Osipov added that in his view, 'the problem of human 
rights is less important than the problem of the dying 
Russian people'. See a . Kruczek, 'W sowieckiej prasie'
(cont.)
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Another line of advocacy which unites virtually 
all demographers is the call for (i) the creation of a central 
demographic institute along the lines of the government
18 2commissions existing now virtually throughout Eastern Europe, 
which would co-ordinate demographic research and make policy 
recommendations to the authorities; (ii) the establishment
of a regular demographic journal; and (iii) extensive funding 
of a broad program of demographic research, without which, as 
it is usually emphasized, policy decisions cannot but be 
ill-founded. While demographic research is indeed expanding
181 (cont.) in Kultura (Paris) no.7-8, 1973, p.122. If, as 
Kruczek suggests, Osipov's views reflect those of a 
growing faction within top party circles, we could witness 
a dramatic change of line on demographic no less than 
other issues. Osipov himself has since been arrested and 
sentenced to eight years imprisonment. But a Samizdat 
article by Agurskii would suggest that this may have been 
because Osipov and the other Christians attached to 
Veche refused to let themselves be used by what Agurskii 
identifies as the neo-Nazi faction within the regime.
See M. Agurskii, 'Neonatsistskaia opasnost' v Sovetskom 
Soiuze', Novy Zhurnal, no.118 (March 1975), p.199 at 
pp.202-3.
182 V. Bodrova, in a discussion printed in Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo 
i Pravo 1975, no.l, p.31, remarks that such commissions 
now exist in Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and the 
German Demogratic Republic. At the time when she spoke, in 
fact, a commission of the same type had also been created in Poland. And although only a lower-level equivalent 
exists in Hungary, events there in the last decade and 
a half indicate eloquently that there is a great deal 
of official concern about demographic trends and that 
systematic endeavours are going on to find appropriate 
policies. This makes the USSR appear something of an 
outsider in its own bloc of nations.
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18 3rapidly, the first two postulates have still not been satisfied. 
Once again, the impression is conveyed of indecisiveness on 
the part of policy-makers.
Whatever response the Soviet government may finally 
opt for, it is clear that it will be faced with a difficult 
and intractable problem if the fertility scissors do not begin 
to close more rapidly in the near future. If the situation 
in the high-fertility areas were indeed to develop in the 
direction of confrontation, it is difficult to conceive of 
anyone other than perhaps China benefiting therefrom. Past 
fertility trends have in effect already assured the Central 
Asian peoples of future demographic dominance within their 
own homelands. Continued high fertility in the future will 
bring them small additional social and political advantage and 
a great deal of economic hardship. While it was suggested 
earlier that the current population policy may not necessarily 
be the worst of the available alternatives (on the let 
sleeping dogs lie principle), it does seem nonetheless that
183 This despite repeated invocations over a long period of 
time. A recent source suggests that Valentei's Centre 
for the Study of Population Problems within the Ecomics 
Faculty of Moscow University 'in accordance with a decision 
of Gosplan, the State Committee of the Council of Ministers 
for Science and Technology and the Presidium of the USSR 
Academy of Sciences performs the role of the main 
organization responsible for working out the socio-economic 
bases and methods of managing and regulating the development 
of the population' (Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, 
no.l, p.28). Valenteirs institute and Valentei himself 
have for some time exuded an air of primus inter pares.
But it should be noted that they have rather less than a 
royal charter (neither the Central Committee nor the Council 
of Ministers are referred to as having endorsed the decision 
to give them special status). Their formal and their real 
position do not seem to be comparable with that of the 
government population commissions of East Europe.
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some kind of differential approach could and should be 
184applied. For such a policy to be implemented without
giving rise to additional tensions, it would probably be 
necessary (and would be in any case wise), to accept some 
modest degree of devolution in social policy decision-making, 
with republics receiving central allocations of budgetary funds 
which they might then dispose according to their own judgement. 
The rather wealthier and less fertile republics could afford 
to disburse more on child endowments if they so desired, 
whilst the high-fertility republics might find it in their own 
best interests to adopt policies aimed rather at restricting 
population growth. Proposals along these lines have actually 
appeared in print in the Soviet Union. Reporting a lecture 
on Yugoslav demographic problems given by the well-known
184 Scholars and publicists have been openly and repeatedly 
advocating a differentiated policy for many years, but 
without success. Thus a book published in 1967, for 
example, draws attention to differential fertility trends 
and calls for 'differentiated demographic legislation' 
to meet the situation, 'since what is appropriate, for 
example, in the Ukraine or the Baltic region, has turned 
out to be quite inappropriate in Central Asia or Azerbaidzhan 
The decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 
8 July 1944 has in certain respects become outdated.'
D.I. Valentei, Teoriia i politika narodonaseleniia 
(Moscow, 1967), p.163. See also, e.g., the recommendations 
of a symposium held to discuss 'Women in Productive Work 
and the Family' in Minsk in June 1969 (reproduced in Soviet 
Sociology, vol.XII (1973), no.2, p.84, at p.93; G.P. 
Kiseleva, 'K voprosu o raionnykh razlichiiakh urovnia 
rozhdaemosti v SSSR' in D. Valentei and E. Burmashev 
(eds) Voprosy teorii i politiki narodonaseleniia (Moscow, 
1970), p.141, esp. at pp.152-3; R. Kallistratova,
'Rozhdaemost i pravo', Sovetskaia Iustitsiia 1971, no.2 
p.14, esp. at p.16; K. Vermishev, 'Stimulirovanie rosta 
naseleniia', Planovoe Khoziaistvo, 1972, no.12, p.102, 
esp. p.105; 'Demograficheskaia politika: ee napravleniia.
Problemy narodonaseleniia', Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1975, 
no.8, pp.148-152. The list could be extended almost 
indefinitely.
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Yugoslav demographer Milo^ Macura at the Soviet Academy of
Sciences, R. Galetskaia brings out the many parallels between
the Soviet and Yugoslav demographic situations. Noting that
Yugoslav child-endowment was formerly paid only to the poorer
(maloobespechenim) families (the decision to do the same in
the USSR having been already clearly foreshadowed at the time
of writing), Galetskaia continues:
Since 1969, child allowances have been 
decentralized; eve
how many families will receive allowances and 
how much they will be. In those republics where 
the birth rate is very low, the allowance is 
higher and received by a larger number of families.
Thus these payments will have not only a social 
but also a demographic significance. 5
Given the traditional Soviet reluctance to accept dispersal of
decision-making, it seems unlikely that this recommendation
will be heeded.
185 'Vstrecha s Iugoslavskim uchenym', Voprosy Ekonomiki 
1973, no.5, p.159. A distinction should be drawn, of 
course, between proposals for a differentiated policy and 
those for a decentralized policy. Many of the advocates 
of a differentiated policy appear to be Russian nationalist 
technocrats who instinctively accept the existing 
centralized bureaucratic structures for determining policy. 
Some of the decentralizers may also be Russian (or 
'European') nationalists who simply believe that a 
decentralization of policy-making would permit the Russian 
or European interest to be more effectively pursued. But 
the two policy proposals are radically different from 
one another in their political implications, whatever 
the motives of their advocates. For other decentralizing 
proposals, see R. Kallistratova, op.cit.; and G.A.
Zlobin, Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, no.l, p.33. 
Kallistratova and Zlobin do not develop their thinking at 
great length, and in particular do not draw the highly 
significant Yugoslav parallel. It is accordingly impossible 
to be sure to what extent they are favouring a genuine 
decentralization as opposed to a centrally-manipulated one 
(which in Soviet conditions might not be too hard to carry 
through).
province /emphasis
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Hitherto the discussion has been conducted in
terms of the prospects for active pro-natalism. The reason
for this is that the chances of a swing towards anti-natalism
186seem to be effectively ruled out. While it is now recognized
that fertility-limitation policies may be of some value to 
developing countries, it is virtually never suggested that 
the Soviet Union itself should limit its population growth.
The same taboo is observed elsewhere in the bloc as well, 
which would suggest that ZPG is ideologically out of bounds.
The official attitude on this point seems for the most part 
to be quite genuinely held by the demographers also. While 
often heterodox on other matters, they nearly always share
186 There are undoubtedly pockets of anti-natalist thinking 
and sentiment among Soviet demographic observers and officialdom, but they seldom come out into the open.
Boldyrev's implicit commendation of what he believed to 
be Nixonian anti-natalism (see note 167, above) is a rare 
example of its kind. Some demographers emphasize that 
they are not in favour of rapid population increase 
(particularly when they are discussing Central Asia), 
but I know of none who would advocate stationary 
reproduction (i.e. holding fertility at replacement rates), 
much less ZPG (net population growth of nil) at the 
earliest possible juncture. It was suggested to me by a 
Soviet demographer that certain members of the Ukrainian 
demographic community are anti-natalists, but if they 
are, they seem to maintain a discreet silence about it.In fact, they appear to be more given to the Strumlinist line cf 
. the abolition of motherhood and its replacement by
production-line institutional education and upbringing, 
which they evidently believe will solve the declining 
fertility problem together with a host of others. For a 
sampling of their somewhat disconcerting, steely-eyed approach, see V.P. Piskunov and V.S. Steshenko, '0 demograflcheskoi 
politike sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva' and P.S.
Il'initskii 1Rol' razvitiia obshchestvennykh form 
potrebleniia v aktivizatsii demograficheskoi politiki* 
in V.S. Steshenko and V.P. Piskunov, Demograficheskaia 
Politika (Moscow, 1974).
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their governments' belief in the inherent and self-evident
187justice of national demographic expansion.
Given its 'vast unpeopled spaces', its labour
shortages, it disrupted internal ethnic balance and its
fertile and not always friendly neighbours, Soviet Russia
must vie with Australia as being the industrial country least
likely to.be susceptible to ZPG-type arguments. And as long
as the Soviet attitude remains what it is, the similar stands
taken in Prague Budapest and elsewhere are unlikely to alter.
At a time when many serious observers believe that a halt
must be called to population and economic growth, it is perhaps
a matter of concern that the USSR and the other Comecon countries
are proceeding so unreflectingly along the path of demographic
18 8mercantilism. So far there are few signs indeed of the
187 'The Soviet society has a vested interest in 
(zainteresovano v) increased fertility, normal population 
growth, reduced mortality.' V.S. Tadevosian in Sovetskoe 
Gosudarstvo i Pravo 1975, no.8, p.22. The linking In 
apposition of these three very different notions as 
though they were virtually synonymous is characteristic.
188 In a round-table discussion of 'Man and his Environment'
published in Voprosy Filosofii 1972 no.11, and 1973, no.l, 
population actually was mentioned by one or two of the 
contributors as a relevant factor. The amount of space 
devoted to it, however, was markedly less than would be 
the case in any comparable Western discussion. Urlanis, 
the only demographer among the 34 or so participants, 
criticized the way in which these matters had been neglected in the Soviet Union: 'We ought not to avoid these
problems either. As Academician Kapitsa said, we live
not in a separate flat but in a communal one...(and) 
this flat is already extremely densely populated.'
'There is no need to dramatize the situation, but it is 
essential that population problems should be studied.
It is most regrettable that we should somehow be standing 
aside from these most pressing contemporary problems.' 
Significantly, however, Urlanis goes on to hedge his bets
(cont.)
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emergence within the Soviet Union of a global perspective
on Soviet population problems rather than a Soviet perspective
on global population problems. If ZPG is to be our salvation,
it will probably have to come without intentional Soviet-bloc 
18 9participation.
188 (cont.) adding that while it is important that the whole
world should appreciate the difficulty and complexity 
of population matters: 'The question arises in various
forms} in some places natality needs to be diminished; 
in other places it needs to be increased.' (Voprosy
Filosofii 1973, no.2, p.46).
189 The proceedings at the 25th Party Congress in February 
1976 do not suggest that population policy has achieved 
a pre-eminent position in the thoughts of key policy­
makers. While it is true and no doubt a sign of the 
times that Brezhnev's report contained a fleeting 
reference to the need to develop an effective demographic 
policy as being one of the tasks of social science, this 
allusion found no reflection in the section of the Five- 
Year Plan guidelines devoted to 'the development of 
science'; and the measures actually foreshadowed for 
improving the working mother's lot seem both vague and 
modest, and unlikely to amount in practice to any radical 
departure from the existing drift of policy. Population 
policy is still being treated as something for future 
decision (an attitude on the part of the authorities 
which is actually fostered by the demographic community's 
eagerness to get its research programs funded and its 
voice heard before policy is decided). (For Brezhnev's 
9peech, see Pravda, 28 February 1976, p.8; for the Plan 
Guidelines, see Izvestiia, 7 March 1976, p.7.
CHAPTER 4 POPULATION POLITICS IN POLAND
This chapter is divided into the following seven sub-sections:
(a) demographic background; (b) evolution of policies on population 
matters'*’; (c) economic policies; (d) ethnic relations;
(e) international politics; (f) ideology; and (g) current population 
policies: debates and dilemmas.
2a. Demographic Background
In the post-war period, Poland's population development has 
followed a path basically similar to those traced out by many other of
^A special section is being set aside for this because of the 
special interest of Poland's Malthusian phase in the late 1950s.
2See the two-volume work by the doyen of Polish demographers, Edward
Rosset, Demografia Polski, two vols., Warsaw 1975. See also
K. Dziewonski and L. Kosinski, Rozwoj i rozmieszczenie ludnosci Polski
w XX wieku, for a more geographic approach. A good short account of
post-war developments is to be found in Z. Smolinski, "Procesy
demograficzne w XXX-leciu PRL", in Aktualne problemy demograficzne
kraju, Warsaw 1974. On the war-time and post-war demographic upheavals,
see K. Kersten, Repatriacja ludnosci polskiej po II wojnie swiatowej,
Wroclaw 1974. The Polish demographic journal Studia Demograficzne, which
has been coming out since 1962 (over four issues have now appeared)
contains a good deal of material on Poland (with English summaries).
Detailed statistical information is made available in the annual Rocznik
Demograficzny. There is an excellent bibliographical guide to Polish 
demographic literature in Bibliografia polskiego pismiennictwa 
statystycznego 1944-1969, Warsaw 1972, pp. 14-19 and 126-235. A guide 
to the Main Statistical Office's demographic publications (not contained 
in the work just cited) will be found in Studia Demograficzne No. 28 
(1972) p. 43, & ff.
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the rather less developed European countries, both Socialist and 
non-Socialist: an initial increase in the birth-rate, followed by 
steady and at times rapid decline with an uncertain stabilization 
emerging only recently; initial rapid decline in general mortality 
rates, followed by stabilization at low levels, then stagnation and 
slight increases in both general mortality and age-specific mortality 
for older age-groups (particularly males), with infant mortality, 
however, continuing its decline from rather high initial levels; a sharp 
initial increase in net population growth followed by decline and a 
shaky stabilization roughly parallel to that occurring in the birth 
rate; increasing nuptiality but also increasing divorce; massive 
migration from the villages to the towns (including a vast statistically 
"concealed" component in the form of daily-commuting worker-peasants); 
sharp increase in the urban work-force and a particularly sharp increase 
in the level of qualifications and employment rates of young married 
women.
External influences on population development in socialist countries
3tend to be limited. With the notable and to some extent temporary
After a decade or more in which emigration was more or less encouraged, 
the Yugoslav authorities are now deploring this outflow and seeking to 
reverse it. This question will be discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 5.
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4exception of Yugoslavia, all frown on emigration, and none has yet 
been confronted by the problem of alien immigration (as the Catholic 
writer Stefan Kisielewski once pointed out with characteristic
During the thaw period in Poland, voices were sometimes raised proposing 
emigration as a means of dealing with the country's manpower surplus.
See " 2 x 2 =  4", Po prostu 8/1957, J. Obodowski; "0 emigracji zarobkowej" 
Zycie Gospodarcze (hereinafter ZG)7/7/1957, M. Kabaj "Pr6ba terapii" ZG 
23/3/1958 Obodowski attempts to justify an earlier suggestion he had 
made along these lines, and defensively stresses that the emigration should 
be directed exclusively to Socialist countries. (He is now a Deputy 
Minister in the Ministry of Labour, Wages and Social Affairs). By the 
time Kabaj was writing, the matter had evidently become more sensitive, 
since he refers obliquely to the future necessity of "internal migration 
and not only internal". Another contributor to this debate (A. Brzeski,
ZG 11/8/1957) disputed Obodowski's restriction of emigration to the 
Socialist bloc. It may be economically more rational for workers to go, 
for example, to France or Belgium. In these matters, declared Brzeski, 
"business is business" (English in the original). He also advanced the 
argument of individual freedom in favour of his cause, and quoted this time 
the Latin tag civitas non est career. Having indicated a complete 
readiness to accept the heresy of economic emigration, Brzeski then 
proceeded to avoid it by embracing the even greater heresy of advocating 
the import of capital. To the best of my knowledge, Brzeski has not since
become a Deputy Minister. See also footnote 43.
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audacity. Once the immense upheavals occasioned by the war and the 
westward displacement of Poland's borders were finally smoothed out, 
Poland settled down to the usual Socialist pattern of nugatory 
immigration and a thin persistent leak of emigration, which, during 
liberal phases, broadens to a stream. In the late 1950s, there was a 
brief period of repatriation of Poles from the Soviet Union to blur the 
pattern; and more recently there has been a tendency for elderly 
Westerners of Polish origin to return to their homeland to spend their 
later years and their warmly welcomed hard-currency pension cheques.
The attitude to immigration as opposed to repatriation appears to be 
that it is inherently slightly reprehensible. Thus a Trybuna Ludu 
(hereinafter TL) article "Polityka spoleczna i demografia" (TL 2-3/8/75) 
says in this connection even of Sweden (a country maintaining very good 
relations with Poland and quite unusually solicitous about its economic 
immigrants) that it "formally opposes pro-natalist policies, but in 
reality makes extensive use of (korzysta szeroko z) migrants to improve 
its population balance ..." References to immigration with Poland 
figuring as the host-country are rare and usually confine themselves to 
discussing the subject of temporary visitors from other Socialist 
countries. A conference participant discussing the labour shortage in 
Poland's cities recently observed that the problem could scarcely be 
solved by immigration, unless it were to be from the Arab or African 
countries. "Since we cannot and probably do not want to postulate such 
a procedure", he said, Poland must needs rely on domestic population 
policies to solve the problem. The sequence of words and ideas is 
interesting and probably revealing. See Aktualne problemy demograficzne
kraju, p. 310-11.
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During the Gierek years there has been an increase in emigration 
generally and some outflow of Germans to the Federal Republic. But 
neither development is viewed with favour, and the numbers involved 
have not to date been enormously significant.
Given its special relevance to numerical concerns, the pattern
of natural increase in post-war Poland may be worth a few additional
comments. These will focus on fertility since it is fluctuation in
the level of fertility rather than mortality that determines natural
increase rates in more developed societies. Poland's natural increase
in the first fifteen years or so after the War was exceptional, both
in relation to its own pre-war experience, and to the levels prevailing
in other European countries of comparable development. Natality
remained extremely high till about the mid-fifties, and natural increase
until about 1960, when the natality decline began to accelerate, and
declining mortality reached a point where further improvement was
impossible. Up to that point, however, Poland's natural increase had
been comparable with that of many Third World countries. The decline,
when it came, was all the more drastic. In 12 years the crude birth
rate fell from 29.1%o (in 1955) to 16.3%« (in 1967), and natural increase
7fell from 19.5%« to 8.5%.. The Net Reproduction Rate, 1.52 in 1955,
8slipped to 1.01 (i.e. only just above the replacement level) by 1969.
The General Fertility Rate (i.e. number of births per thousand women in
the population aged 15-49) fell from 98 in 1955 (the second highest in
9Europe) to 58 in 1965 (the fifth lowest in Europe). To a considerable 
^See the discussion in parts (d) and (e) below.
7Rocznik Damograficzny 1974, Warsaw 1974, p. xxi.
^Ibid., p. 107.
gZ. Krzyzanowska, "Niecierpliwo^d - z4y doradca", TL 5/12/1972.
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extent the decline in the crude birth rate was due to changes in the 
age-structure of the population, as the less numerous cohorts of the 
depression and war years reached the most fertile age-groups. But as 
the declines in the GFR and NRR indicate, other factors were also at 
work. Among them, one might mention the rapid growth of industrializa­
tion and urbanization (in Poland in recent years, there has been a very 
large gap between rural and urban fertility : See Table 2 in Appendix B) 
the spread of education and the aspirations and attitudes it engenders, 
the sustained urban housing crisis, expanded employment of young married 
women in urban areas, the legalization of abortion and increased 
availability of contraceptives, and the later and more explicitly anti- 
natalist measures adopted by the government after 1959. Since the late 
1960s there has been a slight increase in the crude birth rate, and 
stabilization in certain more analytical measures of fertility. The 
most frequent view among Polish demographers, however, has been that 
this stabilization will be only temporary, and that further decline is 
to be expected.^-0 As the NRR for the country as a whole currently stands 
at 1.05 (1973), this would mean that the population would soon be no 
longer reproducing itself, though owing to the present age-structure of 
the population, and depending on the speed of the further decline 
postulated, there would, of course, continue to be a surplus of births 
over deaths for some time to come.
■^A view based on obvious assumptions about growing urbanization and 
increasing educational standards (given the very strong correlation 
of both with lower fertility in Poland, etc., and also on investiga­
tions of intended family size which show planned fertility as steadily 
declining by cohort. See, e.g. Z Smolihski, "Perspektywy dzietno^ci",
ZG 3/11/1974.
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One of the consequences of Poland's erratic fertility fluctuations 
since the war has been that the abnormalities created in the population's 
age-structure by past catastrophes have been further accentuated. The 
plunge in age-specific fertility rates occurred when the very small 
World War II birth cohorts were reaching the child-bearing age-groups; 
whilst the post-war baby boom and the present stabilization of inherent 
fertility have both occurred at a time when the size of the main child­
bearing cohorts would have ensured a large birth rate in any case. The 
consequent differences between the birth rates for different years not 
far removed from one another are very great. (Thus 782,000 children 
were born in 1957, but only 599,000 were born in 1962, and 520,000 in 
1967. ^  This is the characteristic "undulatory effect" (falowanie) much 
commented on and deplored by Polish observers. In the age-pyramid, this 
phenomenon takes the form of dramatic bulges interspersed with deep 
indentations. The succession of these demographic "highs" and "lows"
(wy2e : nize) as they are known, has most disruptive effects on economic 
and social life.
b. Evolution of Policies on Population Questions
At the end of World War II, a Poland emerged which differed
drastically from its predecessor state territorially, politically and
demographically. Its population had been reduced from over 35 million 
12to 23.6 million, and its very large ethnic minorities (amounting to 
roughly one third of the population in the 1930s) had been virtually 
eliminated by the combined effects of war, genocide, territorial and
^ Rocznik Demograficeny 1974, p. XX. 
12Rocznik Statystyczny 1971, p. 68.
266
population shifts and deportation. The population of Polish stock 
had also been decimated by a similar catalogue of disasters and 
upheavals. Though the total extent of the Polish state had been 
reduced, population density had been reduced also. There were, 
moreover, large expanses of formerly German territory in the west, 
where the autochthonous Polish population was either of modest or 
negligible dimensions, which now had to be settled and thereby 
consolidated as Polish. In these circumstances, with a threat of 
national extinction (to be understood quite literally) having been 
narrowly averted, and a future threat from German revanche needing to 
be forestalled, it was perhaps inevitable that a strongly pronatalist 
mood should emerge in both the nation and its new rulers. The burgeoning 
birth rate was greeted with great popular and official enthusiasm and 
approval. It was indeed one of the few issues on which complete unanimity 
of views could be attained. The government's attitude was expressed more
in the form of rhetoric, propaganda, and a general policy orientation;
13no systematic and explicit pro-natalist program was ever enunciated.
But the overall economic policies of the time were certainly calculated 
to reinforce the natural demographic revival that usually occurs after a 
war, as postponed marriages are concluded and postponed progeny hastily 
brought into the world. The revival of economic activity in the cities 
(including trade, services and some private enterprise in the early years) 
and the redistribution of old land and the subdivision and allocation to 
eager peasants of vast tracts of new land were also conducive to the 
formation of a pro-natalist climate. The introduction of social services
A. Jdzefowicz, "Polityka ludno^ciowa i zatrudnienia w Polsce", 
Biuletyn Instytutu Gospodarstwa Spolecznego (hereinafter BIGS)
V (1962), No. 4, p. 13.
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on a larger scale no doubt exerted a similar influence.14 The years 
of reconstruction before the forced-draft industrialization phase 
began were years of relative prosperity and must have done a lot to 
give apparent substance to the optimism fostered by the regime in 
demographic as in other matters. The means of family limitation were 
not in any case readily available and little publicity was given to 
them. Abortion was prohibited for all but exceptional cases.15 And 
government policies in housing and other matters favoured people with 
larger families to an extent that came ultimately to be keenly resented 
by many members of the less fecund urban intelligentsia.
Then with the general liberalization of life in most parts of the 
Soviet bloc that took place in the mid-1950s, abortion legislation was 
liberalized in the Soviet Union16 and it became easier for advocates of 
a similar step in Poland (as elsewhere in the bloc) to put their case 
publicly and make representations in the appropriate quarters. In 1956, 
after a lengthy campaign of press articles depicting the evils of barn 
and back-street abortions, making good use of the claim that the church
For a review of the more important ones from the point of view of 
population policy, see M. Latuch, "Elementy polityki ludno^ciowej w Polsce" 
in Polityka ludno^ciowa; wspdiczesne problemy, (hereinafter Polityka 
ludnosciowa) Warsaw 11973, p. 106, esp. pp. 116-124.
IThe legislation on abortion was taken over directly from pre-war Poland.
It would appear that by the mid-fifties, however, evasion of the restriction 
had become widespread and prosecution infrequent. (See M. Parzyhska,
"Po dyskusji - projekt ustawy" in Zycie Warszawy (hereinafter ZW) 13/4/1956.
This development was reported (a full week after it happened) by TL and
ZW simultaneously on December 1, 1955.
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was the main adversary and surprisingly little overt use of the fact that
similar legislation had been passed in the USSR (surely a most remarkable
17sign of the times), the reformers won. At the same time, efforts were
17For the text of the new abortion legislation, see Dziennik Ustaw May 8, 
1956. The important provision in it was that "difficult conditions of 
life" (trudne warunki zyciowe) might be accepted as grounds for abortion. 
However the preamble contained no reference to the right of a woman to 
decide in these matters (as did the Soviet legislation). And indeed for 
some years afterwards (up to 1959) , it remained unclear and hotly disputed 
just how broadly the social indication was to be interpreted; and by whom 
it was to be interpreted (i.e. by the woman or by the medical authorities). 
These facts bear out the observation sometimes made in the press at the 
time that the passage of the law had been "controversial" and the result 
of a "compromise". While most other East European regimes brought in 
reformed legislation at the same time, there was no uniformity about it 
and it would be a mistake to assume that the issue in Poland was in any 
sense pre-determined. Neither East Germany nor Albania (then still an 
overtly obedient satellite) altered their restrictive legislation.
Reading the main newspapers at the time, one gets the impression that a 
group of reformists centred around the Warsaw daily Zycie Warszawy led 
the struggle, and that the official party newspaper Trybuna Ludu main­
tained a certain distance from events. The PAX (pro-regime Catholic) 
press was strongly opposed (more emphatically so then than it has been 
since) and the official Church also condemned the proposed reforms. It 
was the Catholics and the Catholics almost exclusively who raised the 
population issue and accused their opponents of being Malthusians. These 
were of course still good tactics in 1956. The reformers denied that they 
had any dark designs on Poland's high birth rate, and there is no really 
hard evidence that many of them were inspired by any such motives at that 
stage. Their arguments were couched purely in terms of relieving the
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made (largely by the same people) to place family planning on an
official footing with government approval and financial support. In
1957, the Family Planning Association (then the Association for Conscious
Motherhood) was formed and permitted to develop links with western
19"neo-Malthusian" organizations and activists. Contraceptives began to 
be produced in meaningful quantities, and a press campaign for their 
acceptance was launched.^0
suffering of overburdened women and reducing the casualties currently 
being claimed by back-street abortionists. It was only later in 
1957-58, and more particularly in 1959 and 1960 that the anti-natalist 
demographic argument began to be used by defenders of the abortion 
reforms. This point is often overlooked by commentators both within 
and outside Poland, who tend to erroneously extrapolate the government's 
anti-natalist policy back to the time of the abortion reform. They may 
be right, but the written evidence certainly does not bear them out; on 
the contrary.
18 •The leaders here were again Zycie Warszawy and their social affairs 
commentator Mirosiawa Parzynska.
19See, e.g., TL July 19, 1959, for an interview complete with photograph 
of Dr Hermann Knaus, co-author of the Ogino-Knaus rhythm method. Radio 
Warsaw June 17, 1959, reported that the "outstanding American scholar 
Dr Abraham Stone" had expressed his surprise and gratification at the 
achievements of the Polish family planners. Dr Stone was once described 
in a Soviet anti-Malthusian article as a "specialist in sterilization" 
engaged on some very dubious field-work in South-East Asia. Literaturnaia 
Gazeta May 10, 1952, quoted in W. Petersen, The Politics of Population, 
London 1965, p. 114-5.
20 ^See "Rok dzia±alno£ci Towarzystwa Swiadomego Macierzyhstwa", TL No. 12,
1958.
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At this stage (1957-58), however, the official support was less 
enthusiastic than it was later to become. The press still conveys the 
impression that a group of family planners have gained the support or 
active tolerance of the government rather than that the latter itself is 
setting the pace. Moreover, the link between family planning and an anti- 
natalist population policy, while urged occasionally in some quarters, had 
not yet received any obvious official imprimatur.
The first articles deploring Poland's high fertility, pointing out
its economic disadvantages, and proposing counter-action, made their
appearance in economic journals and the popular press during the course 
2iof 1957. Whatever the disclaimers of their authors, in the context of
W. Bieda "Uwagi o niektdrych ekonomicznych stronach zjawisk ludno^ciowych", 
My£l Gospodarcza No. 5, 1957; S. Wyrobisz "Fatalizm populacyjny czy inter- 
wencja" MG No. 8, 1957; J. Czarkowski "Przyrost ludnoäci a stopa zyciowa",
MG No. 9, 1957; A. Jdzefowicz "Ekonomika i ludno^c" ZG No. 17, 1957. These 
articles developed the idea that rapid population growth was economically 
disadvantageous, placing as it did excessive strain on both current con­
sumption and current and future investment. The existing cake had to be 
divided among more all the time, whilst the expectation of excess labour 
supply in the future forced additional investment in the present to prepare 
the necessary jobs for them. High population growth rates were particularly 
inimical to growth in living standards, especially in the fields of food 
production and housing. While these authors were fully aware of, and 
indeed emphasized the unfamiliar and taboo nature of their subject-matter, 
they tried to some extent to avoid being identified as Malthusians.
Certain journalists of similar views, on the other hand, were much less 
cautious. A Szypulski, writing in the Democratic Party weekly Tygodnik 
Demokratyczny (May 7, 1957, "Przyrost naturalny a £rodki spozycia") urged
radical and anti-egalitarian measures to check population growth which
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the Soviet tradition in these matters they can only be described as 
Malthusian. While some of the more scholarly contributors to the 
discussion sought to evade this label, none of them really tried to 
relate themselves to the Stalinist doctrines on population; no doubt 
any attempt on their part to have done so would have been futile. Yet 
despite their Malthusianism, they were ultimately to win the day.
After a lengthy period of public discussion, the authorities were finally 
won over more or less unequivocally to the anti-natalist side. In 1959, 
faced with one of Poland's recurrent meat shortages, Gomuika hit upon, 
or more probably was led to the idea that if he had fewer subjects to 
cater for, his economic problems, among others the tasks of maintaining 
food supplies and providing jobs for the demographic high that would be
policy he described as the only way out of the clutches of poverty 
"Let us cry out 'People! for God's sake: you're not rabbits!' If we 
don't, we'll be sorry" (Inaczej bedzie fie). Another journalist 
(ZW June 22, 1957) "To nie przyczyna lecz skutek" drew the following 
striking parallel: "A man who wants to have a party or invite guests 
for the summer always calculates his financial and accommodation 
capacity very carefully ..." (The parallel, of course, is with the 
notorious "nature's banquet" of Malthus). For another 
early example see Glos Pracy (hereinafter GP) July 10, 1957 "Czy 
lekkomyslnosf i zacofanie", which quotes with approval a second press 
article boldly entitled "Czy Malthus mial racje" (Was Malthus Right?).
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"invading" the labour market in the latter part of the sixties, would
be much more manageable. And accordingly, at a Central Committee plenum
22devoted to the meat crisis, he pronounced categorically that Poland's
population growth rate was excessive. It was in these circumstances
then, that Poland embarked on its heretical anti-natalist policy. The
abortion legislation was further liberalized and Catholic and other
dissenting doctors were prevented from imposing their views on reluctant 
23mothers. The activities and views of the family planners were given
22 TL October 18, 1959. Having compared Polish natural increase with 
that prevailing in other European countries, Gomulka continued: "And 
yet there are still people in Poland who belly-ache (psiocza) against 
socialism because of the lack of meat on the market. If capitalist 
England had the same natural increase as Poland does, its standard of 
living would be falling constantly". Gomulka then made perfunctory 
mention of "our young nation" and "our optimistic future", but in the 
same context hastened to emphasize that "our numerous children" placed 
"considerable burdens and difficult obligations on us, their fathers" 
"The natural increase of population prevailing in Poland at present", 
concluded Gomulka, "is a serious obstacle to the growth of the nation's 
living standards". After the events of 1970 and the reported 
disturbances of early 1975, the time would appear to be ripe for someone 
to undertake a special study of the historiopoeic role of the meat-shop 
in post-war Poland.
23"Zmiany w sposobie udzielania orzeczeh o przerywaniu ciazy", TL Jan 12,
1960.
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enhanced support. And simultaneously, the flow of anti-natalist 
articles in the press became freer, more emphatic and more authorita­
tive in tone. An intensive campaign against the "wave of brats 
flooding Poland" (zalewajaca Polske fala bachorow) was maintained 
thereafter for some months.
The reorientation of policies that occurred in 1957-59 seemed to 
produce spectacular results. The birth rate had already begun to decline 
from its high point in the mid-fifties; but by the late 'fifties and early 
'sixties, it was fairly plummeting down. To what extent the new policies 
accentuated or prolonged the fertility decline involved in this trend is 
difficult to determine, but certainly there was a marked change in public 
attitudes, both official and unofficial. Aspirations concerning family- 
size changed dramatically, as did the popular attitude towards large 
families, which
24A report in ZW November 10, 1959 mentioned that the Association for 
Conscious Motherhood had been permitted to conduct its work in 
factories. Trybuna Ludu ("Zbyt dlugo trwaja kiopoty produkcyjne", 
TL March 20, 1960) first complained that contraceptive production 
was inadequate, then a little later was able to report considerable 
increases in production during 1960 over 1959 (TL August 27, 1960) .
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now became harshly censorious.25 With the exception of anti-Germanism, there 
can have been few other propaganda lines which were quite so successful with the 
population. Many Catholics who would not accept other anti-church views 
nonetheless accepted this one, and did so despite the most outspoken and 
sustained condemnation of government policy by Church spokesmen headed by the 
redoubtable Cardinal Wyszynski.26
Successive slumpts in the birth rate were greeted with small, but unmistakably 
gratified communiques from the Main Statistical Office27 As the birth rate 
fell further and further, the matter ceased to be
25Biographical sketches of women in the Polish press frequently refer to an
atmosphere of contempt having surrounded anyone with any more than about three
children. See, for example, TL July 26-7, 1975, p.3, where a peasant from
Bydgoszcz wojewödstwo remarks "I even feel ashamed these days (Az wstyd si^
dzisiaj przyznac) that I come from a family of eleven children". One legacy
of the Gomuika anti-natalist phase to the Polish language is the contemptuous
neologism "dzieciorob" (roughly: "Kidmaker"), which immediately suggests
associations with the word "brakor6b", meaning "poor workman","producer 
of worthless goods" in other words one of the perennial villain figures in the
exhortatory industrial literature of socialism. A public opinion poll taken in
1960 already suggested considerable internalization of the new policies. See
Spo-^eczenstwo Polskie w badaniach ankietowych Warsaw 1966, p.70.
25See note 79 below.
27e.g. TL August 1, 1961. Even in 1964, by which time Poland’s age-specific 
fertility was already drawing close to replacement levels and was well below 
it in the cities, the latest reported decline in the birth rate was greeted 
as representing a tendency "which is naturally advantageous". ZG August 2, 
1964. The same tone was maintained till late into the 1960s. The Main 
Statistical Office's communiques have never actually reached the point of 
sounding slightly alarmed, for which they have been strongly criticised by
one observer (BIGS XV (1972) No. 3-4, p.53).
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treated as one of great urgency, but the basic official line remained 
unaltered to the end of Gomuika's ascendancy. Despite the abruptness 
of the fall in the birth rate, and despite the fact that urban repro­
duction rates had dropped well below replacement levels, there was 
relatively little critical discussion of the matter in the press in the
second half of the 1960s, apart from in the publications of the PAX
28(pro-regime Catholic) organization.
PAX was able to publish articles by several well-known "non-Catholic" (in 
the official sense) demographers like J. Holzer and Z. Smolihski 
(Kierunki Jan. 5 and Feb. 9, 1969). This in itself would suggest that 
professional concern about demographic trends was growing and finding 
it difficult to make itself heard. Some non-Catholic papers of the less 
official type lent a degree of support to a cautious pro-natalist sounding 
out, but Trybuna Ludu remained impassive (see, e .g.the articles by 
M. Kowalewski and the then head of the Main Statistical Office, Wincenty 
Kawalec, in TL May 25, 1969, and TL No. 248, 1969), It is interesting 
however, that very late in Gomuika's reign, an article by the pro-natalist 
demographer Latuch appeared in Trybuna Ludu ("Dylematy polityki 
ludno^ciowej TL October 31, 1970) itself. While its advocacy was cautious 
and not alarmist, the remarkable thing about the article was that it 
appeared at all. One may well wonder whether this was not another small 
symptom of Gomuika's loosening grip. This documentary evidence tends to 
support rumours that Gomulka personally torpedoed recommendations coming 
from both the Church and representatives of the medical profession in 
favour of restrictions on abortion. E. Smith of UPI reported on March 28, 
1971, that Wyszynski had mentioned in a sermon delivered to a medical 
congregation that in June 1970, the Polish Episcopate had submitted a 
memorandum to the government about the "biological threat to the nation . 
An AFP report the same day said that the 1970 memorandum had not received 
a reply from the Gomulka regime. The UPI report noted, however, that the 
matter had been taken up by the new leadership, and that Wyszyhski had
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It was in fact only after the fall of Gomulka in 1970, that this, 
like so many other of his policies, came up for serious review. In recent 
years, particularly during 1972, the issue of pro- and anti-natalism has 
been intensively discussed in the popular press and scientific publications. 
The overall attitude of the Gierek regime in the early 1970s has been one of 
relatively weak interest in population policy as such, and mild pro-natalism, 
mitigated by financial caution and a commitment to egalitarianism in social 
policy. More will be said about this in 4.g.
Thus having been initially pro-natalist like all good Stalinist regimes, 
Poland became the only Socialist state in Europe to espouse Malthusianism (and 
unlike China in the 1970s, without the smokescreen of vigorous anti- 
Malthusianism on the international arena). Now, together with Yugoslavia 
and the USSR, it is one of the relatively few not to be pursuing an 
emphatically, not to say desperately pro-natalist policy.
c. Economic Policies
The central problem posed for economic planning and policy by demo­
graphic developments in Poland has been the disruption occasioned by the 
successive waves of demographic "highs" and "lows", which lead to alternate 
phases of excess strain and under-utilization in a number of different 
fields: the labour force, the educational system, social services and so on. 
Thus as the post-war baby boom began to reach school age, it was felt
necessary to organize a patriotic school-building campaign financed by
29public subscription. By the late 1960s, however, the high was already
said that he had received "authoritative assurances" that certain con­
clusions had already been drawn, in part from the church's memorandum.
29This policy of course also reflected Gomulka1s distaste for allocating 
budgetary finance to "non-productive" investments. For a retrospective 
criticism of this feature of Gomulka's educational policy, see 
J. Kluczyrlski "Prognozy rozwoju o^wiaty w Polsce" in Rozwoj spoleczny 
Polski w pracach prognostycznych, Warsaw 1971, p. 93.
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being replaced by a low, and some schools were even being closed down for
lack of pupils.30 The baby boom had meanwhile passed on to adulthood and
in consequence, Poland's lagging housing industry was beginning to be
further taxed by the exceptionally large generation of young people now
31making their presence felt in the marriage statistics. And most 
spectacularly of all, in 1959, as we have seen, Gomuika had been 
precipitated by a shortage of meat on the domestic market to decide that 
the Poles' excessive propensity to consume was related to an excessive 
propensity to reproduce and that to curb the former it was essential to 
curb the latter.
However it is in the sphere of manpower planning and labour policy
that the most crucial demographico-economic disturbances are seen as 
32occurring. Gomuika came to power during a period of alarms about 
, 33unemployment, and throughout his period in office, this same problem was
31
A Marek, "School organization problems in connection with demographic low", 
Radio Free Europe Research Poland, Nov. 30, 1970. See also Siowo 
Powszechne (hereinafter SP) April 10, 1970.
See footnote 97 below.
>
The literature on labour and employment policy in Poland is particularly 
rich. The following all contain valuable discussions of the demographic 
dimension of work-force problems: A. Rajkiewicz, Zatrudnienie w Polsce 
Ludowej w latach 1950-1970 Warsaw 1965; H. Jedruszczak, Zatrudnienie a 
przemiany spoleczne w Polsce w latach 1944-1960 Wroclaw 1972; L. Sobczak, 
Rynek pracy w Polsce ludowej Warsaw 1971; K. Dzienio and M. Goiacka 
Bilanse sily roboczej Warsaw 1971; M. Oledzki Polityka zatrudnienia Warsaw 
1974; E. Koziowska and J. Wojtyia Ludnodd, zatrudnienie, prawo Katowice 1975; 
S. Klonowicz Zdolnodd do pracy a wiek czlowieka Warsaw 1973; M. Kabaj Element; 
pelnego i racjonalnego zatrudnienia w gospodarce socjalistycznej Warsaw 1972; 
W. Ratynski Problemy polityki zatrudnienia Warsaw 1972.
See Rajkiewicz, op. cit., p. 135-36.3
continually threatening to recur. Though the causes of the unemp'iZ^ment
of 1956 were not directly demographic, it had become apparent to
economists by the later 1950s, that the arrival of the post-war baby
boom on the job market would pose a considerable strain on the Polish
34economy's capacity to absorb them. Gomuika's concern to restrain 
consumption reflected an awareness on the part of the leadership that jobs 
would have to be created for the large cohorts of school-leavers expected 
in the later 'sixties. To create the jobs, it was felt, large investments 
would be required; and given Gomuika's ideological predilection for heavy 
and extractive industries, i.e. for the capital-intensive rather than 
labour-intensive sectors of the economy, to create those jobs did indeed 
require very heavy investments.
The high presented another major problem to economic planners. Poland,
35like the other socialist countries, had (and indeed still has) a marked 
tendency to use labour inefficiently. Intermittently throughout the Gomuika
34A. Jözefowicz suggests (Z zagadnieh dynamiki ludno^ciowej w Polsce" Nowe 
Drogi (hereinafter ND) 1959, No. 2, p. 56) that the period of 1950-1956 
had been one in which demographic considerations were accorded little 
attention by planners, and that work on the long-term plan (plan perspekty- 
wyczny) foC 1960-1975 was associated with a considerably enhanced 
degree of emphasis on the demographic factor. He also mentions that as of 
early 1959, it was felt that no clear-cut population policy could be 
formulated given the limitations of existing knowledge. This view of the 
Demographic Commission of the body responsible for preparing the long-term 
plan was effectively overruled later in the year.
35The jednostki inicjujace entrusted with the experimental introduction of 
the watered-down Gierek reforms have in fact been increasing their employ­
ment levels appreciably faster than other sectors of the economy and thereby 
making a disproportionate contribution to the growing labour shortage of 
recent years. See the article by B. Fick in 2G December 15, 1974, and the
comment on it by W. Laskowski in ZG June 8, 1975.
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period, campaigns were conducted to reduce so-called surplus employment.
3 6(przerosty zatrudnienia) . At times, particularly during the late 
1950s, these campaigns were given greater impetus by shortages of urban 
labour, shortages which were to some extent demographically-conditioned.
At other times, as in the late 1960s, the policy of restricting employment 
was adopted in order to prevent large increases in labour supply from 
creating their own kind of fait accompli of inflated employment and reduced 
productivity. It always seemed to be either that the only way to escape 
the Scylla of over-employment was via the Charybdis of unemployment, or 
that the only way to escape the Scylla of the impending labour surplus, 
was to rush into the embrace of the Charybdis of overemployment. Over­
employment, lest anyone should think it obviously the lesser of the two
evils, was associated in Polish conditions (as in Socialist conditions
37generally) with gross inefficiency, low and stagnant productivity , low
3 6In 1958, 1963 and again in the late 1960s. See Rajkiewicz, op. cit., 
pp. 139 and ff, 229 and ff; see also Ratyhski, op. cit., Ch. V, in 
which Gomulka's policy of attempting to force up productivity by forcing 
down employment increments is severely criticized. Ratyriski's book was 
published by the Trade Union (CRZZ) publishing house, and his approach 
to the problem of employment seems to reflect a kind of pragmatic grass­
roots concern with keeping the constituents on the job.
37See, eg., L. Zacher Problemy strategii rozwoju gospodarczego Polski 
Ludowej Warsaw 1974, p. 102, 124-25; K. Dzienio "Demograficzne 
uwarunkowania strategii zatrudnienia" in Demografia spoteczna Warsaw
1974, p. 293.
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and stagnant wage levels,^ absenteeism,^^ lack of industrial discipline
41inflationary pressures and, in the opinion of some, such symptoms of
disorganization and demoralization as drinking on the job, industrial
accidents and smouldering worker discontent (a potent factor to be
42reckoned with in Poland).
Faced with these unattractive alternatives, the Gomulka regime
finally decided in the late 1960s to strive for greater efficiency even
at the cost of accepting a certain measure of planned unemployment in the 
431970s. They might conceivably have succeeded in escaping with this heresy 
as well had they convinced the working class that some substantial number 
of their members might benefit from this new dispensation, but Gomuika,
This obviously applies only to the pre-Gierek period. See Olgdzki, op.cit., 
p. 264, 309. See also Zacher, op. cit., p. 133-34.
39See, eg., K. Dzienio in Demografia Spoleczna Warsaw 1974, p. 295.
40See, eg., M. Kabaj "Bariera zatrudnienia" ZG October 12, 1975.
41Ibid. See also Oledzki, op. cit. , p. 112.
42For unusually candid airings of this line of argument, see the contribu­
tions by K. Toeplitz, J. Bochehski, W. Görnicki and A. Micewski to the 
collective volume Polski problem Nr 1, Warsaw 1972. Cf. some similar 
reasoning from an earlier lucid moment in M. Kabaj "Grofne zjawiska i 
konflikty" ZG Jan. 19, 1958.
43 See Ratynski op. cit. . p. 10, 76; Dzienio and Golacka op. cit. , p. 108.
H. Kröl, the prominent labour economist revealed in an article in TL 
Feb. 15, 1971, that the Gomulka version of the 1971-75 plan was 
contemplating an unemployment figure of 200,000 by 1975, and this on the
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who was in any case no diplomat, was not even aware that there was any
44need to negotiate. In the event he was not removed by higher 
ecclesiastical authority, but hoist with his own petard of 1956 - a near 
revolution.
In this, as in many other aspects of economic policy, Gierek reversed
Gomulka's approach, and acted swiftly to avert the looming unemployment
45that his predecessors' plans had accepted. Under Gierek, employment has
basis of certain quite unreal premises about female and peasant 
employment. Krdl's estimate was that the figure unemployed by 1975 
would in fact have been about half a million. He also asserts that 
influential party economists were urging these on the basis that
the demographic situation demanded it. If this is not an oversimplifica­
tion or distortion of their position, it would certainly seem, as Kröl 
suggests, that these people timed the introduction of their measures 
very badly, given the enormous increases in the work-force in the late 
1960s and early 1970s (see Appendix B. Krol also revealed that the old 
suggestion of economic emigration had again been raised, presumably in 
camera.
44The negative aspects of the Gomuika package were much more evident to 
the worker than their positive ones. The price rises, and the threat of 
wage penalties and unemployment were far more palpable than any possible 
future benefits. Gomulka must have been one of the few people in Poland 
in 1970 unaware of the groundswell of popular feeling even before his 
disastrous price-hike in December.
45For a discussion, see H. Trend, "Arbeitsmarkt und Vollbeschäftigung in 
Polen" in Osteuropäische' Rundschau 1972, No. 9,,p.l.
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burgeoned to such an extent that even the massive labour force increments 
of 1966-70 and 1971-75 have been fully absorbed; indeed, there has been 
a good deal of talk about labour shortages in the last two years, and 
Gierek has had to regress to the widely-criticised Gomulka expedient 
of imposing a succession of administrative limits on permissible 
employment levels.^6
In the near future it will be the turn of the demographic low of
the 1960s to begin to make its own kind of impression on the labour
market. What form the already existing labour shortages will assume
then is still a matter for conjecture. Polish economic demographers,
like their counterparts elsewhere, plead for demographic considerations
to be taken fully into account in the formulation of policy; and there
is probably a growing awareness of these matters now among the Polish
leadership. But a solution of the problem may require more drastic
economic measures than the present government will wish to hazard. There
47is less talk of radical economic reform now than ever. Immigration of
48Arab or other Gastarbeiter scarcely seems likely - that proposition is
For statistics showing the state of employment as measured by state 
employment agencies (and here Rajkiewicz's caveat of 1957 - ZG March 3, 
1957 - that "No-one believes the official data not even the state agency 
that gathers them" may still be of some relevance), see Appendix Table 5. 
For instances of administrative restrictions on employment levels, see, 
eg., ZG Feb 10, June 23 and Dec 15, 1974, and June 8, 1975, all at 
page 15, and TL November 28, 1974. 
lThe use of the word "reforma" fairly quickly became taboo after Gierek's 
accession, and the form "udoskonalanie (udoskonalenie) systemu zarzadzania 
gospodarka narodowa" or similar became mandatory.
See note 5 above.
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in any case as ideologically unsound as the suggestions referred to earlier
that Poland's labour surplus might be exported temporarily or permanently,
as before the war. Poland does supply a certain amount of labour power to
49 . .its neighbours mainly on a cross-border commuting basis, but the abolition
of this and similar arrangements would scarcely make much difference to its
situation even in the short run. In any case the outflow of German
"autochthons" now seems likely to increase and therefore to cancel out any
such gains. The labour power of women and pensioners is relatively less
exploited in Poland than in the Soviet Union or the G.D.R., but there are
strong influences militating against their further mobilization. Female
work-force participation rates have already been emphatically denounced by
Polish commentators as too high both for social and natalist reasons;
Gierek himself, moreover, has repeatedly pledged a new deal for women, part
of which is said to be the chance of getting part-time rather than full-time 
50employment. And the Party is committed to lowering rather than maintaining,
49Estimates of the numbers involved vary. For a review of the evidence, 
see J.L. Kerr "Gastarbeiter in Eastern Europe" Radio Free Europe RAD 
Background Report 169 (Eastern Europe), December 4, 1975, pp. 10-12.
50Current trends would seem to suggest however, that given the dynamism 
of Poland's economic growth in its present phase, the ceiling that is 
ultimately reached by women's employment will be biological rather than 
social. At present women's employment in the socialized sector is 
increasing at the spectacular rate of 6% per annum, and women now 
constitute 42% of the socialized labour force and 46% of the total 
labour force. Part-time work for women, though increasing quite 
sharply, is not in fact keeping pace with the overall increase in 
women's employment. See ZW March 3, 1975 p. 3, and TL August 1, 1975,
p. 8.
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much less increasing the pension age, a commitment which it in fact
51has already begun to honour.
In all the circumstances, it is possible that the forthcoming 
demographically-determined decline in labour supply could play the role 
of midwife to Poland's long-canvassed and repeatedly shelved, decentral­
izing economic reform. But other solutions - attempting to impose greater
industrial discipline by administrative fiat, for example, as in 
52Czechoslovakia, or in the USSR in the 1940s and 1950s, or simply 
struggling through with a minimum of structural alterations and a 
maximum of central "parameter" manipulation and ad hoc administrative 
campaigns - seem rather more likely.
d. Ethnic Relations
Before the war, Poland suffered from one of the most intractable 
complexes of ethno-political problems of any country in Europe. There
51See Gierek's speech to the VI Congress, VI Zjazd PZPR Stenogram Warsaw 
1972, pp. 156-57; Polityka March 15, 1975, p. 2. The policy favouring 
earlier retirement was adopted partly for its potential benefits in 
removing some of the demographic pressure from the labour market. Now 
that that consideration is no longer applicable, they are nonetheless 
stuck with it, and will have to induce pensioners to return to the 
labour market of their own free will. This, in fact, is already being 
done: see Polityka December 22, 1973, p. 2 "W kraju". For a sign of 
the growing awareness of the importance of pensioner manpower, see 
"Starsi ludzie i praca" TL June 16, 1975.
52See A. Elias, Manpower trends in Czechoslovakia Washington 1972, p. 5. 
For an interesting and less than approbatory Polish glimpse of these 
measures, see W. Grochola "Jak polubid dzieci" in Polityka Jan 5, 1974,
p. 11.
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were, among others, large Ukrainian Belorussian, German and Jewish
minorities, amounting in total to about one third of the total
population. The Ukrainians and Germans were particularly militant, and
represented, moreover, explicit irredentist claims supported with
varying degrees of overtness by two of Poland's former partitioners.
In many of the cities, the Jewish element was large and increasing much
faster than it was assimilating, whilst at the same time, its presence
in certain very visible professions and activities was growing faster
again. After the slaughter, famine, murder, and deportations of and
after World War II, Poland finally emerged with what is officially said
53to be about 99% ethnic homogeneity. While this claim is certainly 
exaggerated (it implies a negligible number of Germans, an assessment 
which is based on political rather than ethnic or linguistic grounds), 
it is true that the only major ethnic issues in Polish politics have been 
largely of the regime's own manufacture.
Little information is available on Poland's remaining ethnic 
minorities; and what information there is is approximate, out-of-date
and somewhat dubious. Questions concerning nationality are not asked
54 55at census enquiries. According to one estimate made in 1963 there
Dziewdnski and Kosihski, op. cit., p. 157.
54In 1968 a trial run for the 1970 census was held, the questionnaires for
which included a question about nationality. Ostensibly for reasons of
economy, this question was dropped from the 1970 census papers. "Cechy
demograficzne ludno^ci" ZG Sept. 6, 1970. The author of this article
noted, however, that the question had proved a very "sensitive" (drazliwe)
one. See also A. Kwilecki "National Minorities in Poland" Polish Round 
Table Yearbook 1968 p.146.
55.ZW December 12, 1963. The 31,000 Jews have since declined to 10,000 to
15,000 in the wake of the "events" of 1968 and the resulting emigration.
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were 180,000 Ukrainians, 165,00 Belorussians, 31,000 Jews, 3,000 Germans
(sic) and a number of other small groups. The White Russian minority in
what was formerly the Bialystok voivodship in the north-east is of sufficient
size and compactness to provide some pretext for incorporation of part at
least, if not all of the area in, say, an extended Soviet Belorussia (if
other circumstances were propitious), and to that extent is a potential
internal-cum-external problem. The Ukrainians are, or perhaps it would be
more accurate to say have been more scattered, and while Ukrainian
nationalists have claimed parts of what is now south-east Poland on partially
ethnic grounds, they too seem unlikely to cause much domestic trouble without
outside intervention or encouragement. The East Slav minorities have been
apparently blue-printed for cultural extinction by assimilation, and press
comments noting with apparent satisfaction first signs of this development 
57have appeared. This probably reflects a vague feeling among both official
(New York Times Magazine April 15, 1973) . The German figure of 3,000 was 
evidently something of an underestimate since Olszowski, the Polish Foreign 
Minister has stated that 65,000 Polish citizens left for Germany in 1971-75 
alone, and an agreement has since been signed which provides for the emigra­
tion of a further 120,000 to 125,000 in the next four years. (The Australian 
October 11, 1975). See also section e ., p .289below) .
56The ZW article previously cited mentions euphemistically that two thirds of 
the Ukrainians had "settled" in the West and North. Dziewdnski and Kosiiiski 
cite two different estimates of the numbers of Ukrainians thus resettled: 
120,000 and 150,000. The lower of the two estimates also includes an estimati 
of 80,000 for the number of Ukrainians resettled under "Action W", an 
operation explicitly designed to disperse people suspected of collaborating 
with "nationalist bands". Dzieworiski and Kosiriski op cit. p. 82
57For a sampling of the tone of official comment on the East Slav nationalities 
see the article by B. Porowski in Argumenty Sept. 14, 1969, (translated in
Osteuropa 1971, No. 1, p. A41.
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and unofficial Polish circles that having lost so much territory and 
population in the East, the least that should be done is to forestall 
any further possible inroads, and that the best way to achieve this is 
by a policy of assimilation. The Polish concessions to the traditional 
Leninist doctrines of "national in form, socialist in content" are minimal.
The German and Jewish minorities represent complex political problems, 
but at this stage those problems too are more likely to be external than 
domestic. So few Jews remain now that one feels that even the demogogic 
skills of the Partisan faction would be taxed by the task of reconverting 
them into the bogey they were made to represent in 1968. The Germans have 
never played any role as a national group in post-war Poland, and it seems 
unlikely that they will start to do so now. Their only political ambition 
in People's Poland seems to be to emigrate. Were they to be frustrated in 
this, and should they then seek to vigorously prosecute their claims they 
might become significant actors on the political scene. But if the present 
climate of Polish-German relations is maintained for some time, the situation 
is likely to be peaceably defused.
Thus, insofar as demographic developments in the minority communities 
can be assessed given the absence of reliable data, they seem to be working 
towards diminution of any internal political problem these ethnic groups 
might represent. The Ukrainians and Belorussians are probably diminishing 
as a result of assimilation and the Jews and Germans are certainly 
diminishing as a result of emigration.
e. International Politics
In the previous section it was suggested that Poland's ethnic 
minorities (and Polish ethnic minorities abroad) were of greater international 
than domestic political significance; and that for them to become the source 
of domestic political pressures external interference or intervention would 
be necessary. It was suggested, in particular, that at some future stage,
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a Soviet government might wish to exploit the Belorussian or Ukrainian
minorities for purposes of its own, to help bring a recalcitrant Polish
government to heel, or, more drastically, to perform further surgery on
Poland so as to permanently alter its borders and/or its position in the
Socialist commonwealth of nations. If this were to happen, the Poles
might have cause to regret their policies towards their East Slav
minorities. But the direction of influence might easily be the reverse
one, either with or without active Polish connivance. Restiveness in the
Western republics of the USSR (especially, Ukraine, Belorussia and
Lithuania) might be aggravated by activity among the corresponding
minorities in Poland. It is conceivable that some Polish government might
one day consciously foster such activity. But far more likely at least in
the foreseeable future, is some kind of largely involuntary embroilment on
the pattern of the Czechoslovak Ukrainian minority's swelling and
subversive influence on the Soviet Ukraine in the days of Dubcek: a liberal
Polish government promising a new deal for various groups within its own
society might find its Belorussians and Ukrainians developing excessively
58close relations with their fellow countrymen across the Soviet border.
None of these possibilities seems imminently likely. And with the 
further decline of the numbers involved, they will probably become less 
likely, rather than more so.
For some appreciation of the remarkable inflammatory capacity of sparks 
of liberalism near totalitarian tinder, see the excellent discussion of 
the role of the Ukrainian minority in Czechoslovakia in the period circa 
1968 in G. Hodnett and P. Potichny The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis 
Canberra 1970 (Occasional Paper No. 6 of The Department of Policital 
Science, R.S.S.S., Australian National University).
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The international problem presented by the German community, on
the other hand, has been (and may remain) a very real one. Ever since
Brandt's historic visit to Warsaw in 1970, arguments have been raging
back and forth about how many Germans there are, how many should be
allowed to emigrate ever or at any one stage, and (under various polite
and euphemistic verbal smokescreens) how much the West German government
should pay for them. The outflow of Germans from Poland that began in
1971 meanwhile grew slower and slower. Then on August 7th, 1975, following
on a meeting in Helsinki between Gierek and the West German Chancellor
Schmidt, an agreement was signed to which was appended a protocol declaring
that 120,000 to 125,000 Polish citizens would be permitted to leave Poland
in the next four years. Since then the emigration rate has again accelerated.
While the Poles, after much evident reluctance, have now agreed to specify
a more or less precise figure of emigrants, should the agreement fail to be
ratified or should further obstacles appear in Polish-German relations,
implementation of the protocol may well be halted. The figure of 120,000
is in any case a compromise. In 1973, the Red Cross reported that it had
59received 283,000 emigration applications. German and Polish estimates in 
the past have varied wildly at both extremes from virtually zero to over a 
million. That being so, both sides are likely to feel aggrieved whatever 
the outcome; and even after implementation of the agreement, some 
discontented would-be Germans may remain in Poland. How many Germans there 
really are in Poland, and how many among those that ultimately leave will 
have been more German than Polish are ultimately metaphysical questions, 
though ones that doubtless will continue to be debated between the presses 
of the two countries.^ But basically, the more that go, the smaller the 
problem, either domestic or international, that remains.
59"Abbau der Illusionen" Die Zeit October 26, 1973.
^°For a full review of the claims and counterclaims made on both sides, with 
extensive citation of press and other source material, see Radio Free 
Europe Research, Polish Situation Reports 24 and 47 for 1971, 16 and 42
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The Polish diaspora in Western countries poses a number of interesting 
questions that are not without their political aspects. However the 
subject is too diffuse and remote from present concerns to warrant even 
brief discussion here. There remains the question of the Polish minorities 
in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The Poles in Czechoslovakia have 
been the cause or at least the occasion of a good deal of conflict in the 
past. However they are a small and numerically stagnant group,61 and it 
seems most unlikely that Polish nationalism, for all its capacity for suicidal 
unwisdom, will ever again work itself up into the fine careless rage of 1939, 
when it joined in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia ostensibly for 
demographic-irredentist reasons.
Recently, however, we have been reminded, if reminders were necessary, 
that the Polish minority in the USSR is by no means a dead issue. And here, 
paradoxically, it would appear likely that it is in part the rapid demo­
graphic decline reported in the Polish community there that is the cause of 
the trouble. The Soviet and Polish governments seem, over the years to have 
had a tacit agreement to assimilate and absorb those of each other's nationals 
as are still resident on the wrong side of the border. The number of people 
identifying as Poles in Soviet censuses has declined rapidly, and the number
for 1972, 16, 31, 37 and 42 for 1973, 5, 9 and 40 for 1974, and 24, 33 
and 37 for 1975.
61Their numbers declined from about 110,000 in 1921 to 72,000 in 1950 (V. Srb 
"Obyvatelstvo Ceskoslovenska v letech 1918-1968" in Demografie X (1968)
No. 4, p. 302) and 67,000 in the 1970 Census. A sudden increase of 4,000 
or so reported since may be accounted for by the presence of Polish 
workers temporarily employed in Czechoslovakia. The numbers of Polish 
school pupils are, significantly, reported as being in decline. Tvorba
Feb 2, 1972, abstracted in ABSEES II No. 4, p. 155.
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claiming Polish as a native language has declined even faster. The real
number of Poles in the Soviet Union is no doubt also in some measure an
irreducibly abstract question; in any case it is an extremely complex one.
But while some of the Poles identified at earlier censuses may have been
Catholic Belorussians or Uniate Ukrainians, and others may have been Soviet
citizens who knew some Polish, wanted to emigrate from the Soviet Union,
and saw their opportunity to do so in the repatriation of Poles organized
in the late 1950s, there can be little doubt that the figures are likely to
greatly underestimate the number of people who would identify as Poles in
an open situation, and have quite a good deal of justification for doing 
6 2so. And there can be little doubt, either, that the Poles are subjected
to conditions as nationally and culturally repressive as those suffered by
any other major ethnic group in the Soviet Union. Late in 1974, a number
of extremely prominent Polish intellectuals called upon the authorities to
take a greater interest in defending the cultural rights of the Polish
6 3community in the Soviet Union. This issue is potentially an explosive
0 2W. Sworakowski is of the view that the true number of Poles in the USSR 
is three times the official Census figure. He writes that "hundreds of 
Poles who managed to escape from the Soviet Union to Poland reported 
that during the censuses the native language question in the census 
forms had been filled out by the census takers without regard to the 
declaration of the interviewed person". This sounds inherently plausible, 
though there are one or two points that need clarification. Are the 
"hundreds of Poles" repatriants of 1957-59 vintage? And which censuses 
were they referring to? Unfortunately too, Sworakowski does not make 
very clear how he arrived at his estimate of the true number of Poles in 
the USSR. See W. Sworakowski "The Poles in the Soviet Union" in Polish 
Review XIX (1974) No. 3-4, p. 143, 145.
^Kultura (Paris) 1975, No. 1-2, p. 230.
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one and must be acutely embarrassing to the Gierek regime. Further 
reported declines in the size of the Polish community in the Soviet Union 
might conceivably have the effect of making the problem worse. Whatever 
course future Polish agitation (and possible government representations 
to the Soviet leadership in private) might take, the Soviet side will not 
be without weapons to use in its own defence, quite apart from its usual 
ones of diplomatic force majeure. They could, for example, ostensibly and 
ostentatiously hand the whole problem over to the republican leaderships in 
Kiev and Minsk and leave them to handle relations with the Poles. Polish- 
Ukrainian amity in particular would almost certainly not prove robust enough 
to bear the strain.
Let us now consider the possible effects of Poland's demographic
development as a nation on her position on the international scene. Since
the war, Poland's population has in fact increased faster than that of
almost any other European country. Between 1950 and 1968, Poland alone
accounted for 55% of the total Eastern European population increase, while
accounting for only about 31% of the total population even at the end of
that period. Already it has become twice as populous as East Germany
64though it was only some 25% larger just after the war. Its position 
relative to the Czechoslovakia has also improved over the same period (not 
to compare it with the pre-war Czechoslovakia, whose large German ballast 
was more a source of weakness than strength). Given that its GNP has also
^The population in the productive age groups in Poland increased by 25% 
over the period 1951-1970 (and has increased much further since) , whilst 
that of East Germany declined over the same period by 18%. W. Iskra 
Czynnik ludzki w rozwoju gospodarczym krajdw socjalistycznych Warsaw
1974, p. 114.
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increased at a more rapid rate than that of its two neighbours, it is
evident that the demographic factor has contributed to strengthening its
relative power position without itself having given rise to any obvious
countervailing factors that might have cancelled out that effect. Poland's
66relative demographic strength vis-a-vis both East (and West) Germany 
seems destined to go on increasing for the immediate future; and depending 
on the durability of the current Czech demographic revival, it may well 
also do so vis-a-vis Czechoslovakia. These two countries have been Poland's 
closest partners (apart from the Soviet Union) in recent years. Gomulka 
seems to have striven for some kind of special relationship with them; and 
there have been signs of a similar orientation on Gierek's part as well.
If Poland were able to maintain its present birth rate or increase 
it, it is likely that barring eco-disasters this would contribute to its 
further enhancing its relative weight within this triangular sub-group in 
the future.
6 5By 7.2% per annum 1951-73, cf. 6.9% (East Germany) and 5.9% (Czechoslovakia). 
The figure for East Germany is inflated to some extent by its 13.1% per 
annum increase in 1951-55, which represented a delayed recovery factor 
after the devastation of war and post-war Soviet reparations. The current 
trends are much more in Poland's favour than the above figures suggest, and 
this is partly due to a demographic factor, namely that the post-war baby 
boom is now bearing fruit in the form of an industrial boom based to some 
extent on extensive labour inputs. cf. M. Kabaj "Integracja a zatrudnienia" 
ZG September 22, 1974.
Few truly Polish hearts can fail to beat faster at the thought that at 
present the difference between the population of Poland and that of the two 
Germanies combined is being reduced annually by roughly half a million.
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Polish crude birth rates have largely risen and fallen with those
prevailing in the USSR as a whole in the post-war period. However RSFSR
statistics would suggest that Polish birth and natural increase rates
6 7are probably now above those prevailing in the Russian population.
Were Net Reproduction Ratios available for the ethnic Russian population, 
they would almost certainly have been below those of the Polish population 
in recent years. These facts and assumptions are unlikely to be unknown to 
participants in Polish demographic debates or wholly absent from their 
calculations, however unrelated these might be to the practical politics 
of the near future. The Polish gains vis-a-vis the Ukrainians since the 
war may also have been a source of satisfaction to some.
The latent geo-politics of Eastern Europe (i.e. what might be 
expected to happen in the event of some shrinking of the Soviet or Russian 
role, for example, or some expansion of the German one) is an inviting 
field for speculation. But demographic developments in Eastern Europe 
itself (i.e. excluding the Soviet Union for the moment) are not apparently 
working towards such a transformation, and so any elaborate consideration 
of future contingencies would not be germane to the present discussion.
Nonetheless, in considering population debates in Poland or any of 
the other East European countries, it is essential to keep this "make-believe" 
dimension in mind as that is certainly what most of the actual participants 
are doing. It is this factor, I believe, that gives those debates much of 
their peculiar piquancy, their ability to rouse the greatest fervour, 
attract the widest public attention, and to evoke anxieties and national 
neuroses which might otherwise seem wholly inexplicable to the outside 
observer.
67Compare the respective tables (for the RSFSR) in Naselenie SSSR 1973: 
statisticheskii sbornik Moscow 1975, p. 70, and for Poland in Rocznik
pemograficzny 1974, p. XXI.
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"How can we feel sure of our frontiers and of peace in Europe, when
there are 198 Germans to the square kilometre and only 88 Poles?" cried
Cardinal Wyszynski, the Catholic primate of Poland in a sermon delivered
in 1959. "If we want a strong Poland, we need a further 25 million people.
Not 30 but 50 million Poles can find living-space in our country. That is
Poland's raison d'dtat. Only then will we be a nation which by its numbers,
it work and its diligence earns everyone's respect ..." Though he did not,
of course, mention them by name, there can be little doubt that Wyszyhski
68also had the Russians at the back of his mind when he spoke these words. 
f. Ideology
Since 1956, Poland has treated a number of tenets of Soviet Marxist 
theory and practice in cavalier fashion: decollectivizing and postponing 
resocialization from year to year; tolerating the church within relatively 
liberal represssive limits; permitting a far broader spectrum of foreign 
information and ideas to circulate within the country than is permitted by
68Wyszynski's sermon is quoted in H.J. Stehle, The Independent Satellite 
london 1963, p. 121. It is noticeable that most Polish demographic 
commentators who allude to the "national future" argument in this kind 
of way fail to locate Poland's place as being necessarily within the 
Socialist bloc (something which is often emphasized in other contexts).
Thus an article entitled "Niepokojacy sygnal" (Disturbing Signal) in 
SP Feb 14, 1973, speaks of "Poland's future place in the great family of 
nations of the world". See also the similar formulations in the follow­
ing articles: "lie dzieci" Kultura October 22, 1972; "Zaproszenie do 
mydlenia" Kultura November 12, 1972; "Lata 1973-78 zadecyduja o przysziodci 
Polski" Kierunki December 10, 1972; "Nowodd 'Polityki' - rachunek
kasztanowy" Kierunki December 3, 1972.
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any of its neighbours, (with the obvious exception of Czechoslovakia 
circa 1967-69), and so on. While Gomulka retreated from some of his 1956 
program, this was in large measure because he had not written that program 
in the first place. His subsequent withdrawal from it was as much 
dictated by personal prejudice as by intra-party or external pressures.
But in certain matters he continued to dissent from the Soviet model with 
the same tenacity he had shown in 1949.
This stubborn adherence to heretical ideas and policies was also
apparent in the Gomuika regime's attitude towards population issues.
Though other East European regimes also permitted or fostered considerable
revivals of demographic research before the final rehabilitation of the
science in the Soviet Union in the early and mid nineteen-sixties, and did
not prevent them from at times treading on potentially dangerous ideological
ground, no other country flew quite so boldly in the face of approved
doctrine as Poland did. While certain decencies continued to be observed,
in the form, for example, of demographic articles devoted to Marx's
demographic views and the socialist law of population, the general tone of
scholarship, and, more particularly of journalism and official pronounce-
69ments was one at times stridently Malthusian pragmatism. Rapid population
70growth was a social and economic bugbear, reflecting primitive mores and
See footnote 21 above.
To take one among many examples, one writer(M. Parzyriska, ZW September 7, 
1957) coined the term "sexological hooliganism" to characterize the 
situation. And as the birth rate subsequently declined, it was pointed 
out that this was characteristic of "developed nations".
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leading to a lowering in the standard of living, and unreasonable burdens
71on the state budget . The world generally, and the underdeveloped 
countries in particular, were faced by a serious demographic crisis. In 
respect of population growth Poland was in effect an underdeveloped country. 
The birth rate was no longer held to be anything to be proud of; on the 
contrary it was something to be ashamed of individually and struggled with 
nationally. In that struggle, "subjective" and superstructural factors 
like propaganda and the spread of contraception had an important role to 
play. The fact that Poland was a socialist country was of limited relevance; 
the nature of the problem remained basically the same.
And so the Polish public was regaled with the horrors of the population
72bomb exploding both within and beyond the nation's borders. Following on 
71The theme of "unreasonable burdens" on the state budget was one of the 
standard features of Gomulkaist journalism. It was particularly prominent 
in the official justifications given for the ill-fated price rises of 
December 1970. The implied suggestion, of course, was that the state had 
its own pockets and its own worthy objectives to which the citizen made 
small contribution; he should therefore not expect the state to offer him 
too much charity. For a sampling of this style of journalism in the neo- 
Malthusian context, see "W odpowiedzi matkom-Polkom" TL August 25, 1958.
An article in Zycie Warszawy ("Niepokojacy rekord" ZW April 26, 1958) 
asked its readers whether they did not feel a "thrill of anxiety" (dreszcz 
niepokoju) at the demographic projection that there would be almost 
6 billion people in the world by the year 2000. Having thus set the 
context of global concern, the writer then went on to deplore the Polish 
birth rate and the records it was setting. "It's really a melancholy 
record. And one that should inspire not pride, but serious reflection".
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the slump in the domestic birth rate, this theme died away in the latter
part of the Gomuika period, and to that extent a partial return to
73orthodoxy occurred. However, many traces of heretical thought have 
survived. Thus,for example, an ,anti-natalist contribution to the domestic
74population debate in 1972 bore the title "Who wants to live standing up?"
And at the international level, while Polish discussions of world population
problems now tend to follow the more liberal version of the current Soviet
75line, they do at times deviate quite dramatically from it.
Though the flow of neo-Malthusian propaganda dried up, there was no return 
to the classical anti-Malthusianism of the early 1950s. (For a sample of 
which, see A. Lewandowski "Kto winien: przyroda czy kapitalizm?" GP 
December 9, 1953). At the level of domestic social policy, on the other 
hand, Gomuika refused to alter his basic anti-natalist orientation.
Cf. footnote 28 above.
74Polityka September 11, 1971.
75A rather startling deviation from the usual current version is to be 
found in, of all places, a Soviet collective volume including contribu­
tions from the bloc countries. Edward Rosset expresses his conviction 
that stationary population is both a near prospect and a necessary and 
desirable objective. "Since the population of the earth cannot continue 
to grow to infinity, since population growth must come to an end somewhere, 
I would favour some solution which would not require that humanity should 
be bathed in a sea of blood". V.S. Steshenko and V.P. Piskunov 
Demograficheskaia politika Moscow 1974, p. 63. Rosset does not go on to 
make any assertion to the effect that Western warmongers favour such a 
solution, and from the context it is clear that he believes international 
efforts to reduce population are essential to avert severe conflict. The 
official Soviet line, of course, either eschews such catastrophic visions
altogether or attributes them to scheming adversaries, whilst in general
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While Polish Malthusianism was softening, so too was the pristine 
rigour of Soviet anti-Malthusianism. After the mid-sixties, the two 
sides tended to move closer together. But for some years before that, 
while Moscow was maintaining that the world had no population problems, 
only social and political ones, Warsaw had been claiming that the world 
was threatened by a population explosion. It had, moreover, permitted 
its Society for Responsible Motherhood to affiliate with the International 
Family Planning Federation, a notoriously "Malthusian" organization, and 
to cultivate other similar international links. And while the Soviet 
Union was rejoicing in its last years of high natural increase and 
asserting that this was not a problem, but a natural and desirable state 
of affairs for a socialist state, in Poland the official view was that 
high natural increase was a basically pathological condition and one that 
had to be cured at all costs.
playing down the demographic factor as an independent variable in Third 
World development or world politics, and asserting that solutions to 
the socio-political problems of the Third World (i.e. their adoption of 
an approved brand of socialism) will also serve to solve the population 
problem, insofar as there is any such thing. For an exposition of the 
Polish version of orthodoxy, see the chapter contributed by the head of 
the Polish delegation to the World Population Conference in Bucharest 
1974, Jdzef Pajestka, to Demografia Spoleczna, pp. 13-32; and for a 
cautious and partial dissent from it, the succeeding chapter by A. Jagielski, 
esp. at pp. 71-73 and ff., and pp. 82-3. See also A. Lubowski: Widmo 
przeludnienia kr^zy nad swiatem (The Spectre of Overpopulation is Haunting 
the World) ZG November 3, 1974. The contents of this article are neo- 
Malthusian. The use of the phrase from the Communist Manifesto is 
deliberate. Lubowski is either unaware of or unconcerned by the fact 
that Soviet orthodoxy would regard his use of a Marxian tag in this
context as virtually sacrilegious.
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It should not be thought that this was a particularly contentious issue 
as between the Soviet and Polish leaderships, or even between their ideologists. 
The Polish authorities simply went their own way and avoided issuing challenges 
on the matter. The heresy in their position was more evident in propaganda for 
domestic consumption than at loftier theoretical levels, where at times attempts 
were made to distinguish between Polish anti-natalism and Malthusianism. But 
preservation of the pure Soviet orthodoxy prevailing up to the mid-sixties would 
have been quite impossible. To do so would have entailed arguing that high 
population growth was a feature of socialism and therefore must be a good thing 
despite the fact that the Polish government had said that for Polish purposes 
it was not. Then in subsequent years it would have been necessary to go on 
maintaining that the high population growth actually still existed, despite the 
fact that in Poland where there was an anti-natalist policy, and in all the other 
socialist countries, where there was not, fertility and population growth were 
declining dramatically. It was actually this turn of events, more than any other, 
that ultimately led to the doctrinal revision in the Soviet Union itself. Already 
by the mid-nineteen-sixties, in fact, relatively few Soviet bloc demographers
7 Awere still prepared to defend the cruder aspects of the old official line.
It remains to consider what forces pushed the Gomu-lka regime into heresy 
on this particular question. The economic reasons have already been briefly 
mentioned, and they were undoubtedly important. But similar rates of natural 
increase had occurred in the Soviet Union, for example, without producing any 
such ideological volte-face. The relative freedom of Polish intellectual life 
in the late fifties was probably another important element in the situation, 
since it was thanks to that that the neo-Malthusian
76 For polemics by bloc demographers with the old Stalinist approach, see eg. 
Materialy miedzynarodowego sympozjum demograficznego w Zakopanem 1964, 
Warsaw 1966, esp. pp. 13-60, and 252 ff. Most of the more stubborn 
demographic hardliners were from the USSR. See, eg. I. Pisarev 
Naselenie i trud v SSSR Moscow 1966, p. 7, 149 and passim.
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current of thought was able to develop among Poland's economists to the
point where it was able to affect the thinking of those closest to the
leadership. But perhaps the most crucial single factor involved was the
determined opposition of the Church to this particular aspect of government
policy. As was noted earlier, the Catholics made use of the anti-Malthusian
77card in their opposition to the abortion reform in 1956. They thereby 
pre-empted the position of Soviet orthodoxy for themselves, thus to some 
extent discrediting it, so to speak, and giving the regime an added 
incentive to countenance ideological revision on the population question.
Cf. footnote 17 above. In the debate on the original abortion reform 
legislation in 1956, one deputy said that the bill might be interpreted 
as a sign of embarrassed incapacity (zaklopotanie) in the face of the 
nation's vigorous fertility. "We criticise the Americans for their 
incorrect neo-Malthusian doctrines", but now we propose to follow them. 
The bill, declared the speaker, is a "relic of the bourgeois order".
The Catholic writer Dobraczyriski cunningly criticized the bill as being 
a demonstration of scepticism (akt niewary) about the effectiveness of 
the state's social welfare system. The Minister of Health deplored the 
use of the anti-Malthusian argument describing it as a "rather low trick" 
(chwyt niezupelnie elegancki). He does not appear to have attempted to 
answer the charge, however. TL April 28, 1956, p. 3. Trybuna Ludu's 
commentary deplored Dobraczyrfski's attack on the social indication and 
described his "demonstration of scepticism" argument as "embellishment" 
(lakiernicza teza) . Though they were thus able to find a Soviet jargon 
phrase with which to condemn Dobraczynski, the situation was certainly 
paradoxical. The Catholic opposition was criticizing the State for 
underestimating its own achievements, whilst the State was criticizing
the Church for overestimating those achievements.
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As relations between Church and State deteriorated in the years after
1956, Gomulka no doubt became less and less inclined to see eye to eye
with the Church on this matter; and their outspoken and continued
78opposition must have enraged him. The change in the policies on 
abortion and contraception of late 1959 were accompanied by a sharp and
That opposition also took organized form, with the Church seeking to 
directly influence the medical profession to frustrate the new legisla­
tion (SP December 24-6, 1956; for an anti-Catholic account of some of 
these activities, see, eg., "W obronie zycia" Polityka August 8, 1959). 
Wyszynski, a man well-known for forthright speech, has over the years 
been particularly forthright about these matters. Reuter August 11,
1968, reported him as attributing the birth of "dwarfs, imbeciles and 
deformed beings" to official family planning policies; on August 7, 1966, 
as describing legal abortion as "the murder of future Poles, the greatest 
crime that can happen in the history of a nation"; on March 15, 1964, as 
comparing the government's policies with the genocidal measures of the 
Nazi administration during the war. The New York Herald-Tribune of 
January 1, 1963, reported a similar statement, together with an estimate 
that the losses to the Polish population were already greater than those 
sustained during the War. Jean Wetz, reporting in Le Monde January 16, 
1960, said of the Cardinal that he "ne manque pas une occasion de s'Clever 
contre ce qu'il appelle 'la transformation des maternites en ossuaires'". 
Gomuika, whose intolerance of opposing views was at least as celebrated as 
Wyszynski's forceful eloquence, must have found such a doughty adversary
particularly infuriating.
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79concentrated campaign against the Church, which suggests that they 
had perhaps become more of a thorn in the authorities' side by that 
stage than even the "situation on the meat market". The authorities' 
option for a fairly explicit neo-Malthusianism is not really surprising 
given the logic of Church-State politics in People's Poland. Indeed,
were the Orthodox Church in the USSR as powerful and pro-natalist as the 
Catholic Church in Poland, one can well imagine that the Soviet leadership 
might at some point have been converted to Malthusianism also.
80g. Population Policy: Debates and Dilemmas
As was mentioned earlier there has been a considerable quickening of 
discussion on population issues in Poland in recent years. To some extent
79See "Zabobon i zycie" TL June 1, 1959; "W obronie Zycia" Polityka August 8, 
1959; "Propaganda kleru a prawda o pf^yro^cie naturalnym w Polsce" Fakty 
i Myali December 15, 1959; "0 ograniczaniu przyrostu ludnosci" ZG 
January 3, 1960; "Populacja i £wiadome macierzyrfstwo" TL January 6, 1960; 
"Posiannictwo kobiety i iycie" GP January 5, 1960; Demagogia i fakty" 
Polityka January 16, 1960; "Pamietnik dziecka nienarodzonego" Argumenty 
January 24, 1960, etc.
80The best general source on this subject is the volume Polityka ludno^ciowa: 
wspdlczesne problemy Warsaw 1973, which is a selection from the proceedings 
of a conference on population policy held near Warsaw in March 1972. The 
remaining papers are mostly published in the BIGS XVI (1973) No. 1; and 
the discussions in BIGS (1973), Nos. 3-4. See also Socjalne i prawne 
€rodki ochrony macierzyiistwa Warsaw 1973 (also the proceedings of a 
conference on social and population policy); Aktualne problemy demograficzne 
kraju Warsaw 1974. For a well-balanced and critical survey of the whole 
area of population policy in Poland written in English by a Polish scholar, 
see J. Zioikowski's chapter in B. Berelson (ed.) Population Policy in
Developed Countries, New York 1974
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this reflects the growing interest in the subject in the Soviet bloc as 
a whole, following on the spectacular fertility decline of the 1960s, and 
to some extent, the growing interest throughout the world. It is also in 
some measure the result of the ideological relaxation of the earlier 
Gierek years, 1971-73, during which quite forthright debate was possible 
on a number of issues that had previously been partly or wholly taboo. 
Candid as it sometimes has been, the population debate in Poland has not 
of course explicitly broached all the matters raised in the discussion so 
far, which was aimed at mapping the politico-demographic context with 
special attention to those features of it to which the protagonists them­
selves make least explicit reference. For convenience of exposition, I 
will divide the themes that actually are broached into the economic, the 
social and the political. All stem ultimately from the one central complex 
of dilemmas; whether or not Poland should adopt a pro-natalist policy 
(there are no anti-natalists any more it seems, only at most anti-pro- 
natalists); for what reasons it should or should not do so; how and on 
what basis such a policy should be formulated; and by what means it should 
be implemented.
g.(i) Economic Issues
The rationale of Gomulka's anti-natalist policy had been that the 
rapid population growth of the time was placing too great a strain on the 
country's capacity to invest, and thereby reducing its capacity to 
comfortably consume. The slower the population grew, the sooner it would 
become possible to supply everyone with the necessary ingredients of the 
good life; excess expenditure on demographic investments and investments 
to provide jobs for outsize cohorts of school-leavers were holding back
living standards.
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When the rapid decline in fertility in the 1960s brought no very
dramatic improvement in living standards, the plausibility of this
argument was greatly weakened. While people were obviously and by
definition adopting it at the micro-economic level, there was a growing
feeling that the chronic weaknesses of the Polish economy, particularly
in its consumer sectors, had more to do with incompetent management and
misconceived priorities than with demographic or any other pressures. As
a 1972 commentator put it, trenchant after the event: "The attempt was
made to explain the weakness of the economy in terms of an excess of
81children ... That of course was sheer lies" (wierutne kiamstwo).
While most economically-oriented participants in the population 
debate stress that they do not advocate a return to the earlier fertility 
pattern even if such a thing were possible, they do argue that the economic 
optimum is a "moderate" rate of increase (umiarkowany wz.rost) . They also 
emphasize the importance of maintaining an even flow in the birth rate and 
avoiding the convulsive and economically disruptive fluctuations that have 
characterized the post-war period. They draw attention to the impending 
labour shortage in Poland and the impossibility of solving it demographically 
except in the long term. This, they say is the consequence of the anti-natalist 
population policy followed by the government in the 1960s,at the very time 
when they should have been doing all they could to keep fertility as 
high as possible so as to prevent the stunted birth cohorts of the war 
period from "echoing" and thereby perpetuating the imbalance in Poland's 
demographic structure. For similar reasons, it is often argued that Poland 
should refrain from pursuing a strongly pro-natalist policy now in the 1970s 
when the most fertile cohorts are much more numerous, as this, if successful, 
would only produce in turn an enhanced echo of the baby boom and a
81J. Rolicki in Kultura October 1, 1972.
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repetition of all the successive problems that it caused. Poland
should wait till the boom passes before introducing its pro-natalist 
82program.
(It was indeed a remarkable feature of Gomuika's population policy
that it was pursued through the very period when it was least necessary.
There was a joke circulating in Poland in the 'sixties to the effect
that Gomuika, who was celebrated for both his austerity and his stubborn
and misplaced intellectual overconfidence, had decreed that after his
death a simple grave was to be erected to his memory bearing the words:
"Wladyslaw Gomuika, economist". The epitaph "Wladysiaw Gomuika,
. 83demographer" would have been equally appropriate.)
In addition to the dangers of exaggerated fluctuations in labour 
supply in the long term, and severe overall shortages in the short term, 
the economic effects of changes in the age-structure of the population 
are often greatly stressed. Low fertility sustained over a number of 
years reduces the proportion of younger people within the population and 
correspondingly increases the proportion of the aged. This pattern of
82See, eg., S. Klonowicz "Dwunasty model reprodukcji" Polityka January 1, 
1973. This in fact appears to be the reasoning that has won official 
acceptance.
83Cf. footnote 28 above. For retrospective criticisms of the Gomuika 
regime's "voluntaristic" refusal to accept demographic advice, see 
"Ku czemu zmierzamy" Polityka November 6, 1971, and (less emphatically 
and more obliquely) "Miedzynarodowa dyskusj a demografdw" TL March 17,
1972.
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demographic "ageing" is actually characteristic of all developed
societies, and judged by European standards, the Polish population
remains comparatively young. Nonetheless, many Polish demographic
commentators, particularly those of a more economic orientation, often
84present these trends as being rather threatening. The dependency 
ratio (i.e. the ratio of dependent age-groups to the active population), 
they point out, will decline, and the economic burden on wage-earners 
will increase, the more so as increasing numbers of young people are 
kept out of the labour force until they are well into their twenties by 
expanded post-secondary education. Moreover, with the break-down of the 
old three-generational family, the state will be required to disburse 
increasing amounts on the upkeep of the old. Apart from that, there will 
be a tendency for the work-force itself to age, as its younger cohorts 
become proportionately weaker. And in an age of unprecedented 
technological change, it is important that the work-force should be 
supplemented by large cohorts of highly-trained young people able to 
successively transform the permanently obsolescent economy they inherit.
84See, eg., "Jak sterowac rozwojem ludnosci" SP July 14-15, 1973.
Z. Smoliriski has declared baldly (Kultura October 22, 1972) that an 
economy not based in the long term on expanding labour resources is 
"sick" (chora). See also A. Wielowieyski, Przed trzecim przyspieszeniam 
Cracow 1968, pp. 242 and ff. Wielowieyski is a prominent lay
Catholic who explicitly dissociates himself from the kind of thinking 
I have characterized as "econocentricnonetheless,, he veers towards 
econocentric reasoning in his endeavours to have some influence on the
course of events.
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Though economic arguments of this type are often put in conjunction
with others, social, "national" or even overtly political, it is difficult
to escape the impression that there is an excessive amount of econocentrism
85in Polish demographic thinking, as indeed there is throughout the Socialist 
world. In Gomulka's policies, the primacy accorded economic over human 
concerns at times reached caricatural proportions. But one suspects that 
while those policies have now been sharply criticized from a social no less 
than an eco-demographic viewpoint, among the reasons operating at the 
official level towards a review of policy, concern about future difficulties 
in finding the necessary human fuel for sustaining policies of economic 
growth occupied a dominant position. The post-growth mentality has 
scarcely begun to affect the socialist world. Even in Poland, despite its 
neo-Malthusian traditions, thinking of the ZPG type has only recently begun
85This econocentrism probably derives from Polish demography's predominant 
associations, (especially in the past) with government statistics and 
planning procedures, and with economics generally rather than sociology. 
It should be said, however, that this bias is considerably less evident 
in Polish than in Soviet demographic writing. The tendency to treat man 
as an object rather than an objective is often explicitly challenged.
Thus one discussant at the March 1972 conference on population policy 
said: "It seems to me to be rather dangerous to regulate human 
reproduction from above as though the population of a country were only 
an economic factor that can be subordinated to production and consumption 
and the rhythm of economic development" (BIGS 1972, 3-4, p. 57). Writers 
sometimes take pains to emphasize that they are not treating human 
beings as instruments (even when they are).
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to be mentioned in print, often with a kind of breathless and shocked 
86disapproval. Relatively few writers betray awareness of what a 
Yugoslav demographer has referred to as the "truism" that in the long 
term, the only acceptable rate of population growth must be around zero.^ 
It is not clear for how long their "moderately increasing" population, 
allegedly so essential for maximal economic growth, will have to go on 
increasing. Nor is it clear how the problem of "ageing" of the population 
will ultimately be tackled if and when that so fervently desired "moderate 
increase" ever smooths out to nothing. Few seem worried, either, about 
what will happen if and when, as Soviet ideologists have long foreshadowed, 
the limits of life expectancy are radically extended: how will the 
economically optimal age-structure of the population be maintained when
One of the few serious articles on the question of ZPG to have appeared 
so far is S. Borowski "0 zerowym wzroscie ludnosci" Stud^ Demograficzne 
No. 37, p. 3. Despite the title, this is in fact a review of The Limits 
of Growth. The tone is calm, but betrays a tendency towards the use of 
derivatives of the word Malthus as arguments in themselves. The English 
and Russian summaries (presumably authorized by Borowski himself) say, 
for example: "The authors of the Report seem to be modernized Malthusianists, 
and consequently, pessimists". For another approach to these matters, 
however, see the article by A. Jagielski cited in footnote 75.
I
M. Macura "Komponente populacione politike saobrazne sadaSnjim i bududim 
potrebama Jugoslavije" in Na~de teme 1974, No. 4, p. 568. Macura comments 
that in "the scientific and ideological confusion prevailing we seem 
disinclined to remember this". It is not entirely clear from the context 
who the "we" are. My own feeling is that the truism is in fact accorded 
rather greater respect in Yugoslavia than elsewhere in the Socialist world.
310
8 8all men can become centenarians? The economic justification for the 
labour-force arguments is in any case seldom given empirical form: how 
the economies of such low-fertility countries as Sweden or Belgium sur­
vived the pre-Gastarbeiter age is not explained. The idea that the upper 
working-age limit could be somehow raised or alternatively, not lowered, 
is relatively seldom explored. Few advance the counter-proposition that
One exception to this among demographers is Edward Rosset, who has a 
special academic (and by now a strong personal) interest in the question 
of the proper utilization of the skills of the old. Citing the Soviet 
demographer Piskunov in support, he writes that it is "quite possible 
that at some stage in the future, there will occur a sharp reduction in 
the incidence of death and disease in the older age groups, which will be
a further powerful factor inducing deepening of the ageing process of the
population. 'For this reason', says V.P. Piskunov, 'from the long-term 
view-point, the argument that natality should be increased in order to 
check the ageing process is not very convincing'". Demograficheskaia 
politika, pp. 59-60.
IThere may be good political reasons for the reticence on this point given 
the Party's commitment to earlier retirement and the unpopularity of any 
suggestion that a promised social reform might be withdrawn. It should 
also be noted that the normal retirement age in Poland has been higher
than in most other bloc countries (basically 65 for men and 60 for women,
cf. the usual 60 for men and 55 for women). Differences of view on this 
problem surfaced at a demographic conference held in Warsaw in 1967 (see 
A. Rajkiewicz in Problemy demograficzne Polski Ludowej, Warsaw 1967, p.171). 
According to one commentator writing at the same time (H. Ch^dzynski in 
ZW November 10, 1967), the debate on the question of the retirement age 
had become "very bitter" (bardzo zawziety): "The thesis that the retirement
age should be lowered is encountering quite energetic opposition". The
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the economy should be adapted to the human resources available rather 
than vice versa; and those that do are usually not economists. In 
economic pro-natalist advocacy, there is, in short, something of a 
tendency towards a technocratic steamrolling of human values, for all 
that the ultimate objective is ostensibly the prosperity and well-being
* n 90of all.
g. (ii) Social Issues
The economic issues arouse relatively few debates that are them­
selves inherently economic. The economically-oriented are fairly much 
agreed that a pro-natal policy is a necessity; their only disagreement 
is likely to be as to details of strategy, timing or feasibility. Those 
who are sceptical of their approach tend to counter it with what are 
essentially social or political arguments. And in general, it is at 
the level of social and political issues that a greater complexity and 
differentiation of views appears.
opposition is likely to have come more from those of sociological 
orientation like Rajkiewicz, than from the economic and demographic 
pro-natalists. (Cf. the discussion of polityka ludno^ciowa and 
polityka spoieczna below). The opposition to earlier retirement 
continues. See, eg., E. Rosset ZW July 21-2, 1974, where a call is 
made for the removal of all restrictions on the employment of pensioners., 
and confidence expressed that the government would see the good sense 
of doing so in the present situation of diminishing labour reserves. 
Rosset's confidence that the authorities would now see things his way 
is probably well-placed: cf. footnote 51 above.
Vor an interesting critique of the economic pro-natalist position, see 
S. Klonowicz Zdolno^d do pracy a wiek czlowieka pp. 411 and ff.
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In the context of policy debates, the distinction between the social 
and the political is apt to become a little more blurred at the edges than 
usual. The discussion here will be in terms of three interrelated 
problems or groups of problems: the role of women in society; the family; 
and living standards. (The position of women, in other words, has not yet 
become a fully-fledged political issue in Poland. The vexed question of 
living standards, while obviously being also economic and, at times, 
highly political, is nonetheless so closely connected with the other two 
problems that it is impossible to separate them).
Those that raised the alarm about impending depopulation often sounded
a concurrent alarm about the decline of the family and family life in
general: the affective, procreative and social functions of the family, it
91was said, were following its economic functions into extinction; the family 
itself was breaking up, there was nothing to replace it, and the end 
product would be chaos; traditional sexual roles were in disarray; the 
divorce rate was growing and so were the numbers of failed and moribund 
marriages; children with growing frequency were returning to empty houses; 
juvenile hooliganism and problem behaviour were becoming commonplace; 
childless and one-child families were leading to egotistical and 
unsocialist attitudes; materialism and a mini-affluence (mala stabilizacja) 
were becoming the order of the day; there was a decline in respect for 
parents and virtually none for the old who were being cut adrift and left to 
float to miserable and irrelevant deaths in complete isolation from their erst­
while families and the community; and numerous other evils like alcoholism,
"A short resume: family bonds are disintegrating, more and more 
marriages are ending in divorce, more and more are admitting to 
conflicts, many are childless, and one third of all families have 
only one child". A. Kantowicz "Polska rodzinna" in Kultura March 12,
1972.
mental disorders and anti-social attitudes were to be seen as the
consequences of the weakening of the family and the moral fibre which
92it had once transmitted from generation to generation.
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Views of this kind were naturally particularly prevalent among
9 3 94Catholic publicists, but by no means confined to them. Poland, like
the Soviet Union before it, had once flirted with radical reappraisals
For a selection of views of this kind, see, eg., the round-table 
discussion "Rodzina wspdlczesna - tendencje, perspektywy" Argumenty 
April 16, 1972.
The pro-regime PAX organization and its press were very active in the 
campaign to restore the standing of the family as were the ecclesiastically- 
authorized Catholic publications. SP October 5, 1972, contains a report 
of a conference organized by PAX's Propaganda Division devoted to the 
"strengthening of the spiritual (psychiczne) and moral health of the 
family".
The discussion mentioned in footnote 92 was published in a weekly put out 
by the official atheist organization. Another weekly closely associated 
with the campaign on behalf of the family, Kultura, is generally regarded 
as having close links with officialdom. Its editor-in-chief, Janusz 
Wilhelmi, who actively associated himself with the campaign both for the 
strengthening of the family and for raising the birth-rate by means 
including restrictions on abortion, was elected a member of the party's 
Central Auditing Commission at the VI Party Congress in 1971. The Gierek 
leadership has in fact repeatedly affirmed its support for the family. On 
March 6, 1975, Gierek declared: "There can be no socialist society unless 
the family is strong, stable (trwaia) and spiritually (duchowo) healthy.
We reject the theories arising in capitalist countries about the allegedly
inevitable crisis of family ties". TL March 7, 1975, p. 3.
of the family, but had then lapsed back into verbal support of the
institution coupled with a practical indifference. This indifference
was particularly evident in Gomulka's time, when, together with the creation
of a markedly anti-natalist climate (which was obviously not pro-family in
its implications), numerous other policies were followed whose implicit
message was that the family was really rather a nuisance. Despite the
planned absorption of large numbers of women into the work-force, the
situation in regard to child-care institutions in Poland remained worse
96throughout the 1960s than in virtually any other Gomecon country. The
Kantowicz comments "The past years have not been the happiest for family 
life. The main reason for that was the semi-official theory of the 
fifties that many families were bastions of political and social reaction". 
Kultura March 12, 1972.
The tables for creches (p. 550) and kindergartens (p. 469) in Rocznik 
Statystyczny 1971 suggest virtual stagnation for both after about 1955. 
(Gomulka, it will be recalled, came to power in 1956). This was not due 
to any decline in demand consequent on the decline that occurred over this 
period in the birth rate. K. Dzienio: The Methods of Steering the Pro- 
natalistic Population Policy within certain European Socialist Countries 
(typescript in English, Warsaw 1974) p. 24, contains a table which shows 
clearly that the proportion of children in child-care institutions in 
Poland over the years 1960 to 1970 was lower than in any other Soviet-bloc 
country with the exception of Rumania in 1970 (and here demographic 
factors were undoubtedly relevant). The relative improvement which Dzienio' 
tables show to have occurred in Poland over the period, coupled with
the Rocznik Statystyczny 1971 data referred to earlier, would suggest that 
the achievement was more one of getting the number of children down nearer 
the number of child-care places than vice versa; and that insofar
as there was an improvement, that improvement was achieved largely by 
overcrowding. This supposition tends to be borne out by articles like,e.q.
expansion of the housing program was very slow in relation to needs, and
towards the end of the decade, an actual decline in the rate of housing
construction was recorded, at the very time when large numbers of post-war
97babies were reaching marriageable age. Moreover, large numbers of very
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"Przedszkole w podwöjnej roli" ZG October 19, 1975. In fact, of course, 
despite the decline in the numbers of children over the period, growing 
urbanization and growing feminization of the work force would have made 
for much greater demand for child-care services, not less.
On the housing plight of young marrieds under the Gomulka administration, 
see, e.q.,the chapter by A. Andrzejewski and W. Czeczerda in Polityka 
ludno^ciowa, p. 140 and briefly, but pithily} the contribution of J. Dangel 
in BIGS 1973, No. 3-4, pp. 89-93. The number of new dwellings built to 1000 
marriages contracted declined from 853 in 1965 to 693 in 1970. The 
absolute number of new dwellings declined in both 1970 and 1971.
Despite an over 25% increase by 1974, the number of households per 100 
dwellings has remained virtually the same as it was before Gierek's 
accession, and waiting lists for housing have actually increased (See 
Table 6, Appendix B. This is due inter alia to the continuing marriage 
boom, the decline in the average size of households, and to the enormous 
pressure of latent demands waiting beyond the rim of the statistical data.
In fact, the housing shortage is much worse than the statistics indicate 
because of the colossal numbers of daily commuters who would gladly take 
up urban dwellings if they were eligible for them. For an interesting 
collection of documents on recent developments see the translated articles 
included in "Wohnungsbau und Wohnungsversorgung in Polen" Osteuropa 1975 no. 6 
pp. A339-A352. For a pessimistic assessment of the chances infrastructural 
development (particularly run-down under Gomulka) has of overtaking the 
needs of the now expanding housing construction industry despite the 
enormously increased investment in it, see J. Dzieciolowski "Plama na 
wizji" ZG November l0, 1974. See also the same author’s article in ZG 
November 24, 1974, and that of Andrzejewski and Czeczerda in
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small flats were built to sub-standard specifications in urban settings
98that were often most uncongenial to family life. Again these were
common Socialist failings, but they were ones in which the Gomulka
99administration tended to outfail its rivals.
ZG July 27, 1975. For somewhat more optimistic and official assessments, 
see P. Kro'l "Proba bilansu" ZG September 9, 197 5; the articles by 
W. Nieciunski and M. Wawrzeniuk in ND 1974, No. 9; and the article by 
S. Kukuryka ND 1975, No. 6. One of the most conspicuous changes in 
housing policy under Gierek's administration has been the greatly
increased prominence given to this problem both in official policy 
statements and the media. It is a field where "loyal opposition" seems 
still permitted to flourish.
98The size of new flats was actually smaller in 1970 than in 1960 (when 
they were not, it can safely be said, large). In addition, economy 
measures involving a lowering of standards were encouraged (eg., the 
installation of windowless kitchens). As one scholar concerned with 
housing matters put it: "We were building flats that were on average 
very small, unfunctional and not infrequently equipped with only primitive 
conveniences and installations". J. Dangel in BIGS 1973, No. 3-4, p. 91. 
See also the same author's contribution to Demografia spoleczna pp.251-285.
99This fact emerges to some extent from the tables given in the statistical 
volume Kraje RWPG: ludnosc, gospodarka, kultura, pp. 88-90, despite the 
evidence of cosmetic presentation (the figures given there for the 
numbers of kindergartens in Poland seem strangely at variance with those 
mentioned earlier from Rocznik Statystyczny 1971). See note 96 above.
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The minute Gomuika and his government fell, these and similar aspects 
of everyday family existence and basic living conditions came in for the 
most withering criticism. (There had of course been some more cautious 
criticism earlier as well,but without any unequivocal allocation of 
political responsibility). Much of it was directly related in due course 
to the population issue. How could one possibly expect the Polish family 
to flourish and to reproduce itself when it was forced to live in such 
wretched conditions, with all hope of perceptible improvement postponed 
to the remote future, and the only chance of partial escape in the short 
term consisting in restricting family size to the barest minimum? Critiques 
of Gomuika's population policy and his general living standard policy became 
so closely interwoven, that it was often difficult to see what the main 
motivation of any given critic was. Was he using the issue of population 
policy to push more effectively for socio-economic reforms, or was he 
advocating an energetic boosting of living standards to promote the greater 
demographic glory of the fatherland? The fertility decline seemed a most 
dramatic vindication of all the unfortunate urban dweller's resentments.
And he was no doubt right in sensing that the stagnant consumer economy 
(coupled with rising expectations) was a major factor in producing the 
slump in the birth rate. And if he was right, the only way to solve the 
demographic problem was to first solve the problems of the standard of 
living. The two issues dovetailed most pleasingly. "*‘°0 Similarly the 
advocates of a revival of family life, even the least materialistic among
One sometimes gets the feeling that an argument is almost being 
presented in the form of "we (or "they", depending on the writer's 
perspective) will stop our Geburtenstreik if you (or "we") build us (or them) 
more flats." This kind of approach was detectable b oth among pro- 
natalists (Build more flats so that the birth rate will rise) and 
anti-pro-natalists (Build more flats or the birth rate certainly won't
rise).
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them, usually felt that some greater concern for the family's material 
well-being would not be amiss. If having children were not such a major 
inroad into the parents' resources of time, energy and money, the chances 
were greater that they would venture having a second and a third. As the 
Catholic economic commentator Andrzej Wielowieyski argued: In Poland even
to have one child is a terrible shock for young working parents, and so it 
is not surprising that many stop there. Yet a family of three, two parents 
and one child, is not a real family; correct upbringing is impossible where 
there are no brothers or sisters. Accordingly the moral health of the
family is dependent in some degree on the prior success of a pro-natalist
n . 101 policy.
Of all the hapless consumers of Gomuika's Poland, it was the young 
mother who had most to complain about. While Soviet socialism has brought 
a kind of professional and social liberation to women that has been much 
more rapid and far-reaching than any equivalent development in the West, it
^^"See Kultur a October 1, 1972. The following schema has been outlined 
many times. A young couple are both working (the overwhelmingly 
typical case) and earning 3000 zloties each. Their first child is 
born. No creche place is available (there are far fewer places in 
creches than in kindergartens),so the wife stops working. The family 
income falls from 6000 divided among two to 3000 divided among three. 
Per capita income in the family falls to virtually a third of its 
former level. Social services and subsidies for children's goods (in 
Poland, as opposed to certain other Socialist countries) make up little
of the difference.
319
is also true in another sense that socialism has replaced the exploitation
of man by man by the exploitation of woman by man. As elsewhere, women in
Poland have been driven onto the labour market more by economic duress than 
102incentive. And simultaneously they have been left (for sociological
103rather than political reasons) with an only slightly diminished share of
the usual domestic burdens of running a household. To further aggravate
the situation, the state of basic trades and services in Poland in the 1960s
104(and 1970s) was probably as bad as anywhere else in the Soviet bloc; and 
it is everywhere bad, as is often admitted. In these circumstances the 
Polish woman, like so many of her sisters elsewhere in Socialist East Europe, 
cast her vote at the abortion clinic, or the private gynaecologist?s surgery.
L. Sobczak Rynek pracy w Polsce Ludowej, p. 192-3. Though it would 
appear that once they have joined the work-force they are in fact 
reluctant to leave it. Cf. note 107 below.
Although many male Communists since Lenin have echoed his injunctions 
to the men of Socialist societies to give their wives more assistance 
in the home, progress has been slow, and most wives are effectively 
"na dwdch etatach" (have two full-time jobs). Trybuna Ludu in its 
regular family rubric periodically calls on men to be more helpful, but 
one does not gain the impression that this matter is widely regarded as 
top priority among the all-male upper echelons of the party-state apparatus.
1"Family life is burdened by the nightmare of everyday life (koszmar codzie- 
nno£ci), in other words by the lamentable state (oplakany stan) of the 
service industries in the country". A. Kantowicz loc. tit. This area is 
another that has been given great prominence since Gierek's accession, 
and great improvements have been promised. But progress is slow, and 
again one wonders where this item figures in the de facto pecking order.
See, e.g.,"Dla czego w uslugach niewiele sie zmienia" (Why little is 
changing in the service industries) TL November 3, 1975.
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A great deal of the Polish population debate has turned on the
question of how to make the woman's role more tolerable. Many of the
contributors were women. Radical feminists in the West would probably
find their attitude unenlightened, since their criticism though often
vigorous, was less than revolutionary. Open declarations of sexual war
would in any case probably not be allowed by the censorship (irrespective
of its sex in the given instance, though it would probably be male; in
listings of the many feminized professions in Poland, no one, to my
knowledge, has ever mentioned the censorship or the police). But there
were few detectable signs in the press (as there were few detectable to
the naked eye of a resident) that any women saw their struggle in such 
105bellicose terms. They did condemn men for their indolence in the
house, but far more vigorously for the attempts that were sometimes made
The occasional items in the Polish press on Western Women's Liberation 
tend to be jocularly deprecating. An interview-article with Germaine 
Greer published in the (usually) sophisticated weekly Polityka 
concluded with the interviewer confiding to the reader reflections 
that occurred to her as she drove with Ms. Greer in the vicinity of 
Stratford at the conclusion of their talk: "Who had cast such a spell
on Titania as to leave her so angry"; and "would she one day find her 
Oberin?" A. Osiecka "Rozmowy z Tytania" Polityka November 11, 1972.
(and made I think invariably by men) to reassign them a place in the
kitchen, or otherwise to put the burden of the nation's future
106disproportionately on them. The defenders of the family included
among their ranks several who believed that a restoration of the 
patriarchal family was essential both to the health of the family and 
the health of the national birth rate. The women who responded to these 
suggestions with indignant rebuttals (in which they were joined by several 
male commentators also) may well have had "middle class minds" and 
interesting intelligentsia jobs, but they were probably fairly representative
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For examples of Polish-style male chauvinists, see M. Czerwiriski in 
Argumenty April 16, 1972, and J. Wilhelmi Kultura November 12, 1972.
One woman reacted sarcastically to the Kultura journalists' formulation 
"strengthening the country's demographic potential" by enquiring whether 
the term "potential" referred both to women of fertile age-groups 
"capable of giving the country workers, soldiers and journalists" and 
also to old people requiring care and attention. W. Grochola "Boze 
brori przed obrohcami" (Protect us, Lord, from our protectors) Polityka 
October 10, 1972. Another woman, contributing to a conference on popula­
tion policy matters, objected most forcefully to proposals calling for a 
reduction in female employment rates for demographic reasons. "When the 
arguments about women's lower productivity and poor work discipline were 
disproven in practice, when the theme of their inferior qualifications 
had to be abandoned, and when finally the presuppositions about a future 
labour surplus lost their validity (all of them reasons advanced by the 
authorities for restricting female employment in the past - J.B.) - now 
we find demographic matters and high considerations of population policy 
being thrust forward instead". M. Jakubowska in Socjalne i prawne £rodki 
ochrony macierzyristwa i rodziny Vol. II, p. 173.
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of all working women nonetheless. Survey results suggest that it
is male Polish industrial workers who are in favour of their wives not 
working, not the wives themselves.1117
Elsewhere in the socialist camp in recent years, pro-natalism has 
sometimes been accompanied by a return to older conceptions of the family, 
complete with sentimental rhetoric about the joys of motherhood, due 
emphasis on traditional male and female roles in and out of the house, 
reduced employment of young women in the most fertile age-groups and an 
elaborate cult of babies. While the Gierek leadership has greatly stressed 
its intention of strengthening the family morally and materially, it has not 
so far adopted any kind of Kinder Küche Partei approach.
g. (iii) Political Issues
The population issue which raises perhaps the greatest passion is 
abortion. Gomulka's adoption of an explicit and emphatic anti-natalist 
policy was, it was suggested earlier, partly caused by Church opposition 
to the abortion legislation of 1956. Throughout the Gomulka era, Wyszyhski 
and lesser Catholic representatives, including some from the otherwise pro­
regime PAX organization, maintained a barrage of criticism of government 
policy in this area (largely unpublished in the case of the official 
Church spokesmen). Abortion was denounced as being literally murder. It 
was held to be a grave threat to the morality of the young. And it was 
said to endanger the health and reproductive capacity of the mother, and 
thereby, of the nation. This latter argument, vigorously stated even before
the decline in the birth rate had gone very far, naturally became more
108frequent as events seemed to be offering their support.
107See B. iiobodziiiska Rodzina w Polsce Warsaw 1974, p. 91 and ff.
108See notes 28 and 78, above.
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After the fall of Gomulka, the Catholic publicists were joined by
other critics of the abortion legislation, who adduced very similar
109arguments to attack it. From this the inference seems clear that
there was a party ban on raising the issue of abortion in Gomulka's time, 
and that this ban was lifted after his removal. The anti-abortionists 
showed themselves to be quite a formidable alliance of national, religious, 
medical and aesthetic objectors. But after a lively debate, and despite 
the trend towards partial or complete restriction of abortion in other East 
European countries (where it had similarly been legal since about 1956-7) 
the counter-reformers were d e f e a t e d . T h e  main ripostes against them,
The anti-abortionists were for the most part concentrated in and around 
the journal Kultura (of which something has already been said in note 
94). The fact that Wilhelmi, the editor-in-chief personally identified 
himself with this view of abortion as well as giving column-space to 
other opponents of the existing legislation would suggest that some 
highly-placed people other than Wilhelmi himself felt that the indications 
for legal abortion should be restricted. (cf. footnote 94) It was 
noticeable that Wilhelmi was eager not to be tarred with the Catholic 
brush. As Stefan Kisielewski put it in his feuilleton of December 3,
1972 in Tygodnik Powszechny (one week after he had praised Wilhelmi for 
his stand on the matter): "Even Janusz Wilhelmi, in defending the just
cause in the matter of our demographic attitudes, shies away from any 
kind of oneness with the Church on the subject like the Devil from holy 
water".
^^Defeat came at a sitting of the Health and Physical Culture Commission 
of the Sejm in March 1973. The discussion at this session (summarized 
in the Biuletvn Wydzialu prasowego Sejmu No. 243/VI Kad., March 27, 1973), 
though interesting and reflecting some of the views that had been 
expressed during the public debate on population and abortion policy, 
nonetheless suggests that the matter had been authoritatively decided 
at some prior stage. It was significant that the only expert opinion
however, did not obviously emanate directly from the government, which may 
conceivably be sitting on the fence to some extent, while giving its support 
in the meantime to the defenders of liberal abortion. The latter, it should 
be said, did not usually defend abortion as such, but saw it rather as a 
regrettable phenomenon that they hoped would soon diminish. However they 
did challenge the propriety of state interference in what they held to be a 
sphere of individual freedom. And they frequently asserted that such 
interference, insofar as it was aimed at achieving spectacular pro-natalist 
successes as in Romania, would be unsuccessful. The language at times was
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tapped in and for the discussion was medical. Demographers were not 
represented, and though some of the participants did make demographic 
assertions, notably the doctors (who like doctors elsewhere betrayed a 
tendency to see themselves as possessing a natural untrained flair for 
demography), the views of the pro-natalist anti-abortionists were wholly 
unrepresented. The only concession which the Commission's sub-committee 
report made to anti-abortionist views was to declare that the view 
advanced by many gynaecologists that a ban should be placed on abortions 
in the case of first pregnancies should be given careful consideration. 
(Thus while this recommendation was not in fact adopted on this occasion, 
its possible future acceptance may have been foreshadowed). One extract 
from the sub-committee's report may be worth quoting as an apparently 
authoritative statement of the current official position on population 
policy:
"The number of artificial terminations of pregnancy being 
performed is showing latterly a tendency to decline and is 
not significantly correlated with the birth rate. The spread 
of contraceptives and effective family planning will mean that 
artificial termination of pregnancy will cease to perform any 
social role, much less any demographic one. A proper pro- 
natalist policy is identical with a social and economic policy 
ensuring systematic increase in the population's standard of
living. (p. 6).
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rather forceful, which may indicate strong personal feelings, but may 
also indicate that there was continuing high-level opposition to any 
change in the law. As one prominent demographer wrote bluntly:
"Population policy cannot be conducted with the aid of 
administrative rigours (i.e. repressive measures), and 
accordingly the views heard calling for withdrawal of 
the legislation legalizing termination of pregnancies 
must be regarded as ill-advised
This particular commentator was as much a pro-natalist as many of 
the anti-abortionists. Virtually all the demographers are pro-natalists, 
but virtually all, too, are firmly opposed to any form of "administrative 
measures" being applied to the problem. Thus, while the economic bias of 
the demographic profession does lead some of them towards the technocratic 
econocentrism referred to earlier, it can also be said that in this matter 
they place a very firm stress on the rights of the individual.
The solution favoured by the demographers, as indeed, by most other
contributors to the discussion, is to remove some at least of the economic
disincentives to having children. Most favour generous child allowances,
preferably graduated fairly steeply by birth order, and a variety of other
social services and economic policies aimed at lightening the load of the
young mother. Many such measures have been adopted or foreshadowed by the
government, but not usually in the amount or form that the pro-natalists
would have liked, and the satisfaction they express about them seems at
112times to be mingled with a trace of reserve. One rather enigmatic lacuna
M. Latuch "Elementy polityki ludno^ciowej w Polsce" in Polityka ludno^c- 
iowa, P- 139
"The adoption of an active and effective population policy has become an 
urgent necessity. Lately we have observed certain symptoms of such a 
policy; these must be turned into a complex program". M. Latuch op. cit.,
p. 137.
in the economic pro-natalists1 program is that they do not seem to have
any contingency plans for the event that their policies should be applied
without success. Would the devotion of some to individual rights then 
113waver?
If many pro-natalists were ready to defend individual rights on the 
abortion issue, and family planning generally, few seemed to question the 
state's ultimate right to make all the macro-decisions and to decide what 
the birth rate should be; though they did frequently emphasize that those 
decisions should be taken after careful research and due consultation with 
experts. And few participants in the debate on either side seemed to 
question the state's right to unleash another barrage of propaganda (as in the 
sixties but this time pro-natalist), to achieve that rate. But there were
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Czechoslovakia's success in increasing its fertility after (among other 
measures) certain restrictions on the availability of abortion had been 
introduced may also contribute to producing some waverers. K. Romaniuk 
in TL February 21, 1971, declared "It can be said with complete certainty 
that decisions of an administrative character have produced meagre and 
in general short-term effects ..." and described parental decisions in 
these matters as their "personal concern", and the state's role as 
limited; in his contribution to the volume Demografia spoleczna in 1974, 
the same author, a keen pro-natalist, said: "The experience of countries .. 
like Czechoslovakia or Hungary (Hungary also introduced restrictions on 
abortion some months before the publication of Demografia spolecznaJ.B.) 
suggests that both economic and legal-administrative measures are 
necessary ..." (p. 249). A little earlier in the same passage Romaniuk
had specified regulations concerning abortion and the production and sale 
of contraceptives as being examples of such administrative measures at
the disposal of governments wishing to influence the birth rate.
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a few sceptics. One journalist commentator spoke of the need to create a
pro-natalist climate in the population by manipulating media and cultural
output, but at the same time deplored the stupidity of mass propaganda,
114suggesting that it was counter-productive anyway. Another journalist,
Ernest Skalski, went rather further, speaking with the greatest distaste 
of any attempts to make people "feel ashamed" of having only one child, as 
an earlier discussant had proposed. This he described as "arrogant social 
pedagogy", a description which,of course, sounds very like a condemnation 
of all propaganda campaigns aimed at adults (and be it noted, in passing, 
that in this domain, Gierek's regime has probably outshone its predecessor). 
Attacking another debater who had declared that "citizens are obliged to 
think about the (needs of the) state in broader categories" (i.e. to be 
aware that they should have more children than they really want if the 
state sees it as necessary), Skalski described this kind of thinking as a 
"perversion" and went on
"The conviction still cannot establish itself in our 
journalistic writing that man is first and foremost a 
value unto himself and not an instrument of policies; 
policies are meant to serve him and not vice versa."
Skalski's article, which bore the sarcastic title "I suggest you have 
three children" , adhered to the usual stylistic convention of suggesting 
that it is journalists (or economists, demographers, historians, doctors, 
lawyers, etc.) who are to blame for the ills of Socialist society, and not 
the system, the government, or particular politicians (other than displaced
^^"I'm not calling for the papers and television to be filled with
hurrah-family (hurra-rodzinne) items, and stupid ones at that, as is 
usually the case with mass propaganda occasions." (w masdwce) J . Rolicki
in Kultura October 1, 1972.
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ones of course, who may be mentioned in season); but it was none the less
115a very spirited and noteworthy defence of private values.
From time to time, an interesting trace of class attitudes intruded 
itself into the debate. Most if not all of the contributors were, of 
course, members of the intelligentsia, whatever their more remote social 
origins. Not only was this quite often evident, it was even at times made 
unabashedly explicit. The fertility of the intelligentsia in Poland, as 
elsewhere in the Socialist world, is markedly below that of other social 
classes and groups, unlike the position in Western Europe, where 
equivalent groups like the urban better-to-do and the professionals have 
tended to increase their fertility in recent decades to the level of or
117above that of the urban proletariat. Many members of the Polish
intelligentsia feel that they are, objectively speaking, the salt of the 
118earth. This feeling sometimes reached the surface of the
115 "Proponuje panstwu troje dzieci" Kultura October 8, 1972
116See, eg., M. Klimczyk "Przynaleznodd do grup spoleczno-zawodowych a 
dzietnodd biologiczna kobiet w Polsce" in Polityka ludnodciowa p. 250
117
118
D.V. Glass "Fertility Trends in Europe since the Second World War" 
Population Studies 1968, p. 118 and ff.
This implicit assumption is everywhere apparent but only rarely explicitly 
defended. There is an example of such a defence in Mikolaj Kozakiewicz's 
contribution to the Argumenty debate cited earlier (April 16, 1972).
Having first protested his support for the then prevailing educational 
policies giving preference to the children of workers and peasants (which 
were in fact widely resented by the intelligentsia, including those more 
recently recruited to it), Kozakiewicz says: "In a dynastic intelligentsia, 
or "elite" there are virtues as well as defects ... such a dynastic 
intelligentsia makes a very important contribution to progress."
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population debate in the form of a conviction that it was vital to the
nation's interests above all to raise the intelligentsia's birth rate.
Concern was often expressed too about the high birth rates rife among
what in Polish is referred to as the "social margin", (margines spoleczny)
120and which we would call the lumpenproletariat. Here too they felt that
what was required was a selective and differential population policy to
119
119See, e.g . , Smolihski in BIGS 1972 No. 3-4, p. 114; A. Rajkiewicz in 
Socjalne i prawne £rodki vol. II p. 16-7 (where he suggests that 
rather than follow a generally pro-natalist policy, attention should 
be concentrated on "certain groups", in particular "women with higher 
education"); J.Wilhelmi in Kultura November 12, 1972. As befits a 
member of the Central Auditing Commission, Wilhelmi puts his case with 
great political dexterity, arguing in effect, that it is unfair that 
middle-class anti-natalists like Wiesiawa Grochola and the like should 
have small families and expect the poverty-stricken peasants with less 
material and cultural resources to save the nation from depopulation.
120This theme has been broached many times since the abortion debates of 
1956, and examples could be cited at great length. "In the present 
phase we should oppose elemental reproduction (zywiolowa rozrodczo^d) 
in groups belonging to the social margin and in pathological milieus, 
or at least not adopt measures which might have a stimulating effect on 
them". (BIGS 1973 No. 3-4, p. 82). Indeed the association between 
large families and demoralized families tends to be made almost 
automatically. Thus one writer, discussing problem and handicapped 
children, declares that most of them come from "broken and large families" 
(z rodzin rozbitych i wielodzietnych) "Arytmetyka i odpowiedzialno^d"
GP November 25-6, 1972. Another finds it necessary to make a denial in 
the following form: "It doesn't seem to me, moreover, that the large
family milieu (ärodowisko wielodzietne) is demoralized to a significant
extent" (BIGS 1972 No. 3-4, p. 121).
encourage the fit and discourage the unfit. This note of social eugenics
was struck with a considerable degree of caution. Other more medically
eugenic proposals have also been aired at times, again, for the most part,
121very cautiously. The caution no doubt reflects some measure of
concern both about the possible consequences to the society and the possible
consequences to the proposer.
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Calls for such measures as compulsory pre-marital medical tests (with 
or without the corollary of legal bans on marriage between particular 
categories of candidates) were made, for example, at the conference 
reported in Socjalne i prawne £rodki. The proposers seem frequently to 
have been people nearer the grass roots of social work. One discussant, 
recalling that the pre-marital examinations had been proposed but not 
included in the Family Code passed ten years earlier, reproposes them and 
suggests they be given some kind of legal sanction for certain cases in 
the form of prohibition of marriage without special judicial permission. 
She expresses some reserve about this method, but feels that the 
seriousness of the situation (reported increases in the incidence of 
handicapped children) justify it (vol. I, p. 337). The Party Central 
Committee representative at the meeting, while not commenting on this 
particular point, declared the party's opposition in principle to 
administrative measures in all aspects of social legislation, mentioning 
divorce, abortion and alcoholism as specific examples. Wincenty Kawalec, 
the then Minister for Wages, Labour and Social Affairs (whose ministry 
had organised the conference) , alluded to these matters in his review of 
the conference in the Poznan journal Ruch Rrawniczy, Ekonomiczny i 
Socjologiczny, 1973 No. 4, p. 41. "Consideration was given to possible 
measures aimed at restricting fertility in demoralized milieus" (p. 48). 
Kawalec saw the lawyer participants as being mainly concerned with 
preventing infringements on human rights, whereas social workers, 
grappling with the problems daily, were more inclined to advocate decisive 
measures. Kawalec himself appeared eager to avoid commitment one way or
the other.
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From the foregoing it should already have been evident that
several major definable interest groups were involved in the population
debate: the Church and Catholic laity, disinterested demographic
nationalists, the demographers, the economic planners, women's righters,
the intelligentsia, doctors, the party-state leadership and so on. Here
again we are obviously dealing with blurry and overlapping edges: the
demographers are often nationalists and sometimes Catholics; the economic
planners may feel strongly conscious of their allegiance to the
intelligentsia, or their loyalty to the party-state leadership, etc. And
within the recognizable groups, a considerable shading of opinion was
often noticeable. Thus within the Catholic contingent, there was a very
wide variation between the principled intransigence and strong language
of Cardinal Wyszyhski at one extreme, and the mild claims and conciliatory
122tone of Sejm deputy Hagmajer (PAX) at the other. Some demographers
were economic pro-natalists; others evoked nationalist arguments; others
again seemed to regard maintaining population growth as an "axiomatic
123thesis not requiring any particular proof"; while still others gently
queried the pro-natalist enthusiasms of their colleagues without quite
124dissociating themselves from them. The medical group is a particularly
122See Hagmajer's modest proposals for modifications in the abortion law 
presented during the discussion cited earlier in the Sejm Commission 
on Health and Physical Culture: Biuletyn Wydzialu prasowego Sejmu,
Nr. 243 VI Kad. March 27, 1973.
123In the words of a critic. BIGS 1973 No. 3-4, p. 96.
124See the contribution by A. Jdzefowicz to Polityka ludno^ciowa, p. 88
and ff.
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heterogeneous one, whose vested interests and orientations have tended,
moreover, to shift over time. In the late 1950s there was often said
to be a faction which was interested in maintaining abortion in an illegal
or at best semi-legal state in order to profit therefrom. Other doctors
both then and now are undoubtedly irritated by the strain legal abortion
places on the scarce public resources they are required to administer.
Many are undoubtedly concerned about the medical aspects of legal abortion
believing it to be harmful; .and among these, the more devoutly Catholic
are likely, of course, to see the medical dangers even more clearly than 
125their colleagues. And now, after years of respectable and quite legal
private abortion practice, a great many gynaecologists would undoubtedly
feel threatened by any severe restrictions on the availability of abortion.
While the profession on the whole was clearly against legal abortion when
it first came in, their position now is more difficult to assess in any
generalized terms. One journalist writing against abortion in the
non-Catholic Kultura has asserted that the views of the medical profession
126on the harm done by legal abortion are "shocking" (wstrzasajace). Yet
the attitude of those associated with the Ministry of Health and the
medical powers-that-be (insofar as that attitude is independent and can be
127safely inferred from the Sejm committee hearings mentioned earlier) is 
rather that the legislation has been medically successful.
125.Doctors are specially concerned about first pregnancies (cf.note 110). For 
an earlier instance of medical opposition, see the report of a meeting 
of the Warsaw branch of the Polish Society for Forensic Medicine and 
Criminology in TL February 11, 1960 "W £wietle ustawy i faktdw".
I J. Rolicki in Kultura October 1, 1972.
127See note 111 above.
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One particularly interesting division which emerged during the
1970s debate was that between the pro-natalist demographic lobby and a
group of academics concerned with a sub-discipline or field known in
128Polish as polityka spoleczna, i.e. social policy. This field, which
not surprisingly has had a rather chequered history in People's Poland,
concerns itself with the sociological analysis of existing social policies
and the consideration and cautious advocacy of improvements. It has now
been joined by a sub-discipline of demography which calls itself polityka
129ludno^ciowa (literally: population policy) , and which aspires to provide 
a similar service to the government in its own field. The practitioners 
of both profess a basically technocratic-loyalist view of their society: 
the existing structures can be accepted, but should be made more rational; 
and the way for them to become more rational is for the politicians to 
listen to our advice.
128Two prominent and forceful representatives of this discipline and its 
characteristic orientation are Antoni Rajkiewicz and Jan Rosner: see, 
e.g. , their contributions in BIGS 1973, No. 3-4. Generally speaking, 
the contributors to the main demographic conferences can be divided 
into pro-natalists (usually demographers) and anti-pro-natalists (usually 
concerned with the theory or practice of polityka spoleczna). On polityka 
spoleczna as science and as a vocation, see, eg., A. Rajkiewicz (ed.) 
Polityka Spoleczna Warsaw 1972; and the two interesting articles in ZG 
January 27, 1974, p. 10.
129The 1963 version of Jerzy Holzer's text-book on demography (Podstawy 
analizy demograficznej) does not contain a section on population policy. 
The 1970 version (Demografia), whose structure is otherwise very similar 
does contain one. Mikolaj Latuch, writing in TL March 17, 1972, reports 
the formation of a Section for Population Policy within the Academy of
Sciences' Committee for Demographic Sciences.
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Thus we have the familiar spectacle of two groups with elitist 
aspirations competing for the ear of the powers-that-be. As the two 
spheres of demographic and social policy are inextricably interwoven, 
it follows that the potential spheres of influence of the two groups are 
also inextricably interwoven. The points at issue between them were not 
trivial. To characterize them in very abridged form: the demographers 
argued that the nation's economic and national future was at stake; the 
social politicians, if the neologism may be permitted, that Poland's 
resources were modest and the needs of her underprivileged great, and 
therefore that any diversion of funds from social services towards the 
probably in any case chimerical objective of raising the national birth 
rate would be a most culpable squandering of scarce government money. In 
the event it appears that the social politicians have for the moment 
prevailed. Nearly all of the Gierek government's moves in social legisla­
tion so far have been aimed at redistribution of wealth and the relief of
130hardship rather than pro-natalist objectives per se.
The different tendencies within the debate could be traced in some
cases to organizational strongholds as well. The official Catholic and
PAX papers naturally supported a pro-natalist policy with restrictions
on abortion. Kultura, a weekly widely believed to have close relations
with high authority, gave considerable prominence and support to the
131pro-natalists and anti-abortionists, whilst also opening its columns
130Of the first of the two increases in child endowment under the Gierek 
administration, for example, Latuch declares flatly: "The essential 
thing is that this last increase was based on social and not demographic 
considerations". Polityka ludno^ciowa, p. 133.
131Cf. notes 94 and 109 above.
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to their adversaries. Zycie Literackie, another prominent cultural
weekly, was anti-pro-natalist, as was, even more markedly and militantly
132the liberal Party weekly Polityka. The Trade Union daily Giros Pracy
represented a kind of down-to-earth version of the polityka spoleczna 
line. The popular Warsaw daily Zycie Warszawy, which had been closely 
identified with the change of policy on abortion and the campaign against 
the high birth rate in the 1950s now adopted a low profile. Trybuna Ludu, 
the party daily, was non-committal or judiciously and moderately pro- 
natalist, but without countenancing repeal of the abortion legislation.
Similarly, among government and academic institutions certain
identifiable cleavages occurred. Most pro-natalist demographers favoured
creation of a central organization co-ordinating research and making policy
recommendations. But as between representatives of the Main Statistical
Office (GUS), the Polish Academy of Sciences Committee on Demographic
Sciences, the Planning Commission, and the Ministry of Wages, Labour and
Social Affairs, there was some difference of opinion about where this 
133might be located. And within the group of participants in the debate
oriented in some way towards the Planning Commission, there appeared to 
be further signs of rivalry between those concerned with establishing a
132In addition to publishing the fire-eating anti-pro-natalism of Urban 
("Who wants to live standing up" September 9, 1971) and Grochola 
(October 10, 1972 and January 5, 1974) , Polityka also published an 
item with a title and style strongly reminiscent of the anti-natalist 
campaign of I960: "featwiej plodzid nifc my£led", (the pungency of which 
is rather inadequately rendered by "Impregnation is easier than 
cogitation") Polityka November 11, 1972.
133See, eg., BIGS 1973, No. 3-4, p. 76, 111.
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Department of Social Planning and those who found the need for a 
Government Population Commission attached to (przy) the Planning 
Commission more urgent (this division reflected that mentioned above 
between polityka ludno^ciowa and polityka spolecna) .
The role of the middle and upper echelons of the Party/State 
apparatus during the debate seems to have taken the form of straddling 
and reconciling conflicting pressures coming from below. During the 
Gomulka era, there was a period after 1959 when the authorities had seen 
population as a clear-cut issue and had maintained a fairly explicit line 
on the matter. While this line became less emphatic in the later 1960s 
it was not formally altered. The Gierek leadership,on its accession, 
planned to make major changes in social policy generally. These plans do 
not appear to have had a specifically demographic component at the outset. 
However the climate was suitable for a public debate and rethink of 
population policy to proceed, and official permission for same was 
presumably granted.
Having thus sought out public and professional opinion on the matter, 
the authorities seem to have avoided favouring any one faction in the 
ensuing dispute. When the public discussion was finally reined in, the 
government's attitude continued to betray signs of ambiguity and compromise. 
While the social policy orientation seemed to be dominant for the time being, 
the pro-natalists were given not only the satisfaction of expecting 
incidental demographic spin-offs from the new social legislation, but also 
the hope that more specifically and explicitly pro-natalist programs might 
be adopted later. Speaking at the VII Trade Union Congress in November 
1972, Gierek said:
134Characteristically, the authorities solved the problem by permitting
both bodies to be established.
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"We should create in this country the kind of socio-economic
conditions and moral and psychological climate that will favour
the development and optimal sizing of the family. That is our
135obligation to the future."
But though representatives of the Polish leadership have thus 
begun hesitatingly to use the language of population policy (something 
which their colleagues in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and else­
where - but not in the Soviet Union - have been doing for a decade or 
more), it is still debatable whether they could be said as of 1975 to 
have a population policy at all. In these matters it is easy to lose 
oneself in semantic trivia; but if one regards a population policy as 
being a policy aimed specifically at affecting the numerical demographic 
development of the country in question, a case could certainly be made 
out for the proposition that apart from a vague and pious hope that the 
population might continue to increase satisfactorily, and that certain 
of their social welfare policies, adopted for egalitarian or other 
reasons, might also serve to achieve this, they have no clear-cut 
demographic policies at this stage whatsoever. A recent semi-official 
exposition of Poland's population policy includes the remark that:
"I doubt that Polish population policy can be summarily
136defined as pro-natalist."
Many might doubt whether it can yet be described as pro-natalist at all. 
The anti-natalism of the Gomulka days has been buried, and social and 
economic policies are infinitely more oriented to family and consumer 
needs. This seems to have had a positive impact (if slight to date) on
135Radio Warsaw II, November 13, 1972.
136M. Kozakiewicz "Population Policy" in Polish Perspectives (in English)
1975, No. 4, p. 13.
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age-specific fertility in Poland. But it seems likely that Gierek,
Jaroszewicz and their colleagues are much more concerned with preventing
a renewed outbreak of the troubles in the shipyards in 1970 than of the
gloom and inactivity in the maternity clinics in the 1960s. Child
endowment has been increased, but it is weighted to favour the poor
137rather than the fecund as such; paid maternity leave has been extended,
and optional post-maternity leave has been greatly extended, but without
reinforcing it by a generous pension allowance as has been done in the
138more pro-natalist neighbouring states. And although young marrieds
The increases bring the monthly amounts paid to 160, 250, 340 and 
360 zl. for the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th children, with 360 for each 
subsequent child; however only families with an income of less than 
1400 zloties per head monthly are eligible, and the graduation is in 
any case a good deal less steep than that prevailing in Hungary,
Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. The average monthly wage in the socialized 
sector in 1974 was 3185 zloties. For a full description of the benefits, 
see M. Piatkowski Zasilki rodzinne Warsaw 1974.
*For an official catalogue of the new benefits granted to women under 
the Gierek administration, see, eg., J. Solecki "Problemy rodziny" TL 
March 3, 1975. Characteristically, the article strikes no pro-natalist 
notes. For a recent summary of pro-natalist measures taken elsewhere 
in the bloc, see R. McIntyre "Pro-natalist programmes in Eastern Europe" 
in Soviet Studies July 1975.
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have been given some credit concessions for furnishing their flats,1^  
their most crucial problem remains to get into one in the first place.140
But if indeed there is a sense in which the Polish authorities do 
not yet have a definite population policy, it does seem very likely that 
they will have one in the near future. It was mentioned earlier that 
many people urged that Poland should adopt a pro-natalist program in 
earnest only towards the end of the 1970s, when the first depleted cohorts 
of the demographic low of the early 1960s would begin reaching marriageable 
age. And despite their other differences, almost all demographers agreed 
that intensive and extensive research must be funded and reported before 
any effective population policy could be devised. (The convergence theory 
seems particularly apposite to academic haute politique). The government 
was also warned that any population policy to be successful, would have to
For an account of these measures see TL March 8-9 1975 and March 12,
1975 (J. Sieradzihski "Dla miodych malzenstw"). The second of these 
items suggests that the credit concessions have a population policy 
significance. However an item in ZW April 23, 1975 mentions them 
rather as being a form of help for the young, i.e. as a consumerist 
measure. The credits carry an interest rate of 6%, which is substantial 
and points up the contrast between this measure and the much more generous 
ones in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, where the debts are also partly or 
wholly remitted according to the number of children the young couple 
produce.
0Cf. footnote 97 above. The principles determining priority of alloca­
tion in housing do not appear to have been altered in favour of young 
marrieds. The "productive sectors" continue to enjoy preferential housing
allocations,* insofar as social factors are taken into account the needs 
of the young and expanding family are not favoured. See T. Zarski "Jak 
budowad i dzielic" TL May 7, 1975 and A. Melich "Od projektu do przydzialu"
TL April 2, 1975.
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be carried out in a complex manner, in many different spheres of life
simultaneously. The devising of such a policy, as well as its subsequent
implementation, would require a permanent government body, partly
scientific, partly administrative/ to co-ordinate research, advise on
policy and later check on how the policies once decided on were being
administered. For a long time, these demands seemed to fall on deaf ears,
but at last, in May 1974, the constitution of such a Government Population
141Commission was announced (the equivalent organization in Czechoslovakia, 
the State Population Commission, gives the impression of wielding great 
influence;in the USSR, pro-natalist demographers have been calling for such 
an organization for years, but so far in vain). If and when the Polish 
organization achieves the eminence of its Czechoslovakian counterpart, the 
evidence of unequivocal government involvement will no doubt begin to 
gather.
Perhaps the most significant sign of this impending development in 
the period before the VII Congress of the PUWP was a speech made by Gierek 
on the occasion of Women's Day in March 1975, in the course of which he 
mentioned the figure of 40 million people for the year 2000 as a minimal 
objective, for the achievement of which, as he added a little inaccurately, 
"the natural increase rate must become greater". While we have not always 
had to pursue an active (i.e. pro-natalist) demographic policy, said Gierek, 
"today it has proved to be a necessity. For this reason it is essential 
that a broad program be developed which would prescribe forms of assistance
For a brief account of this development together with the text of the 
Premier's decree establishing the organization, see BIGS 1974, No. 2, 
pp. 89-97. For a (not enormously illuminating) description of the new 
body's functions and responsibilities by its Chairman, see K. Secomski 
"Polityka ludnoöciowa na dzi£ i jutro" ZW June 7, 1974.
141
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for families rearing children, and in particular for large families 
(wielodzietnych). We shall present that program in a few months time 
at the VII Congress/'142
To what extent this program would go beyond the social-policy
orientation of moves taken thus far was not easy to foresee. Certainly,
no press campaign for a higher birth rate followed Gierek's statement.
143The Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny gave the statement considerable
prominence, but none of the other main weeklies did, and there was no
144follow-up or comment in Trybuna Ludu itself or Zycie Warszawy. Gierek
did not refer to the matter on Mothers' Day, nor does the Politburo or
Government appear to have discussed the matter of population policy at
any time during 1975 (though they have repeatedly discussed housing policy,
145for example, in the last year or two) . A Trybuna Ludu article about the 
second phase of the child endowment increases taking effect on August 1st, 
spoke only of "improved living conditions" and made no reference to 
encouraging larger families. Insofar as any change has, therefore, been 
clearly foreshadowed, it seems likely to be along the lines of more of the
142TL March 7, 1975.
143Tygodnik Powszechny March 16, 1975, p. 1, "Obraz tygodnia".
144See the account of Gierek and Jaroszewicz's meeting with a selected 
group of women to mark the occasion in ZW May 27, 1975. The tone of 
that report was rather that women are glad to make sacrifices for their 
country, and that in fact the party and government had already succeeded 
in making their lives much easier.
145TL July 26-7, 1975, p. 1.
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same: increased economic benefits to offset the costs of raising children; 
positive inducements, in other words, rather than repressive measures, 
with a strong flavour of Gierekist consumerism and social welfare 
egalitarianism to them.
In some respects this is perhaps the most significant aspect of
current Polish population policies. While elsewhere in the Soviet bloc,
a clear trend seems to be establishing itself in favour of restrictions
on the availability of abortion and in some cases, contraceptives, in Poland
pressures of this kind have apparently been resisted. It might not be
being overparadoxical to say that this is partly because in Poland, unlike
the other socialist countries, there would be a good deal of popular
146support for such measures. But it would also appear that in addition to
146 . .An article by Z. Smolinski in TL January 18-9, 1975 ("§wiadome 
macierzyrtstwo" mentions that "only a small (niewielki) percentage of 
women" in a large fertility survey sample "regarded abortion as morally 
proper" (sluszne moralnie). (Hypocrisy on this point, however, is often 
conscious: 37% of the sample said that they might agree to the operation 
in concrete situations). Here again we are dealing with an instance of 
the church/state dialectic in Polish political life. Abortion should 
not be restricted, nor a pro-natalist policy followed because to do so 
would be to admit that the Church had been right all along. As the Deputy 
Minister of Wages, Labour and Social Affairs, H. Biaiczyrfski said in his 
introductory paper at the conference organized by the Ministry in 1973:
"I think the degree of social maturity of the Polish community is still 
too low for a pro-natalist policy to be proclaimed". (Socjalne i prawne 
£rodki vol. I, p. 3). On the same occasion, the demographer Mikolaj Latuch, 
who unlike Bialczynski, does favour a pro-natalist policy, emphasized that 
"The realization of one system of values (demographic growth) must not be 
achieved at the cost of any other system of values (secular culture,
elimination of social and cultural inequalities)". Ibid., p. 171 .(emphasis) 
added) .
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not wanting to agree with the Church, the present authorities have some
positive commitment to a secular and, in this particular respect, liberal
vision of family life. One of the most regular contributors to Trybuna
Ludu on demographic and family matters is the educationist and sexologist,
Mikolaj Kozakiewicz, who is personally not an eager pro-natalist and is
certainly opposed to repressive measures; on more than one occasion recently
Kozakiewicz has been able to declare from official platforms that this is
147also the attitude of the authorities. In 1974 an article appeared in
Trybuna Ludu which dealt specifically with the subject of abortion and its
147See his "Population Policy" in Polish Perspectives 1975, No. 4. "... we
are interested in demographic growth but not to the point of forcing it 
on people against their will ..." (p. 15) "Our attitude to the problem 
of abortion and contraception is also very significant ... some quarters 
(mainly the church)" ... (have called for) "severer restrictions.. 
Demographic policy, however, has not given way to these pressures".
(p. 16). See also his article in TL August 2-3, 1975. Trybuna Ludu's 
reluctance to avoid commending abortion restrictions is sometimes taken 
to considerable lengths. An article on the recent upturn in the 
Hungarian birth rate ("Prawidlowy rozwdj demograficzny" TL April 1, 1975) 
asserts that this development is not due primarily to the restrictions 
imposed on abortion in 1973. There is no time to discuss this issue here, 
but suffice it to say that in this writer's judgement, given the history 
of Hungarian endeavours to raise the birth rate by economic incentives, 
TL's assessment seems more normative than empirical. A Kozakiewicz 
article on the Rumanian family (part of a regular rubric) manages, unlike 
all others in the series, to wholly avoid reference to demographic 
matters (Rumania has a population policy marked by draconian administra­
tive measures): TL January 18-19, 1975.
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legal suppression, declaring boldly that such an approach was 
characteristic of right-wing and clerical regimes like Spain, etc.^8 
One can only wonder what the reaction to this article must have been 
in the Rumanian, Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and Bulgarian embassies, 
given the fact that in recent years all four countries have (for more 
or less overtly demographic reasons) reintroduced restrictions on the 
availability of abortion.
148 Sztuczne poronienia" TL June 15, 1974.
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CHAPTER 5
POPULATION POLITICS IN YUGOSLAVIA
The demographico-political situation in Yugoslavia 
bears strong resemblance to that in the USSR. In each case 
we have a numerically strong and politically dominant 'post- 
Christian' Slavic element which is in greater or lesser 
measure divided against itself, and substantial ethnic 
minorities largely of Moslem culture whose loyalty to the 
existing status quo is questionable. In each case there are 
dramatic divergences in demographic behaviour between the 
main national groups. And in each case it appears that 
demographic trends are bound to aggravate if not indeed to 
precipitate severe socio-economic stresses and conflicts.
The relative success of the Soviet and Yugoslav regimes 
in resolving or containing these conflicts will be a most 
interesting test of the respective viability of two polities, 
which, in many respects, represent the antithetical extremes 
of modern European Communism.
5.a Yugoslavia: The Demographic Background1
During the 20th century, various parts of Yugoslavia 
have been successfully affected by the social metamorphosis 
known as the demographic transition, in which, typically,
1 Perhaps because of the great diversity of Yugoslavia's 
sub-populations, there are relatively few general works 
covering broad areas of its demographic development.
The quarterly Stanovni£tvo (appearing somewhat irregularly 
of late) has published many scholarly articles on 
Yugoslavian demography since its first appearance in 1963, 
but most are synchronic studies, and regionally or 
thematically specialized. Monographs, particularly those 
of a general character, have not been plentiful. See 
Centar za demografska istra^ivanja, Razvitak stanovni^tva 
Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu (Belgrade, 1974);
D. Breznik, Demografski metodi i modeli (Belgrade, 1972),
Ch.8 and prilog I; Vh Simeunovicf, Stanovnistvo Jugoslavije 
i socijalistickih republika 1921-196T (Belgrade, 1964); (cont.
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first death and then birth rates fall from high to much lower
levels, giving rise to a period of accelerated natural increase
in the process. The more developed regions of Yugoslavia,
Slovenia, Croatia and parts of Serbiaf began this phase in
2the last century, and all had effectively completed it by
the mid-1960s. In Bosnia and Hercegovinaf Macedonia and
Montenegro, the transition began later and is only now approaching
its completion. In Kosovo, death rates started falling some
decades ago, but birth rates did not begin to follow them until 
•3very recently. The pattern throughout the world has been, 
roughly, that the later a country or region embarked upon the 
demographic transition, the more rapid the decline in its death 
rate was likely to be. In consequence, more or less sustained 
periods of low mortality and continued high natality have 
ensued, giving rise to the Third World phenomenon popularly 
identified as the Population Explosion. Yugoslavia, like the 
USSR, has its own Third World, and its own domestic Population 
Explosion. As a result of it, and of ethnic differentials in 
demographic behaviour, certain less prominent national 
communities notably the Bosnian Moslems (a Serbo-Croat-speaking
1 (cont.) Centar za demografska istrazivanja, Fertilitet
stanovnigtva u Jugoslaviji (Belgrade, 19721 and Migiracije 
stanovni^tva Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1971); M. Raäevicf', 
Determinante fertiliteta stanovni^tva u Jugoslaviji 
(Belgrade, 1971). The publications of the Savezni 
zavod za statistiku (Federal Institute for Statistics), 
in particular the demographic annual, Demografska statistika 
also contain some retrospective data. The English-language 
journal, Yugoslav Survey, regularly carries demographic 
articles of good quality.
2 Razvitak stanovni^tva u posleratnom periodu, p.5.
For vital rates by republics, see Simeunovicl op.cit., 
p. 43, 46, and Savezni zavod za statistiku, Demografska 
statistika 1972 (Belgrade, 1974), p.34-36.
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group now officially recognized as a constituent nation of 
the Yugoslav Federation) and the Shiptars, or Albanians, 
have greatly increased their relative numerical strength in 
Yugoslavia overall, and, even more significantly, within 
their respective territorial units. Other national groups 
have remained numerically stagnant, or shown only weak 
increase during recent decades. An extreme example may bring 
out the magnitude of the relative changes that this kind of 
development can involve: the Hungarians at the 1921 Yugoslav
Census outnumbered the Albanians by 468,000 to 440,000. Yet 
in the year 1972, according to the official Yugoslav demographic 
yearbook, there were roughly ten times as many Albanians born4in Yugoslavia as Hungarians.
With such regional and ethnic differentiation as 
this, it makes little sense for the most part to speak of 
overall trends in the Yugoslav population. Nation-wide 
demographic indicators indicate little, and in fact serve 
rather to conceal the nature of trends in particular regions.
The material presented in the Appendix has accordingly been 
chosen with a view to illuminating the disparate paths taken 
by the main sub-populations in the post-war period. As 
generalizing comment is so difficult and so deceptive, these 
introductory remarks will strive where possible to draw attention 
to the most politically relevant regional deviations from the 
overall Yugoslav norm.
Natality in Yugoslavia fell from the relatively 
high (by the European standards of the time) 36.7 per thousand 
in 1921, to 25.9 in 1939, rose again to 30.3 in 1950 (the peak 
year of the post-war baby boom) and fell rapidly thereafter
4 The 1921 census figure for Hungarians and Albanians
(based on linguistic affiliation) is from S. Clissold 
(ed.), A Short History of Yugoslavia (Cambridge, 1966), 
p.165. In 1972 in Yugoslavia, there were 54,334 and 
5,717 live births to Albanian and Hungarian mothers 
respectively. Demografska statistika 1972, p.146.
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to 18.3 per thousand in 1972 (still relatively high by European
5standards). The decline in mortality has been more steady, 
and as a result, the post-war years saw the period of most 
rapid natural increase in Yugoslavia's history. Since then, 
natural increase has also fallen away rapidly, dropping to 
less than ten per thousand in 1969 for the first time since 
the Yugoslav state was established. These magnitudes do 
have, I believe, some national political relevance, whatever 
their imperfections as demographic measures in the pure sense. 
The post-war baby boom (a phenomenon common to all regions) 
arrived on the labour market in the early and mid-1960s, 
at a time when Yugoslavia was already struggling with growing 
unemployment (a problem to be discussed in greater detail in 
the next section). The period of rapid national population 
growth of the late 1940s and early 1950s probably also served 
to reinforce in the minds of the Communist leadership the 
traditional Stalinist doctrine that high rates of natural 
increase are a sign of national vigour inherent to Socialism; 
and to postpone the time when any of them could perceive that 
lagging population growth might conceivably be a problem either 
at the national or the republican level. National indicators 
tend to deceive politicians in the USSR and Yugoslavia, just 
as they do the casual external observer of demographic 
statistics. However, the rapidity of the recent overall 
decline in natural increase has been so great that decision­
makers can probably no longer simply dismiss the issue as 
being the invention of chauvinist trouble-makers.
It will be observed from the tables in Appendix C , 
that in recent decades, the regional differentials in natural 
population growth have actually been increasing, despite the
5 Demografska statistika 1972, p.30.
6 Ibid.
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almost universal trend towards decline in birth rates.
Thus in 1950-54, Macedonia's natural increase was twice that 
of Croatia, whereas in 1970-73 (despite the rapid intervening 
decline in Macedonian fertility), the difference was nearly 
fourfold. In 1950-54 Kosovo's natural increase was less 
than times that of Vojvodina. By 1970-73, it was ten times 
as great. Such comparisons as these are demographically 
crude and to some extent misleading. In the emotionally 
charged atmosphere of Yugoslav nationality politics, however, 
demographic oversimplifications are not uncommon. And in 
any case, more discriminating statistics, when they are 
available, frequently suggest almost equally alarming inferences.
The post-war baby boom in the more developed 
republics tends to divert attention from the fact that already 
by the early 1950s, very large discrepancies existed between 
the inherent fertility levels of the different national groups.
In the Census year of 1953, the General Fertility Rates of the 
different national groups ranged from 72.5 (Hungarian),
83.1 (Slovenian), 91.0 (Croat) and 101.8 (Serbian) to 170.5 
(Yugoslav, undetermined - i.e., Bosnian Moslem) and 228.2g(Albanian). By 1961, an even greater gap had opened up, 
as the fertility rates of the more developed nations had 
fallen quite sharply, whilst those of the two main Moslem 
groups had remained relatively stable: 59.5 (Hungarian),
70.9 (Slovenian), 74.8 (Serbian) and 80.6 (Croatian);
164.3 (Yugoslav, undetermined) and 223.9 (Albanian). Since 
that time, the divergence between Albanian on the one hand and 
Serb, Croat and Slovenian fertility on the other has undoubtedly 
been maintained.^ At the same time, the potentially very
7
7 See Table 3, Appendix C.
8 Savezni zavod za statistiku, Fertilitet zenskog 
stanovni^tva 1950-1967 (Belgrade, 1971) , p .22.
9 Ibid.
10 See Table 4, Appendix C.
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significant gap between Macedonian and Albanian fertility has 
dramatically widened. In 1953, the GFR for the ethnic 
Macedonian population in Yugoslavia was 143.0 (cf. Albanian 
228.2); by 1961, the Macedonian rate had dropped to 99.0 (cf. 
Albanian 223.9). I have not yet seen any Yugoslav computation 
of GFRs by nationality for the census year 1971. But it 
appears that proportionately, the gap between Macedonian and 
Albanian fertility has widened still further since: that while
both have declined, the Macedonian decline has been a good 
deal steeper. My own (not strictly comparable) calculation 
of the GFRs for the two national groups within the Macedonian 
republic as of 1970 gives a figure of 69 for the Macedonians 
and 183 for the Albanians. Since 1961, on the other hand, 
Bosnian Moslem fertility seems to have fallen quite sharply 
(though statistics may exaggerate the steepness of the 
decline - see note 12, below), and the gap between Moslems,
11 The figure I have given is not strictly comparable with
those cited for 1953 and 1961, primarily because the 1953 
and 1961 statistics refer to the total Albanian and 
Macedonian populations in Yugoslavia, not to those in 
Macedonia alone (where the overwhelming majority of 
Macedonians, but only a minority of Albanians, are 
resident). Though it is not actually indicated in the 
Yugoslav source, the GFR was evidently calculated for 
women aged 15-49 (not 15-44). My own calculations are 
also for women aged 15-49. They are based on the 
official Census results for population in Macedonia by 
age, sex and nationality (as of 31 March 1971), and total 
births by nationality of mother in Macedonia during 
1970. No allowance was made for the slight time discrepancy, 
as the main objective was simply to render an impression 
of the current state of differential fertility in the 
Republic. See Savezni zavod za statistiku, Popis 
stanovni£tva i stanova 1971, vol.I (Belgrade, 1974), p.28; 
and Savezni savod za statistiku, Demografska statistika 
1970 (Belgrade, 1973), p.144. A Yugoslav source provides 
the following GFR statistics for Macedonians and Albanians 
within Macedonia in the census years 1953 and 1961: 
Macedonians - 144 and 100; Albanians - 251 and 223.
Thus the Albanian rate in Macedonia, from having been rather 
less than twice that of the Macedonians, was by 1970 
nearly three times as great. Fertilitet £enskog 
stanovni^tva 1950-1967, p.22.
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Serbs and Croats in Bosnia and Hercegovina is consequently
closing. But even so it remains significant, at least for
the two major groups, the Moslems and the Serbs. Again
according to my own calculations, the respective GFRs for
Moslems and Serbs within Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1970 were 
1296 and 63. Before the gap closes completely (assuming
that it does), further significant changes in their relative
demographic strength can be expected. Outside Bosnia and
Hercegovina and Macedonia, the momentum and direction of
change in relative ethnic fertility levels can be gauged
reasonably well from the statistics on Net Reproduction
Ratios by republic and province presented in Table 4 of 
13Appendix C. The political implications of these trends will 
be discussed in greater detail in 5.d and 5.f, below.
12 The procedure adopted was the same as that for the
Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia, and utilized the 
same statistical sources: Popis stanovni^tva i stanova
1971, vol.I, p.16; and Demografska statistika 1970, p.143. 
The Serbs can derive little comfort from the GFR for 
Croats in Bosnia and Hercegovina in 1970, which by the 
same procedures I calculate to be 81. The GFRs for the 
three national groups within the republic in the census 
years 1953 and 1961 were respectively as follows: 
undetermined Yugoslavs (i.e. Bosnian Moslems) 180 and 172; 
Serbs 138 and 105; and Croats 124 and 127. Fertilitet 
zenskog stanovniStva 1950-1967, p.22. Here the 
discrepancy m  computation procedures between the Yugoslav 
source and myself is probably negligible, though there are 
problems with ethnic self-identification, particularly'
in the case of the Moslems. There is reason to believe 
that there was a substantial undercount of Moslems in 
1953 and 1961 because of the pressure on them to identify 
themselves as 'Yugoslavs'. As the GFRs were based on 
this Census undercount on the one hand, and vital statistics, 
on the other, they may have the effect of inflating 
Moslem fertility in the earlier years. Moslem women 
in childbirth seem less likely to have been identified 
as 'Yugoslavs' or even Serbs or Croats, than households 
being visited by officials at the time of a national 
undertaking like a census.
13 The Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Montegrins are all 
sufficiently concentrated and dominant in their own 
republics (in the case of the Serbs, in Serbia Proper) 
for the republican NRRs to be a fair guide to ethnic 
fertility trends. The figures for Kosovo are also a 
reasonable indicator of Albanian trends (though the presence 
of a substantial Serbian minority of lower and, in recent 
years, sharply falling fertility would cause some slight 
downward distortion.
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The reasons for the sharp postwar fertility decline
in Yugoslavia are no doubt very similar to those operating
elsewhere in Eastern Europe:^  rapid industrialization and
urbanization, increasing educational levels, growth of female
15employment in the towns, the chronic urban housing crisis,
16the total inadequacy of child-minding facilities, the
secularization of life-styles and the decline of clerical
influences, the progressive liberalization of abortion 
17legislation, changes in family structures and values, etc.
Most of the factors involved are closely related to one another; 
and many form part of the general socio-economic modernization 
that has been proceeding in Yugoslavia since 1945. Before 1939, 
some 75% of the Yugoslav population lived from the land. By 
the 1971 Census, only 38% were still dependent on agriculture
14 Cf. Ch.l, p.4, footnote 1, above.
15 It has been calculated (on the basis of 1971 Census data) 
that for the female cohorts of 50-54 years of age, employed 
urban women had an average of 1.70 children, and unemployed 
urban women an average of 3.55. In the some cohorts, women 
without education had an average of 4.46 children, women 
with completed basic schooling an average of 2.43 
children, and women with higher education 1.04 children. 
Razvitak stanovniStva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu,
p. 17. In 1961, the General Fertility kate for the urban 
population of Yugoslavia was 73.3, and for the rural 
population 98.1. Fertilitet stanovni£tva u Jugoslaviji, 
p. 95.
16 The Yugoslav Statistical Yearbook does not appear to 
supply any information on the numbers or proportions of 
children in preschool child-care institutions, but from 
fragmentary data for parts of the country appearing in 
the press, it is clear that the coverage is a good deal 
weaker than in any of the European Socialist countries.
These matters are discussed further in 5.g, below.
17 The causes of changes in fertility are notoriously 
difficult to isolate and disentangle from one another.
The influence of abortion legislation is particularly 
difficult to assess, in that it appears to be a 
contingent cause, one which only exerts its effect after 
other developments have created the necessary preconditions. 
Yugoslav demographers, like their counterparts elsewhere
in Eastern Europe, are inclined at times to play down (cont.)
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for their support. Urbanization has not gone ahead at
quite the same speed: like many other countries at a similar
level of development, Yugoslavia has a massive army of some
1.4 million 'peasant-workers' commuting to the cities daily
to work in factories and returning to their farms at night
19or at week-ends. Nonetheless, the rate of rural-urban
20migration in recent decades has been very substantial.
17 (cont.) the demographic importance of abortion legislation
in the hope that they will thereby dissuade legislators 
from seeking to pursue pro-natalist objectives by 
'administrative measures'. Nonetheless, even they are 
prepared to concede that liberalized abortion probably 
accelerates the rate of decline in fertility and may 
enable lower levels to be reached than would otherwise be 
the case. See D. Breznik, 'Problemi demografskog razvitka 
stanovniMtva Jugoslavije', paper presented to the Belgrade 
Conference on Population Policy held in 1973 (Savetovanje 
o izgradnji druKtvenih stavova o populacionoj politici u 
Jugoslaviji), mimeograph, p.20. Having asserted and cited 
opinion to the effect that without liberalization of the 
abortion laws in Yugoslavia, the fertility decline would 
have occurred anyway, Breznik goes on to say that ' this 
does not mean the complete negation of the influence of 
abortion legislation on the fertility of the population - 
particularly as regards the duration of the process of 
fertility decline and the minimal levels that might be 
reached by particular populations.'
18 Razvitak stanovni¥tva Jugoslavije u posleratnom periodu, 
pp.l, 41.
19 Puljiz estimates that together with their households, 
the peasant-workers make up about 3 million, i.e. more 
than one seventh of the total Yugoslav population. Vlado 
Puljiz, 'Oblici i posljedice deagrarizacije u Jugoslaviji', 
paper presented to the Belgrade Conference on Population 
Policy, 1973, mimeograph, p.16.
20 It is estimated that in the period from 1948 to 1953, an 
average of 203,000 left the land annually; between 1953 
and 1961, an average of 229,000, and from 1961 to 1971, 
an average of 217,000. Razvitak stanovni^tva Jugoslavije 
u posleratnom periodu, p.42.
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Under the impact of the declining birth rate of
recent years, the Yugoslav population has begun to 'age', with
the proportion of pensioners in the total population increasing,
21and the proportion of children decreasing. One region in
which this trend has scarcely begun as yet, however, is Kosovo,
where the extremely high fertility of the Albanian population
is keeping the age pyramid very broad at the base, and economic
22dependency ratios unfavourable. As with fertility, regional 
differences in age-structure are striking, and of considerable 
socio-economic and political significance.
The educational and occupational composition of the 
population as a whole has altered considerably in the post-war 
period, as might be expected, with levels of schooling and 
vocational training increasing substantially overall, and the
21 Unlike in other Socialist countries, where the ageing of
the population is a recurring theme in press and periodical 
articles, it is unusual to find any comment on this 
problem in Yugoslav sources, except in the specific context 
of agriculture (where the ageing of the work-force is 
particularly marked). Demographers occasionally discuss 
the matter in specialist publications, but the daily and 
periodical press virtually never does. For a rare exception, 
see M. Nikolic, 'Fenomen starenja aktivnog stanovniMtva 
u nas', Borba, 14 July 1974.
22 Thus 53% of Kosovo's population is under the age of
20, and only 7% over 60, whereas the corresponding figures 
for Serbia proper are 31% and 14%, and for the Vojvodina 
30% and 15%. Such dramatic differences in dependency 
ratios as these figures imply naturally contribute 
considerably to maintaining and extending the differences 
in national income per head between the various regions. 
See Tables 7 and 8, Appendix C.
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proportions employed in secondary and tertiary activities
advancing at the expense of farming. Again there are the usual
regional differentiations, with the less developed areas
continuing to lag behind. The more rapid population growth of
these areas has led to rural overpopulation actually being
accentuated, despite the draining off of manpower to the 
23cities. In this connection, it is worth noting that Kosovo,
much of which is mountainous terrain unsuitable to agriculture,
is now by far the most densely populated of the eight republics
and regions (it was one of the least densely populated in 
241921). Given existing trends in fertility and migration, its 
relative disadvantage in this respect seems bound to worsen.
The regional distribution of population in Yugoslavia 
has shifted considerably in this century as a result of war 
and migration. There is no time to discuss either of these 
topics in satisfactory detail. Suffice it to say concerning
23 Cf. footnote 20, above. Unlike commentators in other 
Socialist countries, Yugoslav writers are relatively 
uninhibited about identifying underemployment and even 
placing bold figures upon it. B. Mujovic, in 'O problemu 
nezaposlenosti i realnim mogucnostima za njegovo rjesenje', 
Na&e teme 1973, no.4, p.745 at p.758, declares that 'in 
recent years', it has been assumed that the surplus labour 
force in the countryside amounted to about 1.3 million. 
However, Mujovic says, it is increasing, and some observers 
are now apparently prepared to put it at two million.
An estimate for Kosovo in 1970 places the labour surplus 
at 180,000, 120,000 of it rural. These reserves together 
with the continuing population growth in the province were 
said to have 'created an army of unemployed' which, given 
the limited possibilities for urban employment, must either 
increase unemployment on the farms or be siphoned abroad.
M. Karan, 'ZapoMljavanje radnika sa Kosova u inostranstvo', 
Socijalna politika, 1971, no. 1-2, p.13.
24 Z. AniHic, 'Population changes in Yugoslavia', Yugoslav 
Survey, vol.XII (1971), no.3, p.l at p.4. By 1971, Kosovo's 
population density was 114/sq. km. (cf. 70/sq. km. in 
Albania and 80/sq. km. in Yugoslavia as a whole).
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the first that Serbia (and Montenegro) lost one-fifth of their
25total population during the First World War alone; and 
that during the Second World War (in which Yugoslavia sustained 
an extremely high casualty rate), the burden of mortality was 
again unevenly distributed, though less so, no doubt, than 
in 1912-1919.26
A few cursory observations should also be made
about inter-regional migration within Yugoslavia. Until the
last couple of decades, internal migration tended to favour
Serbia proper and Vojvodina exclusively, all other regions
recording net outflows. Since the mid-1950s, Slovenia and
Croatia have also been showing a positive internal migration 
27balance. The main patterns of inter-regional movement 
have, of course, been from the less developed south to the 
north. Serbs from all regions, but particularly from Bosnia
25 I.e. not including the Balkan Wars of 1912-13. See 
Clissold, op.cit., p.159. This devastating loss effectively 
put paid to Serbian imperial aspirations, though not all
Serbs have yet realized it.
26 Total Yugoslav casualties are usually put at 1.7 million, 
or 11% of the then population. As can be seen from 
Table 1, the casualties were concentrated in Croatia 
(whose population actually declined between 1931 and 1948), 
Bosnia and Hercegovina and Montenegro. (The stagnation
of Vojvodina1s population over the same period was due 
rather to migratory factors.) Croatian commentators 
sometimes draw attention to their particularly heavy losses 
in World War II, though without detailing how they 
came to pass. See, e.g., A. Wertheimer-Baletic,
StanovniMtvo SR Hrvatske (Zagreb, 1971), p.25, where 
a figure of 661,500 is cited for Croatia's war dead.
Razvitak stanovni¥tva Jugoslavije u posleratnom 
periodu, p.ll.
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and Hercegovina, and latterly from Kosovo, have tended to
gravitate to Serbia proper and Vojvodina, as have Montenegrins,
and, though in much lesser measure, representatives of other 
2 8ethnic groups. Croats from Bosnia and Hercegovina have 
also tended to emigrate to Croatia, thereby leaving the 
Moslems in the region (who have no metropolitan area outside
2(the republic to attract them) in a relatively stronger position. 
The Macedonians, perhaps because of their ethnic and linguistic 
distinctness, have maintained an even balance between immigration 
and emigration.
28 For an overall picture of inter-regional migratory trends, 
see Table 5, Appendix C. At the 1971 Census, Serbia 
proper and the Vojvodina had a net inflow of Serb residents 
from Kosovo of 48,935; and a net inflow of Montenegrins 
from Montenegro and Kosovo of 23,041 and 6,147 respectively. 
These figures, it should be emphasized, do not convey the 
full demographic effects of the migratory patterns in 
question, since they fail to record past immigrants 
deceased at the time of the 1971 Census, and, of course, 
those children of immigrants who are born in the new
area of settlement. The figures are probably further 
affected by changes in ethnic identification from 
Montenegrin to Serb after settlement in Serbia. And 
finally it needs to be remembered that the criterion of 
permanent residence employed in Censuses (cf. note 31, 
below) may also lead to underregistration of southern 
migrants (notably Albanians) in the northern regions.
The figures have been computed from Popis stanovniKtva 
i stanova 1971, p.76, 78, 82 and 84. The net inflow of 
Serbs from Bosnia and Hercegovina to Serbia as of 1971 
was 161,052 (again by my computation). Op.cit., p.76, 82.
29 The 197| Census reveals a net inflow of 94,455 Croats 
from Bosnia and Hercegovina into Croatia. The same 
strictures apply to this result as to the computations 
presented in the previous footnote. A calculation of 
net migratory flows in and out of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
by nationality based on the 1961 Census results showed 
that of a total deficit of 211,000 for the republic as a 
whole, 132,000 were Serbs, and 66,000 Croats. The total 
deficit for Moslems and Yugoslavs (undetermined) was
only 4,000. Again, it must be stressed that these figures 
do not near adequately render the demographic consequences 
of inter-regional migratory flows in recent decades. See 
Migracije stanovnilltva Jugoslavije, Table 28, p.210-11.
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It should be stressed that Yugoslav statistics on
inter-regional migration over recent decades are incomplete,^
and depend heavily on indirect and in some cases misleading
census data. Since the war, Yugoslav censuses have applied
the criterion of permanent rather than present residence.^
As a result, the growing numbers of intra-Yugoslav 'Gastarbeiter'
in the more developed regions (particularly Slovenia) are
systematically overlooked, though many of them may regard
themselves as permanent settlers. No reliable estimates
have been published of the numbers or ethnic composition
of those involved in these supposedly temporary movements;
32and it seems quite probable that none exist. This fact needs 
to be borne in mind wnen considering Table 5 in Appendix G.
30 Yugoslav migration statistics are all based on cumbersome, 
indirect and incomplete computations like those exemplified 
in the previous two footnotes. Data on pre-war and 
war-time migratory movements are apparently scanty and
the very important cumulative effects the latter have had 
on the present distribution of settlement in Yugoslavia 
will probably never be known. Partly because of Yugoslavia's 
relaxed (by Socialist standards) internal administration, 
direct monitoring of population shifts has not been 
systematically carried out. Slovenia is alone among 
the republics in keeping adequate records of current 
migratory movements. See Migracije stanovni¥tva 
Jugoslavije, pp.5-9, 328-30.
31 Popis stanovni¥tva i stanova 1971, vol.l, p.vi .
32 The only figures I have seen are for Slovenia, where 
estimates range between 100,000 and 150,000. Occasionally 
fragmentary data are published for other republics or 
regions, but even they are said to be unreliable.
'Statistical registration of these movements is inadequate... 
Permanent migration is much greater than that which is 
officially recorded, and is often spontaneous (stihijske) 
and unorganized.' M. Bekic, a member of the Federal 
Committee for Labour, quoted in VUS, 1 May 1976, p.18.
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Another area in which official statistics are
inadequate and conceded to be so (or accused of being so)
by many Yugoslav commentators is external emigration. There
has at times been hot dispute about the total numbers and
ethno-regional affiliations of the emigrants. In the early
stages of the mass emigration that followed the economic
reforms of 1965, Croatia, Slovenia and parts of Bosnia and
Hercegovina were particularly affected, and Croatia's share
of the diaspora is undoubtedly still disproportionately high.
Official estimates of the total numbers involved are approximate
and at times conflicting. But at its highest point, in 1974,
the Yugoslav economic emigration evidently amounted to some
1.1 million workers, the vast majority of them between the
33ages of 20 and 45. A semi-official estimate given recently
after the effects of the West European economic slump had
made themselves felt (through reduced employment in general
and discriminatory measures against immigrant workers in
34particular) put the figure at about 950,000. The Yugoslav 
Gastarbeiter phenomenon is, of course, one without parallel 
in the Socialist world. Its demographico-political significance 
will be outlined in greater detail in a separate section 
(5 .c., below).
33 One estimate (among many) gives the figure of 1,122,000 
workers abroad (including overseas countries) as of
late 1974. M. MiMovic, 1Sedma republika', NIN, 19 October 
1975, p.10. Neither this nor the estimate in the following 
footnote includes non-employed dependants residing abroad.
34 Svetozar Peposvki (the President of the Federal Committee 
for Labour), in Politika, 6 February 1976, p.10.
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5.b The Labour Force and Employment Policy
Strange as it may seem, those responsible for
Yugoslavia's first Five-Year Plan apparently took no account
35of population growth whatsoever. It was only with the 1957-61
Plan that the demographic factor began to be systematically
3 6represented in planning documents. But while it was thus
formally taken cognisance of, key decisions about economic
strategy continued to be reached without much regard to
37natural fluctuations in labour supply. In 1965, Yugoslavia 
embarked on a radical economic reform, one of the main purposes 
of which was to restrict employment in the socialized sector 
in order to facilitate increase in productivity. Partly at
35 'Koliko ce nas biti', NIN, 25 November 1973, p.22 at p.24.
36 M. Macura, 'Komponente populacione politike saobrazne 
sadaKnjim i buducim potrebama Jugoslavije', NaMe teme 
1974, no.4, p.554 at p.555.
37 One Yugoslav economist has remarked that the 1966-70 
Plan devoted a particularly long passage to employment 
problems, without, however, taking anything like effective 
account of them at the strategic level. T. Mulina,
'Tretman stanovni¥tva i radne snage u kontekstu privrednog 
razvoja Jugoslavije', paper presented at the 1973 Population 
Policy Conference in Belgrade, mimeograph, p.10. The 
prominent economist and sociologist (and, at times, 
forthright critic of official policies), Branko Horvat, has 
been quoted (by Z. Antic in Radio Free Europe Research RAD 
Background Report 54 (Yugoslavia), 20 March 1975, p.3) as 
saying that 'in the reform plans of 1965, there was not a 
single word about employment'. Horvat was evidently 
referring to other documents. The spirit of the two 
criticisms is in any case identical.
38 For comprehensive critiques of the 1965 economic reforms 
from the viewpoint of manpower problems, see, e.g., T. 
Mulina, 'Nezaposlenost, uzroci i karakteristike u 
sadaXnjoj fazi razvoja privrede', Ekonomski Institut, 
Belgrade, Studije i saopsftenja (Belgrade, n.d.); and
M. Kne¥evic", 'Neki socijalno-politi^ki i ekonomski problemi 
zapo¥ljavanja nasih radnika u inostranstvu', Ekonomska 
misao 1968, no.2, p.331.
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least as a result of these policies, employment stagnated and
there was virtually no increase in the numbers of employed for 
39four years. In the meantime, the mass exodus from the farms
set irrevocably in motion by post-war modernization continued
40to spill rural school-leavers and others into the towns.
And given its youthful age structure, the existing workforce 
was not being depleted by natural wastage at a very high 
rate.41 Moreover, the middle 'sixties saw the entry into 
the able-bodied age-group of the first of the large cohorts
39 Between 1945 and 1964, employment in the non-rural 
Yugoslav economy had expanded at an annual average rate 
of 10%. The numbers of employed in 1968, however, were 
actually lower than in 1964 (3,579,000 compared with 
3,608,000). See Ivo Vinski, 'Privredna reforma i 
zaposlenost', Pregled, 6 June 1969, tr. in Osteuropa, 
vol.XIX (1969), p.A347.
40 Cf. footnote 20, above, from which it is quite clear that 
no diminution of the pressures of urbanization occurred 
during the period.
41 D. Breznik, 'Demografska komponenta razvojne politike', 
Ekonomist, vol.XXIII (1970), nos 2-3, p.413 at p.417-18.
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of school-leavers born during the post-war baby boom.
During the late 1950s, and early 1960s, when the depleted
war-time cohorts had been reaching working age, annual
increases in employment had been very high. Now, at the
precise time when demographic considerations favoured a
strategy of extensive rather than intensive (i.e. labour-
intensive rather than capital-intensive or productivity-
oriented) economic growth, the choice was made to severely
limit new employment and to favour policies leading to the
43drastic paring down of existing employment. Industries 
and whole sectors of the economy that had been favoured by
42
42 One Yugoslav observer found that the timing of the 
Reform was 'reasonably well-timed', since the rate of 
growth in the total population between 20 and 60 was at 
its lowest point in 1965 and 1966. Miodrag Nikolic,
'Planiranje investicija kao sredstvo za suzbijanje 
nezaposlenosti', Ekonomska misao 1968, no.2, p.301, 
at p.303. However, even on Nikolic's reckoning, the 
annual increase by 1967-68 was much greater than could 
be comfortably handled by a labour-tight economy. The 
assumption that 20 (rather than 16-17) represents the 
outset of adult working life in Yugoslav conditions was 
in any case an unreal one, and positively misleading in 
the given instance. The weight of Yugoslav opinion, as 
well as of logic, is against Nikolic. Virtually all 
other analysts take 15 as the lower limit of working 
age, and place the work-force echo of the post-war baby 
boom in the mid-sixties. See, e.g., D. Breznik and 
M. Sentic, ' Radni kontingent stanovniStva i formiranje 
radne snage u Jugoslaviji do 1970 godine', Ekonomska 
misao 1968, no.l, p.151 at p.161; V. Simeunovic, 
'Population of Working Age', Yugoslav Survey 1966, 
p.3717, footnote 1. See also footnote 46, below.
43 While the reform did not of course aim at the total 
stagnation of employment in the years after 1964, the 
planned level of employment increase was very modest, 
just 2.3% per annum, less than half of that prevailing 
in 1953-61. See A. Wertheimer-Baletic, 1Regionalne 
demografske implikacije zapo¥ljavanja u inozemstvu', 
Ekonomski Pregled 1969, nos 7-8, p.703.
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'political' investment now fell on hard times as sterner
economic criteria were applied. Mass redundancies often
occurred among the higher categories of the work-force as
44well as among the semi-skilled and unskilled. Graduates 
and school-leavers were particularly hard hit. Thus it was 
that the regime manufactured for itself a new stratum of 
underemployed, over-educated youth, a stratum that was to 
occasion the leadership a good deal of anxiety in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.^
Skilled planners and technocrats must have had 
their reservations about the timing, if not the substance of 
the 1965 reforms. Demographers and economists were certainly 
quick to point to the unfortunate link between lowered
46employment opportunities and increased labour supplies.
44 The proportion of qualified workers among registered 
unemployed in 1964 was one-sixth of the total; by 1968 
it comprised one-third (in absolute numbers, an increase 
from 32,000 to 95,000). I. Vinski, op.cit., p.A349.
45 The student disturbances at Yugoslav universities in 
the northern summer of 1968 (particularly those at 
Belgrade university) caused a mini-crisis requiring the 
personal intervention of President Tito. The ideology
of the Belgrade movement had a marked New Left flavouring, 
which probably reflected among other things the growing 
professional insecurity of young graduates at the time. 
Again in the Croatian crisis of 1971, the role of 
university students was critical.
46 In 1966, a Yugoslav demographer wrote: 'The economic
reform, rationalization and the shift to a more intensive 
system of production have lessened the need for new labour, 
and tljat at precisely the moment when the sources of 
labour supply had grown quite exceptionally'. D. Vogelnik, 
'Demografski procesi i stabilizacija', Ekonomist, vol.
XIX (1966), nos 1-4, p.375 at p.385. In March 1968, the 
Serbian Economic Associatin (Savez ekonomista Srbije) 
organized a conference on employment problems, at which 
the causes and consequences of the employment crisis were 
forthrightly analysed by a number of specialist observers. 
For a review of the conference, see 'Savetovanje o 
problemima zaposlenosti', Stanovni^tvo, vol.VI (1968), 
nos 1-2, p.90; for the proceedings, see Ekonomska misao, 
1968, nos 1 and 2.
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The decision was, of course, a political one, the outcome
of a complex struggle in which various ideological and
47ethno-regional orientations were heavily engaged. It
can at least be asserted with confidence that on this occasion
the top leadership showed scant regard, or possibly no regard
at all for the demographic context and demographic ramifications
48of their decisions. They evidently felt the problem could
be solved by opening the flood-gates a little wider and
allowing the surplus manpower to seep out of the country.
What in fact followed was a torrent. This mass emigration
did not solve the problem of unemployment within the country,
however. Numbers registered as seeking jobs continued to 
49increase, even when the employing capacity of the economy 
began to recover, after 1968. Since the defeat of the
47 For a discussion of some of these aspects of the 
politics of the reforms, see P. Shoup, Communism and 
the National Question (New York, 1968), Ch.6.
48 'Statistics indicate that at the end of 1965 there were 
236,000 registered unemployed, 40% of whom were seeking 
employment for the first time. Though the number of 
unemployed is up by 11% over December 1964, a comparison 
will show that nothing exceptional is taking place in 
this field. Three years ago, at the end of 1962, there 
were precisely as many unemployed, i.e. 236,000. And 
then the situation was relatively more difficult, for 
total employment was lower.' 'Leto 1965 v lu^i statistike', 
Delo, 5 January 1966. The above excerpt from the Slovenian 
party daily is a good example of the insouciant style
of poet-reform official thinking on employment problems.
As Mulina commented: 'The full seriousness of the current
unemployment has begun to be comprehended only after a 
significant delay.' T. Mulina, Nezaposlenost, uzroci 
i karakteristike, p.34.
49 See Table 12, Appendix C.
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'liberal Westernizers' (for want of a better term) in 1971-72,
there has been some reversion to labour-intensive growth,
and annual employment increments have picked up, at the50expense of productivity and real wages. By now, the
annual increase in the 15-60 age-group is diminishing, and
can be expected to go on doing so, thus raising the possibility
that in the future some of the pressure will ease on the
labour market. For this to happen, it will be necessary for
large numbers of the Yugoslav workers 'temporarily abroad'
to remain abroad. At present, however, it is official policy
to 'bring' them all back. More significantly, it has become
official policy throughout Western Europe to favour indigenous
workers over Gastarbeiter, and to deport those of the latter
51who are unable to find work. The demographic strains on
50 For a general survey of trends in industrial productivity, 
see Miodrag Nikolicr, 'Labour Productivity in Industry, 
1952-1973', Yugoslav Survey 1975, no.l, p.119. Between 
1965 and 1971, productivity increase was greater than 
that of employment. Since then the trends have been 
reversed (see Nikolic', op. cit. , Table 1, at p.120).
The planned annual increase in productivity (in the 
socialized sector) over the 1971-75 period was 4.9%; 
the rate actually achieved was 2.5%. The planned rate 
of increase in employment in the socialized sector was 
2.7%; the actual rate was 4.3%. The year 1975 saw the 
highest increase in employment (5.4%), and the lowest 
increase in industrial productivity (0.9%) of the five- 
year period. (The above data are drawn from D.J.I.
Matko, 'The Fulfilment of the Yugoslav Five-Year Plan 
for 1971-75', ABSEES, vol.VII, no.2 (April 1976),
Special Section II, p.xvi). The increase in real wages 
over the period 1971-75 was the lowest for 20 years. 
(Politika, 20 February 1976, p.7.) In the first two 
months of 1976, the number employed in industry was up by 
3.7% over the same period in 1975, whilst the physical 
output of industry had increased by only 2.1% (Politika,
5 May 1976, p.8).
51 These matters will be discussed and documented in greater 
detail in 5.c, below.
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employment policy are thus likely to remain for some time 
yet.
In the official approach to employment problems,
as intimated earlier, there has been a certain regression
towards expanding employment even at the risk of thereby
lowering productivity and wages, and adding to the inflationary
and liquidity problems that have been dogging the economy
since well before the post-1973 recession in Western Europe.
But in labour policy, as in many other fields of government
action, there are clear signs of a compromise between
irreconcilable opposites, of gaping chasms thinly papered
52over. Though the 'liberal Westernizers' have suffered 
something of an eclipse since 1972, their 'technocratic' 
orientation continues to be influential. At the same time, 
the 'Partisan' element, while re-emerging strongly over the
52 Labels like 'Westernizers', 'technocrats' or 'Partisans' 
are obviously unable to totally encapsulate the truth, 
though they contain an important element of it. Their 
use does not imply a belief that they explain everything. 
In the sphere of labour policy, for example, it is 
interesting to note that the Trade Unions favour 
'technocratic' policies: i.e., would prefer to see
productivity and real wages increasing more rapidly than 
employment. Speaking at the VII Trade Union Congress 
in December 1974, the former Yugoslav Premier and current 
president of the Yugoslav Trade Union Federation, Mika 
Spiljak, said that 'the trade unions cannot support a 
policy of higher employment at all costs, particularly not 
if this would have the effect of slowing down growth in 
productivity and wages'. (Kommunist, 23 December 1974, 
p.12) See also VUS, 20 March 1976, p.9. For a Polish 
contrast, cf. Ch.4, footnote 36, above.
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same period, has not achieved a fully dominant position.
In employment policy, the uneasy balance between these two
conflicting tendencies seems to take the form of an incongruous
mingling of sober 'technocratic' employment plans with
54either swashbuckling 'Partisan' rhetoric or plain 
55obfuscation. The plans are set at modest and realizable 
levels, but extravagant claims are sometimes made about 
the capacity of the economy (and indeed, of those modest 
plans) to absorb Yugoslavia's various accumulations of 
surplus labour power. And there is evidence that many
enterprises are subjected to extra-economic pressures to
, 56take on more workers than they can effectively utilize.
53 Conventional as the term 'Partisan' may be in some 
measure, any scrutiny of biographical sketches of new 
appointees to official positions bears out its strong 
empirical content. I have not seen a detailed analysis of 
partisan representation before and after 1971, but the 
impression of growing Partisan strength (at a time when 
demographic factors might lead one rather to expect a 
weakening) seems to be a general one among observers.
See, for example, the remarks by F. Singleton in Soviet 
Studies, vol.XVIII, no.3 (July 1976), p.463.
54 The martial terminology of the post-war years has been
greatly revived since 1972, and is applied, among other 
places, on the employment 'front'. See, e.g., 'Bitka za
zaposljavanje mladih' (Battle for the Employment of the 
Young), Borba, 20 September 1974.
55 Examples could be cited at length. One particularly 
egregious instance is to be found in an article produced 
for external consumption which speaks throughout of 
Yugoslavia's deep-seated and secularly worsening unemployment 
as 'temporary' unemployment. 'Employment and Temporary 
Unemployment', Yugoslav Survey, 1974, no.2, p.l.
56 Thereby, of course, contributing to swelling employment
above the planned levels. See, e.g., Politika, 20 
February 1976, p.7.
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The current five-year plan to 1980 (srednjoro^ni
plan) envisages an increase in employment in the non-rural
sector of almost one million, with an annual increase
of employment in the socialized sector of 3.5%, or about 
57180,000. Given that the annual increments in 1974 and 1975 
have been well above that, this seems a reasonable objective 
and one which may possible not prove beyond the economy's 
capacity to absorb without generating inefficiency. But 
ostensibly the authorities believe that magnitudes like these 
will be sufficient to reduce existing unemployment, provide 
work for large numbers of workers returning from abroad, 
soak up the continuing inflow of peasants into the towns, 
and also absorb the natural increase in the work-age 
population.^
This seems to be a case either of misty and wishful 
thinking or disingenuous propaganda. To begin with, the
57 Politika, 21 May 1976, p.12.
58 For examples of apparently quite unrealistic optimism, 
see 'Znacajni izgledi za zapo¥ljavanje povratnika', 
Politika, 7 August 1976; 'Employment and Temporary 
Unemployment', Yugoslav Survey, 1974, no.2, p.l, at p.21. 
The Politika article claims to foresee jobs being available 
for 400,000 returnees by 1980. Among other confusions,
it appears to assume that natural wastage creates a store 
of new jobs (rather than being outweighed by a greater 
influx of school-leavers). An article on the Croatian 
draft five-year plan to 1980 in Borba, 4 January 1975 
claims that 180,000 new jobs will be created by 1980 in 
the republic, and that this will suffice to halve 
unemployment (then 54,000), and also employ 100,000 
returnees. This calculation would leave 53,000 jobs 
spread over five years to absorb natural increase and 
increased numbers of women and peasants seeking urban 
employment.
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Yugoslav economy has a pool of over 600,000 domestic
unemployed that has to be drained off. As was remarked
59earlier, this total has been growing in recent years,
despite the high employment increments. While this may be
6 0due in part to statistical anomalies, the trend cannot be 
reassuring; nor are there any obvious reasons why it should 
suddenly be reversed. Then there is the pool of exported 
unemployment, the privremeno zaposleni u inostranstvu 
(temporarily employed abroad), now becoming more familiar by 
their new name of povratnici (returnees). While there is 
evidence that only a surprisingly small proportion of the 
returnees are at present seeking employment in the socizlised 
sector,61 this seems likely to change. Given the high 
unemployment and (for them) the relatively low wages 
prevailing in their homeland, the possible prejudice against
59 The trend is still continuing. A recent report gave the 
figure of registered unemployed as 650,000. VUS, 5 June 
1976, p.15. See also 'Vise zaposlenih, ali i onih koji 
tra¥e posao', Politika, 5 May 1976.
60 Politika, 16 May 1976, p.7, reports a Dimitrovgrad survey 
which found that of 1,189 registered unemployed in that 
area, only 160 were 'really' out of work. NIN, 22 December 
1974, p.10, refers to a proportion of the registered 
unemployed who 'pray to God not to give them work'.
The article cited in the preceding footnote (VUS, 5 June 
1976) concedes that unemployment statistics may be a 
little inflated, but rejects suggestions that categories 
like housewives, students, owners of property, specialists 
reluctant to move to another town, etc., should be automatically removed from the registers.
61 NIN, 28 December 1975, p.8, reports an estimate that 
two-thirds of the returnees are not seeking work in the 
socialized sector of the economy.
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them on the part of employers, and their natural desire 
to enjoy a period of leisure financed by their savings 
abroad, it is quite likely that some returnees will choose 
to make a pause before seeking work in Yugoslavia. There 
may be a delayed deluge awaiting Yugoslav employment offices.
Annual increments in the population of working
age, while starting to diminish,are still quite high.
Official estimates of the increase in the work force in the
forthcoming period are, in the light of this, surprisingly
6 3low, and may be an underestimate. Moreover, given that
62 Given the difficulties on the labour market, it would 
be understandable if unemployed resident Yugoslavs were
to resent the returnees, and harassed firms were to resist 
pressures on them to take on returnees on any kind of 
quota basis. Such resentments sometimes find reflection 
in Federal Assembly debates and seem very likely to affect 
grass-roots decision-making. See Politika, 10 October 
1975, p.7, and 22 April 1976, p.8.
63 The draft long-term plan (dugoro^ni plan) for the ten-year 
period to 1985 speaks of a growth in the work-age population 
of 0.9% per annum, and in the economically active population 
of 0.6% per annum, or a total in absolute terms of 660,000.
(Borba, 26 October 1974, supplement page XIV). An analysis 
published in 1969 (when most of the relevant demographic 
magnitudes were already definitely known) suggested an 
increase in the economically active population over the 
same period of 865,000 (even assuming a decline in the 
work-force participation rate). D. Breznik, 'Demografski 
i drugi aspekti formiranja radne snage u Jugoslaviji 
za narednih 20 godina', Ekonomist, 1969, no.l, p.131 
at pp.139-40. Breznik expected the total increase in 
work-age population between 1976 and 1981 to be 866,000, 
and in the economically-active population over the same 
period to be 460,000. Current estimates of a 300,000 
increase in the numbers of economically active over the 
five-year period 1976-80 (Politika, 7 August 1976) 
therefore seem wishfully modest, particularly given the 
apparent conservatism of Breznik's assumptions about 
work-force participation. These calculations do not, in 
any case, give any very clear advance insight into what may 
happen on urban labour markets, where trends in peasant 
agriculture and urban female employment are crucial.
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the proportion of females in the urban labour force in 
Yugoslavia is still a good deal lower than in other Socialist
countries, and given that the existing trend is towards
64 65increase fend that official policy endorses this trend),
one can expect further pressures to come from this source
also. Estimate of the labour surplus in Yugoslav agriculture
vary. A semi-official figure of 1.3 million was mentioned
earlier for 1973 (together with the opinion that it was by
then already too low). Another estimate, based on different
6 6and more demanding criteria, puts it at 5.5 million.
In any event, it is clear that with 38% of the active 
population still engaged in agriculture, the pressure of 
peasants on the urban labour market is not going to diminish 
for some decades yet. Puljiz has estimated that the 
agricultural population is 'deruralizing' at the rate of a
64 In 1961, women comprised 26.4% of all (non-rural) 
employees; by 1971, they made up 31.7%. In this respect, 
Slovenia and Croatia may serve as indicators of future 
trends in Yugoslavia as a whole. In 1971, 42.4% of all 
employees in Slovenia and 36.2% of all employees in 
Croatia were women (and the percentages were still rising). 
'Employment and Temporary Unemployment', Yugoslav Survey 
1974, no.2, p.l at pp.13-14.
65 The Resolutions of the Tenth Congress of the League of 
Communists of Yugoslavia (published as a supplement to 
Komunist, 3 June 1974) emphasize that equal work 
opportunities must be guaranteed. Discrimination on the 
basis of sex is evidently not uncommon, but official 
publications always deplore the practice. See 'Posao
za ¥ene', Borba, 18 January 1975.
66 B. Jovetic, 'Sta s mladima na selu', Kommunist, 25 
December 1969, tr. in Osteuropa, 1970, no.11, p.A816 at 
A817. Jovetic's estimate was made 'from the point of 
view of modern agriculture* .
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quarter of a million a year. Even if only half of these
people were seeking urban employment, that would be sufficient,
together with the natural increase in work-age population,
to fully dispose of the planned increase in employment in
6 8the socialized sector to 1980. What then of the existing 
unemployed and the returnees? Or the existing labour 
surpluses in some enterprises?69
From these considerations it emerges clearly,
70that official hopes notwithstanding, the next years will
67 V. Puljiz, 'O socijalnom i jos nekim srodnim problemima 
poljoprivrednog i seoskog stanovniKtva', NaKe teme 1973 
no.10, p.1669 at p.1672.
68 Half seems a conservative estimate given overall activity 
rates and the fact that most such peasants are young 
adults. Politika, 7 August 1976, cites a figure of 
'about 300,000' peasants who will seek urban employment 
in the five-year period to 1980, whilst VUS, 20 March 
1976, p.9, suggests it may be 'about 400,000' . Both of 
these estimates seem well below the kind of figure Puljiz's 
data would lead one to expect. From this it is evident 
that official hopes rest also on certain optimistic 
assumptions about developments in agriculture.
69 Politika, 20 February 1976, p.7, reported a statement 
by a delegate to the Federal Assembly to the effect 
that 'there are not a few enterprises where there are up 
to 20% more workers than is necessary'.
70 It should be emphasized that not all spokesmen are 
determinedly optimistic. The nearer they are to the 
government (the Federal Executive Council) the more 
sober they are. Replying to a Macedonian criticism of 
the Federal Executive Council's employment plans for
1976 as being too modest, a Council spokesman said that he 
was not sure how the economy would survive even a 2.5% 
increase in employment, which, he said, was itself not 
economically justified in present conditions. Politika,
10 October 1975, p.7.
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not bring any significant reduction in the Yugoslav reserve 
armies of unemployed - unless of course the orientation figures 
of the plan are tacitly ignored and an all-out attempt is 
made to extend employment at the cost of all else. Not only
will unemployment not decline, it seems likely, in fact, that
71it will continue to increase, quite possibly alongside and 
despite above-plan employment increments. With the employment 
bubble of the mid-1960s returning to plague them, Yugoslav 
policy-makers have limited freedom of manoeuvre. The only 
way open to them to solve the unemployment problem comprehensively 
is to abolish it, or at least, to radically redefine it.
There are signs that some moves in that direction may be
72being longingly contemplated. Other more substantive 
measures are also under consideration. As many of these 
latter closely relate to the position of the 'returnees' 
in Yugoslav society, I shall defer fuller discussion of them 
to the next section.
71 Like the trend towards excessive unemployment (cf. footnote 
59 above), the trend towards excessive employment seems
to be still moving inexorably forward. In the first 
quarter of 1976, despite the Federal Executive Council's 
plans (cf. previous footnote), employment increased by 
4.7% over the first three months of 1975. 'Preko plana -
i zaposlenih i nezaposlenih', Borba, 5 May 1976, p.6.
72 The burden of maintaining unemployment benefits is 
naturally felt to be greater in the less developed 
republics. Kosovo appears to solve its problem by simply 
not providing the benefits. Of the 32,879 registered 
unemployed in Kosovo in 1970, only 6% were receiving 
cash unemployment benefits, and only 20.5% were covered
by health insurance. M. Karan, op.cit., p.13. In Macedonia 
it is proposed to remove certain categories of unemployed 
from the registers, as not all qualify as 'really unemployed' 
and some have other sources of income or support. (Politika, 
9 March 1976, p.9). Slovenia and Croatia can better afford 
a liberal approach to these problems. Cf. footnote 60, 
above.
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The Yugoslav authorities are in an unenviable
position. Their labour force embarrassment must be an
important factor in orienting them towards seeking some kind
of trading accommodation with the Comecon/Warsaw Pact
countries: for investment funds to finance labour-soaking
73projects at home; for secure markets for the products
of their less viable industries and future extensive growth
(which products are difficult to dispose of on competitive
Western markets); and possibly even as alternative homes
74for Yugoslavia's inhospitably treated 'guest workers'.
73 During the period of Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement in 
1972, the USSR undertook to supply nearly 1,000 million 
dollars in credits. Difficulties arose subsequently 
over the implementation of this agreement, however. One 
outside observer recently assessed that 'very little 
indeed' of the credits had actually been realized.
S. Stankovic, 'Yugoslav Foreign Minister Visiting Moscow', 
Radio Free Europe Research RAD Background Report 1171 
(Yugoslavia), 8 December 1975.
74 There are some 8,000 Yugoslav workers employed in 
Czechoslovakia. For the moment all are employed by 
Yugoslav firms. Negotiations to enable Yugoslavs to be 
engaged by Czech firms have been dragging on since 1972.
VUS za na¥e gradjane u svijetu, 13 August 1975, p.21, 
reported that an agreement was about to be signed, but it 
appears to have been held up since. In the meantime, 
complaints have been expressed in the Yugoslav press
about the manner in which Yugoslav workers in Czechoslovakia 
have been treated when 'hired out' to Czech firms (Politika, 
13 July 1976, p.8). Large-scale employment of Yugoslav 
workers by Soviet-bloc firms does not seem imminent, 
though prospects for Yugoslav firms to take contracts 
in Comecon countries and import their own workers with 
them may be a little better. (See the two articles 
subtitled 'Migracije u Istocnoj Europi' in VUS za na¥e 
gradjane u svijetu, 5 and 12 March 1975). The marked 
cooling of relations with Moscow since late 1975 will 
certainly not help to overcome the serious obstacles 
that stand in the path of increased co-operation in 
this field.
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The labour surplus must also tend to favour
reconciliation with the forces of state socialism at the
domestic level. All the other European Socialist states,
whatever periodic misgivings they may have about Soviet-
style extensive development, with its high employment and
low efficiency, are at least spared the worry of high overt
unemployment. Indeed, all are now afflicted in some measure
or other by labour shortages. Yugoslavia is unlikely to
75reach this luxurious stage for decades yet. Before they
do, they are bound to feel at least an occasional twinge
of ambivalence about their neighbours' labour policies.
During the reform period, from 1965 to 1971, their rejection
7 6of the state Socialist model was unequivocal. Even critics
of the government's employment policies did not go so far as
to laud the Soviet alternative. Economic rationalism is
still perhaps the dominant accent in the official position,
despite the resurgence of political employment in the last
77two or three years. But the ambivalence is clearly 
detectable; and the reasons for it not difficult to understand.
75 There are of course local labour shortages in Yugoslavia, 
and shortages of particular skills. Slovenia, however, 
is the only republic which has been experiencing an 
overall labour shortage. See 'Pomanjkanje radne snage', 
VUS za nase gradjane u svijetu, 3 April 1974. Cf. 
footnote 88, below.
76 A. Milojevic and V. Sultanovic in 'Zaposljavanje u 
inostranstvu ', Pregled, 1972, no.l, p.33, for example, 
refer to the 'inherent political and economic weaknesses' 
of state socialism, and suggest that if there were to be 
a liberalization of its economic system, 'very powerful 
migratory movements' might be unleashed, which would 
bring with them 'very deep political and economic 
implications' (p.35).
77 Cf. footnote 70, above.
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For Yugoslavia's labour surplus is more than just 
a dilemma of economic management. It is a continuing threat 
to the stability, and indeed to the very survival of the regime. 
Now that Western Europe has decisively closed its doors to 
new immigrant workers and is even seeking to rid itself of 
many of those it has already accepted, Yugoslavia must solve 
the problem (made the worse by having been temporarily and 
partially shelved) with its own resources. There will be at 
least a nervous decade or two in which those resources are 
quite simply unequal to the task. This would be a testing time 
for any polity. But for the Yugoslav regime, fighting to 
maintain its independence between indifference and hostility, 
striving to placate the fissiparous passions of its turbulent 
nationalisms, and at the same time endeavouring to implement 
various ambitious social experiments, the task will be 
incomparably more difficult.
Reconciliation with Moscow and a relapse into state 
socialism would obviously be a defeat. But it would be a 
defeat which would bring relief from external pressure and 
an opportunity to soak up (or more efficiently repress) 
pockets of unemployed discontent at home. Perhaps, some 
Yugoslavs might argue, the defeat could be negotiated rather 
than imposed, in a way that would permit at least symbolic 
retention of national pride and independence, and avoid any 
threat of imposed territorial revision. Such considerations 
as these may seem a far cry from a choice between annual 
employment increments of 2^% and 5%. But the Yugoslav political 
economy is preeminently a system where tout se tient.
For the moment, Yugoslavia is pursuing its usual 
policy of walking on both legs, placing less weight on the 
Western leg than in 1965-72, but favouring it nonetheless.
While 'struggling' to absorb its rationally unabsorbables, and 
seeking, at the same time, to extend its trading contacts 
with the Comecon countries, it is also continuing its efforts 
to integrate its economy into the tougher league of non-Socialist 
trade. To do this, Yugoslavia must maintain high standards of 
efficiency; neither its labour force, nor its markets, nor
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its currency are shielded by the protectionism of the Comecon
7 8system. The Soviet vices of 'levelling' (uravnilovka),
79slackness (nerad), low wages and low productivity make it 
more difficult for Yugoslavia to find a place in the 
international division of labour (ukljuHiti se u medjunarodnu 
podelu rada). Unfortunately, however, not all Yugoslav 
industries and not all Yugoslav regions are ready for sharp 
international competition. Many could feel drawn by the 
relative tranquility and assured exchange of Comecon. Some 
might prefer the relative comfort there as a long-term 
proposition. Among other things, it could provide them with 
a way of easing the growing burden of their labour surpluses.
Here, as in so many other respects, Yugoslavia is 
split asunder by a dilemma stemming ultimately from the fact 
that some parts of the country belong to the developed European 
West, while others belong more naturally to the European East, 
and others again to the Third World. Though the discussion 
thus far has been couched in overall, national terms, in fact 
the regional aspect of the manpower problem is one of the 
most sensitive and the most crucial; and one which is likely 
to linger on when, in the developed areas, the employment 
bubble caused by the high fertility of the post-war years
78 There seems to have been over the years a long-term trend 
towards greater uravnilovka in wages. In 1955, unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers received 50% of the average 
wage, whereas by 1974, they received 75%. (Politika,
11 October 1975, p.9). During the reform period 1965-71, 
some attempt was made to counteract levelling tendencies.
It was not evidently very successful. Though the post-1971 
official mood has been again more egalitarian, articles 
deploring uravnilovka are still appearing regularly in 
the press. See, e.g., 'Jednakost sa viKe lica', NIN,
7 March 1976, p.14. Komunist, 29 April 1974, has an 
article deploring uravnilovka on one page and a second 
article on another page calling for the establishment 
of 'worker majorities' in Leage of Communists organizations. 
Here, too, authority speaks with two voices.
79 'Nerad na udaru', NIN, 26 October 1975, p.7.
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has become no more than a distant memory. Slovenia, as we
have said, is the only republic which, taken as a whole, can
complain of a labour shortage. Elsewhere there is a surplus,
though in the case of Croatia, Vojvodina and Serbia proper,
it is an accumulated surplus of rural overpopulation and urban
unemployment (both hidden and overt, resident and exported), not
one which is being actively increased all the time by natural
8 0increase in the work force. In that sense it can be said
that the urban economies of those regions are starting to
gain on their objectives of full and rational employment,
though the aggravation of returning economic emigrants may
effectively conceal this for a good decade or more yet. In the
less developed areas, however, natural increase is continuing
81to nullify the gains made by urban employment. In Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, Montenegro and parts of Macedonia, some improvement 
in this respect can be expected, but in the Albanian areas of 
Kosovo and Western Macedonia, no significant easing of the 
demographic pressures can be expected for at least two decades. 
And in all the less developed regions, the accumulated gap 
between employment aspirations and possibilities is very serious. 
Very rapid expansion of urban job opportunities is necessary 
if rural underemployment and massive and overt urban unemployment
80 In 1972, the Croatian and inner Serbian socialized 
economies employed the equivalent of 3h and 5 annual 
natural increments in the work force. M. Milenovic7,
'Neke karakteristike zaposlenosti i zapoMljavanja u 1972 
godini' , Socijalna politika, 1973, no.4, p.17.
81 For the years 1971-76, Breznik calculated that Bosnia 
and Hercegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo, which comprise 
32.4% of the total population would contribute over 
two-thirds of the natural growth in the economically 
active population. D. Breznik, 'Demografska komponenta 
razvojne politike' at p.422. The vulgar fractions
have been added to Breznik's computations. In Bosnia and 
Hercegovina and Kosovo, in 1972, employment increments 
in the non-rural economy of 4.7 and 7.5% respectively 
were still not equivalent to the natural increase in the 
economically active population (to say nothing of 
technological and accumulated labour surpluses of various 
kinds). M. Milenovic, loc.cit.
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8 2are to be relieved. The only alternative to this would be 
to facilitate mass emigration from the less developed areas 
to the developed north of Yugoslavia or beyond.
While there has been some international emigration
from the less developed republics, the outflow from the more
developed regions, particularly in the earlier years, was
proportionately much greater. The Albanians and Bosnian
Moslems (like the Moslem peoples of Soviet Central Asia)
8 3seemed particularly reluctant to leave their homelands.
Just as this unfavourable regional distribution of emigration
84began to alter in the early 1970s, external restraints were 
imposed on the process, first freezing it at a less than optimal 
stage in its evolution, and then reversing it. Since Western 
European countries are seeking on the whole to shed their
82 On rural underemployment, see notes 23 and 66 above.
The urban unemployment rates of the less developed 
republics are naturally higher than elsewhere, not only 
because of the greater demographic pressures, but also because of the modest dimensions of their non-rural 
economies, whose slender absorptive capacities can be
the more easily overwhelmed. Thus in Albania and Macedonia/ 
registered unemployment comprises roughly 30% of the total number of employed in the non-rural economy (see Tablel2, 
since when the situation has surely deteriorated). Even these figures may underestimate the real dimensions of 
urban unemployment. Cf. footnote 72, above.
83 A Croatian estimate made in 1968 put the joint Croatian 
and Slovenian contribution to the emigration at 69% (cf. 
30.3% of the total population as of 1971), and the combined 
Moslem-'Yugoslav'-Albanian contribution at 4.1% (cf. the 
14.8% of the population constituted by Albanians and 
Moslems in 1971). All Yugoslav emigration data are 
unsatisfactory, and the estimates circulating in the 1960s 
were perhaps particularly so, but there clearly was a 
major disproportion in the ethnic composition of that 
earlier emigration. See Z. Komarica, Jugoslavija u 
suvremenim evropskim migracijama (Zagreb, 19 70) , p720.
84 The 1971 Census data on Yugoslav workers abroad (see 
Table 6) suggest a marked rectification of the ethnic 
distribution of emigrants had occurred by that time.
It should be remembered, however, that the Census figures 
are of limited reliability. They may well understate 
the older emigration (which was heavily Croatian).
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more recent and less skilled immigrant workers it is likely 
that the less developed regions will bear a disproportionate 
burden of the return flow. Their slender economies, which 
needed the relief of emigration more in the first place, are
o ccorrespondingly less able to deal with the remigration.
In the case of inter-regional migration within
Yugoslavia, the barriers are less formal, but not necessarily
less formidable. The Yugoslav Constitution guarantees the
right of all Yugoslav citizens to settle in any part of the
8 6country they wish. And while, until recently, there 
appears not to have been an explicit policy on internal 
migration, the one that is emerging at the federal level 
favours movement of workers from labour surplus to labour 
deficit areas within the country. There are in any case no
85 A report on a Federal Assembly debate on the returnees
in Politika, 1 April 1976, p.6, says that: 'Yesterday's
discussion again showed that the problem of people 
returning from working abroad is bearing down on the 
undeveloped regions particularly severely.'
86 Article 183 of the 1974 Constitution prescribes that the 
citizen's freedom of movement and settlement anywhere in 
Yugoslavia can be limited only in criminal cases, epidemic 
emergencies, and 'in order to protect public order or
in the interests of national defence'. Ustav Socijalisti^ke 
Federativne Republike Jugoslavije (Belgrade, 1974).
87 A conference on internal migration policy was held in 
Pri¥tina in 1972 (for a report, see M. Rancid, 'Problemi 
usmeravanja radne snage', Stanovni¥tvo X (1972), no. 1-2, 
p.115). At this stage it was evident that a federal policy 
on the matter was only in the process of being worked
out. It is likely to be a controversial issue. Should 
migration from less developed to more developed regions 
be encouraged, or would it be better to increase the flow 
of capital to the less developed regions? What should 
be the relationship between migration policy and other 
population policies? By what means can migratory flows 
be legitimately and efficaciously controlled and directed? 
Whatever federal policies are adopted, republican 
resistance or the pressure of events may in any case 
subvert them. Unfortunately, considerations of space 
preclude further discussion of this interesting theme. For 
what is probably a fairly official, federal, view, see 
M. Jeli&id, 'Neki aktuelni problemi unutraSnje migracije 
radnika', Socijalna politika, 1973, no.l, p.18. See also 
Migracije stanovnigtva Jugoslavije, Ch.VII.
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regulations in Yugoslavia resembling the internal passport
and restricted urban residence systems that have been
maintained in the Soviet bloc countries. Despite all this,
however, there are strong countervailing pressures against
complete freedom of movement within Yugoslavia. Given that
unemployment is endemic to the whole country, no republican
or lower-level authorities will want to import other people's
problems to compound their own. Ethnic resentments may
operate to deter outsiders at every level, from administrative
and enterprise decision-making to inter-personal relations.
In the case of immigrants to Slovenia or emigrants from
Kosovo, there may be linguistic problems. Published literature
contains clear evidence of reluctance on the part of the
more developed republics to receive large numbers of workers
from less developed areas (where skills and general cultural
8 8levels are much lower); and of resentment on the part of 
the authorities in high-fertility areas at the less than 
generous cooperation they receive from the better-off regions
88 See, e.g., A. Wertheimer-Baletic^, ' Populaciona politika 
i politika radne snage', NaMe teme, 1974, no.4, p.578.
In this article, as elsewhere, the author develops the 
argument that the low birth rate in Croatia over recent 
years will bring about a serious labour shortage in the 
near future, and that the way to correct this is to 
increase the Croatian birth rate as quickly as possible. 
There is here an implicit premise that such labour 
shortages could not, or should not, be replaced by 
surplus labour from elsewhere in the country (for which 
premise the author was gently rebuked by Macura, who 
pointed out that she was overlooking the internal 
migration factor. M. Macura, 'Komponente populacione 
politike', p.563. See also J. Lojk, 'Postojeca
struktura rada u SR Sloveniji ogranicavajuce deluje 
na medju repub li<*ko zaposljavanje' (The existing structure 
of labour in Slovenia limits the possibilities of inter­
republican employment), Socijalna politika, 1973, no.l, 
p.21, in which the author deplores the excessive rates 
of increase in employment in Slovenia in 1971 and 1972 
as leading to extensive and inefficient development.
In Slovenia, write Lojk, 'where for some time now there 
have been periodic labour shortages, employment policy 
cannot be conducted extensively.' The implication is, 
of course, that Slovenia cannot accept the labour surpluses 
of other republics.
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in their attempts to find work for their swelling labour 
89forces. Reliable sources suggest that behind the scenes,
the Constitutional provisions about freedom of movement and
90settlement are apt at times to be sidestepped.
It may be just as well from the regime's own point 
of view that they are. For while this may mean that labour 
surpluses get bottled up in the least developed regions, 
leading to accentuated urban unemployment, rural overpopulation, 
a widening in the development gap between the regions, and 
possibly to acute local unrest - in other words, to a typical 
complex of Third World problems - any solution which sought to 
enforce mingling between peoples of such sharply divergent 
standards and traditions might well lead to a marked worsening 
of ethnic relations.
The development problem facing the less developed 
regions of Yugoslavia is a daunting, if familiar one. Their 
rapid population growth is, of course, a crucial factor 
impeding their efforts, forcing them to sprint desperately 
after an ever-receding target. In the areas where population 
growth has fallen away, by contrast, improvements in terms 
of per capita economic indicators are much more easily 
attained. Despite very considerable politically-motivated
89 See, e.g., the account in Komunist, 7 July 1975, p.ll, 
of a meeting of the Kosovo Presidium of the Socialist 
Alliance, which says that 'a large proportion' of Kosovo's 
unemployed will not be able to find work in the province, 
and reports that 'it is thought that more could be done
in this country to provide work for people from Kosovo in 
other republics'.
90 A reliable source indicated to the author that would-be 
immigrants from the less developed regions of Yugoslavia 
arriving in Slovenia without guarantees of employment 
are given a meal and a bed for the night, and are then 
sent home again.
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capital flows from the more developed to the less developed
regions in the post-war period, the development gap per capita
91has not narrowed, but widened. It is a situation in which
everyone tends to feel resentful: the poorer regions because
they are falling behind; and the richer regions because
they are required to pour money down a sink of low productivity/
where advances are in any case nullified by excess population 
92growth.
The demogenic problems of Yugoslav labour, migration 
and development policies have a certain similarity to those 
confronting the Soviet Union; and even to those confronting 
Poland in the 1960s and 1970s with its high work-force 
increments and its occasional agonizing between the apparent 
alternatives of full or rational employment. But the strategic 
approach that the Yugoslav regime has taken has meant that 
the problems present themselves in a much more overt, and 
politically, perhaps, more acute form. The Yugoslav strategy
91 The Yugoslav press frequently discusses and/or deplores 
the growing development gap between the different regions 
of Yugoslavia, and data relating to it (unlike in the USSR) 
are not scarce. Between 1947 and 1972, the ratio between 
highest and lowest income per head increased from 3.14:1
to 5.71:1 (in absolute terms from 1,986 dinars to 
10,288 dinars). It was the four less developed regions, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina and Montenegro 
which recorded the slowest per capita growth rates over 
that period. 'Regionalni razvoj i diferencijacije',
Borba, 29 September 1974.
92 Cf. footnotes 165, 263, below. While spokesmen from the 
wealthier and poorer regions agree that the development 
gap is regrettable and ought to be struggled with, their 
diagnoses and recommended therapies differ. Ethno- 
regional disputes over such issues seem to have survived 
the crack-down on nationalist extremisms of 1971-72.
Both the 1976 plan and the 1976-80 plan ran into major 
difficulties because of differences between the republics 
and provinces. See, e.g., Politika, 26 December 1975, 
p.l; and 11, 12, 16 and 18 March 1976.
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makes it unlikely that a stage will be reached in the near 
future in which a pro-natalist policy will seem to many an 
economic necessity. Nor is it likely that through systemic 
and systematic squandering labour will become such a scarce 
resource that the temptation will be felt to bind it to its 
tasks by increasingly severe labour laws. Thus in Yugoslavia, 
the two main threats to private autonomy posed by the politico- 
demographic dilemmas of state socialism simply do not obtain. 
Slovenia is the only area of Yugoslavia in which such problems 
seem at all relevant. And Slovenia (as subsequent discussion 
will illustrate) seems immune to the dangers.
5.c Emigration
Yugoslavia is unique among Socialist states in 
tolerating emigration. Indeed, for a number of years, it 
not only tolerated emigration, but fostered it; and planned 
its socio-economic development on the implicit assumption 
that for the foreseeable future, the outflow of surplus 
labour might continue. Even before the economic reforms of 
the mid-1960s the Yugoslav regime was relatively relaxed 
about admitting to some domestic unemployment and did not 
strain to sop it up by paternalistic employment policies.
It also tolerated, though it did not actively encourage, a 
certain amount of economic emigration. The vehemence of the
93 There was some legal non-economic emigration of national 
minorities (especially Turks), in the 1950s and early 
1960s: between 1953 and 1961 (inclusive), a total of
just under 300,000 people were officially recorded as 
leaving Yugoslavia. Since that time, official emigration 
has only topped 10,000 in one year, and in recent years 
the registered numbers have been derisory. (See Demografska 
statistika 1972, p.29). Even before 1965, however, the 
official external migration figures were falling short of 
reality. One source cites an annual figure of 6,600 for unofficial economic emigration from Slovenia alone between
1953 and 1961 (Franci Stare, 'Nekateri pogledi na problematiko 
zaposlovanja na¥ih delavcev v tujini', Ekonomska revija 
1969, no.l, p.81 at p.82). An estimate for Yugoslavia as 
a whole gives the shortfall between official and actual 
net emigration between 1953 and 1961 as averaging somewhere 
between 12 and 17 thousand yearly (Migracije stanovni¥tva 
Jugoslavije, p.86, footnote 19).
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exodus after 1965 appears to have taken the leadership by
surprise, however. It had little in the way of a prepared
94policy to deal with the problem when it arose. The initial
attitude seems to have been one of passive connivance coupled
9 5with a slight, lingering disapproval of those who left.
In the first years no attempt was made to gather adequate
statistics (and they are still not good). Similarly, little
effort was expended on maintaining contact with the emigrants
and seeking to influence their behaviour in the interests of
9 6their former country. It was only after the phenomenon had 
already attained massive proportions that official complaisance 
was disturbed. Even then, the response was lethargic, despite 
the energetic campaigns of alarm conducted by scholars and 
publicists, often moved by fears for the survival of their 
own ethnic communities.
94 At the beginning of 1965, the year after legal economic 
emigration began, Yugoslavia had still not signed agreements 
with any recipient countries concerning the legal
status and social security of its citizens. (M. Begtid, 
'Yugoslav Nationals Temporarily Working Abroad', Yugoslav 
Survey, 1972, no.l, p.17, note 1). Supplementary 
schooling for migrant children abroad was not organized 
until 1970 (Politika, 19 December 1975, p.9). Only 
two fortnightly publications were being produced for the 
emigrants as of 1969 (Franci Stare, op.cit., p.94). 
Improvement since has been only relative. Cf. notes 96,
110 and 156, below.
95 See, e.g., Z. Komarica, Jugoslavija u suvremenim evropskim 
migracijama, pp. 103-04 .
96 Cf. note 94, above. Komarica, writing in 1970, drew 
attention to the enormous disparity between the tiny 
number of official Yugoslav social centres for migrants 
and those provided by international religious agencies 
for the (Catholic) Croats alone. Komarica, op,cit.,
p.111.
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The most emphatic public criticism came from the
9 7Croats (and in lesser measure, the Slovenes). At first
Croatian concern was thinly veiled in the form of a
disinterested concern about Croatia's capacity to contribute
to overall Yugoslav development. Later, in the climactic years
1970-71 it became more and more openly nationalistic.^ It
should be emphasized that there was a great deal of foundation
for the Croats' anxiety. The statistics on emigration were
and are, as mentioned, quite inadequate. But it was clear that
Croatia's and the Croats' contribution to the outflow was
disproportionate. While forming little more than one-fifth
of the Yugoslav population, the Croats were thought to constitute
99somewhere between 40% and 65% of the emigrants. Moreover, the
97 The Slovenes' share of the earlier emigration was also
markedly disproportionate (running at between one-third 
and one-fifth of the total in 1964 to 1967), Franci Stare, 
op.cit., p.83. See also F. KoYul, 'Po kateri poti',
Na£i razgledi, 1970, no.17 (11 September), p.499; and 
kT Boh, 'Populacijski problemi v o¥eh slovenskih 
izobraYencev in druYbenih delavcev', paper presented to 
the 1974 Slovenian Demographic Symposium.
98 Nearly all the serious work on economic emigration being 
done in the late 1960s and early 1970s was Croatian. See, 
e.g., V. Komarica, op.cit.; V. Holjevac, Hrvati izvan
domovine (Zagreb, I960); I. BauYid and Z. Maravid,
Vrac^anje i zapoSljavanje vanjskih migranata iz SR Hrvatske 
(Zagreb, 1971); and Stanovnitffevo: emigracija i zaposlenost 
u Hrvatskoj (Zagreb, 1971). By 1970-71, the popular 
Croatian press was spelling out the message of Croatian 
demographers and economists in clear and forceful terms.
See, e.g., 'BioloSkom osiroma&ivanju pridonijela je i 
ekonomska emigracija' (Economic Emigration has also 
Contributed to our Biological Impoverishment), VUS, 18 
February, 1970 ; and 'Sve o popisu', Vjesnik, 27 March 
1971, Croatian researchers into emigration evidently 
received little sympathy or support from federal statistical 
authorities. (See '800 tisuca ili milijun radnika u 
inozemstvu?', VUS, 10 March 1971.)
99 Komarica cites one study done in 1966 which suggested that 
63% of the migrants might be ethnic Croats (while himself 
placing the figure at 54%). Komarica, op.cit., p.19, 20.
The 1971 Census result implied that only 3^% of the emigrant 
were Croats. The Census figure, however, was certainly an 
understatementof emigration in general, and Croatian 
emigration in particular (either in the sense of emigration 
of ethnic Croats or emigration from the Croatian Republic). 
Cf. footnotes 83 and 104.
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great bulk of the emigrants were under the age of 45,^^
so that the demographic effects of their departure, assuming
that many of them would never return, would be twofold. The
loss of the workers themselves might be compounded by the
loss of their progeny or their reproductive capacity.
And this was occurring at a time when Croatia's fertility
102had already dropped well below replacement levels.
Altogether, as initial research revealed, the emigration
was producing a host of unexpected consequences. Not only
10 3were too many leaving; it was the wrong people who were
doing so. The more developed republics were, on the whole, 
supplying most of the emigrants. And increasingly workers
were leaving posts in Yugoslavia to seek higher pay and better
100 92%, insofar as the Census results can be taken as a 
guide. M. Begtic, op.cit., Table III, p.20
101 A. Wertheimer-Baletic-, ' Demograf ske implikacije
zapo£ljavanja u inozemstvu' in Stanovni^tvo SR Hrvatske, 
pp.79-80.
102 Cf. Table 4, Appendix C.
103 The emigration reached a crescendo in 1970-71 (simultaneously, 
in other words, with the crescendo in strident nationalism), 
in which two years, 375,000 workers left the country.
(M. MiSovic", 'Sedma republika', NIN, 19 October 1975 , 
p.10). By that time, the emigration was ceasing to have 
any direct connection with employment levels within 
Yugoslavia. In 1966-68, when the number employed in the 
socialist sector had declined by 96,000, the number of 
departures for work abroad (as measured by the 1971 
Census, admittedly an underestimate) was 110,000. In 
1969-71, while employment increased by 460,000, the number 
of departures shot up to 535,000. Miloje Nikolid, 'Some 
Basic Features of Yugoslav External Migration',
Yugoslav Survey, 1972, no.l, p.l.
104 Cf. Table 6, Appendix C (which undoubtedly underestimates 
this factor)/ and footnote 83, above. Croatian estimates 
of emigration from the Croatian republic itself usually 
ranged between about 40% and 50%. The Census results made 
it difficult to go on citing such estimates, though their 
validity was not thereby really undermined.
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conditions abroad. Skilled workers and specialists with
higher education in deficit professions formed a growing
proportion of those departing. Among those leaving directly
from rural areas, many were abandoning good agricultural land
and thereby placing a strain on Yugoslavia's capacity to
feed i t s e l f . F e w  seemed to be returning, and those who
107did seldom brought any new skills home with them, or put 
their accumulated funds to productive use in Yugoslavia.
On the other hand, hard-currency remissions from those abroad, 
after modest beginnings, were forming a valuable and growing 
item in Yugoslavia's strained balance of payments; and
those who were abroad were at least not swelling domestic 
unemployment still further. There were, in other words, 
tangible economic benefits to offset the loss of young and 
expensively trained domestic manpower. But the demographic,
105 One survey suggested that 77% of all emigrants had been 
employed in Yugoslavia before they left. M. Nikolic, 
op.cit., p.8. According to another enquiry, 60% of the 
emigrants were motivated principally by a desire for 
higher wages. Politika, 19 December 1976, p.9.
106 Over half the emigrants who left rural occupations to
go abroad came from agriculturally developed areas rather 
than backward and overpopulated regions. M. Nikolic^, 
op.cit., p.8. Local agricultural labour shortages were 
so great that workers were even brought in from across 
the Rumanian border to work farms in the rich agricultural 
province of Vojvodina. (Politika, 27 June 1973, cited in 
S. Stankovic, 'Yugoslav Agricultural Plan Adopted', RFE 
Research Yugoslavia, 5 July 1973.
107 Few emigrants appear to have gone abroad with the intention 
of acquiring new qualifications. M. Nikolicf, op. cit. , p.9.
108 As of 1966, Yugoslav hard-currency remissions averaged 
200-250 dollars per worker, less than the corresponding 
figure for all the other major migrant nations, and only 
half that for Italians, Spaniards or Turks (Franci Stare, 
op.cit., p.95). By 1975, the average Yugoslav worker was 
remitting $1,900 a year. The annual total increased from 
35 million in 1964 to 1,600 million in 1974. Between 
1968 and 1974, a total of 3,600 million dollars were sent 
back to Yugoslavia. (S. Letica, 'Mit ili realnost', VUS,
1 October, 1975).
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social, ideological and political implications of the
emigration seemed to be almost uniformly disastrous.
Demographically, some parts of the country were being denuded.
Owing to the separation of families, divorce was widespread
109among emigrants, and children were frequently neglected.
On the ideological plane, the whole rationale of socialist 
self-management seemed called into question, if not positively 
mocked by such an explicit and sincere acknowledgement of the 
superiority of other systems. Two decades of socialist 
education and upbringing were being abandoned to an onslaught 
of hostile ideological and political influences. And large 
numbers of the nation's potential defenders were being lost 
to the armed forces. Anywhere else in Socialist Europe, any 
one of these considerations might have been regarded as a 
decisive argument against further toleration of the emigration. 
The remarkable thing is that the Yugoslav authorities remained 
unmoved by them for so long. Though there was some expansion 
of governmental activity among the migrants through the
109 See, e.g., VUS za nase gradjane u svijetu, 17 October
1973, p .62; Politika, 12 April 1976 , p.9. Very little 
is known about the fate of children of emigrant parents, 
according to the Politika article, which comments: '...
perhaps more care was given to the children who went 
abroad with their parents (though there, too, not enough, 
of course) than to those who remained in the country'.
For a study of the effects on children left behind by 
their parents, see 0. Buried 'Porodice ciji su hranioci 
otisli na rad u inozemstvo', Jugoslovensko udru^enje za 
sociologiju & Slovensko sociolosko drustvo Drustveni 
konflikti i socijalisti£ki razvoj Jugoslavije (1972 
Portorotf conference), vol.II, p .165.
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consular network and other agencies, such services were never
, ^ 110 adequate.
While the emigration continued to be described as 
'temporary', the leadership did not seem eager to precipitate 
any return flow. As late as 1971, President Tito was still 
defending the policy of organized emigration in terms which
suggested he saw no prospects of its imminent revision.
112Shortly thereafter, however, the line began to change, 
apparently under strong pressure from (among other sources) 
military opinion; and spokesmen began making statements to 
the effect that despite the serious employment situation at 
home, Yugoslavia should be making preparations to encourage 
its absentee work-force to return. Given that there was no 
apparent way in which any such program could be carried out,
110 'The Federal Statistical Institute does not have the most 
basic information about changes occurring among our 
citizens abroad', M. Misovic, 'Ko se brine o njima',
NIN, 11 January 1976, at p.17. Consulate services for 
the emigrants were evidently established on the basis of 
a 1969 estimate of needs and have not been updated since.
M. MiSovic", 'Sedma republika', NIN, 19 October 1975 , 
p.10 at p.13.
111 Speech at Gnjilano, 13 April 1971, cited in Socijalna 
politika, 1971, nos 3-4, p.5.
112 Croatia at least had already formulated a program for 
accelerating the return of economic emigrants in 1972. 
'Programi i ulaganja - vise radnih mjesta', VUS za na^e 
gradjane u svijetu, 14 February 1976.
113 In the Gnjilano speech cited earlier, Tito had not found
it necessary to regret the absence of young men of military 
age. In December 1972, however, he expressed grave concern 
that the equivalent of 'three big armies' were abroad 
(Borba, 9 December 1972), and generally deplored the 
emigration. In the meantime, the Croatian crisis had come 
to a head and the disarray in the Yugoslav party and state 
had been brought to order by Tito and a minority of senior 
associates, supported by the only truly federal institution 
in Yugoslavia, the army, and the organization of Partisan 
veterans. The inference seems clear that military opinion 
was strongly influential also in effecting the change in 
emigration policy that ensued (rather than, say, Croatian
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or the returnees provided with jobs, the statements seemed
114more rhetorical than anything. However, towards the end
of 1973, Yugoslavia's resolve in the matter was given an
unexpected jog by the slump in the Western European economy.
Prompted by the oil crisis, successive Western European
governments began introducing limitations on the inflow of
115foreign workers into their countries. In time, as the
recession deepened, they began to take measures to reduce
116the number of Gastarbeiter they already had. Thus without
113 (cont.) nationalist sentiment, which during the same
period was being subjected to public obloquy). The 
army subsequently effected further changes in emigration 
policy to ensure that young men of military age did not 
evade service by going abroad. (See S. Stankovic,
'Impact of Yugoslavs Working Abroad on National Defense 
and the Economy', Radio Free Europe Research Yugoslavia,
4 February 1974; and 'Yugoslavia's Manpower Export:
An Analysis', RFE Research Yugoslavia, 9 July 1973.
114 A reproach evidently made in or near official circles.
See M. Begtic, 'Vracanje Jugoslovenskih gradjana s 
rada u inostranstvu kao element politike zapo^ljavanja 
u inostranstvu', Socijalna politika 1973, no.4, p.10.
115 The West Germans (where roughly half of all the Yugoslav 
emigrants were employed) were the first to ban further 
intakes, on 23 November 1973. Most other European 
countries had adopted similar restrictions by the end
of 1974. S. Letica, loc.cit.; VUS za na£e gradjane 
u svijetu, 27 November 1974, p.25.
116 Many of the restrictive measures that followed were
a response to scapegoating ethnic hostilities expressed 
by autochthonous populations of Western Europe. See, 
for example, the discussion of the decisions by West 
German Land governments to limit settlement by non-EEC 
citizens in many of the major German cities in 
'"Rasterecenje" gradova', VUS za naKe gradjane u svijetu, 
12 February 1975. See also 'Povika na ■gastarbajtere"', 
Politika, 25 March 1976.
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warning (and indeed without even so much as prior consultation)
the Yugoslav government found itself suddenly confronted
by a small flood of unemployed 'returnees' (povratnici).
Judging by the desperately reassuring tone of press articles 
117at the time, the alarm felt by both the government and
the workers themselves must have been acute. m Because of
their rash earlier endorsement of a policy of 'bringing
back' the migrants, the authorities were even suspected by
the workers in some instances of having themselves engineered
118the deportations. Since the turn of 1974, thanks to the
recession, the return flow of workers has far outweighed
new employment abroad. It is difficult to say precisely
how great the net inflow is. The Yugoslavs themselves do
119not know, and the estimates given tend to vary. Whatever 
the number, it is certainly greater than even the accelerated
117 See, for example, the article 'Masovnog otpuMtanja nece 
biti' (There'll be no Mass Dismissals), VUS, 26 December 
1973, whose two sub-titles were 'false dilemmas' and 
'limited consequences', and whose first sentence read:
’The oil crisis has not lessened Western Europe's 
dependence on foreign labour, but on the contrary has 
increased it'. The article went on to develop the curious 
argument that since there was an energy crisis, Western 
countries would want to retain all sources of energy
they had, including human energy. In a subsequent article, 
a Yugoslav official attempted to maintain that the 
authorities had foreseen the recession and the employment 
slump all along. VUS za na¥e gradjane u svijetu,
1 October 1975, p.23.
118 Komunist, 15 September 1975, p.14.
119 Cf. notes 38 and 39, above, which suggest there was a 
net return of 150,000 workers between early 1974 and 
early 1976. This is the usual estimate given for that 
period, though higher ones are sometimes cited. Mi^ovic, 
for example, uses estimates of 200,000 and 300,000 at 
different points in the same article. 'Ko se brine o 
njima', p.17, 18. Not many of the returnees are yet seeking 
work in the non-rural sector, however. (Cf. note 61, 
above, and accompanying text.)
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expansion of employment of recent years can comfortably 
accommodate.
The initial remigration policy outlines formulated 
in 1972-73 were predicated on the assumption that there was 
no desparate urgency to the task. It was also hoped at that 
time that the Western governments involved could be induced 
to cooperate in the enterprise. Basically the intention 
was to lessen the outflow (and reduce the skill levels) 
of new emigrants, and at the same time increase the inflow 
of returnees, in particular those with qualifications that 
were in short supply at home, thereby replacing what was
essentially a one-way movement with a 'circular flow* of
120migration. Apart from the additional difficulties this
policy would have created on the strained labour market (had 
it been successful), it is hard to imagine that Western 
governments and employers would have ever given the scheme 
their blessing.
In the event, however, the recession rendered all 
these plans totally irrelevant. Once the restrictions had 
been abruptly and unilaterally imposed, the Yugoslav government 
was placed in the position of having to redeem its somewhat 
expansive promises according to a time-table imposed from 
without. They had now to find work for a potential total of 
returnees amounting to nearly one quarter of existing
120 See M. Begtic, 'Vracanje jugoslovenskih gradjana s rada 
u inostranstvu kao element politike zapo¥ljavanja
u inostranstvu'.
121 ' [We were]...getting rather carried away by the illusion 
that the countries where most of our citizens were 
employed would accept our formula of a "circular flow" 
...', MiXovic, Sedma republika', p.ll.
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extra-rural employment within the country. And they have
virtually no control over the rate at which those returnees
may be propelled back into the country to reclaim their
122constitutional right to work. So far the remigration has
been uncomfortably intense, without reaching the torrential
proportions of the earlier emigration peak. But it may at
any moment intensify. The Yugoslav authorities must be
watching Western economic barometers with quite as much
anxiety as any of their Western counterparts.
However, the policy response to the emergency
situation created by the recession has been surprisingly
sluggish. Certain fairly obvious measures that have been
123proposed over and over again since the 1960s have still not 
been implemented. The reassertion of Party supremacy after 
1972 notwithstanding, Yugoslavia remains much less monolithic 
than may sometimes appear to be the case. The struggle 
between various ethno-regional and ideo-political interests 
seems to be going on more or less continually, prolonging 
and sometimes even paralysing the decision-making process. 
Policy regarding the returnees is one of the many areas 
of decision-making which has suffered in despatch and 
coherence as a result. The constitutional upheavals of 
recent years have undoubtedly made their contribution to 
this same result. There is, in addition, the difficulty that 
some of the most effective means available to alleviate
122 The new Yugoslav Constitution, like its predecessors, 
rashly guarantees Yugoslav citizens the right to work: 
Ustav Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, 
Clan 159, p.93.
123 As of 1970, many of the proposals that are still 
struggling to get off the ground in 1976 were already 
not new. See VUS, 21 October 1970, p.6.
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the returnee problem involve rather serious compromises with 
hard-line principle, and that at a time when hard-liners have 
been enjoying something of a renaissance.
The verbal efforts that are being made to absorb
the returnees are (and have been for some years) extremely 
124strenuous. But some organizational steps have also now
been taken. Yugoslav enterprises are subjected to pressures
, 125to take on set quotas of returnees. Some customs and
126fiscal concessions are being offered to encourage emigrants 
to mechanize their agricultural holdings or set up trademen's 
establishments. In some cases, emigrants from particular 
areas have been encouraged to invest through Yugoslav banks
124 Letica mentions that at the Federal level alone, there 
had been produced the equivalent of 60 densely covered 
pages of resolutions on returnee policy between 1971 
and 1974. S. Letica, 'Mit ili realnost'.
125 On 1 September 1976, a new customs law came into effect 
in Yugoslavia which exempts returnees absent for at 
least two years from paying duty on household goods
or tradesmen's equipment up to 15,000 or 25,000 dinars 
in value respectively. See Politika, 25 August 1976,
P . 7 .
126 Hitherto, taxation concessions have been largely left 
to the initiative of local authorities. (For instances 
of local action in this direction, see Politika,
30 December 1975, p.7, and 6 January 1976, p.8.)
Attempts to achieve national co-ordination of communal 
policies on taxation of private enterprise have evidently 
been going on for years, and at last report were still 
in progress. See Politika, 19 April 1976, p.5.
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127in the setting up of new enterprises in their home communes.
In exchange they are guaranteed interest on their capital
upon its maturing after a certain period, and in the meantime
are offered work in the enterprise their funds have helped
to create. It is also hoped that concessions to agriculture
may induce more people to remain in that sector, and returnees
128to go back to it rather than seek work in the towns.
It is frequently suggested that Yugoslavia's industrial
capacity should be utilized more effectively, in particular,
that the shift co-efficient be raised to provide jobs without
129additional investment. Proposals have also been voiced
that the compulsory retirement age be lowered, and the
127 One of the most widely publicized instances of this 
occurred in the Dalmatian commune of Imotski, which has 
a particularly high emigration rate. The Imotski model 
has received an imprimatur from the party weekly,
Komunist (see 13 January 1975, p.10). Other such 
enterprises have been established in Croatia, Macedonia 
and Bosnia and Hercegovina. See, e.g., VUS za nase 
gradjane u svijetu, 12 February 1975; NIN, 28 December 
1975, p.12. Resistance is continuing, however. Two 
apparent supporters of such undertakings emphasize that 
they are still no more than 1 isolated' instances and 
have yet to prove themselves. See VUS, 25 December 1974, 
p .8; and NIN, 11 January 1976, p.18.
128 Thus, for example, a Croatian official emphasizes that 
investment credits and the introduction of a system of 
social security for private farmers in that Republic are 
meant to encourage employment there and thus reduce the 
pressure of returnees on the urban labour market. VUS 
za na¥e gradjane u svijetu, 14 February 1976.
129 It is pointed out on such occasions that Yugoslavia's 
productive capacities are poorly utilized (less than 70%,
compared with 80 to 85% in Western European countries). 
Politika, 26 December 1975, p.12. One observer sees 
the possibility of creating 150,000 new jobs by increasing 
second and third shifts by only 10%. Komunist, 4 February 
1974, p.4.
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widespread practice of part-time work for supplementary 
income be curbed. And there have been attempts made to 
expand the export of labour to the East and the Third World.
Many of these measures or proposals seem to be at 
best problematical. Stopping the drift to the cities is 
difficult in any rapidly developing country, and not less so 
so in Socialist countries where rural incomes and living 
standards are well below those of the towns. Calls to increase 
the utilization of Yugoslavia's industrial capacity never
explain why such an obvious step has not already been taken
131many times over. Part-time work is an endemic feature
of Socialist economies. In the Yugoslav case it is a mass 
phenomenon with its own deeply entrenched vested interests 
(which, no doubt, have grown in symbiosis with the equally
entrenched uravnilovka); its overnight abolition scarcely
132seems practical. And of the proposal to lower the
retirement age it has been well said that it would only
133lead to a different form of concealed unemployment.
Unfortunately the more promising of the policies 
for economically absorbing the emigrants seem to be the very 
ones that have evoked the greatest controversy and ideological 
or other resistance. The tendency to disapprove of emigrants 
has never been quite expunged from the psyches of Yugoslav
130 Cf. footnote 74, above. Labour exports to the Third 
World are associated with capital construction projects 
there.
131 The calls themselves are a recurring ritual, often 
performed at the highest levels, without, however, 
producing any effect. See MiKovic, 'Ko se brine o 
njima', p .18.
132 It has been estimated that 3 million of the 5 million 
people employed in the Yugoslav (extra-rural) economy take 
on part-time work to boost their incomes. 'Mesto u 
domovini', Politika, 19 December 1975.
'Skracenje sta¥a i zaposljavanje', Politika, 18 May 1976.133
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decision-makers; and there is continuing resistance to
the idea that they should be given anything that might 
resemble preferential treatment. To the ideological hard­
liner, or the self-made-man who has climbed the bureaucratic 
ladder to success, it must seem particularly repugnant that 
'deserters' to capitalism should return with hoards of 
accumulated wealth and become 'rentiers' in their Socialist 
homelands. And some employers and rank and file workers 
may feel similar resentments/^
These natural human jealousies and animosities 
are reinforced and legitimized by the circumstance that 
all proposals to utilize the wealth of the povratnici raise 
serious problems for the theory and practice of socialist 
self-management. If small business undertakings are delivered 
increasingly into private hands, individual farming extended 
and strengthened, and such alien institutions as capital
134 One Yugoslav questionnaire showed that 38% of all
emigrants were hoping to use their earnings to solve 
their housing problem. NIN, 21 September 1975, p.ll. 
Accordingly it would seem sensible to use this factor 
as a means of drawing their funds back into the Yugoslav 
economy and providing employment in the construction 
industry. Yet housing construction continues to flag 
and plans to create special opportunities for emigrants 
to spend their money on housing run into political 
difficulties. See Politika, 22 April 1976, p.8. Or 
consider, for example, the proposals made in the Federal 
Assembly to discriminate in employment policy against 
returnees who had jobs before leaving Yugoslavia.
This kind of retrospectively punitive action would, of 
course, be a very good way of ensuring that most of the 
best people remained abroad. Politika, 10 October 
1975, p.7.
135 For some allusions to these matters, see 'Program 
povratka', Politika, 21 May 1976.
399
markets, private investment, etc. tolerated, is there not
a danger that all this, together with the continuing inflow
136of major Western credits, will create a strong basis
for the reemergence of capitalism? It is no doubt
considerations such as these that have helped to block the
137large-scale replication of the Imotski experiment.
The new law on customs has at last been passed, but only
138after prolonged resistance, it would seem. The Basic Law
on Associated Labour (the so-called 'Workers' Constitution'),
soon to be promulgated, contains provision for the use of
private funds in self-managing enterprises; but it remains
139to be seen to what extent it will succeed in drawing the
136 Foreign credits in 1974 and 1975 (presumably virtually 
all Western) totalled 1,600 million dollars, a figure 
well in advance of the (in any case largely unrealized) 
credit proposed to Yugoslavia by the USSR in 1972 (cf. 
note 68, above). See Z. Antic, 'Yugoslavia confronted 
with Return of Gastarbeiter', Radio Free Europe Research 
RAD Background Report/89 (Yugoslavia), 15 April 1976, 
pp.4-5.
137 Cf. note 127, above.
138 Despite innumerable proposals (for special concessions 
for returnees), the old Customs Law, which dated from 
1965, the year when the main flow of emigration began, 
had been altered little before it was finally superseded 
in 1976, Politika, 2 March 1976, p.5. The reforms were 
foreshadowed for a long time before they were actually 
introduced. See VUS za na¥e gradjane u svijetu,
14 February 1976, p.67.
139 It has been claimed that intending returnees in West 
Germany have expressed their satisfaction with the 
proposed new law on Associated Labour, and in particular 
with its provisions for using private funds in both 
private and self-managing enterprises. Politika, 14 
April 1976, p.10.
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capital of returnees and other private citizens into 
expanding the Yugoslav economy's employing capacity.
Thus, while official policy is veering towards
further exploitation of private initiative and private funds
to overcome its medium-term employment difficulties, there
appears to be strong and continuing opposition to such a
strategy. The current five-year plan envisages an increase
of 100,000 in employment in the private sector. This seems
a utopianly optimistic assessment, recent and proposed
reforms notwithstanding. Whatever formal legal provisions
and government resolutions may say, for private enterprise
to flourish, the mentality which has resisted the reforms for
so long must be overcome. The Yugoslav press, however,
140contains innumerable proofs of its tenacity. Actual
employment trends in the private sector over recent years
do not inspire confidence either. In 1971, 90,000 were
141employed there, in 1973, 93,000 and in 1974, 91,000.
This seems scarcely the springboard for a leap forward of 
over 100% in the next five years. In any case, even if 
such dramatic improvement is achieved, it will not be enough
140 Thus, for example, a recent article in the Belgrade
daily, Politika (15 June 1976, p.5) describes some of 
the discriminatory measures that have been taken against 
tradesmen in recent years. VUS for 21 February 1976, 
p.15, declares that 'small-scale production (mala 
privreda), despite declaratory support, is not given a 
chance in this country'. Another item speaks of the 
strange 'inertia' that refuses to respond to the many 
proposals that have been made to facilitate opportunities 
in mala privreda for returnees (Politika, 26 November 
1975, p .7).
141 Statisti^ki godi¥njak Jugoslavije 1975, p.110.
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to avoid severe unemployment developing in at least some
areas. A recent press item quotes an expert opinion that
in Bosnia and Hercegovina employment needs to go ahead at
a rate of 4 to 4^ -/2% per annum, especially in view of the
republic's large pool of potential returnees; but that
'not even half of that number will be able to find employment
unless small-scale production (mala privreda) comes to our 
i42aid. The irony of the situation is that (as elsewhere in
the Socialist world) the much deplored stagnation of private
trades and services is coupled with an acutely-felt need
143for just such trades and services.
Much of the emigrants' savings continue to stay
out of the country in foreign banks. It is vital to
Yugoslavia's chances of employing those emigrants at home
that incentives be offered to draw their funds back into
144profitable investment within the country. But the incentives
142 Politika, 5 April 1976, p.9.
143 See, e.g., 'Zanatstvo u zapecku' and 'Talas dopunskih
zarada' in Politika, 9 and 10 January 1976.
144 As of early 1972, Yugoslav workers were estimated by 
West German sources to be holding some 4,000 million DM 
in West German banks alone. VUS, 26 January 1972 cited 
in Z. Antic, 'Yugoslavia Curbs Labour Exports to Western 
Countries', Radio Free Europe Research Yugoslavia,
7 February 1973, p.3. Another West German source has 
suggested that the Yugoslav government made efforts to 
gain access to these funds 'behind the backs' of the 
workers. Münchner Merkur, 2 February 1974, cited in 
S. Stankovic, 'Impact of Yugoslavs Working Abroad on 
National Defense and the Economy', p.2. One infers that 
any such efforts must have been largely unsuccessful, 
given the present drift of policy towards positive 
inducements.
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must not only be offeree^ they must also be accepted and
believed in by the emigrants themselves. Changes of political
climate or economic strategy would have a disastrous effect
145on 'business confidence'. The emigrants thus have a kind
of independent bargaining position, a potential pull over 
their Socialist masters, that is greater, perhaps, than any 
enjoyed by a non-elite group anywhere else in Eastern Europe.
It would not be surprising if many Yugoslav politicians felt 
in these circumstances that it would be better if they simply 
washed their hands of the emigrants. Such sentiments are 
particularly likely to be felt in those regions which, under 
the new decentralized arrangements, are least likely to 
benefit from the influx of either hard currency or manpower.
In addition to expanding the Socialist sector 
by policies of extensive growth and encouraging various 
forms of private initiative and finance, two other strategies 
for absorbing the returnees are sometimes advanced: increasing
internal mobility of labour between the less and more 
developed regions of Yugoslavia; and encouraging further
145 Komarica cites an instance of taxation regulations
being changed in Imotski commune (in the period before 
it decided to import Gastarbeiter capital) to the 
detriment of returnee tradesmen working in the private 
sector. Komarica comments: 'They all feel cheated
and maintain that they will keep their money in their 
pockets until they get a guarantee that their investments 
will not be wiped out by future changes in regulations.' 
Komarica, op.cit., p.99. Imotski commune evidently 
drew certain conclusions from this experience, but what 
of other communes in Yugoslavia?
This appears to be the Federal line on internal migration 
generally (cf. note 87, above); and it is often urged 
in the specific context of the returnee problem. See, 
for example, the statements by the Croatian Undersecretary 
for Labour in VUS, 20 August 1975, p.3.
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foreign investment (by which is usually meant investment
147from Western sources, in particular, West Germany).
Both of these may be sound policies in the long term.
But in the short term neither can be much more than
palliative. And in each case there are serious political
problems. Internal migration tends to be resisted by
republican and local authorities, and may aggravate inter-
148ethnic tensions. And any further increase in the volume
of Western credits could endanger the policy of non-alignment,
lead to excessive dependence on Western governments and
agencies, or lead to a worsening of relations with the Soviet
bloc countries. Despite the difficulties, it appears that
the leadership will persist with both of these policies.
There is increasing talk of responding to the growing Western
European inclination to take capital to the workers rather
149than bring the workers to the capital. It might be
147 Cf. note 131, above. During President Tito's visit to 
West Germany in 1974, he and West German Chancellor 
Schmidt reportedly agreed that it would be mutually 
advantageous if West German-Yugoslav economic links were 
expanded, and, in particular, if West German investments 
were directed increasingly to the emigration regions
of Yugoslavia. VUS za naKe gradjane u svijetu, 24 July 
1974. Hitherto, very little of West German investment 
has gone to the countries from where its Gastarbeiter 
stem. Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia provide two-thirds 
of all the migrants, but received only 1% of all West 
German foreign investments in the decade before 1974.
'Pouke jedne recesije', NIN, 2 February 1975, at p.36.
148 Cf. notes 88-94 above (and corresponding text), and 
also the discussion in 5.d., below.
149 'Ne kao stari pe^albar', Politika, 18 January 1976.
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sensible if similar thinking were to be applied within
Yugoslavia itself, and capital were to be encouraged to flow
to the areas where the returnees have the most aggravating
effect on the labour market, rather than redirecting workers
en masse to the more developed regions of the country. While
it appears to be felt that Kosovo must be treated as a special
150case in which outmigration is mandatory, there are signs 
that official policy may come in time to prefer flows of
capital rather than manpower within Yugoslavia as well as
• „ 151in Europe.
150 Since 1972, Kosovo has been given formal priority in
emigration opportunities as a matter of policy (Miloje 
Nikolic, op.cit., p.12). This relative advantage was 
quickly cancelled, however, by the closing of the 
West European labour market. In the first nine
months of 1975, only 250 left Kosovo for abroad, 
whilst 3,000 workers returned, a figure equivalent to 
more than one-third of the (itself very high) employment 
increment for that same period. Komunist, 20 October 
1975, p.20. Kosovo is also seeking special treatment
in internal migration policy (see the remarks by a 
Kosovo delegate in a Federal Assembly debate on returnee 
policy, Politika, 1 April 1976, p.6). Here, too, there is 
some disposition at the Federal level to meet their 
demands. (See the remarks of the President of the 
Federal Employment Council in Socijalna politika 1973 
no.l, p.19). But, again, compare note 148, above.
151 It is now possible for enterprises to invest directly
in enterprises in other republics and thereby contribute 
to discharging the quota obligations of its home 
republic towards the Federal Fund for the Undeveloped 
Republics and Provinces. The Slovenian Chamber of Commerce 
has set up a permanent delegation in Kosovo to facilitate 
such dealings. In an article commenting on this event, 
it was pointed out that Slovenia had run into a develop­
mental limit in the form of a shortage of human resources.
'In large organizations one hears increasingly of 
intentions to take investments to areas where there are 
more people than jobs.' VUS, 28 May 1975, p.8.
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It is not possible to produce either a current 
assessment of, or future projections for, the demographic 
impact of the emigration. It is still in a very volatile 
stage where economic movements in the West might yet 
precipitate further landslides in at least one, if not 
either, direction. For the moment, the Western European 
countries (especially Germany and Austria), the two most 
important from Yugoslavia's point of view),"^ ^^  are planning 
to further diminish their migrant worker totals over the 
next few years. If, on the other hand, Western economic 
recovery ever does take place, fresh openings may appear, 
either there, or elsewhere. Despite its proclaimed policy 
of bringing its people back, the Yugoslav government would 
surely welcome a further period of respite.
But a more serious obstacle to demographic 
assessment of the emigration is the fact that emigration 
statistics have always been and continue to be extremely 
sketchy. The authorities do not know how many went; nor do 
they know how many have returned. No one can know how many
152 Austria reduced its migrant worker total by 40,000 in 
1975 and plans a further reduction of 30,000 for 1976. 
Over 130,000 of Austria's 177,000 Gastarbeiter as of 
late 1975 were Yugoslavs. (Politika, 22 January 1976, 
p.4). West Germany reportedly plans reducing its 
2 million or so migrant workers to 1^/2 million by 
1980. A Yugoslav press article puts the total number 
of Yugoslavs in West Germany as of early 1976 at just 
under 400,000 workers together with 250,000 dependant 
family members. (No West German source is cited, 
however). 'Povika na "gastarbajtere"', Politika,
25 March 1976. Cf. note 157, below.
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will return: existing data on emigrant plans to return are
153conflicting. And there is not much reliable information
regarding the present demographic structure of the emigration. 
Very little seems to be known about the assimilatory processes 
to which Yugoslavs abroad are subject. Vital statistics 
relating to Yugoslav families in emigration are not collected. 
How many of them have contracted mixed marriages is not known. 
Nor do there seem to be any statistics about knowledge of
156their native language among the children of the emigrants.
154
155
153 Before the Western European countries adopted their 
discriminatory measures, actual rates of return were 
very low. (Begtic, 'Yugoslav Nationals Working 
Temporarily Abroad', p.22). Komarica cites questionnaires 
which found, variously, that 87%, 92% and 13% of respondents 
planned to return. (Komarica, op.cit., p.100). The
more optimistic results seem slightly the less plausible 
of the three. While official statements have always 
maintained that the emigration was 'temporary', less 
official statements are more sceptical.
154 The overworked Yugoslav consular network would find 
gathering the emigration's vital statistics a difficult 
task, but until very recently in fact it was not required 
to do so at all. Nor, apparently, did the Federal 
Institute for Statistics do anything to fill the gap. 
Misovic, 'Ko se brine o njima', p.17.
155 In West Germany alone, between 1960 and 1970, there were 
14,000 mixed marriages registered in which one party 
was a Yugoslav. NIN, 21 September 1975, p.ll.
156 There is, on the other hand, no shortage of newspaper 
articles deploring emigrant children's very weak or 
non-existent grasp of their native tongue. See, e.g.,
VUS za nase gradjane u svijetu, 30 January 1974, p.34, 
and 29 May 1974, p.30. It was noted earlier that 
supplementary schooling for Yugoslav children did not 
begin to be organized until 1970 (footnote 94). It was 
not, apparently, until 1975 that a text-book for use in 
such schools was definitively projected, and an inter­
republican agreement on these matters reached (after
(cont.)
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With such a profusion of unknowns to deter him,
it would be a rash observer who attempted any overall
judgements about the future ethno-demographic reverberations
of the Yugoslav emigration. Two general comments can and
should be made, however. The first point to note is,
paradoxically, that the diaspora may still be growing.
For as against the returnees, there are also those dependant
family members who are going abroad to join their bread-earners.
While tightening regulations regarding workers, Western
countries have often made attempts to guarantee better living
conditions for those of their migrants that they have been
prepared to accept. And there has been a secular trend for
some years towards increase in the numbers of family dependants
157joining migrant workers at their place of work. To this
factor must be added that of the ongoing fertility of the 
increasingly reunited migrant families. In West Germany, 
as elsewhere in Western Europe, migrant fertility now makes
156 (cont.) two years of negotiations). (Politika, 19 and
25 December 1975). As of 1976, it is claimed that 
50% of the 50,000 children of school-age are covered by 
supplementary schooling (VUS za na¥e gradjane u svijetu,
6 March 1976, p.67). The figure of 50,000 school- 
children could bo an underestimate. On these matters, 
see also 'Kuda druga generacija?', Politika, 13 June 1976.
157 Between late 1973 and late 1974, despite the restrictions 
that had been placed on foreign workers in the meantime, 
the registered number of Yugoslavs in West Germany 
increased from 673,300 to 707,800. In late 1972, the 
figure had been 594,300. See Statistisches Bundesamt
Statistisches Jahrbuch 1975, p.65 and the corresponding 
tables in the 1974 and 1973 volumes. However, compare 
footnote 152, above.
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a major contribution to the national birth-rate. Given
the age-structure of the Yugoslav diaspora as revealed by 
the 1971 Census, it is inevitable that large and growing
159numbers of children must be being born to Yugoslavs abroad. 
Given the trend towards assimilation of migrant children so 
often deplored in the Yugoslav press, it is quite likely that 
the growing numbers of children abroad may in time deepen 
the alienation of the parents, and strengthen their inclination 
to remain in their adopted countries.
Secondly, it seems likely that despite the tendency 
towards a more even ethnic distribution of the emigrants in 
the later years of the emigration, the national composition 
of the diaspora will never reflect the national composition 
of Yugoslavia; in other words, some Yugoslav nations will 
be demographically weakened by the emigration, and others 
(relatively) strengthened. Since 1972, the Yugoslav press
158 'Four years ago, only one in ten children born in the 
Federal Republic was of foreign extraction; now it is 
one in six or even one in five.' Per Spiegel, 24 March 
1975, p.41. Spiegel estimated that by 1976, the number 
of foreign children born in Stuttgart might be greater 
than the number of Germans.
159 Between late 1973 and late 1974, the number of Yugoslav 
citizens under the age of six in West Germany increased 
from 37,800 to 48,000. The 48,000 aged 0-5 in 1974 
compared with 17,400 in the group 6-10. This comparison 
also seems to suggest, among other things, that the 
number of Yugoslav children being born and raised in 
West Germany has been increasing. Compare Statistisches 
Jahrbuch 1975, p.65 and the corresponding table in the 
1974 volume. It will be interesting to see how the 
latest discriminatory measures affect these trends.
Cf. footnotes 116 and 152 above.
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has been careful to avoid reference to the ethnic structure
of the emigration. To my knowledge, no official estimates
of the position in this regard have appeared since the 1971
Census figures were published. Their accuracy then was
160questionable (and questioned). Since that time, the
ethnic disproportions may have increased. For, as suggested
earlier, the returnees, being rejects from sophisticated
Western economies, are likely to contain large numbers of
the least skilled. Also, residence permits and visas for
family members are more readily given to the older, more
161established immigrants. Again, it is the older migrants
who are more likely to be living in family units abroad
(with or without Yugoslav spouses). Conversely, it should
be remembered that the Albanians and other less developed
ethnic groups had a particularly low rate of female emigration,
16 2and therefore, presumably, of family formation abroad.
All these factors will tend to reinstate or reinforce the 
earlier trends of ethnic differentiation within the diaspora.
Given the inadequacies of the data, it is hard 
to make even rough predictions about the future of the 
Yugoslav economic emigration. But it does seem inevitable
160 1Izgubljene dusfe, Delo, 13 July 1971. This article 
in the Slovenian party daily declared that the census 
had missed 'half* of the Croats abroad. Cf. notes 83,
99 and 104, above.
161 Komunist, 15 September 1975, p.14.
162 Judging on the basis of the 1971 Census results, only 
4% of the emigrant workers from Kosovo were women 
(cf. 18% from Macedonia, 37% from Croatia and 40%
from Slovenia). Begtic, 'Yugoslav Nationals Temporarily 
Working Abroad', p.20.
410
that it will leave a permanent (and recurring) indentation 
in the Yugoslav age-pyramid; that the contributions of 
the various ethnic groups to that indentation will be 
generally speaking in inverse proportion to their employment 
rates within Yugoslavia; and that differential emigration 
will aggravate the impact of differential fertility on 
Yugoslavia's ethnic structure.
5.d Ethnic Relations
The following discussion will be based on two 
premises: firstly, that ethnic numbers in Yugoslav
conditions can be to a significant extent converted into 
political power; and secondly, that ethnic harmony is 
unlikely to be achieved in the near or middle future by any 
process of homogenization or reconciliation. These 
propositions may need some prior elaboration.
163Traditionally, Leninist Socialism has recognized
that ethnic groups not only have a right to exist, but also
to a position of equality in the state. While this principle
164is sometimes honoured in the breach, it is never flatly 
disavowed. Efforts are usually made to solve the problem
163 The Yugoslavs have, of course, rejected Stalin, but 
not Lenin.
164 Both historically, and in recent years, Soviet policy 
on the nationalities has equivocated between Great 
Russian chauvinism thinly disguised and greater or 
lesser measures of ethnic pluralism. But Bulgaria and 
Rumania have been perhaps even more given to unitaristic 
assimilationism at times than their Soviet mentors.
On Rumania's assimilationist phase (and the strategic 
reasons for their partial retreat from it), see R. King, 
Minorities under Communism, Ch.7; see also (cont.)
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of ethnic antagonisms by removing their socio-economic 
causes; that is to say by attempting to iron out the 
inequalities of economic development or socio-economic 
status that are believed to underlie them. Here again, 
while the socio-economic equality may not always be in 
fact achieved, or even honestly striven for, it is nearly 
always legitimate for an underprivileged ethnic minority 
to demand action in that direction.
European Socialist states and societies are 
generally speaking organized in accordance with, among 
other principles, the 'national key'. Most party and government 
bodies on public display are given an elaborate balance of 
representatives of different ethnic groups. Great efforts 
are made to achieve proportionate representation in education, 
publishing, the professions, the arts, etc. The 'Socialist' 
content of the particular activity may betray the interests 
of the national group in question, but the form is national 
nonetheless.
Moreover, Socialist control systems, effective 
for most purposes, are nonetheless ill-equipped to deal 
with the pervasive, subtle and extraordinarily tenacious 
sentiment of ethnic affinity. Georgian or Albanian 
nationalists may be condemned, but Georgians and Albanians
164 (cont.) 'Ceausescus Nationalitätenpolitik', Osteuropa
1975, no.5, p.A282. Bulgaria's Staatsvolk nationalism 
seems to be growing unchecked at present . Presumably this is 
a sign of Moscow's special favour. See the discussion
of the Macedonian question in 5.d., below; and 'Migration 
of Turkish Minority and the Status of Bulgarian Moslems',
RFE Research Bulgarian Situation Report/13, 28 April
1976, p.5. On the other hand, Hungary, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia have all treated their national minorities 
remarkably well in at least some respects. Even an 
ethnically almost homogeneous state like East Germany 
observes certain decencies in relation to its tiny 
Lusatian Sorb minority. (See K.J. Dippmann, 'The
Legal Position of the Lusatian Sorbs since the Second 
World War', Slavonic and East European Review, vol.LIII, 
no.130 (January 1975), p.62.
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cannot be abolished. Private farmers, craftsmen, traders 
or liberal democrats can be prevented from organizing, or 
even permanently erased from the scene; and they can 
certainly be excluded from joining the party ipso facto.
But Georgians and Albanians cannot. Albanianism in itself 
is not a crime. (Nor even is Jewishness, though it may verge 
on it at times). Thus, socialism positively facilitates a 
degree of ethnic cohesion on the one hand, and is powerless 
to eliminate it on the other.
In Yugoslavia, these factors are particularly
relevant. Unlike the Soviet Union, the Yugoslav regime has
sought to give genuine content to Marxist-Leninist traditions
on nationality policy. Even before 1965, and certainly since,
there has been no one dominant ethnic group which can succeed in
bending the principles of nationalities policy to its own
perceived advantage. The political significance of ethnic
numbers in the USSR may well grow in the future; and it
may be underestimated in the present. In Yugoslavia, that
significance has already become overwhelmingly evident. If
economic equality (at least in per capita terms) has remained 
165elusive, political equality has been gaining in reality 
almost continuously. The main ethnic groups are now 
accorded almost a veto power over the activities of the
165 It may be argued and is argued, that were it not for
the demographic factor, redistribution of wealth within 
Yugoslavia's different regions might well have been 
considerably advanced by now. 'Calculations show that 
Kosmet's falling behind Slovenia in economic growth 
is two-thirds due to its faster population growth, and 
only one-third due to its slower economic growth'.
Janez 3kerjanec, 'Mednacionalni ekonomski odnosi v 
Jugoslaviji', Teorija in praksa 1969, no.l, p.26 at p.31. 
The economic factors (low capital efficiency and capital 
accumulation, lower investments levels per head, etc.) 
were themselves often partially demographic as well.
Cf. notes 91 and 92 above, and note 263, below.
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federal political organs - at least in t h e o r y . A n d  the
'national key' (nacionalni klju&) is being progressively applied16 7to more and more spheres of life. The control system
aspires to check only the more extreme chauvinist elements.
But it does this in relation to all ethnic groups. Ethnic 
patriotism and consistent struggle for causes which are 
Socialist in form and ethnic in content has been virtually 
legitimized through the federal system.
The Yugoslav leadership has evidently arrived at 
the view that the only way to eliminate the perils of 
nationalist sentiment is to legitimize it and build it deep 
into the country's political structure. Perhaps, indeed, 
that 'view' is not a conscious decision by a transcendant 
ethnically unaffiliated elite, but rather the resultant of
166 On the theory, see 'Deveto reMenje', 'Formule odgovornosti' 
and '2ivot ispravlja gre&ke' in NIN, 23 March 1975,
18 May 1975 and 2 May 1976, respectively. On the practice, 
compare note 92, above.
167 It appears that republican and provincial controls 
over cadre policy, for example, are being extended down 
from the top party and state bodies to lower levels. 
Republics and provinces have their own cadre lists and 
expect 'their' cadres to act within federal agencies in 
accordance with their instructions. For two somewhat 
Aesopian articles on these developments, see VUS, 22 
May 1976, pp.12-13; and NIN, 7 March 1976, pp.8-9.
In Kosovo, efforts are being made in the party and state 
organs and in higher educational institutions to ensure 
that the proportion of Albanians is equivalent to their 
percentage of the population (which, incidentally, given 
the age structure of the Albanians, would lead to their 
adults being effectively overrepresented). An article 
on Pristina University reports that 'to date, there have 
been rather fewer Albanian students (65%) than the percentage 
of Albanians in Kosovo (over 70%), but that structure is 
more favourable this year, and in future years, the 
relationship between the two will be finally evened out.' 
NIN, 16 February 1975, pp.12-13. For notes on the efforts 
to achieve full implementation of the 'national key' in 
Kosovo party organizations, see Politika, 21 October 
1975, p.6, and 11 December 1975, p.6. There too, it 
appears that the objective is a percentage identical with 
that of the ethnic break-down of the province's population 
at the last Census, despite the fact that this would 
overrepresent Albanian adults.
414
conflicting ethnic forces within the ruling party. Whatever 
the long-term success of such a strategy may prove to be, 
in the short and medium term, it can scarcely be expected 
to work miracles. For the Yugoslav regime is encumbered 
with a burdensome legacy of ethnic strife. Inter-ethnic 
relations began on a sour note when the Yugoslav state was 
created after the First World War, and have been in a state 
of deterioration most of the time since. The Communist Party 
is virtually the only Yugoslav political party which has ever 
attracted anything like a nation-wide and genuinely multi­
ethnic following. To it too must go the credit for achieving 
the only period of relative ethnic tranquility in modern 
Yugoslav history, namely the first twenty years or so after 
the war - though even that interlude may have owed more to 
repression than to reconciliation. Be that as it may, in the 
last decade it has become clear that Yugoslavia has expunged 
none of its ethnic antagonisms; and that when Tito goes, or 
the Russians come, the League of Communists may be hard put 
to it to repeat its remarkable unificatory feat of the Second 
World War.
Unfortunately, demographic trends seem likely to 
inflame the general atmosphere of intolerance and suspicion 
still further, as well as leading to objectively destabilizing 
transformations in a number of specific directions. 
Reconciliation, if it comes at all, is unlikely to forestall 
the aggravation that demographic trends (together with other 
developments) are already producing.
Reconciliation is at least a possibility, if a 
long-term one. Homogenization, on the other hand, seems to 
be totally out of the question. Curiously, the leadership 
(unlike its Soviet counterpart) has set its face against 
developing any kind of supraethnic national identity. The 
reason for this difference in approach seems to be that the 
Russians are a dominant (if perilously maintained) majority, 
whereas the Serbs are not. While the non-Russian ethnic 
group in the USSR may see 'Soviet man' and 'the Soviet people'
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as Russian notions, there is not a great deal they can do to 
actively dethrone them. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, 
the non-Serbs reached an agreement in effect to resist the 
notion of 'Yugoslav' as being a Serbian imposition. And they 
have succeeded very largely in officially discrediting it.
Thus pressures towards homogenization of that kind have become 
largely a thing of the past. Ethnic particularisms are 
flourishing in Yugoslavia, and given existing conditions are 
likely to go on doing so for a long time to come. They are 
increasing rather than diminishing.
This should not be taken as meaning that contacts
between the ethnic groups are necessarily diminishing or
hostility between them increasing. The contacts are increasing,
and the hostility may not at the present moment be worsening.
But while inter-marriage has become a relatively more common
phenomenon, intra-ethnic social interaction remains the norm;
and the gulf between Christian and Moslem in particular remains 
16 8very wide. Quite apart from the possibility that greater
168 R. Petrovic, 'Ethnically Mixed Marriages in Yugoslavia', 
Sociologija: Selected Articles 1959-1969 (Belgrade,
1970), p.185, esp. p.198, note.14. As m  the Soviet 
Union, people of Moslem faith are less likely to contract 
ethnically mixed marriages, especially the women. And 
when they do, it is usually with other Moslems, if the 
latter are territorially speaking, 'available'. Thus 
in 1972, in Macedonia, of the 2,587 Albanian women who 
married, 2,486 married Albanians, 76 married Turks (who 
comprise 6.6% of the republican population) and 15 
married Macedonians (69% of the population). Demografska 
statistika 1972, pp.232-33. (Some of the 15 Macedonians 
may also have been of the Moslem faith, incidentally.) 
Bosnian Moslems are a little more prone to inter-marriage, 
though even they are markedly less so than either Serbs 
or Croats within Bosnia and Hercegovina. By contrast, 
inter-marriage between Serbs and Croats, though still 
infrequent, is rather more common, both in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, and elsewhere. A thorough examination of 
this question would have to allow for geographical 
dispersion and other factors. However, the overall 
pattern is probably clear enough without detailed 
statistical analysis.
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social contacts may aggravate rather than relieve tension
169at a certain stage in development, such contacts as
exist are still and will long remain quite insufficient
to bring about that ideal state identified by Soviet
ideologists as sblizhenie. And in any case, though inter-
170ethnic mingling is commended by official policy, sblizhenie 
is not a declared objective.
With these premises and considerations in mind, 
let us turn to briefly survey Yugoslavia's internal ethno-
demographic landscape.
There is a pleasing symmetry about the vital
statistics of the Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats in 
171recent years. So evenly are they matched, a religiously-
inclined observer might see in it an oecumenical intervention 
by extra-terrestrial authority. The sceptic might say, on 
the other hand, that it would take more than absolute parity 
to satisfy the Serbs and the Croats, and he would, up to a 
point, be right. The nationalist solipsisms and the mutual 
antagonism are so deep-rooted, that his own nation's low 
fertility seems far more important to the chauvinist than
169 On this point, compare footnote 95 to Ch.3, p.196, above.
170 'Ten years ago, 12.4% of all marriages contracted were 
ethnically mixed, and the percentage is increasing all 
the time, which is something of exceptional significance.' 
NIN, 25 May 1975, p.28. Yugoslavs place less stress on 
inter-marriage than Soviet ideologists, however, and
do not now appear to harbour any implicit hope that it 
will bring about the linguistic or cultural homogenization 
of the country.
For a rough guide, see tables 3 and 4, Appendix C.
See also notes 8, 9, 12 and 13 (and the corresponding 
text), above.
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the fact that his adversaries are identically placed (even
if he bothers to apprise himself of the latter circumstance -
which he may not). Many Croat demographic commentators in172the heyday of nationalist demography (or demagography
as one might call it) argued that Croatia's demographic problems
were the result of machinations by 'bureaucratic', 'centralist',
'statist' or 'firm-handite' (HvrstorukaKke) forces (for all
17 3of which, read: Serbian). There were at least two reasons
why Croatian demographic comment up to 1971 tended to be 
more nationalistic than that of the Serbs. Firstly, because 
their republican party authorities were supporting or at least
172 For a fairly extreme example of pre-1972 Croatian 
demagography, see 5. Djodan, 'Prilog raspravi o 
regionalnom razvoju SFRJ', Kolo 1969, no.3; see also the 
rebuttal by S. Suvar, 'DruStveni razvoj i medjunacionalni odnosi u tuma<5enju dra §ime Djodana' and 'Da li je 
Hrvatska eksploatirana' in NaSe teme 1969 nos 6 and 12. 
Djodan has suffered political persecution since 1971, 
whilst feuvar has become an even more successful young 
party official and ideologist. Djodan's views border
at times on national paranoia. For less paranoic, but 
equally forceful nationalist demographic commentary, see the articles by the subsequently disgraced VUS 
journalist Neda Krmpotid, 'Nametnuti plebescit' and 'Veliko prebrojavanje' in VUS, 10 February and 31 March 
1971. Instances of strongly partisan thinking flash 
in and out of more scholarly analyses by Croatian 
demographers and economists also.
173 The Croatian writer Zvonimir Komarica paraphrased the
approach of 'bureaucratic optimists', (i.e. Serb 
centralists) to emigration in these terms: 'the wave
of demographic explosion from Kosovo is spattering the 
western republics, so it is natural that workers from 
those republics migrate to Europe, for Europeans are 
also migrating to Canada, USA and Australia. Apart from 
that, the western republics have a tradition of 
emigration, so it's natural that they form a majority.
In any case, "now, everyone's going", and we're all 
Yugoslavs, so there's no problem, since the average 
Yugoslav rate of emigration is too small to be a cause 
for concern. Attitudes like these regard any discussion 
of the causes of migration, or of the occupational, 
republican or ethnic structure of the emigrants as super­
fluous. They also regard it as unnecessary to talk about 
the hard currency income the migrants send back /Komarica 
has in mind which republic should get how much of it/, 
about the organization of cultural and informational 
activities among the migrants, of clubs, etc....', 
Komarica op.cit., p.105.
418
tolerating spirited nationalistic utterances, whereas the
Serbian party leadership were trying to hold their hotheads
down. And secondly, because the Croats in some cases really
did have a point. Though Serbian fertility had actually
declined faster than Croatian to reach comparable levels,
174the Croatian emigration rate was much heavier. Thus it
seemed to Croats that their situation was much worse, and that
if existing emigration patterns persisted, the Croatian
population would be decimated, firstly by the direct loss of
the emigrants themselves, and secondarily, by the loss of their
actual or potential progeny. As mentioned earlier, the 1971
Census came up with an official figure of 672 thousand for
the number of Yugoslavs 'temporarily' working abroad. But all
contemporary estimates from other sources suggested the real
figure was nearer a million. The Census procedures for
enumerating the emigrants and the resident population were
175severely and cogently critized in Croatia. The Census
estimate of 261 thousand ethnic Croats abroad was almost 
certainly an underestimate. Before the Census result was 
published, the Croatian media had been making free use of an 
estimate of half a million Croats abroad. If this were so, 
the number of Croats living and working abroad was approaching 
half the total number of people employed in the non-rural
174 Cf. notes 98, 99 and 194, and the corresponding text, above.
175 Cf. note 98, the articles by Krmpotic cited in note
172, and also: 'Popis obaviti na znastvenoj osnovi',
Novi list (Rijeka), 4 February 1971; 'Zapaljiva popisnica', 
VUS, 10 February 1971; 'Regionalci', VUS, 3 February
1971, and the discussion about some of these articles 
published in VUS, 10 March 1971. In addition to criticizing 
the procedures for recording workers abroad, Croatian 
commentators expressed strong opposition to proposals to 
permit regional identification to pass as ethnic 
identification. This they saw as a centralist (i.e.
Serbian) plot to diminish the number of Croats by siphoning 
some off as Dalmatians or similar. In the end, the 
procedures for registering regional identification were 
decentralized and regulated at the republican level.
(See 'Rubrika: nacionalnost', VUS, 7 June 1972.)
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17 6economy of the Croatian republic. It was at best uncertain
whether very many of them would ever return. As the Croatian
media often pointed out in 1969-71, Croatia had the highest
emigration rate of any country in Europe (in those heady times
it was normal to speak of Croatia as if it were the same kind
177of entity as Greece or Portugal). Given its traditionally
heavy emigration losses, and the stagnation in its population
over the 1930s-1940s period, this further blow to national
strength, pride and prestige must indeed have seemed almost
intolerable. And the indifference of Belgrade statistical
and other authorities to this haemorrhaging of the national
life-blood must have seemed too gross to be without malice.
The emigration rate from Serbia was until the late 1960s, one
17 8of the lowest of any region in the country. Had it been as
high as Croatia's, it seems unlikely that the policy of fostered 
emigration would have lasted as long as it did. When in fact 
the policy was reversed, Serbia's annual emigration rate had 
probably almost overtaken that of Croatia.
The Croats' main anxieties focus on their traditional 
adversaries, the Serbs. Their relations with the other two 
main groups with whom they live in geographical contact, the 
Moslems and the Slovenians, are rather better. Both have been 
in some measure allies against the 'centralists' of Belgrade, 
and neither seems to be perceived as a major threat to Croatian 
interests. There were signs that the pre-1972 Croatian 
leadership supported the position of the ethnic Moslems who, 
demographically at least if not also politically, have now 
become the dominant ethnic group in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
176 Cf. Table 11, Appendix C.
177 See, e.g., 'Izmedju umiranja i 'eksplozije ' ' , VUS,
12 March 1969.
Komarica, op.cit., p.25, estimated that (as of 1968) 
only 0.42% of: the population of Serbia was abroad, 
compared with 3.30% from Slovenia and 4.21% from 
Croatia.
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179thereby supplanting the Serbs.
An outside observer might suppose that Croat
nationalists should be content to accept their own external
migration on the basis that they could compensate for it
economically and ethno-demographically by accepting migrants
in turn from other parts of Yugoslavia and turning them into
Croats. While there were strong assimilatory demands being
made in Croatia during the height of the nationalist phase,
it seems that most Croats would prefer to retain their own
18 0people rather than import substitutes. Their attitude is
the more understandable inasmuch that Yugoslav official policy 
stipulates that all minorities within Yugoslavia should be 
entitled to special cultural and educational facilities.
Thus in time immigrant communities might become a permanent 
and alien fixture within the Croatian Republic. Though Croatian 
strength within the Croatian Republic as measured by official 
statistics had remained unchanged at just on 4/5 of the total 
in recent deacades, the 1971 Census assessment is to some 
extent fictional, since it includes all Croats living 
'temporarily' abroad who could be traced by the census clerks, 
and does not include people from other republics 'temporarily' 
resident in Croatia. If Croatian emigrants were to be replaced 
in a continuous process by peoples from the less developed 
regions, and if these latter peoples were guaranteed the 
necessary facilities for maintaining their national identity,
179 Croats and Moslems in Bosnia and Hercegovina have both had 
a good deal of experience of pressures to become either 
Serbs or 'Yugoslavs'. See Esad Simic', 'Mednacionalni 
odnosi na razpotju', Teorija in praksa 1969, no.10, p.1479, 
especially at 1484-85. Pressures against the Moslems seem 
to still come more from the side of the Serbs. (See 'Streit 
um die Anerkennung der bosnisch-herzegowinischen Mohammedaner 
als Nation', Osteuropa 1975, no.4, p.A236.)
180 Cf. note 88, above. Compare, too, the following comments
by &uvar: 'As we know, there is among the Serbian, Croatian
and Slovenian communities a certain distaste for the 
"rapid multiplication of the Shiptars"'; and: 'I know
that Djodan and people who think like him secretly do not 
wish that let's say half a million Albanians should settle 
in Croatia'. S. Suvar, 'Da li je Hrvatska eksploatirana', 
pp.2055, 2062.
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the Croatian grasp on Croatia could be rapidly weakened, the 
more rapidly inasmuch as the Croatian birth rate would be far 
below that of its immigrant communities. In these circumstances, 
any Croatian republican authorities are likely to wish to 
maintain close control on migratory movements in and out of 
their territory.
The Slovenians lack the keen anti-Serbian feelings or
the tendency to grandiose nationalist illusions that are common
among the Croats. They do not live in close contiguity with
any other Yugoslav peoples apart from the Croats, with whom
they share the Catholic religion and an Austrian past, and
with whom, also, their relations have traditionally been tolerably
good. Their tenacious retention of a separate ethnic identity
through long centuries of Germanic rule, however, seems to
have enhanced their national anxieties as well as their national
pride. In any case, despite the fact that their age-specific
fertility has been substantially higher than Serb or Croat
181fertility in recent years, they too have engaged latterly
in considerable quantities of ethno-demographic soul-searching.
Newspaper stories with titles like 'Are we Slovenians dying
out?' have been common, suggesting that there is a widespread
182fear that they may be. Though the Slovenians do not have
181 Cf. Table 4, Appendix C, and notes 8 and 9 (and the 
corresponding discussion), above.
182 See, e.g., 'Ali Slovenci izumiramo?' (Are we Slovenians
Dying Out?), Delo, 5 February 1972; 'Bomo Slovenci res
izumrli?' (Will We Slovenians Really Die Out?), Delo,
27 October 1973. Expressions of nostalgic regret that 
past demographic development (emigration and early decline 
in fertility) cancelled Slovenia's chances of becoming
a European nation of comparable size to Norway are not 
infrequent, even in academic texts. See, e.g., D. Vogelnik, 
'Slovenski demografski trenutek: 1970-2000', paper
presented to the 1974 Slovenian Demographic Symposium, 
mimeograph, pp.5, 40-41. One section of the paper is 
entitled: 'Slovenia's Demographic Transition - A
Historical Opportunity Missed'.
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any particular bete noire among the other Yugoslav nations,
they do not particularly like any of them either; and for
reasons that would be apparent to any Western traveller who
took a quick sampling of each of the Yugoslav regions,
they regard themselves as culturally superior to all of them.
Autonomist and separatist sentiments are widespread in 
18 3Slovenia, and what most of them would probably prefer would 
be to have as little to do with the rest of Yugoslavia as 
possible.
Slovenian emigration to Europe, though not as heavy
as the Croatian, was nonetheless substantial, particularly in
184the earlier years after 1964. It was natural that the
emigration should 'begin' from Slovenia, given its greater
geographical and cultural proximity to Central Europe. However,
like the low natural increase rates which conceal a relatively
healthy fertility, this trend was probably imperfectly
understood by most Slovenians, and, coupled with the very
visible arrivals of migrant workers from other and less
developed regions, must have contributed to growing fears
that Slovenia would be denuded of its own people and settled
by the great unwashed from the remote and primitive hinterlands
of Yugoslavia. Though 'temporary' emigration from Slovenia
was given as 48,000 by the 1971 Census, the real figure, as
in Croatia, was probably much higher. An estimate in 1974
185placed it in excess of 80,000. Simultaneously, there are
somewhere between 120 and 150 thousand migrants from elsewhere
183 During the period of acute inter-republican tension before 
1972, these sentiments found considerable overt expression. 
See, e.g., 'Hoce li slovenci u vojsku?' NIN, 31 October 
1971 (for a Slovenian initiative to create separate 
republican armies).
184 Cf. note 97, above.
VUS za naMe gradjane u svijetu, 3 April 1974. Politika, 
2"6_"July 1976 , gives the figure of 64,000 plus 3,000 day 
workers in the Italian and Austrian border regions.
185
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in Yugoslavia and the number is certainly growing. None
of this finds reflection in official Yugoslav demographic
statistics. Even the Slovenian authorities themselves,
despite their efficient population registers, do not appear
to know exactly how many domestic Gastarbeiter they are 
18 7sheltering. And as with Yugoslav workers abroad, it
is not known how many of these immigrants want to stay or will
stay permanently in Slovenia. It seems likely, however, that
188a large proportion of them will, if they can. This being
so, it is quite possible that Slovenia's ostensibly homogeneous 
ethnic structure (cf. Table 10) will be significantly altered: 
by Slovenians staying abroad; by Shiptars, Macedonians and 
others remaining in Slovenia; and by second generation
186 'It is not known precisely how many workers from other
republics there are in Slovenia at present: from political
sources we were informed that there are about 100 thousand, 
but the Institute for Sociology put forward an estimate
of 120 to 140 thousand.' P. Stojanovic, 'Senke visokog 
standarda', NIN, 4 August 1974, pp.12-13. Another 1974 
estimate put it at 150,000. (VUS za na¥e gradjane u svijetu, 
3 April 1974 ) This same source mentioned that 6,000 
new places were expected to be made available for workers 
from other republics in 1974. One in four employed 
workers in Slovenia is not Slovenian. ('^torkljo v 
slovenski grb!', I.T.D., 15 January 1974). If one were 
to regard Slovenia as an independent country, this 
proportion would give it far and away the highest 
percentage of Gastarbeiter in Europe.
187 As was noted earlier, Census statistics locate people at 
their 'permanent' residence, not their work residence.
In 1972, 26.6 thousand of the 28.7 thousand babies born 
in Slovenia were reported as being born to Slovenian 
mothers (Demografska statistika 1972, p.148). This 
suggests that very few indeed of the migrant workers have 
their families with them. As there are controls on 
workers entering Slovenia (cf. note 90, above), it is 
possible that there are a significant number of 'illegal' 
workers there, not even registered as 'temporarily 
resident' with the local authorities. This would explain 
the discrepancy between the estimates given in note 186, 
above.
188 'PeHalbari bez pasoMa', VUS, 1 May 1976, p.16 at p.18.
424
effects in both cases. While it would appear that most of
the migrants in Slovenia are for the present single men or
men whose families have remained at home, this pattern seems
bound to alter in future. For social, ethical and perhaps
190political reasons, it is desirable that it should. Large
numbers of single men of visibly different cultural standards 
are a threat to ethnic harmony anywhere. But admitting them 
to fuller socio-economic status in Slovenia will offend the 
prejudiced, and also have quite palpable effects on the 
ethnic composition of the republic's birth-rate.
The present state of the Slovenian immigrant community 
is already a source of grave concern to many native Slovenians. 
No data have been published, to my knowledge, about the ethnic 
structure of the immigrants. But it would seem that many of 
them are Albanians, who form in many respects - demographically,
189 Cf. the earlier discussion of the same dilemma in the 
Croatian case. Once granted minority rights, the 
immigrants could form permanent and unassimilable 
communities. One reason why official statistics are not 
reorganized to give a realistic picture of the residential 
ethnic structure of Slovenia may be that if this were done, 
it could become difficult to resist demands for the 
rigorous application of the nacionalni kljuH in the Republic.
190 The prominent Slovenian sociologist, Stane Saksida, is 
quoted in P. Stojanovid', op. cit. , as comparing the 
Slovenian immigrants with European Gastarbeiter and 
saying that 'the work force from the south of our country 
is not offered adequate living conditions in Slovenia'.
The article goes on to comment unfavourably on the 
'alienation' to which the migrants are subject, and 
mentions that Slovenian political authorities have been 
concerning themselves with the problem.
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economically, culturally - a diametrical antithesis to the 
191Slovenians. Meanwhile, Slovenian ladies are locking
192themselves nervously into their flats, and Slovenian
economic analysts are stressing that Slovenia's capacity to
take surplus labour from other regions is considerably less
19 3than it might appear.
Much of the immigration in the past appears to have
been 'elemental' and unorganized. Now that the elements
of a nationally co-ordinated internal migration policy are
becoming visible, it is possible that Slovenia will be able
to secure some restraints on further inflows. But official
policy does appear to favour some degree of greater internal
mobility at least. Moreover, Slovenia has a continuing and
194acute labour shortage. And in any case, in Yugoslav
191 I was assured by reliable sources that the Albanian 
community is substantial.
192 'It is clear that she is nationally oriented toward
Slovenia, but without any special sharpness toward the 
'south'; but the thought of danger from workers from 
the south is more compelling. That's why she mostly 
stays home in the evening... She is much more interested 
in locking the doors than in changes in the federation, 
so she does not know who the commune president is, but 
she is greatly disturbed about the question of construction 
near her home.' The above is extracted from a Yugoslav 
sociologist's composite portrait (based on survey results) 
of a type of person who has withdrawn from active political 
life. It is quoted by Sharon Zukin in her Beyond Marx 
and Tito (London, 1975), p.121. Perhaps the only comment 
that needs to be added to this eloquent pen-sketch is 
that in Slovenia, migrant workers from other republics 
form 42.4% of all employed in the construction industry.
(VUS, 1 May 1976, p.19 )
193 Cf. note 88, above.
194 According to Politika, 5 December 1975, p.14, Slovenia has 
a labour deficit of 80,000 and is prepared to accept 10,000 
workers a year from other republics. When compared with the 
figure of 6,000 cited for 1974 in note 186, above, this 
suggests that recruitment of external labour is not 
diminishing, despite the pressures to reduce it. The above 
report related to a visit to Kosovo by a Slovenian Trade 
Union delegation. The Slovenian Chamber of Commerce, it 
will be recalled (cf. note 151, above), expressed itself in 
favour of exporting capital rather than importing manpower. 
This seems to be another instance of bifurcated, or at 
least bivocal, policy. Cf. also notes 89, 90 and 150, above.
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conditions it is not always easy to control movements within 
the country. It is fortunate for the Slovenians that the 
word 'elemental' is the pejorative antonym of 'planned' in 
the Socialist vocabulary and Weltanschauung. This may enable 
them to devise some means of maintaining a degree of ethnic 
balance within their republic, and to defend the means by which 
they achieve it.
The other key ethno-demographic problems emerging 
in Yugoslavia all concern the Moslems or the Shiptars.
Accordingly, it will be useful to briefly consider the recent 
demographic development and future prospects of these two 
peoples.
Demographic statistics by nationality are very imperfect 
in Yugoslavia and always have been, particularly so in the 
case of the main Moslem groups. Census counts, both before 
and after World War II, have often striven or at least tended 
to conceal or diminish the presence of these groups, and as 
a result, it is difficult, if not impossible, to get any clear 
impression of their development over time.^^ The last Census,
195 The best approach available to Slovenia would probably be 
to adopt the Western European line of limiting further 
intake of workers on the grounds that better provision 
should first be made for those that are already there.
Politika, 9 February 1976, p.8, reports a social compact 
(druStveni dogovor) between the Slovenian trade unions, 
chamber of coirimerce and the republican government guaranteeing 
a legal minimum of decent living conditions for all workers 
'at the time of their employment'. This would obviously have 
the effect of making migrant labour more expensive and 
discouraging the inflow of the less skilled. It was evidently 
felt necessary to 'stress particularly that this compact
will not lead to Slovenia's closing in on itself'.
196 The pre-war censuses (of 1921 and 1931) deliberately 
obfuscated national affiliation for political reasons.
In each of the four post-war censuses, the Moslems have 
been recorded by radically different methodologies. As
a result, the data are not comparable. There was also 
extensive movement between the categories 'Albanian' and 
'Turk' in at least the first two post-war censuses, which, 
in combination with the substantial emigration of Turks, and 
in some cases 'Turks', to Turkey in the period up to 1965 , 
makes the statistics for both these groups rather unsatis­
factory. For an account of the methodological procedures 
employed in recording nationality at Yugoslav censuses, 
see Popis stanovni¥tva i stanova 1971, vol.l, p.XIV-XVI.
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however, was probably less imperfect than any of its predecessors
in this respect. Indeed, it was probably the nearest thing to
a free election that the Yugoslav peoples have experienced
since the 1920s. Many Moslems who had previously felt it
necessary to hide their ethnic affiliations behind one or
other of the fig-leaves that had been thrust upon them in the
19 7past, now felt able to display themselves. In the result,
the Moslem nation suddenly emerged as the strongest single
ethnic community in Bosnia and Hercegovina. Their registered
19 8numbers also showed a sharp increase in Montenegro, and may
have done so in Macedonia, were it not for local political
pressure against them to identify as anything other than 199Macedonians. How much of their registered increase in
Bosnia and Hercegovina in the post-war period has been due 
to a change in self-identification, and how much
to their more favourable fertility and migration patterns 
would be impossible to assess with precision. However, it can 
be asserted with confidence that the relative gains of the 
Moslems have been a real trend and not a purely statistical 
artifice. Though the Moslem birth rate is now declining fairly 
rapidly, it is still substantially higher than that of either 
the Serbs or the Croats in Bosnia and Hercegovina, so that the
197 It was repeatedly emphasized by the highest political 
authorities in Bosnia and Hercegovina that Moslems were 
to feel absolutely free to so identify themselves. See, 
e.g., the article by the Bosnian party secretary, Ilamdija 
Pozderac, in Komunist, 4 March 1971.
198 Cf. Table 10, Appendix C.
199 In the 1948 census, 37,000 Slavonic Macedonians identified 
their religion as Islam. These people have not emerged 
(or been permitted to emerge) as Moslems at subsequent 
censuses, as might have been expected by analogy with the 
situation in Bosnia and Hercegovina. For an account
of their ethnic make-up and some of the pressures to 
which they have been subjected, see Mustafa Imamovic 
'Nesporazumi oko Muslimana', Gledista, 1971, no.2, 
p.247. For the Macedonian view, see Nova Makedonija,
21 January and 14 February 1971.
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relative advantage of the Moslems is bound to go on 
increasing in the f u t u r e . I t  is also, of course, quite 
likely that more of them remain concealed as 'Yugoslavs', 
or even as Serbs, and that these people too may one day feel 
emboldened to declare themselves. Very large numbers of Serbs 
and Croats have left Bosnia and Hercegovina to settle in
2 01Serbia and Vojvodina and Croatia respectively in this century.
The indications are that this trend is continuing, and that
the relative strength of Serbs and Croats will be further
diminished as a result. Moreover, while being the largest
of the three main ethnic groups, the Moslems made the smallest
contribution both to inter-republican and external emigration
2 02from Bosnia and Hercegovina. Given the combined effects
of all these factors, it seems quite conceivable that at some 
stage in the future the Moslems will advance from their present 
40% of the republic's population to becoming an absolute 
majority. In modern times, the Serbs have tended to assume 
that they were the majority nation in Bosnia and Hercegovina.
It is possible that this assumption contributed to the decision 
to colonize Vojvodina with (among other people) Bosnian 
Serbs after World War II. If so, a serious strategic
200 Cf. footnote 12, above.
201 The numbers involved could not be quantified with any 
worthwhile degree of precision, but certainly run into
the hundreds of thousands (without the recurring echo effects 
of transferred fertility). Cf. notes 28 to 30, above.
202 At least until 1961, the net outflow of Moslems from 
Bosnia and Hercegovina seems to have been negligible (cf. 
note 29, above). The 1971 Census results still suggest 
very modest net migratory outflows of Moslems from Bosnia 
and Hercegovina to Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, but it is 
possible that their numbers are now growing, and are 
simply not adequately registered owing to the 'permanent 
residence' criterion. One estimate in 1970 put the total 
number of Moslems living in Slovenia and Croatia at 
100,000 (VUS, 22 July 1970, p.22). A letter-writer to
Vjesnik (7 May 1971) claimed there were over 100,000 
Moslems in Croatia alone. According to the Census results, 
there were only 18,457 in Croatia and 3,231 in Slovenia. 
(Popis stanovniKtva i stanova 1971, vol.l, pp.24, 32.
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miscalculation was involved. The hold on Vojvodina was
strengthened, but at the cost of demographic dominance in
Bosnia. Like the Russians, the Serbs do not seem to have
the numbers or the demographic or cultural dynamism to cement
an empire. It really would appear that the republic of Bosnia
and Hercegovina presents a case in which ethnically differentiated
trends of fertility and migration have laid the foundations
for a transfer of power from one ethnic group to another.
Whether that transfer will take place remains of course to
be seen. Certainly the one-time dominance of the Serb element
in the republican party organization has been and is being
20 3greatly weakened; and presumably this process may go further
yet, as the Serbs are still overrepresented in the party as
i i 204 a whole.
The position of Bosnia and Hercegovina in the 
Yugoslav state is crucial. Any partition of Yugoslavia, or 
division of the country into Western 'Catholic' and Eastern 
'Orthodox' (or 'capitalist' and 'communist') spheres of 
influence, whether carried out by internal or external agents, 
would have to find some way of solving the problem of Bosnia 
and Hercegovina. Both of the main antagonists, the Croats 
and the Serbs, would probably claim it all, and any division 
of the spoils would leave both sides aggrieved. Both the
203 Shoup gives the following figures for the numbers of
Serbs and 'Yugoslavs' in the 1948, 1954, 1959 and 1963 
Bosnia and Hercegovina Central Committees: 31 and 5;
46 and 6; 49 and 7; 52 and 5. There were, in addition,
1,3,6 and 8 Moslems who gave their nationality as 'Serbian' 
in those same successive Central Committees. P. Shoup, 
Communism and the Yugoslav National Question, pp.277-78.
A name-count ty the author) of the 1974 Bosnia and Hercegovina 
Central Committee suggests that over one-third (a possible 
35 out of 93) are Moslems (see the list in Komunist,
1 April 1974, p.ll).
204 As of the first half of 1973, there were 75,515 Serbs,
43,709 Moslems and 15,716 Croats in the total membership 
of 143,577 (ibid)♦ In 1971, Moslems formed 39.6%,
Serbs 37.2% and Croats 20.6% of the Republican population.
See Table 10, Appendix C.
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Croat and Serb populations of the republic are concentrated 
to a large extent far away from the heartlands of the metropolitan 
republic. Bosnia and Hercegovina is inoperable. The emergence 
of the Moslems as the dominant ethno-demographic group in the 
area represents a great threat to Serb and Croat chauvinists 
alike. However, for all that it will place a severe strain 
on inter-ethnic relations in the Republic itself, it does 
paradoxically at the same time represent a ray of hope for the 
Yugoslav Federation. Serb and Croat nationalists would never 
agree about Bosnia and Hercegovina and would be (and are) 
dissatisfied by any arrangement that is struck. With the 
Moslems the largest single community there, and possibly one 
day to become an absolute majority, both are thwarted, and 
their claims to hegemony seem a little less justified and 
justifiable. Either side might, moreover, find it easier 
to reconcile itself to a common misfortune than one inflicted 
on it by the main adversary. Thus a Moslem majority in Bosnia 
and Hercegovina may strengthen the hand of moderate Serbs and 
Croats in the Republic. And in a post-Tito setting, the role 
of the Moslems as compromise custodians of positions of power 
at the Federal level may also become more significant, as the 
Moslem Bijedii's lengthy tenure of the Premiership possibly 
suggests.
Outside Bosnia and Hercegovina (apart from the
Macedonian communities) the main concentrations of Moslems are
in the SandYak area of Serbia and the adjoining communes over
the border in Montenegro, where, until the last Census, their
relative strength had been almost totally suppressed by
official statistics. In several communes they are in a
majority, and their overall strength is probably still greater
than the most recent data suggest. DraYa Mihajlovic, the
Cetnik leader, was apparently planning to somehow dispose of
2 0 5this pocket of Moslem strength; and its strategic significance
205 On Mihajlovic's plans, see M. Had£i j ahic^ , 'Krivo svedocanstvo' 
VUS, 26 August 1970. During the Second World War, the 
Sandzak area was the centre of particularly confused and 
violent exchanges between various armies and local bands 
of ethnic militants. Cetnik and Moslem detachments 
were particularly heavily involved in communal reprisals
in the area. See S. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia (London, 1971),
Ch. 3.
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has probably, for demographic reasons, increased since his
time. The once ostensibly homogeneous Montenegrin republic,
with its large and growing Moslem and Albanian minorities,
and its own considerable exodus of Montenegrins (despite their
relatively high - though declining - fertility, the absolute
number of Montenegrins actually decreased within Montenegro
between the last two censuses, mainly due to changes in
ethnic self-identification, but also due to differential
20 6fertility and emigration to Serbia) now seems much less of 
an impenetrable fortress than it did formerly. And any renewed 
elaboration of what might be described as the Belgrade-Bar 
connection within Yugoslav politics could not rejoice at having 
in its intestines a wide band of territory that was largely 
peopled by an official Yugoslav nation with a republican 
stronghold of its own, and no particular sympathy for Serbo- 
Montenegrin interests. If the Moslems did acquire a controlling 
interest in Bosnia and Hercegovina, in the event of an ugly 
crisis threatening to lead to Yugoslavia's disintegration, a 
humane population exchange might then be possible that would 
inter alia achieve Mihajlovic's objectives. It is a remote 
possibility, and one may hope that the contingency should not 
arise; but it would be even more remote were a Moslem Bosnia 
and Hercegovina never to crystallize.
Albanian fertility is now beginning to fall, but is
still very high. For some time now, the differential population
growth rates between Shiptar and non-Shiptar populations
207have been enormous. The Albanians' share of the total
population of Yugoslavia is increasing rapidly and will continue 
to do so. In 1971, a group of researchers published a remarkable 
set of population projections by republic (province) and
206 They were 383,988 (81.4% of the total) in 1961, and only 
355,608 (67.1%) in 1971, 'Nacionalni sastav stanovni^tva 
po op^tinama', Statistijki bilten 727 , April 1972 , p.8.
207 See Table 4, Appendix C, and notes 8 to 11, above.
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20 8nationality to the year 2030. According to these projections,
by 2030, the Albanians would constitute 16% of the total
population (compared with 4.9% in 1961); and according to one
variant of their republican projections, the Kosovo Autonomous
Province would number 6,769,000 in 2030 compared with 964,000
in 1961. As Kosovo is already the most densely populated
region, the pressures that would result from anything even
remotely approaching such a build-up would obviously be
enormous. As the authors commented in their accompanying
text: 'What repercussions all this will have had on earlier
ethnic and republican borders, on the living standards of
individual ethnic groups, and on relations between those groups,
209the future will reveal'.
The increase in the Moslem population projected by
210the group was an unwitting underestimate. Even so, they
anticipated that the combined strength of Moslems and (the 
largely Mohammedan) Albanians by 2030 would be 25%. Clearly 
Yugoslav politics would be transformed by such a development.
The methodology of the group was faulty; and 
tendentious (no one in the group appeared to be either an 
Albanian or a Moslem). The effect of their methodological 
procedures was undoubtedly to inflate the estimated future 
number of Shiptars. The scientific wisdom of taking any
208 Zarkovic, N. Stojkov, G. Todorovic" and M. (irjana) 
Dzumhur, Projekcije stanovni^tva SFR Jugoslavije po 
republikama i narodnostima do 2030 godine (Sarajevo, 1971). 
The book was given prominence in at least the Slovenian 
and Croatian press. See Vjesnik, 14 August 1971, and 
Tovari^, 30 August 1971.
v /  ^209 Zarkovic et al., op.cit., p.83.
210 They derived their figure for the Moslems from the 1961 
Census results which, as later became apparent, greatly 
underestimated their real numbers. In consequence their 
projection for the Moslems for the year 2000 was only 
slightly higher than the figure revealed by the 1971 
Census. But they continued extrapolating very rapid (and 
almost certainly unrealistic) increase rates for them to 
2030 . Ibid., p.81.
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demographic projections more than 30 years into the future
211is in any case extremely dubious. Nonetheless, the
projections do serve to bring out the seriousness of the 
changes that are taking place: both their objective
seriousness, and the degree of anxiety felt about them by 
members of the 'declining' ethnic groups.
Even without extending projections too far into 
the future, and even allowing for further and fairly rapid 
decline in Albanian fertility, it is certain that some major 
shifts will occur. In Yugoslavia as a whole, for example, it 
is obvious that the Albanians will overhaul the Slovenians (as 
the Moslems have already done) and distance their particular 
rivals, the Macedonians. These developments can be confidently 
expected within a decade. Let us, therefore, concentrate our 
attention on that closer perspective, and consider the Albanian 
problem in its concrete regional setting.
First of all, the Albanian hold on the medieval 
centre of Serbian civilization, Kosovo, has now been strengthened 
to the point where it can no longer really be in doubt.
The Serbs have probably never been a majority there in modern 
times, despite the efforts to colonize the area in this century. 
And now the fertility scissors and the high emigration of
211 The projections by nationality were based on crude 
assumptions about future trends in natural increase 
rates, and assume that even in 2030, Albanian and Moslem 
natural increase rates will be much higher (17% and 
11%) than those of the other ethnic groups. Their 
republican projections assumed no decline in the fertility 
of the more fertile after the year 2000 on the strange 
logic that as this decline could not be foreseen so far 
in advance, it would be better not to make any assumptions 
about it. And while they refer to their estimates as 
projections, they speak about them constantly as though 
they were ineluctable certainties which could only be 
forestalled by vigorous policy interventions. See especially 
pp 2 0 and ff., 79.
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Serbs from the area are ensuring that Albanian dominance
will go on increasing by leaps and bounds. At the 1961
Census, the Albanians were 69% and the Serbs 24% of the
population. By 1971, their respective proportions had become
74% and 18% respectively. The absolute Serbian numbers
are stagnating, despite a Serbian birth rate in Kosovo that
212is well in excess of the Serbian national average. In May
1968 the prominent Serbian author, Dobrica Cosic, and the 
historian, Jovan Marjanovic", were summarily removed from the 
Serbian Central Committee for attempting to raise, among
213other matters, the question of the Serbian exodus from Kosovo. 
Both had prior 'records' as Serbian nationalists, and it is 
possible that their expulsion was effectively for an accumulation 
of offences, and not just for that particular episode. However, 
it is easy to see their point of view in some measure; and 
hard to see, on the other hand, how a situation could have been 
long maintained in which the nationalist concerns of the 
largest national group were a grounds for excommunication, 
whilst elsewhere the party organs of the smaller republics 
were in some cases consecrating nationalist arguments as 
party orthodoxy.
The Serbian decline in Kosovo seems bound to continue 
until their proportion of the population falls below 10%.
Not long ago they were a disproportionately influential one
212 The complete stagnation of the Serbian population in
Kosovo (227,000 in 1961, 228,000 in 1971), in combination 
with the relatively higher fertility of the Serbs in the 
area (GFR 130 in 1961, cf. 75 for Yugoslavia as a ^ 
whole in the same year, (Fertilitet zenskog stanovnistva 
1950-1967, p.22) suggests either high emigration, or 
changes Tn ethnic self-identification, or both. The 1971 
Census recorded a net migratory balance of 49,000 Serbs 
from Kosovo (plus 6,000 Montenegrins from Kosovo), cf. 
note 28, above. See also 'Uzroci migracije stanovnistva', 
Politika, 22 June 1971, transl. in Osteuropa, vol.XXII 
(1972), no.3, p.A196-97.
213 Borba, 30 May 1968.
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quarter, with much higher representation than that in the
party and all other important spheres of life. Now the hold
of ethnic Albanians over the local party organization is
214secure, and likely to strengthen further with time.
This remarkable transformation raises the question of how long
Kosovo can be held down to its present status of Autonomous
Province within the Republic of Serbia, and the Albanians to
their status of narodnost (as opposed to narod), in the face
of local pressures for recognition as a Republic and greater 215autonomy. The reasons for denying them that status are being
stripped of their plausibility all the time by the Shiptar's
great demographic dynamism. Soon they will be the fourth most
numerous ethnic group in Yugoslavia and their province the
fourth most populous territorial unit. In this context, it
is relevant to ask what may be the long-term consequences
216of the Kosovo authorities' rapprochement with Tirana.
It is also highly apposite to the Kosovo question that the 
Albanians are making similar silent conquests in the adjoining 
Republic of Macedonia. Let us turn to review the situation 
there.
214 In 1953, Serbs and Albanians made up 38.5% and 46.8% 
of Kosovo's party membership respectively. In 1968, 
the figures had become 31.4% and 54.9%, and in 1973,
26.51% and 61.49%. The Albanian component in central 
party organs in Kosovo in 1974 ranged between 2/3 and 
3/4. Between 1968 and 1972, party membership in the 
province actually dropped from 50,316 to 43,916.
Presumably Serbs made up a large proportion of the drop­
outs and expellees. See Shoup, op.cit., p.272; and 
Komunist, 1 April 1974. See also note 167, above.
215 On the development of republican and autonomist
aspirations, see R. King, Minorities under Communism, 
esp. p.137 and ff.; and L~ Zanga, 'Jugoslawische
Nationalitätenpolitik im Fall Kosovo', Osteuropa, XXV 
(1975), p.503. The 1974 Constitution goes some of the way 
towards granting Kosovo republican status. Meanwhile 
autonomist pressures continue, e.g., for further increasing 
the status of the Albanian language within the province, 
and for preventing any discrimination against people who
do not know Serbo-Croatian. See Politika, 6 March 1976, p.6.
216 These aspects of the problem will be further discussed in 
section 5.f, below.
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In 1961, the Albanians formed 13% of the Macedonian
republic's population, whilst their total numbers in Yugoslavia
as a whole were below that of the Macedonians. By 1971, there
were 1,310,000 Albanians in Yugoslavia as compared with 1,195,000
Macedonians, and their percentage of the Macedonian Republic's
population had increased to 17%, while the Macedonians had
declined from 71% to 69%. In the immediate post-war period,
Macedonian fertility was also very high, but it has now
fallen very rapidly to something little above replacement
level. Albanian fertility meanwhile remains high and a period
of sharply differential ethnic growth has thus been set in 
217motion. This raises a particularly disturbing prospect
in the western communes, including the area around the capital
of Skopje. In some of these communes, the Albanians form a
large majority. Their areas of settlement form a kind of
pincer fcrmation threatening Skopje, in which city they already
have a substantial minority. The Turks of Macedonia, despite
considerable emigration to Turkey up until the most recent
218period, are also displaying great demographic resilience.
217 Cf. footnote 11, above. In 1972, there were less than 
twice as many Macedonians born in Macedonia as Albanians: 
20,751 Macedonians, and 11,323 Albanians (Demografska 
statistika 1972, p.147). By contrast, the 1971 Census 
revealed for the age-group 20-24, that there were more 
than five times as many Macedonians as Albanians in the 
Republic (110,746 as against 21,674), Popis stanovni^tva 
i stanova 1971, vol.l, p.28. Thus within a generation,
a cohort ratio of more than 5 to 1 will be replaced by 
one of less than 2 to 1 in schools, on the labour market, 
etc.
218 The Turks' absolute numbers declined substantially 
during the inter-cen sal period 1961-71, but it is likely 
that their total was overstated in 1961, as a result of 
Albanians giving their nationality as Turkish in order to 
facilitate emigration to Turkey. It is not clear how 
much emigration to Turkey is still going on. In the 
period after 1965, Turks from Macedonia would have been 
more likely to emigrate to Western Europe. In any case, 
over 57,000 of their total of 108,552 in Macedonia are 
under the age of 20, which is suggestive of a continuing 
demographic vigour. Cf. note 220, below. There may also be a large (and rapidly growing) number of Gipsies in Macedonia who would welcome recognition as a distinct ethnic group. Cf. note 385, below.
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It seems quite likely that more of them could ultimately be
assimilated by the Albanians than by the Macedonians, since
they share with the former their Moslem faith and a similar
socio-economic pattern, as well as being concentrated 
, • • , 218ageographically m  the same areas. The Macedonians are thus
faced with a serious and (literally) growing national minority 
problem, one that is complicated by the fact that the 'minority' 
is really an overwhelming majority in the area adjacent to 
the potentially irredentist country, Albania. Threatened by 
Bulgarian ambitions under possible Soviet sponsorship from 
one side, the Macedonians are exposed to an equal or possibly 
even greater potential pressure from the Albanians in the 
West. Albania has a somewhat comic-opera standing in the 
eyes of most students of world affairs. It should, therefore, 
be recalled, perhaps, that the total population of Albanians 
in the Balkans is now well in excess of 4 million: that 
that population is neatly concentrated in and just adjacent to 
the borders of the Albanian state; and that it can be 
confidently anticipated that by the end of this century, the 
total numbers of Albanians will be approaching the present 
numbers of Bulgarians, Greeks or Serbs. Other factors may 
limit its strategic capacity; but the demographic factor 
seems to be laying the foundation for Albania's ultimate 
emergence on the Balkan scene as a country of a significance 
more comparable with that of its neighbours. Both Serbia 
(or Serbo-Montenegro) and Macedonia are threatened by this 
foreshadowed development. The Serbs will probably have to 
accept defeat in Kosovo, indeed perhaps have already done so, 
up to a point. But the Macedonians can scarcely afford any 
such magnanimity. It is not accidental, to borrow a phrase, 
that the most resolutely and unapologetically Malthusian
demographic commentators in Yugoslavia today are Macedonians. 21(
218a Cf. note 168, above.
219 Cf. note 266, below.
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Macedonia's tenuous grasp on statehood is under growing pressure.
The distribution of the Albanian minority within the republic
makes border adjustments an extremely painful prospect, and
one that any Macedonian politicians will probably always reject.
With their own demographic resources they will be unable to
counter the Albanian advance. Even an effective differential
population policy starting to work well immediately would not
do more than mitigate the problem, and resettlement schemes
could scarcely achieve more. Emigration of the remaining Turks
220might help slightly, but the numbers of Macedonians available 
for settlement in their place are necessarily limited. If, 
in this situation, Albanian agitation within the Yugoslav 
Federation for a readjustment of boundaries in favour of Kosovo 
were ever to gather strength, the Macedonians might conceivably 
feel pushed in the direction of a flirtation with the Bulgarians, 
who have a similar problem with Moslem minorities and a similar 
attitude towards them. Moreover, the Bulgarians have some 
spare Macedonians (though they are at present pretending not 
to have), and could in any case serve to provide a powerful 
counterweight to the Albanians. The only danger, from a
220 Between 1960 and 1966 (inclusive) 42,607 of the
registered total of 73,291 official emigrants were 
headed for Turkey. The largest single number (14,528) 
left for Turkey in 1960 (Migracije stanovnistva 
Jugoslavije, p.89). Presumably emigration to Turkey 
would continue to be included in 'official' emigration 
statistics. (In any case, Turkey is not listed as a 
recipient of 'temporary' emigrants from Yugoslavia in 
the 1971 Census results). That being so, it may be 
relevant to note that official emigration has tailed 
off to virtually nothing since 1969 (514 in 1971, 262 
in 1972, Demografska statistika 1972, p.29). The Turkish 
government is in any case unlikely to welcome immigrants 
from any source at present, as they have their own 
severe 'returnee' problem, and are already accepting 
some Turks from Bulgaria (about whom they seem to have 
some political and economic reservations). See RFE 
Research Bulgaria/28, 16 October 1969 , and Bulgarian 
Situation Report/lT7 28 April 1976, p.5.
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Macedonian point of view, would be whether such a counterweight
221might not be positively crushing. Here again, we are
looking rather a long way ahead. But that may be what some 
Macedonians are doing.
Meanwhile the Macedonian^ in striking contrast to 
the seven times more numerous Serbs, have been rather stern 
with their national minorities. Before the 1971 Census, they 
announced firmly and repeatedly that none of their Macedonian­
speaking Moslems felt any kinship with the newly emergent 
nation of Yugoslav Moslems; meanwhile, the party line 
in Bosnia and Hercegovina was affirming that absolutely no 
restrictions were to be placed on the right of those of
222Moslem ethno-cultural origins to so identify themselves.
The numbers of Macedonian Slavonic Moslems who would wish
separate ethnic identity for themselves may not be very 
2 2 3great. But their repression by the Macedonian authorities
221 Compare the discussion in 5.f, below.
222 The Macedonians were opposed to the emergence of a 
Moslem nation in Bosnia and Hercegovina and Yugoslavia, 
presumably because it would diminish their relative 
standing in the federation, as well as complicating 
their internal policy towards Slavonicf (and possibly 
other) Moslems in Macedonia itself. Cf. note 199, above. 
See also, Borba, 12 September 1970, Nova Macedonia,
24 December 1970, and 'Muslimani: nacija ili vera?',
NIN, 7 February 1971.
223 Supposing that the 1948 Census figure of 37,000 Slavonic 
Moslems in Macedonia represented something like a full 
count, and supposing that some thousands emigrated to 
Turkey (as suggested by Imanovic in 'Nesporazumi oko 
Muslimana', cited in note 199, above), their numbers 
might now be somewhere around 50,000. Some may not be 
identifying themselves for Census purposes as Macedonians. 
But few are in any case stating that they are ethnic 
Moslems; 3,002 in 1961, 1,248 in 1971 CNacionalni 
sastav stanovnistva po opStinama', p.9). These figures
in fact seem scarcely sufficient to account for Bosnian 
or Sandzak Moslems who have migrated to Macedonia.
(The 1971 Census results indicate that of Macedonia's 
1,248 Moslems, 987 are immigrants to the republic 
(Po)pis stanovnistva i stanova 1971, vol.l, p.80).
Until a census without political pressures is conducted 
in Macedonia, the 'true' number of Moslems will remain 
something of an enigma.
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is at least symptomatic of the latter's ethno-demographic 
anxieties.^  ^
Thus recapitulating the overall picture, we have 
the Slovenians and Croats with low fertility and severe 
migratory imbalances, and a consequent anxiety about national 
survival and the future ethnic composition of their republics; 
bloodless transformations in Bosnia and Hercegovina and the 
Autonomous Province of Kosovo, both at the expense of the 
largest Yugoslav nationality, the Serbs; the stirings of 
what may some day become a more severe problem in Montenegro; 
and a crisis situation building up in Macedonia. Serbia 
proper and the Province of the Vojvodina are the only areas 
in which demographic change - though acutely alarming to 
many Serbs (and Hungarians) is not obviously a serious 
destabilizing influence on the tenuous local calm of ethnic 
relations.
At the level of the Federation also, serious
adjustments will be necessary if conflict is to be avoided
in the future. Several of the regional ethno-demographic
problems have international implications of great potential 
2 2 5gravity. And it seems obvious that as time goes on,
either the Moslems and Albanians will be accepted into 
progressively more equal partnership with the Slavonic 
'Christians', or trouble will brew. Should the Serbs (with or 
without Montenegrin co-operation) or the Croats ever choose
224 It is also possible that the Macedonians are eager to 
forestall any claim to ethnic separateness by Moslem 
Macedonians in Bulgaria. Just after the war, the Bulgarian 
authorities published data suggesting that there were 
32,399 Macedonian, 3,184 Bulgarian, 3,735 Mohammedan- 
Macedonian, and 385 Turkish children attending school in 
the area of Bulgaria known as Pirin Macedonia. These 
figures would seem to imply that some 10% of the Bulgarian 
Macedonians were Moslems. The proportion may well have 
increased since. 'Na silu Bugari', NIN, 28 December 
1975 , p.38 at p.39.
Compare the discussion in 5.f., below.225
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to defend their threatened ethno-national interests by 
political or other coercion, the ultimate consequences for 
Yugoslavia and the world would indeed be difficult to 
foresee.
5.e Ideology
In the initial post-war years, Yugoslavia took
over the entire Soviet ideological corpus with virtually
no modification. Even after the break with Stalin in 1948,
the Yugoslavs strove for some time to be more doctrinally
pure than their excommunicators. The subsequent growth of
self-management, non-alignment and other heresies in the
1950s, however, does not seem to have initially affected
the official approach to population questions, which remained
orthodoxly Stalinist. Thus, in the late 1950s, we still
find newspaper articles with titles like 'We're living six
years longer', °, 'A land of young people' or 'The
dynamism of the contemporary Yugoslav; our population
2 2 8growing more strongly all the time':
Data from the field of vital statistics are ,
encouraging, for they prove that the post-war 
development and growth of our population are 
marked by a progressive upsurge... Yugoslavia 
belongs to a group of countries of exceptionally 
high natality, occupying in this respect second
place in Europe.229
In fact, in the year in which these words were 
written, three of Yugoslavia's eight republics and provinces 
already had Net Reproduction Ratios below replacement level
226 '2ivimo Mest godina du^e', Vjesnik, 3 June 1957.
227 'Zemlja mladih ljudi', Vjesnik, 18 August 1957.
228 'Dinamizam savremenog Jugoslovena: sve jaHe kretanje
naSeg stanovniMtva', Oslobodjenje, 12 July 1959.
229 Vjesnik, 18 August 1957.
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2 30(Croatia, Serbia proper and the Vojvodina). But even
when pockets of the 'white plague' were perceived and
acknowledged to exist, it was held nonetheless that there
'diminution of natality and depopulation have remained as
2 31a grave legacy (teMko nasledje) of the past'.
By the early 1960s, however, an awareness was
beginning to grow that the old verities were of limited
cognitive and practical value. Concern about demographic
problems increased. In 1962, an Institute for Demographic
Research was established in Belgrade, and early in 1963 there
appeared the first issue of a quarterly demographic journal,
StanovniMtvo. Both of these developments were explained in
terms of 'the seriousness and complexity of the present
2 32demographic situation'. As the old beliefs faded, a more
down-to-earth and empirical approach took their place.
Similar developments occurred at about the same time in some 
other European Socialist countries, and later, to a considerable 
extent, in the Soviet Union itself. But the Yugoslavs 
are probably justified in claiming that 'while the dogmatic 
approach to problems of population and employment did not 
bypass our country either, we did free ourselves of it
230 Savezni zavod za statistiku, Fertilitet zenskog 
stanovnistva 1950-1967 (Belgrade, 1971), p.18.
231 Oslobodj enje, 12 July 1959 .
232 From an editorial note appended to the first issue of 
Stanovni^tvo, in which the reasons for its formation 
were outlined. An item in the same issue gave a similar 
explanation for the decision to establish the Centre
for Demographic Research, mentioning both 'inherited' 
and 'new' demographic problems that Yugoslavia was 
confronted with, and emphasizing, among other things, 
the regrettable divergences in demographic behaviour 
arising in different regions of the country. See 
Stanovni^tvo, vol.I, no.l, p.134.
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more quickly and radically than the other socialist 
countries'.233
This proposition needs to be qualified, however.
A distinction has to be drawn between the official approach 
to domestic and international population problems.
Domestically, very little remains of the old mercantilist and 
anti-Malthusian attitudes. For international consumption, 
however, after a phase of neo-Malthusianism, the Yugoslav line 
is again Marxist and anti-Malthusian. Accordingly our 
discussion of Yugoslav demographic ideology shall differentiate 
between these two planes.
Domestically, since the repudiation of the Stalinist
law of population under Socialism, it has been accepted that
rapid population growth is neither inevitable in Socialist
countries in general, nor in fact actually happening in the 
2 34Yugoslav case. It is no longer maintained or implied that 
there are any important and inherent differences between 
demographic processes in socialist and non-socialist countries. 
Insofar as pockets of high natural increase still exist in 
Yugoslavia, or insofar as the echoes of past natality booms 
continue to plague the labour market, it is conceded that 
this is not an advantage. Socialism is not held to automatically 
ensure full and efficient employment; and the potential
233 T. Mulina, 'Tretman stanovniKtva i radne snage u kontekstu 
privrednog razvoja Jugoslavije', Belgrade Population 
Policy Conference 1973, mimeographed paper, p.2. As 
Mulina himself has pointed out, however, having freed 
themselves of Stalinist dogma on employment, the Yugoslav 
authorities succumbed to an antithetical tendency to 
blithely ignore the social consequences of imposing 
tighter criteria for labour productivity on a country 
with surplus labour power and a demographic boom of 
school-leavers. Cf. the discussion in 5.b., above.
234 In 1964, the party daily Borba devoted a lengthy round­
table discussion to the declining birth rate. See 
'Za£to opada natalitet', Borba, 2 and 3 February 1964.
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conflict between high employment and low efficiency is an
issue that is always more or less squarely faced. The old
mercantilist hostility to emigration has largely vanished,
though traces of it do appear at times in the officially-
sponsored campaign to draw the economic emigrants of the last
decade back into the fold of Yugoslav society. Stupendous
or exceptional advances in life expectancy are no longer
claimed or expected, and public attention is just as likely
to be focussed on increases in mortality in certain male
age-groups, or on the relatively high rates of infant mortality
that still persist in some parts of the country. In a word,
2 35myths have been supplanted by pragmatic good sense.
Official interest in population theory at the
domestic level remains low, however. The Stalinist doctrine
on population has not been succeeded by anything either as
primitive or as coherent. And while some demographers
2 3 6seem prepared to explore the void that has been left, 
it would not appear that leading Party figures or theorists 
have any such ambitions. Rather than an official theory 
of population, we now have official theories about various 
matters pertaining to population. Received views on such 
questions as the family, abortion and contraception, sex 
education, the role of women in society and the home or the 
administration of social policy have all undergone considerable
change in recent years, but in no case does it appear that
235 Here, of course, one is speaking of non-specialist 
comment in the media. As the 1960s advanced, its 
celebratory, propagandist content declined, and the 
terse, sober judgements of technical demographers 
became more and more prominent.
See, e.g., J. Klauzer, 'Jedan aspekt ocenjivanja 
potrebe za populacionom politikom u Jugoslaviji', 
Stanovni^tvo, vol.VI (1968), nos 1-2, p.5 at pp.7-8.
236
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numerical demographic concerns were a decisive factor in
237determining the direction of change.
As in the case of the Soviet Union, it is intriguing
to speculate on whether this relative reticence is due rather
to a lack of demographic interest or understanding on the
part of the authorities (and a relegation of demographic
matters to a relatively low level of priority), or to their
sense that these issues are so potentially divisive that it
were better to keep them out of ideological discussions and
decision-making as far as possible. While demographic trends
and indeed a rubric known as 'population policy' now figure
2 38prominently in Yugoslav planning documents, the demographic
element has been largely absent from current political debates
and press reporting on economic problems, regional development
2 39and differentiation, etc.-at least since 1972 . Given the
237 Here, emigration and employment policies constitute
a partial exception. The reversal on emigration policy 
after 1972 was to some extent motivated by demographic concerns - the anxieties of particular republics and 
ethnic groups about their shrinking substance, and of the military about their declining manpower. Similarly, 
employment policy in recent years has been more closely 
geared to soaking up some of the labour surplus. But 
in both cases such action was overdue and politically 
imperative. No particular demographic insight or 
viewpoint was required on the part of the decision­
makers. Nor were their actions justified in terms of any 
notions about 'socialist' population trends or values.
238 The draft Long-term Development Plan of Yugoslavia to 
1985 (published as a supplement to Borba, 26 October 1974) 
contains a section entitled 'Population and Employment', 
and a sub-section within that entitled 'The Basis of 
Population Policy'.
239 For a dramatic illustration of the change in tone that
occurred in the press after 1971, compare, for example, 
the article 'Rubrika: nacionalnost' (VUS, 7 June 1972)
with almost any article on demographic themes published 
in the same weekly over the period 1970-71. From one or 
two hints contained in the later article it emerges 
clearly that inflammatory nationalist writing about
Croatian demographic problems had in the meantime been 
simply banned. Some academic observers on the other hand 
have continued after 1971 to stress the demographic element 
in economic problems. See footnotes 263, 264 and 266, 
below.
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density and passion of the demographic reporting in 1971 
(the year both of the nationalities crisis focused in Croatia 
and the last census), this seems to confirm that enforced 
self-restraint on these issues is at least an implicit element 
in the compact struck between regional interests in the 
aftermath of Tito's letter of September 1972. It is particularly 
significant that in recent years the party daily and weekly,
Borba and Kommunist, have contained very few feature articles 
on demographic problems. Thus the vagueness and implicit 
nature of domestic population doctrine probably indicates 
above all a desire by the authorities to maintain an ideological 
stance broad enough to straddle all Yugoslavia's competing 
ethnic and regional particularisms. This conclusion is 
reinforced by a consideration of the official approach to 
global population problems, as we shall now see.^^
At the international level, official doctrines on
population have been rather more explicit and clear-cut.
By the 1960s, Yugoslavia was following policies that were
clearly divergent from those of Soviet bloc countries and
rather more attuned to prevailing sentiment in the leading
2 42non-aligned nations, notably Egypt and India. While not
240 This same conclusion is also supported by a consideration 
of trends in domestic population policies at the federal 
and republican levels. See 5.g., below.
241 For a Yugoslav perspective on the development of inter­
national co-operation (and conflict) in the population 
sphere, see Hristina Pop-Antoska, 'Razvoj pogleda na 
populacionu politiku sa osvrtom na planiranje porodice 
u Ujedinjenim Nacijama' (sic) , Na£e teme, 1974 , no.4, 
p. 603 .
242 Tito cultivated particularly close relations with Nehru 
and Nasser, together with whom he formed at one time a 
kind of Big Three of the non-aligned world. As both Egypt 
and India were particularly plagued by population pressures, 
and among the first Third World countries to recognize
the fact, it seems likely that Tito and Yugoslavia's conversion to neo-Malthusianism in the 1960s stemmed partly 
from their influence.
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24 3sharing their neo-Malthusian alarms for domestic purposes,
the Yugoslav government, and President Tito personally, became
involved with Third World countries and leaders engaged in
efforts to make the family planning movement fully respectable,
and to secure international financial and technical assistance
for it. Tito was an original signatory (and the only Socialist
signatory) of the Statement by Heads of State on Population
issued by the UN Secretary U Thant on 10 December 1966.
This document, prepared at the initiative of Mr John D.
Rockefeller of the Population Council, and also signed by,
among others, Mrs Ghandi and President Nasser, was markedly
neo-Malthusian in vocabulary and sentiment. After first briefly
characterizing the unique character of the modern population
explosion, the Statement declared firstly, that population
problems must be treated as 'a principal element' in economic
management; secondly, that the right to decide on numbers and
spacing of children was a 'basic human right'; thirdly, that
international peace depended on a solution being found to 'the
challenge of population growth'; and fourthly, that the
objective of family planning was the enrichment of human244life, not its restriction.
By the time of the 3rd UN World Population Conference 
held in Bucharest in 1974, however, the official Yugoslav 
position had been transformed. In official statements made 
in connection with the Conference, the neo-Malthusian concern 
and emphasis on international co-operation of the 1966 Statement
243 It is not to be excluded that Yugoslavia's international 
neo-Malthusian contacts (coupled with the urban labour 
surplus making itself felt at about the same time, in the 
mid-1960s) did give a considerable fillip to the Yugoslav 
family planning movement, which established itself during 
this period as the pressure group most influential in determining the direction of Yugoslav domestic population 
policies. Cf. 5.g., below.
244 For a complete text of the Statement, see Studies in 
Family Planning no.16 (January 1967).
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are replaced by anti-Malthusianism and a clear orientation
towards the more radical and confrontationist Third World 245countries. Family planning, while still held to be an
inalienable human right, is no longer regarded as having a
'principal' role to play in economic development. The central
problem, it is maintained, is to achieve a more equitable
distribution of wealth within the international community.
Population is scarcely mentioned at all, and then only in
later paragraphs, in a fading, deprecating inflection. It
is suggested that population problems will only be solved
when 'the root of all evil', the neo-colonial system, is
246radically transformed. There is even a slight tendency
to treat the Third World population explosion as a kind of 
bargaining counter.
The reasons for this marked change of line are, of
course, political rather than intellectual. At the time of
the 1966 Statement, relations between Western neo-Malthusians
and Third World governments concerned about domestic population
growth rates were just beginning to flourish. Governments
and international agencies everywhere seemed to be overcoming
their past resistance to the idea of world-wide fertility247control campaigns. Since that time, however, the climate
245 See, for example, President Tito's message to the 
Bucharest Conference (UN World Population Conference 
Press Release POP/CONF/IO August 19, 1974); the report 
on the head of the Yugoslav delegation, Deputy Premier 
Anton Vratusa's address to the Conference in Borba,
22 August 1974; and the interview with Vratu^a, rSve 
nas je viSe, ali izlaz postoji', VUS, 11 September 1974.
246 'The developing countries... feel more clearly all the time 
that there can be no solution and no way out within the 
framework imposed by the capitalist socio-economic system 
and the present order of international economic relations. 
Logically and naturally, it is sought to begin solving 
the population problem 'at the root of all evil', at the 
level of the system itself, which has fallen into a 
profound crisis and must be changed.' Anton Vratu^a, in 
VUS, 11 September 1974.
247 For an account of these developments, see Symonds and 
Carder, op.cit., Chs 12-14.
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has changed markedly. The Soviet bloc countries, for example, 
after initially softening their traditional anti-Malthusian 
stance in the mid-1960s, have tended to revert again towards their 
hard-line position of the 1950s. China, despite its domestic 
anti-natalism of recent years, vigorously opposes inter­
national initiatives in the area of fertility control. And 
many of the more radical non-aligned Third World countries, 
including some who are domestically strongly anti-natalist, 
have come increasingly to resent what they see as excessive 
Western concentration on this issue. These countries prefer 
to direct their efforts in the international arena towards 
securing a reordering of priorities away from population 
programs. Exploiting their growing voting strength in 
international forums, they have organized the campaign towards 
the establishment of the New Economic Order, to which all 
other issues are increasingly subordinated. By the time of 
the Bucharest Population Conference in 1974, many Third World 
countries were maintaining that the population issue was a
red herring, a minor irrelevancy, and should be so regarded
24 8even at a conference expressly devoted to population.
A Yugoslav source suggests that the reason for the
growing discord on international population problems after
1967 lay in changes of policy on the Western side - the
increasing insistence by the US and the World Bank on the
249pre-eminent importance of fertility control. Certainly
Third World resistance to international initiatives in 
this area seems to have increased in direct proportion to 
growing governmental commitment to them in the West. And the 
attitude of the World Bank and its president, Robert Macnamara, 
was at least the occasion for the sharp debates on the subject
248 See J. Finkle and B. Crane, op.cit.
249 Pop-Antoska, op.cit., p.617.
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2 50in the UN in 1970. But given the relatively small
proportion of international aid made available in the form251of population programs, and given the strongly Malthusian
attitudes taken by many of the resisting governments 
252domestically, it would appear that for the international 
fraternity of 'anti-Malthusians', as for Yugoslavia, the 
decisive argument against expanding international population 
programs is not scepticism as to their efficacy, but rather 
an emotional reaction to 'genocidal' pressures, coupled 
with the shrewd insight that the issue is one that can be 
converted into political capital, and therefore, perhaps, 
into even greater economic benefit than the most elaborate 
family planning programs could ever bring.
250 Symons and Carder, op.cit., pp.181-83.
251 Though the proportion of all aid going to population 
programs worldwide increased rapidly during the late 
1960s and early 1970s, it had not reached much more than 
2*5% of the whole at the time of the Bucharest Conference. 
See United Nations World Population Conference 1974,
E/CONF.60/CBP/24, The Role of International Assistance
in the Population Fields, Annex Table 1. It has been 
estimated that in 1971, the major international donors 
contributed no more than one-tenth of the cost of the 
fertility control programs then in operation in 
developing countries (and these are widely held to be 
modest enough in scope). See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Population Policies 
and Economic Development (Baltimore, 1974) , pp. 80-81.
252 W. Parker Mauldin et al., in their 'Report on Bucharest' 
identify Yugoslavia, together with the domestically 
anti-natalist India and Egypt, as belonging to a group 
of countries consistently opposing references in the 
draft World Population Plan of Action to population 
problems and population policies, substituting instead 
references to the need for social and economic development 
and a new international eonomic order. This group 
evidently also emphasized the need to avoid any kind
of coercion at either the national or international 
levels - a piquant detail in view of India's recent 
draconian steps in national population policy. See 
Mauldin et al., op.cit. , pp.371-72.
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Thus it seems very likely that Yugoslavia, long
a pillar of the non-aligned movement and always eager to
play a leading role in it, was tugged along by the trend of
opinion among its Third World associates. And indeed, the
interview with the head of the Yugoslav delegation to
Bucharest cited above makes it clear that political rather
than substantive considerations were paramount. Vratusa speaks
with satisfaction of the prestige accruing to Yugoslavia from2 53its participation in the conference and points out that
thanks to skilled organization and caucusing, the non-
2 5 4aligned countries were able to 'impose' their will on the
developed nations. The intellectual disingenuousness of the
official line emerged rather clearly in two articles published
on the occasion of the Bucharest Conference in the party daily,
Borba. The first of them, significantly entitled 'Population
- a Worry for the World' reproduced a number of statistics on
world population growth, food production, etc., and while
not neglecting the injustices of the international economic
order altogether, emphasized the sui generis nature of the
2 55population problem and the gravity of its implications.
253 'With such prestige all doors were open to us; all 
delegations were ready to co-operate with us and sought 
our co-operation. We took, if I may say so, full 
advantage of this.' VUS, 11 September 1974.
254 'At this conference we witnessed the transition of militant 
opposition into an active posture, and I think that this
is an important result of the Bucharest Conference. The 
developing countries succeeded in imposing their view 
because they were organized and united in their activities 
and submissions.' Ibid. It should be noted that the 
word 'impose' (nametnuti) used by Vratusa on this occasion 
is a very negative one Tn Yugoslav political vocabulary, 
being usually used to describe the hegemonist activities 
of East or West. World population problems are evidently 
now seen essentially in terms of Lenin's kto kogo.
255 'PriraStaj - briga sveta', Borba, 2 August 1974. Compare 
also 'Eksplozija stanovniÜstva1 , Borba Reflektor,
17 September 1969.
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The second of them, which appeared just a fortnight later, 
during the conference, was entitled, equally significantly,
'A Battle between Rich and Poor', and presented the population 
problem as being basically a minor aspect and byproduct of 
the unjust international economic order. The tone and 
vocabulary of the article were martial; the content was 
oversimplified, political, sloganizing, and quite bereft of 
any demographic content whatsoever.
It might appear from the foregoing that the Yugoslav
ideological position on international population problems has
257edged back very close to that of the Soviet Union. This
is in a sense true. While this trend may reflect in some
degree the general shift towards Moscow in the year or two
after 1972 (a movement since arrested), it should be emphasized
that differences between the Yugoslav and Soviet views on
world population problems remain. Yugoslav spokesmen tend
to be more moderate in their formulations, more insistent on
family planning as a basic human right, and more prepared to
give qualified support to international fertility control 258programs.
256 'Bitka bogatih i siroma^nih', Borba, 22 August 1974.
257 For an example of anti-Malthusianism worthy of the best
the Soviet Union could offer, see Seljka Zalar,
'Maltuzianizam i ekologija', Na^e feme 1973, no.4, p.886. 
This piece is actually a review of an article which 
appeared in the Paris journal, La ^ens^e. But the 
reviewer clearly endorses the original/which declares, 
for example, that the Club of Rome's Malthusian recipes 
are actually intended 'to worsen the living conditions 
of the working classes'. Their machinations need to be 
'unmasked'. Only socialism can etc. This kind of crude 
propaganda is rare in NaSe feme, a serious journal, 
and is in fact well to the left of the official Yugoslav 
line in its most recent hard-line version.
258 Yugoslavia has also maintained a distinct stance
politically, caucusing and voting with its non-aligned 
allies, and not with the Soviet bloc. See Mauldin et al., 
op.cit., pp.363, 372.
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Notwithstanding the gulf that has grown up between 
their domestic and international ideological attitudes to 
population problems, one feels reluctant to castigate the 
Yugoslavs for their opportunism. Given their special political 
circumstances, cast adrift between the mercies of the Brezhnev 
and Sonnenfeldt doctrines, they can scarcely be reproached 
for seeking to maintain those of their international links 
which seem to offer them some measure of security. Moreover, 
there is a level at which their domestic and international 
doctrines are in unity. Both at home and abroad, they maintain 
that it is the obligation of the more developed to further 
the growth of the less developed. The New International 
Economic Order has its domestic counterpart in the ideological 
principle of solidarity, and the practice of redirecting 
funds towards the backward regions of the country. At home, 
as well as abroad, the Yugoslavs proclaim family planning 
and the knowledge and means essential to its implementation 
to be basic human rights. And most important of all, both 
internationally and domestically they consistently adhere to 
the principle that no pressure should be put on countries 
or republics (or provinces) with high population growth rates 
to reduce their natality as a precondition for receiving aid 
from those better off. This, of course, is a principle 
which reflects credit on their political prudence as well as 
on their generosity of spirit. If the Federal authorities 
in Yugoslavia were to put pressure on the Kosovo leadership 
to slow down the Albanian birth-rate or forfeit aid from the 
Fund for Undeveloped Republics and Regions, the most likely 
result would be a tidal wave of irredentism quite possibly 
reaching even the high land of the province's central party 
organs. But whatever their motives, the Yugoslav counsel of 
respecting sovereignty, supplying generous development funds, 
and also supplying the means to fertility control without 
obtrusive advice on whether, why, or how to use it, may 
still be the wisest available, both for their own purposes 
and for the world beyond.
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Insofar as Yugoslav population doctrines are 
schizophrenic, they are in any case a faithful reflection 
of the national make-up. Yugoslavia, as the cliches always 
have it, is a bridge between East and West, between state 
socialism and democracy, between Europe and Asia, between 
Christendom and Islam, between developed and undeveloped, 
between rich and poor, between the haves and have-nots.
These contrasts have their embodiment within Yugoslavia in 
the form of sharp regional differentiation. They also find 
reflection within the loose orthodoxy of the ruling League 
of Communists, and even, at times, within the minds of 
individual Yugoslav theorists and activists. It is not in the 
least surprising, that while on the one hand struggling to 
gain admission to the affluent economic elite of Western Europe 
and North America, Yugoslavia also feels a strong bond of 
sympathy with the downtrodden and dispossessed of the world.
The summary manner in which, for example, Yugoslavia's vital 
exports of anything ranging from meat to manpower are 
abruptly curtailed by Western European nations whose economies 
and polities are infinitely stronger; would be quite sufficient 
explanation on its own for any inconsistencies of self- 
identification on her part. The needs and problems of the 
non-aligned and Third World countries seem to make little 
enough impression on the Western powers. Accordingly when 
something arises which does seem to seize their imaginations 
and make them anxious - namely the population explosion - 
it is not surprising that the exploders rejoice in the fact, 
even if the negative consequences of the detonation will be 
mainly theirs to bear. In this respect, one sometimes has 
the feeling that Yugoslav commentators are almost sorry they 
do not themselves have a population explosion large enough
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to excite the apprehension of their more opulent neighbours 
2 59to the West.
This brief review of Yugoslav ideological 
pronouncements and attitudes on population questions would 
be incomplete without some reference to less official strands 
of thought that obtrude from time to time. It was said earlier 
that official thinking, particularly at the domestic level, 
is unsystematic, less than fully coherent, and given only 
limited prominence in official pronouncements and the media.
In any case, despite the greater restrictions of recent years, 
Yugoslavia is, of course, far more tolerant of heterodoxy 
than any of the Soviet bloc countries.
The usual theoretical framework of demographic
writing in Yugoslavia is vaguely Marxist. But sometimes
2 60the Marxist element is totally lacking; and at other
times it is a critical Marxism which displays little patience
259 The attitude of some Third World governments to their 
population explosions resembles at times that of a 
peasant farmer who is troubled by a marauding rogue 
elephant which threatens his crops and his very life: 
when the peasant perceives that his landlord is also 
alarmed by the elephant and believes it to be subject in 
some way to the peasant's control, he is overjoyed that 
he has at last found something that inspires fear and 
a kind of respect in the heart of his oppressor. Compare 
the following phrase from a Yugoslav commentary on world 
population problems: 'to diminish the "explosion"
of which, it seems, it is only the developed nations who 
are afraid' (NIN, 18 August 1974, p.34).
260 Yugoslav commentators not fully alerted to the correct
'line' on world population are apt to take a common-sense 
view of it# identifying it as a severe and pressing 
problem without any particular political colouration.
This is presumably the explanation for the contradictory 
pair of articles in Borba at the time of the Bucharest 
Conference. Specialists are naturally particularly 
prone to neglect ideological niceties. Accounts of the 
recent demographic history of the world and of the Third 
World population explosion nearly always read as though 
they might have been written by any member of the 
international scholarly community. See, e.g., (cont.)
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with such of the old orthodoxies as still linger in the 
2 61Soviet bloc, and is equally severe about the inadequacies
2 coof official Yugoslav thinking.
But more significantly, there are periodic
manifestations of an at times virulent Malthusianism. Since
1972, these outbursts have been relatively infrequent in
the popular press, but they are still to be found quite often
in scholarly comment and conference proceedings. Predictably,
they seem to be concentrated in areas where a dominant ethnic
2 61group feels its place threatened by a more fecund minority.
260 (cont.) D. Breznik, 'Neki problemi porasta svetskog
stanovnigtva', Medjunarodni problemi, vol.XX, no.2, p.45;
M. Ragevid, 'The Development of World Population with 
Special Reference to the Modern Period', a paper (in 
Serbian) presented to the Belgrade Population Policy 
Conference, 1973.
261 See, e.g., S. KraSovec, 'Razvitak marksistidkog pristupa 
teorii i politici populacije', NaSe feme 1974, no.4,
p. 536 , esp. p.551; and the same author's dflovegtvo 
kruh in lakota (Ljubljana, 1970); R. NjegT3 and L.
Radovi6 , * Novi pogledi sovjetskih autora na zakon
razvitka stanovnigtva u socializmu', Ekonomski Anali 
no.35 (June 1972)T p.44; R. Supek, Ova jedina zemlja 
(Zagreb, 1973).
262 See the instances cited by Macura (of such inadequacies
and of such criticism) in 'Komponente populacione politike', 
NaSe teme 1974, no.4, p.554, esp. pp.554-58.
263 'The causes of unemployment and underemployment are known. 
They should be sought simultaneously in inadequate 
investment and in demographic expansion. In this country, 
however, a one-sided approach is common, which seeks the 
cause exclusively in either inadequate investment or 
demographic expansion, depending on whether the researcher 
comes from our developed or insufficiently developed 
regions.' K. Miljovski, 'Kretanje stanovnigtva, ekonomski 
razvoj i nedovoljno razvijena podrudja', paper presented 
to the Belgrade Conference on Population Policy 1973. 
Despite the sober moderation of this formulation Miljovski 
himself (as becomes a Macedonian) is somewhat Malthusian 
in his approach when compared with current official 
doctrine intended for export.
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The most elaborate and thorough-going Malthusian analysis I
have encountered comes from the pen of a Serb from Bosnia
and Hercegovina, where the erstwhile Serb majority has
recently melted away.^^ A Slovenian Malthusian, writing
in the party newspaper, draws explicit comparisons between
the perils of the world population explosion and the situation
in Yugoslavia, and issues a transparent warning that diligent
and tidy peoples with small families cannot be expected to
go on paying for the 'irresponsibility' of the over-fecund.
But perhaps the most consistently Malthusian of all are the
Macedonians, threatened by the demographic and national upsurge
26 6of their large Albanian minority. Few Macedonian contributors
264 G. Zarkovic, 'Smanjivanje prirodnog prirastaja stanovnistva 
i ekonomski i socijalni razvoj', paper presented to the 
Belgrade Conference on Population Policy 1973. Zarkovic,
a former Partisan and a professor of medicine at 
Sarajevo University, is no doubt more exposed to the 
hazards of ideological error by virtue of his medical 
background, and perhaps more able to get away with it by 
virtue of his former high status as a government official.
265 I. Popit, 'Povpre^je zdaj: dva otroka', Delo, 9 September
1972. Since that time Delo articles on demographic themes 
have become much more tactful. For an instance of fully 
'official' Malthusian thinking by a Macedonian, see the 
Macedonian Central Committee member Aleksandar Donev's 
article, 'Kako da presahnu izvori nezaposlenosti'
in Komunist, 7 January 1974, p.ll.
266 Virtually all of the Macedonian contributors to the 
Belgrade Conference on Population Policy in 1973 placed 
great stress onthe desirability of checking fertility
in order to promote the economic growth of their republic. 
They seemed to believe that great strides could be taken 
by educational and propaganda campaigns (contrary to 
the hard-line Marxist doctrine that development is a 
pre-requisite for fertility control, and that the role 
of 'subjective' factors like family planning programs 
can only be at most ancillary). One contributor, for 
example, wrote that: 'Factor analysis has shown that in
most cases, natality is independent of the majority of 
factors associated with social development. This suggests 
the conclusion that natality is mainly affected by habits, 
customs and traditions... Communes with the highest and 
lowest natality can have the same socio-economic 
conditions...' N. Stojkov, 'Determinante visokog i 
niskog nataliteta u Jugoslaviji*. See also V. Starova, 
'Vlijanieto na zdravstvenata zastita na demografskite 
dvi^enja', and K. Miljovski, op.cit.
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to demographic discussions fail to make the point in some 
form or other that high natality is a severe economic 
burden, and one which can and must be reduced by a vigorous 
program of enlightenment in the field of fertility control.
Some of the most contentious and divisive issues 
in the global population debate are reproduced almost exactly 
within the Yugoslav microcosm. This being so, the task of 
maintaining some kind of unity of theory and practice is a 
formidable one. So far the regime is still maintaining its 
footing on the ideological tight-rope.
5.f. International Politics
It has been demonstrated in earlier sections, that the
demographic factor is for the most part working to aggravate
rather than alleviate Yugoslavia's domestic security problems.
Unemployment is continuing to grow and seems likely to go
on doing so. Substantial numbers of emigrants are now
returning from Western Europe to their homeland, where they
may significantly swell the numbers of the unemployed.
They may also be returning with some form of political
contamination acquired abroad, whilst beyond the reach and
2 67influence of the Yugoslav media and control mechanisms.
Above all, the criss-crossing ethnic antagonisms that have 
bedevilled Yugoslavia's short history are almost all being 
accentuated or likely to be accentuated by demographic 
trends.
267 A recent Komunist article (26 August 1974, p.17) on
the 'education1 (obrazovanje) of workers abroad remarks 
that adoption by workers of foreign ways draws them away 
from their homeland, and threatens them 'either with 
assimilation or other negative influences'. The article 
goes on to say that studies of 'temporary' emigrants 
point 'more than clearly' to widespread 'temporary' 
assimilation. Cf. notes 89, 91 and 151, above.
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Yugoslavia's internal security problems are closely 
bound up with its external problems. In consequence, any 
discussion of the influence of demographic factors on Yugoslavia's 
foreign relations is bound to seem rather like a reprise of 
her domestic population difficulties seen from a slightly 
different perspective. This is all the more difficult to 
avoid inasmuch that Yugoslavia's relations with other countries, 
though often bad, have seldom been quite as bad as her relations 
with herself. However, the two perspectives are vital 
complements to one another. The perilous and intractable 
complexity of Yugoslavia's politico-demographic problems 
only emerges fully when the two are juxtaposed.
At the most general level, Yugoslavia's overall 
economic and political strength might not seem threatened 
by the course of its demographic development in recent decades.
For many years after the War, it had one of the highest natural 
increase rates in Europe, and despite the very low fertility 
prevailing in some regions of the country, it still belongs to 
the upper bracket. With the exception of Albania, most of 
its neighbours are growing more slowly, or at any rate no 
faster. Rumania, a country of comparable size, has in recent 
years overtaken Yugoslavia in population, and thanks to its 
pro=natalist exertions and restrictions on emigration, is 
now forging steadily ahead; but Rumania is perhaps Yugoslavia's 
strongest ally in the region, and it is unlikely that many 
Yugoslavs would give the matter a second thought.
Economically, Yugoslavia has firmly renounced Soviet 
employment policies with their depressed wages and productivity, 
and there seems little likelihood that they will return to them 
in the foreseeable future (though some concessions in the 
direction of 'excessive' employment may be made during the 
present phase of acute unemployment). Its economic performance 
(unlike that of many of the other Socialist countries) has 
not depended crucially on incremental labour inputs for more 
than a decade past. Given this economic development strategy 
and the problems which it entails, the slump in fertility
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in most parts of the country after the early 1950s must be 
seen more as a blessing than a bugbear. In any case, it is 
unlikely to affect Yugoslavia's economic strength vis-a-vis 
its neighbours.
The massive outflow of young emigrants in the 1960s
and 1970s, on the other hand, must have at least temporarily
weakened the country's defence capabilities. Yet for many
years there seems to have been remarkably little public concern
26 8about the matter, not even among the defence forces.
When the military did press the issue, in the early 1970s,
their wishes were acceded to, and restrictions were introduced
269on young men leaving the country. Now the recession in
Western Europe has eliminated any element of policy option in 
the matter. Presumably, with time (if they are given it), 
the Yugoslav defence forces will be able to progressively 
repair the numerical indentations they must have suffered 
through emigration; though as they do so, they will be slightly 
harassed by diminishing cohorts of 18-20 year-olds.
It seems curious that the drain of emigration on the 
country’s defence potential was tolerated for so long. It is 
all the more curious, given the Yugoslav strategic doctrine
268 Independent critics of government policy sometimes
referred to the military disadvantages of the emigration 
(Franci Stare, op.cit., pp.83, 86; Komarica, op.cit., 
p.108; KnesSevid, opfcit. , pp. 333, 335 , 338), but usually 
only fleetingly, or to complain that no serious study had 
yet been made of the problem from that point of view 
(Stare, p.86). The military may have been making 
representations privately, but in public they seem to have 
been remarkably poker-faced until after 1972. Thus, for 
example, a 1971 article on the Census by an army colonel 
scrupulously avoids commenting on either the emigration or 
the sharp decline in the birth rate that had been occurring 
in the years before. S. Vidakovid, 'Popis stanovni^tva 
i mogudnost koriscenja rezultata za potrebe narodne odbrane', 
Vojno-ekonomski pregled, vol.17 (1971), no.4, p.484.
269 Cf. note 108, above.
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2 V 0of total or general national defence (opMtenarodna odbrana).
This doctrine, which seeks to apply updated lessons from the
successful Partisan resistance of the Second World War to
contemporary conditions, postulates that the broadest possible
strata of the population should be drawn into active defence 
271operations. This being so, it is all the more desirable
that not only those of prime military age, but also all
adults up to the age of 40 or 45 should be on hand and in
training ready for an emergency. Yet it was precisely these
2 72groups which were most depleted by the emigration.
270 Press expositions of the doctrine by senior officers 
are quite common. See, for example, the interview with 
General Pejnovicf (Head of the Centre for Strategic Research 
of the General Staff) in VUS, 24 December 1975. For a 
very good short account by a Western observer, see A.
Ross Johnson, 'Yugoslav Total National Defence', Survival, 
vol.XV (1973), no.l, p.54.
271 And also into counter-espionage and counter-subversion 
through so-called samoza^tita (literally 'self-defence'), 
the self-managing version of internal security, or, 
perhaps, of the Soviet bditel'nost'. Calls for intensified 
samozaMtita activities have been particularly frequent 
since late 1975, when the renewed wave of 'cominformism' 
was first publicly acknowledged. See 'Samoza^tita, £ta
je to?', Politika, 11 January 1976, p.7.
272 According to the 1971 Census results, 92% of all workers 
abroad were under 45, and 53% were under 30. Sixty-nine 
percent were men. The Census undoubtedly underestimates 
the numbers of older emigrants, but suppose nonetheless 
we were to take the figures 90% and 50% for under 45
and under 30 respectively, and apply them to the estimated 
maximum number of 'temporary' emigrants of 1.1 million.
We then get 990,000 under 45 and 550,000 under 30, of 
whom some 685,000 and 380,000 respectively would have been 
men. In 1971, there wre 1,950,000 and 4,250,000 men 
in the age groups 18-29 and 18-44 respectively in 
Yugoslavia (including those emigrants who were recorded by 
the Census). On this very rough reckoning, as of circa 
1973, over one-seventh of all potential soldiers under 
45 and over one-sixth of all those under 30 must have been 
out of the country. In the light of this estimate, Tito's 
comments about 'three big armies' (note 108, above), 
seem to be very restrained. The above calculations are 
based on the figures supplied by Begticf, 'Yugoslav Nationals 
Temporarily Working Abroad', at p.20, and Popis stanovnistva 
i stanova 1971, vol.I, p.2.
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Granted also the stress of opKtenarodna odbrana on the most
extensive mobilization of civilian population in organized
and co-ordinated sabotage activities against the invader, it
is clearly of the greatest importance that the dangers of
273fifth column operations should be kept to a minimum.
If the Yugoslavs really believe their own intermittent 
suggestions thataaggressive initiatives are to be expected 
from a Western power, then it is all the stranger that they 
displayed such equanimity to vast numbers of their citizens 
being exposed to moral and political danger in West Germany 
and elsewhere. While their potential ideological backsliders 
in the West could succumb to political views of either a left- 
or right-wing type, it is of course possible that both left­
wingers and right-wingers and ethnic partisans of all descriptions 
could be organized to participate in a plan directed from one 
centre. This is a possibility of which the Yugoslavs are 
very conscious, and to which it will be necessary to revert 
a little later.
Having made these general observations about the 
demographic factor in Yugoslavia's external relations, let us 
now look more closely at some of the specific national minority 
questions involving Yugoslavia and her different neighbours, 
beginning with the three non-Socialist states among them.
Though there has been a long history of dispute 
between Yugoslavia and Italy over ethnodemographic issues in
273 Cf. note 271, above. The importance of morale is all 
the greater, given the prominent role assigned by 
opstenarodna odbrana to territorial defence units 
manned by non-regular personnel, and subject in the 
first instance to communal and republican political 
authority. The territorial defence forces, whose 
institution was a response to republican demands as 
well as to national strategic considerations, have been 
assessed by some sceptical outside observers as being a 
way of equipping the country for future civil war (Johnson, 
op.cit., p.58). The task of reabsorbing the returnees 
into these defence arrangements must certainly be a 
delicate one.
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the past, most notably and most recently over the question
of Trieste, the issue seems for the time being to have been274effectively buried. In any case, the ethnic minorities
remaining on either side are already small and are continuing
275to decline rapidly thanks to emigration and assimilation.
Though Slovenians betray at times a sense of regret about the
might-have-beens of the Trieste area, the question seems
headed for oblivion, and Slovenian interests are unlikely to
persuade future Belgrade governments that it ought to be
pursued all out for its own sake. Relations with Greece
are also good; and despite the assimilationist policies
conducted against the Slav-speaking Greek Macedonians, Belgrade
seems acquiescent and without ambitions. In Austria, on the
other hand, the very fact of the apparent decline in the number
of self-identifying Slovenes and Croats has been in recent
years, and is still, a very live issue. The Austrians are
currently proposing to conduct a special census of their Slav
minorities, apparently in the hope, or possibly, as the
2 7 6Yugoslavs assert, with the intention, of then declaring 
them abolished, and refusing to provide any further cultural 
facilities for them, or equal rights for the use of their 
languages in the areas where they are concentrated. Given 
that the numbers of Slovenes and Croats involved are not
274 The signing Of the 1975 agreement between the two states 
seems to be genuinely expected by the Yugoslav side to 
solve the very long-standing dispute over Trieste
(see VUS, 19 November 1975). Given that the matter 
had been the subject of sharp polemics not long before 
(see, e.g., Komunist, 22 July 1974, pp.20-21), some 
residual scepticism may still be in order.
275 For a Slovenian study giving data on the declining numbers 
identifying as Slovenians in Italy (and apparently 
accepting this trend as inevitable), see J. Jeri, 'Etnicna, 
gospodarsko-socialna in kulturno-prosvetna struktura 
slovenske narodnostne skupnosti v Italiji', paper presented 
to the 1974 Slovenian Demographic Symposium.
276 'Manevri znani kao"poseban popis"', Borba, 26 February 1975.
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277great, and given that genuine assimilation processes might
well have been going on there, the extreme sensitivity of the
Yugoslavs to this issue seems disproportionate. A surface
reading of the Yugoslav press would suggest that it is the
27 8breach of the 1955 Austrian State Treaty involved, and
the prominence of extreme Germanic emotion that is evoking
such a keen response. But perhaps a better clue to understanding
the situation was provided by a recent front-page story in the
Belgrade daily Politika, which reported on an obscure and
unofficial UN committee meeting in New York, at which there
were signs of co-operation, not to say collusion, between the279Austrian, Bulgarian and Soviet representatives. The
Austrian problem is in any case not more than a quasi-demographic 
one. The numbers involved and the apparent direction of 
demographic trends must tend to diminish it as time goes on.
Yugoslavia's relations with her Socialist neighbours 
vary from sharp hostility in the case of Bulgaria, through 
deteriorating rapprochement (Albania) and deteriorating 
tepidity (Hungary) to fairly cordial co-operation (Rumania).
The two main factors involved in each case are ethnic 
entanglements and the relationship with Moscow.
277 According to the 1971 Austrian Census, there were 22,000 
Slovenians (in Carinthia) and 25,000 Croats (in Burgenland). 
The Yugoslav press, however, has been recalling that in 
1846 there were 103,000 Slovenians and in 1910 some
44,000 Croats ('£emu slu2e be£ki "popisi"', Politika,
25 May 1976). Even allowing for a certain amount of 
Austrian repression, however, neither community could now 
be called vast.
278 For the official Yugoslav view of the Treaty, see
'Nezadovoljena prava nacionalnih manjina', Komunist 
27 January 1975. On Germanic nationalist excesses, 
see, e.g., Politika, 12 August 1976, p.4.
279 Politika, 5 August 1976. The UN committee
meeting in question was concerned with the implementation 
of the Covenant on Racial Discrimination. The Austrian and 
Bulgarian delegates supported one another as against 
Yugoslavia. The Soviet delegate agreed with them both 
that conducting a census is an internal matter.
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In the case of Yugoslav-Rumanian relations, the 
respective minorities on each side are small (about 0.2 or 
0.3% of the population in each case) and stagnant or declining, 
and quite insufficient to form an adequate basis for serious 
dispute. But in any case, this and other potential causes of 
tension are submerged beneath the common fear of Soviet 
intervention. Rumania is developing its own strategy of total 
national defence, and co-operation between her and Yugoslavia 
will probably continue to grow, at least while the Ceausescu 
leadership remains in control.
Hungary, despite the keen nationalist and revisionist
sentiments of its population, maintains for the most part an
outwardly modest demeanour in regard to nationality problems,
both within its borders and beyond them. This is true also of
the official Hungarian attitude to the large Magyar population
in the Yugoslav Vojvodina. A Hungarian census taken during
World War II while part of the Vojvodina was under the Horthy
regime's administration still managed to suggest that the
Hungarians were the largest single ethnic group in the
2 8 0Vojvodina as a whole. Since then Hungarian strength has
slipped badly on paper (Yugoslav paper), and undoubtedly has
done so also in fact. The large Hungarian minorities in
Czechoslovakia and Rumania have also, relatively speaking,
2 81lost ground since before the war. The current Budapest
280 Clissold, op.cit., p.122. The Vojvodina referred to 
there does not correspond precisely to the present 
province of that name.
281 Hungarians formed 25.8% of the population of Vojvodina 
in 1948, but only 21.7% in 1971 ('Nacionalni sastav 
stanovni^tva po op^tinama', p.ll). They were 10% of the 
Rumanian population according to the 1930 Census, but 
only 8.5% by 1966 (the percentage of Rumanians having 
increased in that time from 77.9% to 87.7%): Anarul 
demografic al Republicii Socialiste Romania 1974,
pp.106-Ö7. There were 658,000 Hungarians recorded by the 
1921 Czechoslovak Census, 597,000 in 1930, and 578,000 in 
1971. As a percentage they had fallen from 5.1% in 1921 
to 4% in 1971, while the Czechs and Slovaks combined had 
increased from 67.6% in 1921 to 94.3% in 1971. (Demografie 
X (1968), no.4, p.302, and XIV (1972), p.183.) The data 
are not strictly comparable, and not, perhaps, wholly 
reliable either. Moreover, in recent years, the Hungarian 
population has been increasing modestly. But the long­
term trend has been clearly towards relative decline.
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policy is to accept these discouraging trends in its neighbour
states with such overt good grace as it can muster. But
there are reasons for supposing that this policy may change
in the case of Yugoslavia. It has been noticeable in the
past that Moscow sometimes permits Hungary a good deal of
2 8 2leeway in relation to the Hungarian minority in Rumania.
A similar right may be extended to them in the case of 
Yugoslavia as well, should Moscow's interests so dictate.
A recent Western report indicated that Cominformists on
trial in Yugoslavia had been accused of maintaining contacts
s / 2 8 3with emigres in 'Moscow, Kiev and Budapest'. The Hungarian
media have at times been apparently entrusted with special
missions that may well be anti-Yugoslav in their implications.
And a Belgrade paper has expressed certain reservations and
suspicious about the activities of some of its Soviet-bloc
neighbours (including Hungary) in recruiting students for
higher education among the Yugoslav nationalities, often at
bargain rates.
282 King, op.cit., pp.163 and ff.
283 Reuter and dpa, 8 January 1976 , cited in Z. Antic^ , 
'Yugoslav Leader Accuses Cominformists of Having Foreign 
Ties', RFE Research RAD Background Report/1 (Yugoslavia), 
9 January 1976.
284 Hungarian news media were given a curiously monopolistic 
role in reporting certain recent perturbations in Sino- 
Albanian relations. See L. Zanga, 'Whither Albania',
RFE Research RAD Background Report/112 (Albania),
18 May 1976, esp. pp.3, Zanga seems puzzled why
among the Warsaw Pact coungries Hungary alone should be 
so fascinated by these developments. Two possible 
reasons suggest themselves: firstly, that Moscow
wishes someone else to fly its kites for it (as is 
often the case); and secondly, that Hungary may 
itself have an interest in seeing a more pro-Moscow 
group replace the Hoxha leadership in Tirana. Compare 
the discussion on Albania, below.
285 'Privatni kanali', NIN, 7 July 1974, p.20.
284
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But for the most part, Hungary (unlike Bulgaria) 
still seems committed to a policy of maintaining its links 
with its potential irredenta by cultivating a conspicuously 
correct nationalities policy in relation to its own minorities, 
and seeking reciprocity from its neighbours. Given the 
steady relative decline of the Hungarian population in the 
Vojvodina (marked, like Hungarian populations elsewhere, by 
low fertility, and also inclined to assimilatory losses), 
it seems likely that the Vojvodinian problem will continue 
to diminish naturally. Demographic trends on their own are 
unlikely to aggravate the situation on either side.
This leaves the two most difficult external 
ethno-demographic problems facing the Yugoslav government: 
the Macedonians and Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations; and the 
Shiptars and Yugoslav-Albanian relations.
The Macedonian problem is not demonstrably demographic 
inasmuch that there is no way of knowing whether population 
trends in the area are ripening the apple of discord or not.
But it does assume quasi-demographic forms and interlocks 
with adjacent problems which are strongly demographic in 
character.
Basically, the conflict rests on the fact that the
Bulgarians maintain that the Macedonians in Yugoslavia are
really Bulgarians, whereas the Yugoslavs assert the contrary
and claim that there may be anything between 200,000 and 500,000
people in Bulgaria who would want to identify themselves as
2 8 6Macedonians also. Even the closest outside observers of
these matters feel reluctant to give unequivocal judgements on
286 The Macedonians made their last significant Census
appearance in Bulgaria in 1956, when 178,000 of them 
were registered. According to Komunist, 8 December 1975, 
p.7., the Sofia party daily Rabotnidesko Delo once 
estimated that there were 500,000 Macedonians in Bulgaria.
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2 8 7the inherent justice of these two positions. The Bulgarian
view at least must be regarded as overstated, however. The 
Macedonian Republic has been in existence for thirty years, 
has developed its own literary language distinct from 
Bulgarian (in which language Macedonian nationalists once 
wrote), and has presumably succeeded therefore in greatly 
strengthening such distinct identification as existed before. 
Power structures develop their own raison d'etre and ideological 
accretions at the worst of times. There is already a small 
army of people in the Macedonian Republic who are in a sense 
committed and professional Macedonians, and who would find 
life difficult and no doubt hazardous in any Bulgarian Macedonia. 
There are undoubtedly, at the same time, some Macedonians who 
still feel a loyalty to a broader identification with Bulgaria 
as well as Macedonia. However, even these people are scarcely 
likely to be greatly enamoured of Bulgaria's current policy 
towards its Macedonians. In the immediate post-war period, 
the new Bulgarian communist regime initially recognized a 
Macedonian national minority within its borders (at a time 
when they believed long term co-operation if not indeed 
a federal merger with Yugoslavia was a realistic future 
possibility). After relations with Yugoslavia deteriorated, 
however, they came to regret this decision, and have over the 
past two decades sought progressively to undo their mistake.
This is in line with their general policy towards their other
287 The Macedonian dispute has been long and acrimonious
and has passed through numerous phases. A considerable 
literature has developed on the subject. See, e.g.,
P. Shoup, op.cit., Ch.4; R. King, Minorities under 
Communism, Ch.10; Stephen E. Palmer, Jr, and Robert 
R. King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question 
(Hamden, Conn. 19 71)"; S. Stankovid", 'The Divisive Issue 
of Macedonia: Yugoslav Attitudes and Suspicions', RFE
Research RAD Background Report/99 (Yugoslavia), 6 June 
1975; R. King, 'The Macedonian Question and Bulgaria's 
Relations with Yugoslavia', RFE Research RAD Background 
Report/98 (Bulgaria), 6 June 1975.
469
main national minorities (the Turks and the Pomaks, or
Bulgarian Moslems), which in recent years has become increasingly
2 8 8oppressive and assimilationist. The assimilationist policy
towards the nationalities has been accompanied by an increasingly
pro-natalist population policy (oriented towards favouring
the low-fertility 'post-Orthodox' Bulgarians over their more
2 8 9fertile Moslem minorities). Bulgarian population and
nationality policies thus seem at present to be dictated by
a combination of mercantilist nationalism and repressive
290authoritarianism. Eager to increase their numbers, they
are apparently prepared to adopt strong measures to achieve 
their aim. None of this is likely to recommend itself to 
more than a minority of Yugoslav Macedonians. The vigour 
and rigour of Bulgarian policies seem to suggest that they 
are heedless of whether or not Yugoslav Macedonians will be 
alienated by their actions. Presumably, therefore, they 
believe it will be possible one day to take over the Yugoslav 
Macedonians and convert the stubborn among them into Bulgarians 
in the same way as they are attempting to deal with their own 
recalcitrant Macedonians. The only possible scenario that 
seems to make sense of such a policy is a disintegration 
or partition of Yugoslavia in which Macedonia were divided
288 See RFE Research Bulgarian Situation Report/13, 28 April 
1976, p.5.
289 All Bulgarian social service benefits become more 
generous to the third child, then fall away sharply 
thereafter. See I. Stefanov and N. Naumov, 'Bulgaria' 
in B. Berelson (ed.), Population Policy in Developed 
Countries, p.149, esp. at p.165.
290 Contraceptives are not readily available in Bulgaria 
except on prescription. And in recent years there has 
been a growing tendency to restrict the availability of 
legal abortion. See Kirk, Livi Bacci and Szabady (eds), 
Law and Fertility in Europe, vol.l, p.157. There is 
opposition in Bulgaria to this growing illiberal trend. 
See, e.g., E. Khristova, 'Da vdignem barierata pred 
razdaemosttaI', Trud, 11 October 1974, p.2. (Despite the 
hurrah pro-natalism of the title, the article is in fact 
at pains to emphasize that policy must respect the fullest 
parental sovereignty.)
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between Bulgaria and a Greater Serbia or other such rump 
state. This would evidently have to be under Soviet sponsorship 
and adjudication. In this context, it is interesting that a 
recent Skopje article referred explicitly to talk in Bulgaria 
about the forthcoming 'falling apart' of Yugoslavia, linking291these assertions directly with Bulgaria's Macedonian policy.
It seems likely that there is a Serbian political underground
which would welcome such a resolution, as the Kekec incident,
292perhaps, illustrates. After the illegal pro-Soviet Yugoslav
Communist Party held its countercongress in late 1975, there
was a spate of articles in the Yugoslav press hinting very
strongly that an 'Informbureauist' underground existed within
the party in many areas of the country, and that too great29 3a liberalism had been displayed towards it in the past.
These strictures were certainly applicable to, among others, 
Montenegro and Serbia.
While the Macedonian question is a demographic one 
in the sense that successive Bulgarian censuses are an important 
factor in ostensibly 'solving' it from the Bulgarian point 
of view, while simultaneously aggravating it from the Yugoslav 
(and no doubt the Bulgarian Macedonian) point of view, there 
is no way of determining in what measure demographic trends
291 *The favourite theme of the present-day agitpropites is 
the "falling apart" of Yugoslavia! There is never a 
political meeting in Pirin Macedonia, it seems, where 
there isn't some well-paid agitator to devote a good 
deal of attention to that theme.' 'Sta se krije iza 
popisa u Bugarskoj', VUS, 26 November 1975, p.6. (trs. 
from an article in Nova Makedonia).
292 In 1973, the Belgrade childrerfs magazine 'Kekec' 
published a linguistic map which depicted a large part 
of Macedonia (including Skopje and also some regions of 
strongly Albanian settlement) as falling within the area 
in which the Ekavian dialect of Serbo-Croatian is spoken. 
See Borba, 23 November 1973, where the episode was 
described as a 'political manoeuvre' (but only after the 
Macedonian Public Prosecutor had demanded that a ban
be placed on that issue of the publication). 'Kekec' and Borba are published by the same enterprise.
293 See, e.g., '£ta hoce', NIN, 9 November 1975.
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in the area are tending to alleviate or exacerbate the
conflict. The Bulgarian authorities are evidently seeking
to disperse as well as forcibly assimilate those of their
citizens who refuse to renounce their Macedonian identity.
What success they are having is something that can only be
guessed at; though it is perhaps significant that the
Yugoslav media have been claiming that numerous arrests of
Macedonian patriots are still being made in the Pirin Macedonia 
294area. Measures like these suggest that the Bulgarians
have a considerable problem on their hands, and that in the 
event of a conflict, the Yugoslavs would be capable of taking 
effective subversive countermeasures behind the Bulgarian 
lines, if time permitted.
Though the demographic factor in the Macedonian 
question is of uncertain status, there is no mistaking the 
crucial importance of demographic trends in the area of 
Albanian settlement in and beyond Albania's borders. Relations 
between Shiptars and Serbs and Shiptars and Macedonians 
are like a time-bomb placed at the central point of gravity 
in the Yugoslav structure. If differential fertility trends 
do indeed light the fuse, the destruction is almost bound 
to spread to other parts of the building.
If, for example, the Albanians were to determinedly 
seek full republic status (as they have already evinced a 
desire to do), thus converting the Serbs into a mere ethnic 
minority in their historic heartlands, or if they were to 
seek to alter further the balance of linguistic privilege 
in their area (as they are also showing signs of wanting to do)
294 According to one Yugoslav source, the latest wave of
arrests began in late 1973, suggesting that it was part 
of a systematic build-up towards attaining a 'good' 
result in the 1975 Census. 'Zvanidno nestali', NIN,
5 January 1975, p.47.
295
295 Cf. note 215, above.
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Serb resistance both within and beyond the province might 
create acute tension, if not open conflict. It is an issue 
which would serve eminently to fully unite the Serbs with 
the Montenegrins. Any such crisis would greatly favour 
the plans of an aggressor or aggressors from the East.
Given the growing numerical strength of Albanians in all 
walks of life in their own province, however, such conflicts 
seem difficult to avoid. Kosovo Albanian politicians must 
maintain their credibility with their constituents, and so 
they must to some degree reflect the pressure for further 
change that the steeply mounting cohorts of young educated 
Albanians are bound to exert on language policy, cadre policy, 
university admissions policy, etc., etc.
Simultaneously, the Albanians are entering into a
parallel stage of development in Western Macedonia.
But there they do not yet have any such position of power as
they enjoy in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians may realize that they
do not have the strength within the Yugoslav Federation to
represent too actively the interests of the Macedonian
Albanians. But given the imbalance between demographic and
296other forms of strength in Western Macedonia, an imbalance 
which must be resolved by some form of compromise or growing 
repression in the future, it may not be easy for the Kosovo 
Albanians (including ranking politicians) to avoid their 
'responsibilities' in the area. If they were to be involved, 
the crisis would worsen markedly, as the Serbs and Montenegrins 
would then almost inevitably be implicated as well. The 
Federal Yugoslav authorities could not afford to offend any
of the key participants in such a dispute. They need to 
maintain Macedonian loyalties because of the Bulgarian threat
296 Though Albanians and Turks formed some 24% of the Macedonian 
population in 1971, only 3 of the 21 members of the republican 
party presidium were apparently Moslems. In the Central 
Committee, the relationship was even more unfavourable for 
the Moslem ethnic groups - only 9 of a total membership of 
84. Albanians and Turks combined form less than 10% of 
the total Macedonian party membership. These disparities 
should be contrasted with the rapidly changing situation in 
Kosovo (see note 214, above).
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(though the Bulgarians' hard-line tactics may give them some 
leeway there). At the same time, they need to maintain the 
loyalty of the Yugoslav Albanians, particularly so in view 
of the recent signs of a possible Soviet-Albanian rapprochement.“ 
And finally, of course, they cannot afford to alienate the 
sympathies of their largest national group, the Serbs, or 
the Serbs' better fifteenth, the Montenegrins. Here again, 
the Yugoslav regime is balanced on a tight-rope, a tight-rope 
that is being tugged at from all directions, in some cases 
deliberately and maliciously. If the Federal authorities support 
one group they must antagonize the others. Their general 
policy is, of course, to support the republican or provincial 
majorities while seeking to safeguard the interests of the 
minorities. But how is this policy to be applied to a situation 
like that in Western Macedonia, where the minority is a local 
majority of rapidly increasing dimensions, with potential 
revisionist support both from another unit within Yugoslavia 
and also from beyond its borders? If the Yugoslavs were to 
try to appease their Albanian minority by making border
297 Since 1974, there has been a sustained purge going on 
at the highest levels in Albania. In early May 1976,
Hoxha announced that a clique of pro-Soviet elements 
had been uncovered. Among their other crimes, this 
clique were said to have been plotting to undermine the 
alliance with China ('Smenjivanja u vrhu', NIN, 9 May 
1976). Since that time, the signs of deteriorating 
relations with China have multiplied; Albania did not, for 
example, congratulate Hua Kuo-feng (The Age, 27 October 1976) 
which seems to suggest either that the deposed plotters 
were remarkably successful, or that they were being 
blamed for something that was not their fault, or, most 
probably of all, that the Hoxha pro-Peking line is 
under an increasingly heavy cloud, and that many elements 
in the Albanian party would like to re-establish closer 
links with Moscow. Albanian relations with Yugoslavia, 
meanwhile, after a period of improvement, are again 
deteriorating, despite efforts by the Yugoslavs to improve 
them. (on this point, see Louis Zanga, 'Kosovo: An
Important Element in Yugoslav-Albanian Rapprochement'
RFE Research RAD Background Report/91. Albania, 2 June 1975;
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adjustments between Kosovo and Macedonia, this would have
the effect of greatly embittering the Macedonians (not to
2 98put it any more strongly)f and extending the border-
area between Yugoslavia and Albania that was not only under
heavily Albanian settlement, but also under (Yugoslav)
Albanian control. Given the perhaps alarming degree of
v 2 9 9rapport that already exists between Pristina and Tirana,
297 (cont.) and 'Whither Albania?', RAD Background Report/112
(Albania) , 18 May 1976). It is interesting to speculate 
what all this might have to do with possible Soviet- 
Bulgarian-Hungarian hopes and plans for the area. It 
seems at times to be forgotten that Albania was once a 
loyal member of the Soviet bloc. In 1958, for example, 
Albanian papers were writing of 'joint wars of liberation' 
with their Bulgarian allies. (Carl Strohm, 'Der Ostblock und das Jugoslawische Nationalitätenproblem', Osteuropa 
1958, p.714 at p.719.) Though the ageing and ailing 
Hoxha-Shehu leadership may be irrevocably set against 
it, Soviet-Albanian rapprochement seems quite likely 
to be seen as of advantage to both parties. Any such 
development would be a dark omen for Yugoslavia.
298 Macedonians could hardly fail to see any such adjustments 
as being the thin edge of the wedge. Having seen the 
way successive concessions to the Albanians had led to 
the decline of Serbo-Montenegrin influence in Kosovo, 
they would be all the more reluctant to contemplate any 
in their own domain.
299 The closeness of the rapport between Pristina and Tirana 
is reflected in and illustrated by the fact that Kosovo 
Albanian is being standardized to norms based on southern 
dialects. This involves considerable difficulties for 
the northern Albanians of Kosovo. It also involves 
elimination of many Turkish and Serbian words in northern 
usage, something which the Kosovo authorities are 
evidently only too happy to endorse. Rilindja, (the 
Pristina Albanian-language party daily), 24 February 
1976, abstracted in ABSEES, vol.VII, no.3 (July 1976), 
p.245. See also 'Sprache und Politik in Albanien', 
Osteuropa, XXIII (1973), no.8, p.A582.
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this would seem like an invitation to irredentism.
The present Yugoslav policy of minimal change in external 
forms, coupled with flexibility in matters of national 
rights and local autonomy, is possibly the best available.
One wonders whether it can hold out in a situation where 
demographic and related socio-economic forces seem likely to 
make fundamental change almost inevitable.
In all the circumstances, it seems that Yugoslavia 
has a vested interest in maintaining bad relations with 
Bulgaria and especially good relations with Albania. Their 
efforts in this latter direction, however, have not seemed 
to achieve very much in the past. To many Serbs and 
Montenegrins, the hard-line alternative of national repression 
of the Albanians must seem more attractive, both emotionally 
and politically, even if it does logically involve better 
relations with Bulgaria and the USSR.
The Yugoslav nightmare is, of course, diplomatic
equivocations notwithstanding, that the Soviet Union will301coordinate a three- or four-pronged attack on her national
300 In 1975-76 there have been repeated references in the 
Yugoslav press to the activities of Albanian 'irredentists' 
Politika, 5 December 1975, p.7, reports the Federal 
Public Prosecutor as saying that 33 irredentists had
been proceeded against in Kosovo during that year. See 
also Politika, 16 January 1976 , p.8, and 24 April 1976 , p.8 
For an account of a trial of 18 Albanian 'irredentists'
(all of them apparently with some higher education), 
see Politika, 8 February 1976, p.9. From these sources, 
it emerges that the present wave of irredentists are 
identified as collaborating with 'Cominformist' and 
Stalinist elements, i.e. with Moscow. See also L.
Zanga, 'The Meaning of the Latest Demonstrations in Kosovo' 
RFE Research RAD Background Report/15 (Yugoslavia),
3 February 1975.
301 Four-pronged in the event that a (post-Ceausescu?)
Rumanian leadership were induced to participate in the 
adventure. Rumania, like Albania, though to a lesser 
extent, has been betraying signs of internal dissension 
in recent years.
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integrity, utilizing Hungarian, Bulgarian and Albanian territorial 
revisionism in the process, and rewarding them all in some
302way with the spoils. To do this, it seems to be accepted,
some internal crisis in Yugoslavia would have to be
precipitated. Unfortunately, the potential causes of such a
crisis are present in abundance. In this observer's view,
the destabilizing demographic growth of the Albanians may
be the spark which sets the bonfire ablaze. Since late
1975, Yugoslav anxieties about Kosovo have been particularly 
30 3apparent. The various enemies of the Yugoslav state
and their co-ordinators may have felt that the movement was
propitious: Tito's advanced years, the recent nationalities
crisis in Yugoslavia and its precarious solution, the peculiar
course of detente, the exceptional dithering of a presidential
election year, the signs of Western complaisance intimated
304in the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine, etc. Perhaps they 
are right. Western policy, which seems wedded to defending
302 'There does not seem to be much doubt that the Soviets 
will not send troops into Yugoslavia while Tito is alive; 
there is serious doubt that they will do so even after 
his passing, unless internal disorders should break out.'
J. Walkin, 'Yugoslavia after the Tenth Party Congress', 
Survey, vol.22 (1976), no.1, p.55, at p.69. Walkin spent 
some time as a US diplomat in Belgrade.
303 Cf. notes 297 and 300, above. Tito's two-day visit to 
Kosovo in April 1975 was a demonstration of the leadership's 
concern both about internal security in the province and 
the state of Yugoslavia's relations with Albania.
304 The Yugoslavs interpret the Sonnenfeldt affair as a 
deliberate signal from the U.S.A. to the U.S.S.R. that 
any settlement they wish to make of the Yugoslav problem 
will be satisfactory provided that the American sphere of 
interest is not threatened. See, e.g., 'Prazan rulet',
NIN, 18 April 1976, p.423. It seems fairly clear that if 
tfte Soviet Union attempts overt aggression against 
Yugoslavia at some appropriate moment, the American 
response will be restrained (cf. note 302). This at 
least appears to have been Kissinger's approach. President 
Ford's celebrated campaign gaffe about there being 'no 
Soviet domination of Eastern Europe', (The Australian,
9 October 1976) may well betray the essence of a (cont.)
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the indefensible until its indefensibility is proven beyond 
all doubt, and to repeatedly selling the last scraps of 
independence of countries that really could benefit from its 
aid for an undisclosed, but apparently modest figure, is 
unlikely to play any very imposing role in future denouements; 
though it may seek to preserve the Adriatic littoral or part 
of it for its own purposes. These being, apparently, the 
facts of life, it will be up to Yugoslavia itself to prove 
its stability and viability under great external and internal 
pressures.
3055.g Population Policies
I Development of population policies at the 
Federal level
It is only in the last fifteen years or so that 
'population policy' has slowly begun to make its appearance 
on the Yugoslav scene as an independent area of government 
concern. The course of development of social and economic
304 (cont.) Kissinger briefing. With Carter's accession to 
the presidency, one wonders whether the shift to the south 
in America will be paralleled by a shift from Central
to Eastern Europe in the State Department. Perhaps the 
Sonnenfeldt doctrine will be replaced by a Brzezinski 
doctrine?
305 For a comprehensive discussion of many aspects of Yugoslav 
population policy, see (if possible) the mimeographed 
proceedings of the 1973 Belgrade Conference on Population 
Policy, Savetovanje o izgradnji drultvenih stavova o 
populacionoj politici u Jugoslaviji. Several key 
contributions to this conference were published in
Nase feme 1974, no.4, including the admirable summary by 
MiloS Macura, 'Komponente populacione politike saobrazne 
sadasnjim i buducim potrebama Jugoslavije'. Important 
republican conferences have been held in Croatia and Slovenia 
see Stanovni&tvo. emigracija i zaposlenost u Hrvatskoj 
(Zagreb, 1971); and Raziskovalni Center Ekonomske 
Fakultete Univerze v Ljubljani, Slovenski demografski 
simpozij (Ljubljana, 1974) , mimeograph. There is a good
(cont.)
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policy in the earlier period was often of great relevance to 
demographic development. But demographic considerations do 
not appear to have been prominent among the decision-makers' 
motives.
Indeed in the first decade and a half of Socialist
Yugoslavia, the regime seems to have paid little or no
attention to demographic questions. It was mentioned earlier
that the factor of population increase was apparently
completely overlooked or ignored by the drafters of the
first Five-Year Plan in 1948; and that it was only in 1957
that demographic considerations began to be systematically
306taken account of by planners. For many years the general
attitude of authority seems to have been one of blithe
confidence that socialism produced high natality, low
mortality, and rapid natural increase, that this was a good
thing, and that a Socialist state could certainly cope with
307any temporary difficulties that might arise as a result.
And the remnants of that attitude seem to be dying hard.
V /305 (cont.) short account in D. Breznik and M. Rasevic,
'Razmatranja o populacionoj politici u Jugoslaviji', 
StanovniStvo X (1972), no.1-2, p.5; and a useful 
one in English by Stanka Krajnc-Simoneti et al. in 
M. Kirk, M. Livi Bacci and E. Szabady (eds), Law and 
Fertility in Europe, vol.II, p.665.
306 Cf. notes 35 and 36, above.
307 Compare the discussion in 5.e., above.
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Some Yugoslav commentators still maintain that
Yugoslavia does not have a population policy or policies as 
3 08such. Accordingly, in what follows we shall often be
considering trends in demographically relevant social policy, 
irrespective to some extent of whether or not the decisions 
in question were taken with explicitly demographic objectives 
in view.
Though the post-war baby boom in Yugoslavia was 
basically the result of a concentration in time of long- 
delayed nuptiality and natality, it seems very likely that 
the social and economic reforms introduced by the new 
Communist authorities made some contribution to it. Post­
war reconstruction and the orchestrated euphoria surrounding
it, rising employment, land redistribution and resettlement,
309the provision of basic social welfare benefits - policies 
such as these were bound to enhance the pro-natalist 
atmosphere, just as they did elsewhere in Eastern Europe.
If, however, Socialist socio-economic programs tended at first 
to stimulate fertility, their long-term effect seems to 
have been, in Yugoslavia as elsewhere, to produce fertility 
decline of a rapidity and scope unequalled in the demographic 
history of Europe. The summary list of causes of fertility 
decline in Yugoslavia given in 5.a., above, contains several
308 This view is particularly common among family planning 
activists, who are always at pains to disassociate 
their movement from any connection with or responsibility 
for the demographic situation in Yugoslavia. But it 
is not confined to them. See , e.g., Breznik and 
Ra^evic, op.cit., p.6.
Family allowances in particular seem to have had a 
significant pro-natalist impact in the post-war years, 
when they were quite large in relation to the incomes 
of the time. Ibid., p.8.
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items peculiar to the European Socialist countries, or at 
least particularly marked in their case; and the effect 
of these seems to have been far greater in the long term than 
the pro-natalist impact of welfare legislation or the 
increasingly empty and celebratory anti-Malthusianism of the 
first two decades or so.
In fact, if actions rather than words are made 
the basis of one's assessment, it could be argued that by 
the late 1950s or early 1960s, the regime was beginning to 
display some anti-natalist leanings. After the first post­
war years, family welfare benefits stagnated in relation to 
incomes'^1“* and were graded regressively by birth-order.^'*'^ 
Programs for building child-care centres were allowed to lapse. 
In 1952, the first liberalization of the abortion laws took
place, and liberalization of practice followed, culminating
312in 1960 in further legislative reforms. In the 1950s,
310 See J. Klauzer, 'Jedan aspekt ocenjivanja potrebe za 
populacionom politikom u Jugoslaviji', Stanovni^tvo 
VI (1968), no.1-2, p.5, at p.8.
311 As of the mid-1960s, Yugoslavia was the only country
in Europe with a degressive scale of payments for family 
allowances. See M. Better, 'Nekateri vidiki politike 
reprodukcije prebivalstva', Ekonomska revija XVI (1965), 
no.2, p.113 at p.127.
312 For English texts of the 1952 and 1960 decrees with 
citations of the original sources, see H.P. David,
Abortion and Family Planning in Socialist Countries of 
Eastern Europe, pp.216, 219. For accounts of the reform 
movement that made them possible, see A. Milojkovic
et al., 'Historijat liberalizacije pobacaja u Jugoslaviji' 
and F. Novak et al. 'Prikaz razvoja odnosa do celokupne
problematike planiranja porodice u medicinskim krugovima', 
papers presented to the 1973 Belgrade Conference on 
Population Policy (mimeograph). See also the paper by 
Petrie cited in note 318.
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efforts to popularize contraception began to win official 
toleration, and by the early 1960s, that toleration was
starting to grow into approval. 313 The usual view of
Yugoslav commentators is that these developments occurred
314for basically non-demographic reasons. However, presumably
by that time the pro-natalist ideological predispositions 
of the authorities must at least have weakened for such things 
to have been possible.
With the exception of the abortion reforms, it 
is unlikely that any of these trends exerted a very major 
influence on fertility. Most of the fertility decline was 
concentrated in the 1950s, and was due rather more to the 
overall socio-economic modernization that Yugoslav society 
was undergoing, the demographic effects of which were 
sharply silhouetted by the sudden exhaustion of the post-war 
compensatory phase. After the 1950s, though some fertility 
indicators continued to show a decline, the trend was markedly 
slower and more differentiated by region. In fact, by the 
time the fertility decline began to be generally noticed, it 
had already almost, if temporarily, arrested itself. It 
was not until the early 1960s that alarms began to be publicly
313 See Novak et al., op.cit.
314 See, e.g., S. Krasovec, 'Stihijnost ili kontrola kretanja 
stanovnistva', p.36; Breznik and Rasevic, op.cit., 
pp.6-7; Klauzer, op.cit., p.8.
315 No doubt attitudes of many kinds were changing. Before 
the War, both abortion and contraceptives had been 
totally banned in Yugoslavia, and the initial post-war 
official attitudes undoubtedly owed a good deal to general 
conservative inertia on sexual questions, as well as
to Marxist doctrines on population.
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expressed about the demographic situation; and even then, 
most came from non-official or only semi-official sources. 
The first explicit demand that the government should adopt a
population policy seem not to have been made until the early 
3161960s. Many of those who made these demands were particularly 
concerned about trends in differential fertility and sought 
action from the authorities that would even these differences
4- 3 1 7out.
During the 1960s, the concern of ethnic nationalists
about demographic trends grew rapidly. The group which had
the greatest impact on the course of official policy, however,
318were the family planners. These were the people who had
316 See M. Macura, 'Demografska analiza u pripremama za 
SedmogodiSnji plan', Stanovnistvo I (1963), no.2, p.179; 
M. Sentic and D. Breznik, 'Demografska kretanja i 
projekcije u Jugoslaviji', Stanovnistvo II (1964), no.2, 
p.101.
317 In addition to the two articles cited in note 316,
see Macura's contribution to the round-table discussion,
'Zasto opada natalitet?' in Borba, 2 and 3 February 1964; 
and M. Better, op.cit. (in note 311). It should be 
emphasized, however, that with the possible exception 
of the Better article, none of these early calls for a 
differentiated population policy had any of the strong 
nationalist colouring with which this demand later became 
associated.
318 The group I have chosen to identify as 'family planners' 
was of course made up of disparate elements. Most 
prominent among them, perhaps, were the party feminists, 
the reforming minority of the medical profession and a 
variety of other social policy liberals. For an account 
of their successful campaign to secure official support 
written by one of their number, see N. Petrie,
'Drustveno-politicki aspekt razvoja planiranja porodice 
u Jugoslaviji', paper presented to the 1973 Belgrade 
Conference on Population Policy (mimeograph).
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secured the reforms of the abortion legislation and the
initiation of contraceptive services in the 1950s. In 1963,
a Co-ordinating Committee for Family Planning was set up
within the official Yugoslav women's organization. The rising
influence of this body soon became apparent. In 1966, as
mentioned earlier in another context, President Tito signed
319the Declaration of Heads of State on world population.
This document asserted that family planning was a basic
human right. As suggested earlier, Tito may have been pushed
in this direction by his association with Nehru and Nasser
and other Third World leaders concerned about population
programs. He was undoubtedly under considerable pressure
in the same direction domestically. In 1967, the Co-ordinating
Committee for Family Planning became the Federal Council for
Family Planning, with participation from bodies outside the
women's movement. And in 1968, a public debate was initiated
on the role of family planning in Yugoslav society. The
outcome of the debate, which became at times quite acrimonious,
320was a victory for the family planners. In 1969, the
Yugoslav Federal Assembly enacted a new law on abortion,
32reconfirming the liberal stance taken by the 1960 legislation.
322At the same time, it passed a Resolution on Family Planning,
319 See note 244, above.
320 See F. Novak et al., op.cit.
321 Sluzbeni list SFRJ 1969 no.20.
322 The Resolution and the new Abortion Law were dealt with 
and passed together, and obviously were regarded by the 
regime as a parcel of measures. For an English text of 
the Resolution, see Yugoslav Survey 1969, no.3, pp.103-06. 
The Resolution was evidently passed in the teeth of stiff 
opposition, and that not only from ecclesiastical or 
dissident nationalist sources apparently. A 1974 press 
article described the Resolution as a 'brave' decision.
S. Stanic,'"Pobuna" ginekologa', NIN, 8 December 1974.
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which completed the legitimization of the movement, and the 
liberal, humanist philosophy which it espoused.
The Resolution reaffirmed the proposition put
forward in the 1966 Statement that it is a basic human
right to be able to plan the size of one's family and the
spacing between births. It went on to declare that 'society
should make it possible for married couples to get information
about modern methods of birth control and provide them with
323adequate means to plan their families'. Abortion, though
deplored, was given a place in the scheme of things as a 
method of last resort. And in fact, it was suggested that 
abortion administration procedures should be made simpler 
and more humane. The Resolution also stressed the importance 
of proper sex education for the young.
With the swelling emigration of the late 1960s
and early 1970s, concern about demographic trends grew even
greater, particularly among nationalists anxious about the
future of their own peoples. In early 1971, in response to
these developments, a Croatian conference on emigration,
employment and population was held in Zagreb, which was
described by a reviewer as the first of its kind to have
324taken place in Yugoslavia. In 1973, a much larger,
national conference was held in Belgrade, whose express
purpose was said to be to contribute towards the 'building
325of views' about population policy at the Federal level.
323 'Federal Assembly Resolution on Family Planning',
Yugoslav Survey 1969, no.3, p.103.
324 See the very interesting review article by Stane 
Kra^ovec, 'Hrvatski posvet o prebivalstvu, emigraciji
in zaposlitvi', Ekonomska revija vol.22 (1971), no.2, p.241.
325 'Savetovanje o izgradnji dru^tvenih stavova o populacionoj 
politici u Jugoslaviji'.
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A second major republican conference was held in Slovenia 225in 1974, and there have been latterly a number of other
meetings of a similar kind dealing with a variety of 
demographically-related topics.
Since 1969, the Federal authorities have altered
their position on emigration policy, and begun to formulate
an approach to internal migration policy. They have also
given increasing prominence to demographic considerations in
327official planning documents, whilst maintaining, as it 
would seem, some restraints on public and parliamentary 
discussions of population problems. The basic orientation 
set by the 1969 Resolution on Family Planning, however, has 
so far not been altered. In 1973, at the initiative of the 
Federal Council for Family Planning, the Federal Assembly 
considered the implementation of the 1969 Resolution, and 
reaffirmed its general principles, while at the same time 
calling upon all parties involved to improve their performance. 
In 1974, the family planners scored another triumph, when the 
new Federal Constitution and all the Republican Constitutions 
incorporated a guarantee that 'it is a human right to freely
326 For citations for all three conferences, see note 
305, above.
327 Cf. note 238, above. This, apparently, was the first 
time a rubric specifically devoted to population policy 
had made its appearance in a planning document. See
'Bolj ^love^ko, bolj razumno', Delo, 22 June 1974.
328 For an account of the preparations for and course of 
these Assembly proceedings (an account which demonstrates 
very clearly the influence of the Federal Council for 
Family Planning on policy formation), see B. Vesic,
'Ostvarivanje na^ela i ciljeva Rezolucije Savezne 
Skupstine o planiranju porodice', Socijalna politika 
1974, no.4, p.17.
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decide about the birth of children'. While the final
formulation was less detailed and explicit than some family
330planners may have hoped (and does contain a proviso about 
limitations in the interest of health), it seems to be 
clear confirmation that in this area, an official about-face 
is not imminent.
In recent years, responsibility for most health 
and social welfare policies of demographic relevance has 
passed to the republics and provinces, and more recently 
even lower to the communes and other local agencies. It 
remains to be seen what patterns of development will evolve 
at these levels in the future. The Federal authorities, 
however, will continue to lay down general principles in 
most areas of governmental responsibility. On present 
indications, it seems likely that republican practice will 
vary in a multitude of minor ways, but that sharp divergences 
on matters of principle will somehow be prevented. Accordingly, 
it may be helpful at this point to spell out in slightly 
greater detail the Federal approach to population policy, 
as it has emerged since the 1960s.
329 Ustav Socijalisti^ke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije, 
p.99, article 191. Identical formulations were entered 
in all the republican and provincial constitutions as 
well. The Slovenian Constitution also contains an 
additional guarantee of the right to information and 
appropriate social security in family planning.
'"Pobuna" ginekologa1, NIN, 8 December 1974.
330 See 1Jednaka prava za bra^nu i vanbra£nu decu', Borba, 
27 September 1973.
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II Federal Population Policy: The Present
Official View
Despite the use of a singular connoting the existence
of a unified and coherent policy, it is still questionable
whether Yugoslavia has a population policy at all. The 1973
Belgrade Conference, it will be recalled, was devoted
explicitly to the creation of such a policy, and many of
the contributors commented on the fact of its continuing 
331absence. And while the Draft Long-term Plan published
in 1974 spoke of 'population policy' as of a known and 
established policy-area, the Tenth Congress of the League 
of Communists held in the same year did not devote any of 
its resolutions or documents to such an entity. In fact 
the author was told by a reliable source that an attempt at 
the Congress to establish a party body concerned specifically 
with population problems had failed. Nor is there any 
government population commission like the ones now in 
existence almost throughout Eastern Europe. Nonetheless 
I feel that enough official statements of one kind and another 
have accumulated for the use of the singular 'policy' to be 
justified, if only to characterize a certain kind of approach 
to matters of demographic relevance.
The first point to make about Yugoslav population 
policy at the Federal level is that unlike those of all other 
European Socialist governments, it is not pro-natalist.
In fact it is explicitly not concerned with the quantitative, 
but rather with the qualitative aspects of human reproduction 
and demographic development. The central aim of population 
policy is said to be the humanization of all aspects of 
reproductive processes. Responsibility for decisions about
331 See the instances cited by Macura in ‘Komponente 
populacione politike', pp.554-55.
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new life is firmly vested in the parents. In some
interpretations, even propaganda aimed at encouraging families
332of a particular size is seen as improper. And quite
emphatically, there must be no limitation placed on the 
availability of any reasonably safe means of family limitation, 
including abortion, though abuse of the latter must be 
reduced. Moreover, every effort should be made to ensure 
not only that the means of fertility control are made available, 
but also that the population is fully informed about all the 
possibilities that exist. Contraception should be propagated, 
and fully incorporated into the socialized health system.
While the family should be accorded the fullest 
freedom to make its own procreatory decisions, it should 
also receive assistance and support from society. Society 
itself, in any case, has a vital interest in the matter.
While laws and regulations providing benefits for the family 
are latterly a matter for republican and local authorities 
to determine, the lead given by Federal authorities is
332 Vida Tom^id, 'Planiranje porodice i populaciona 
politika', paper presented to the 1974 Slovenian 
Demographic Symposium (mimeograph), esp. p.16. Tommie, 
who was one of the first to press the issue of 
liberalizing family planning (in 1940; see N. Petrie, 
op.cit., p.2), is President of the Federal Council 
for Family Planning, a member of the LCY Central 
Committee, and a frequent spokeswoman for Yugoslavia 
at international conferences on demographically 
relevant topics. Given her high political standing 
and the Federal Council's overwhelming influence 
on policy-making in this area, her views (though 
described as 'theses') can be safely regarded as at 
least semi-official.
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towards favouring their increase, though again without
333any apparent demographic motivation.
But while society should provide optimal conditions
for family life, it has no right to force people to live
together against their wills, either for demographic or
any other reasons. Unlike Rumania in other words, Yugoslavia
is moving towards further liberalization of its divorce
laws. This again is a republican/provincial responsibility,
but while there has been significant regional variation in
334recent family legislation, is does not seem to be open 
to any republic or province to formulate restrictive 
divorce criteria in the hope thereby of encouraging fertility.
Federal documents invariably emphasize the principle 
of the equality of the sexes. Women are entitled to the 
fullest participation in social, economic and political life, 
and social and population policy must be designed to implement 
and further their rights. Society must strive to equalize 
the roles of the sexes, and also to humanize the relations 
between them. Patriarchal dominance and exploitation must
333 The Resolution passed by the Tenth Party Congress 
(published as a supplement to Komunist, 3 June 1974) 
contains nothing on population policy as such, but 
pledges party support for women and the family, child 
welfare, etc. See the section entitled 'Zadaci SKJ
u socijalnoj politici', pp.43-47. See also Tito's 
support for child-care services expressed in an 
important press interview first published in the Zagreb 
daily, Vjesnik, and reproduced in Komunist, 2 February 
1976. The emphasis is always on solving social problems 
not demographic ones. See, e.g., 'Ka^njene majke', 
Borba, 25 October 1974, and 'Socijalna karta za celu 
porodicu*, Borba, 23 February 1975.
334 See *Kako se snaci', NIN, 30 November 1975, ' Razvod sa
starim brakom', NIN, 24 August 1975, and 'Kriza nove 
porodice', NIN, 7 September 1975.
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be eliminated both in the home and at work. To this end, 
children should be educated to an acceptance of their roles 
in the new egalitarian family. They should also be given 
adequate sexual education in school to be able to conduct 
themselves with decency and responsibility in adult life.
It will have been noticed that all of the principles
outlined so far are not in a sense principles of population
policy at all. They might rather be termed 'metaprinciples',
normative principles or parameters within the limits of which
335population policy objectives must be pursued. As far
as demographic objectives in the narrower sense are concerned,
Federal policy is rather more reticent. It is conceded that
very high and very low fertility are not desirable, and that
the sharp regional differences that exist at present are not
desirable either. The confidence is usually expressed that
these differences will be ironed out in due course. No sense
of urgency about the matter is ever betrayed, however.
This is a development which is to be expected in the next 
336'decades'. It is in any case not a matter over which
the Federal authorities claim direct jurisdiction. Just 
as decisions concerning family size are left to the parents, 
decisions about what economic or other measures might be
335 Macura draws a similar distinction between 'principles'
(na£ela) and objectives (ciljevi) of population policy. 
'Komponente populacione politike', p.566.
336 The draft Long-term Plan speaks only of a 'gradual
overcoming of regional demographic differences', Osnova 
zajedni^ke politike dugorocnog razvoja SFR Jugoslavije 
do 1985 godine: Predlog za javnu diskusiju, published
as a supplement to Borba, 26 October 1974, p.XIV.
A press article speaks of 'approaching' demographic 
uniformity 'in the course of the next decades',
(Koliko ce nas biti*, NIN, 25 November 1973, p.24).
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taken to affect demographic indices are left to the republics 
and lower-level authorities. Population policy, like social 
policy, generally, is very largely decentralized - within 
the limits, of course, of the general ethical and organizational 
principles laid down by the Federation.
The Federation's organizational prescriptions have 
actually passed through a major upheaval recently with the 
latest constitutional reforms, the effect of which is to 
extend the process of decentralization beyond the republics 
to the commune, the 'interest community', the enterprise, 
and even the Basic Organization of Associated Labour (BOAL).
In essence the new system purports to increase the role of 
the individual worker in all aspects of social life affecting 
him. Elaborate representative structures known as interesne
337zajednice have been established to administer social policy.
Most fields of demographic relevance - health, social
security, pre-school education, housing and so on - fall
under this new system. What the de facto power relations
between these new structures and the existing Federal,
republican and local party and administrative authorities
will prove to be remains unclear. However, the earliest
indications seem to suggest that as far as efficiency is
concerned, they have not wrought an instantaneous revolution,
as some at least of the areas in question continue to suffer
3 38relative neglect. It seems also that some of the
337 For the constitutional position of the new 'interest 
communities' , see Ustav Socijalisti<*ke Federativne 
Jugoslavije, articles 51-59, and 110-13. For an 
interesting general discussion, see S. Nik^ic, 'Kraj 
zna£i po£etak', NIN, 22 December 1974.
338 Thus in the field of housing, for example, where progress 
throughout most of the country has been inadequate for 
years, a new crisis appears to be setting in. See 1Novca 
ima - stanova nema', VUS, 22 May 1976; and 'Nema lokacija, 
nema ni stanova' and 'Ima para, nema stanova', Politika,
22 and 28 June 1976.
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decentralization will be partially neutralized by the 
reaching (doubtless under centralized party or governmental 
direction in many cases) of 'social compacts' on unified 
policy guidelines. Nonetheless, decentralization, local 
diversity, and fissiparation of policy will undoubtedly 
continue to mark the Yugoslav social policy scene, just as 
they did before the creation of the interest communities. 
And they could become even more prominent.
Lest it should have been inadvertently suggested
by the above exposition of the theoretical position that
Yugoslavia is a humanist paradise, a few additional words
should be said about the practice of population policy.
Despite the lengthening history and considerable political
influence of the family planning movement in Yugoslavia,
fertility control services are in fact still generally
on a very low level, particularly in the less developed 
339republics. Knowledge about contraceptive procedures is
weak; apart from coitus interruptus, they are generally
y339 See, e.g., G. Zarkovic et al. 'Znanje, stavovi i praksa
planiranja porodice kod 2enskog stanovni^tva u fertilnoj 
dobi'; D. ^tampar, 'Planiranje porodice u Jugoslaviji - 
razvoj i problemi'; G. Zarkovic et al., 'Djelatnost 
zdravstvenih ustanova na planiranju porodice u 
Jugoslaviji', papers presented to the 1973 Belgrade 
Population Policy Conference; Social Welfare Aspects 
of Family Planning in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, 1973) 
(mimeograph); Krajnc-Simoneti et al. 'Law and 
Fertility in Yugoslavia' in Kirk et al., op.cit., 
vol.II, esp. pp.674-75.
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not used at all. And the overall level of what the
Yugoslavs call 'sexual culture' is in most regions rather
low. There is an excessive dependence on abortion, especially
in the areas of Serbian settlement.341 Despite the relative
ease with which legal abortion is made available, illegal
abortion remains widespread, and substantial numbers of
342deaths from abortions have been reported. Propaganda
of less damaging means of fertility control has been quite
inadequate, especially in those areas of the country where
343it is most needed. It was only after the 1969 Resolution
on Family Planning, that contraceptives were formally
340 Of 8,000 women in a 1970 survey, only 25% had heard 
of IUDs, 32% of condoms and 36% of the rhythm method.
In Slovenia and Croatia 88% employed some kind of 
contraceptive method, whereas in Kosovo only 44% did.
In Ljubljana 27% used the pill, but generally speaking 
the vast majority (70% of the total national sample) 
relied basically on coitus interruptus. Zarkovidf
et al., 'Znanje, stavovi i praksa', pp.13-14.
341 Data concerning abortions in Yugoslavia are not published 
regularly. For a lengthy, though slightly dated 
discussion, see Breznik et al., Fertilitet stanovni^tva
u Jugoslaviji, pp.305-41. A recent estimate put the 
annual total of abortions in the country at about 
300,000, of which 120,000 occurred in Serbia proper and 
45,000 (cf. 19,000 live births in 1973) in Belgrade.
These are registered abortions ('Pismo nerodjenom detetu', 
NIN, 8 February 1976). The total figure (including 
illegal abortions) may be higher by 100,000 (B. Vesic, 
op.cit., p.19).
342 There were 146 deaths consequent on abortion in 1966 
(Fertilitet stanovnistva u Jugoslaviji, p.329).
Reportedly, all cases of death from abortion since 1963 
have resulted from illegal abortions. Krajnc-Simoneti, 
et al., op.cit., p.677.
343 Zarkovic et al. speak of 'the regrettable fact that 
least work is being done on family planning in the areas
of highest fertility'. 'Djelatnost zdravstvenih ustanova*,
p. 3.
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incorporated into public health programs (though they had
been introduced in fact in some regions earlier), and even
after the legal requirement was passed, practice often lagged 
344far behind. The medical profession has frequently taken
345a negative, conservative attitude to fertility control; 
they almost invariably have no training in the field, and 
are often hostile to it, making the experience of women 
seeking abortion, for example, so unpleasant that many still 
prefer the lethal attentions of illegal practitioners.
In other spheres of demographically relevant
social policy, outside Slovenia at least, the record of
the Yugoslav system is not very much more favourable.
The housing problems of the country, for example, are in
many ways like those of Poland or Czechoslovakia: a
chronically acute shortage of urban housing; ineffective
346deployment of funds that are made available; under-
347fulfilment of housing plans; slow construction;
344 Though the principle that contraceptives should be 
covered by health insurance had then been accepted for 
some years, 2arkovic et al. found that social insurance 
funds in fact covered less than half the total sum 
required for actual current expenditure on contraception, 
and less than 1% of what might be regarded as a 
satisfactory program. Ibid., pp.2-3.
345 See, e.g., F. Novak et al., op.cit.; 'Pismo nerodjenom
detetu', NIN, 8 February 1976.
346 In recent years, more money has been available for 
housing, but construction continues to lag. See the 
articles cited in note 338 above, two of which could
be translated as 'The money's there, but the flats aren't'.
347 See, e.g., 'Zasto kasne stanovi', NIN, 14 April 1974;
and 'Korakom puza', Komunist, 22 September 1975, p.15. 
Yugoslav construction rates are among the very slowest 
in Europe. On underfulfilment of plans, see e.g.,
'Stan nas nasusni', Komunist, 14 April 1975. The economic 
reforms seem to have particularly affected housing 
construction. The 1966 figure for dwellings completed 
was not surpassed till 1972. Statisticki qodisnjak 
Jugoslavije 1975, p.210.
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long waiting lists; widespread incidence of one-room 
348sub-tenancies; irrational rent and allocation policies
349in the 'socialized' sector; innumerable bureaucratic
350restrictions on any self-help initiatives in the area;
and so on. In addition, Yugoslavia has some rather distinctive
problems of its own, including spiralling costs and prices
351 colossal price variations fromin the housing industry,
352commune to commune, and illegal and often sub-standard
353housing in outer city suburbs.
Pre-school child-care institutions are also totally 
inadequate despite female work-force participation rates 
that are higher than most in Western Europe (if not as high
348 'Generacija podstanara', NIN, 23 May 1976.
349 See, e.g., 'Rosada stanarina', VUS, 20 November 1974;
'Rome stanarina s popustom?', VUS, 19 November 1975; 
and 'Milijarde koje nitko nece'. ' VUS, 10 December 1975.
350 See, e.g., 'Ko ju privilegovan', NIN, 16 November
1975; 'Ukleto vlasni^tvo', VUS, 7 February 1976.
351 A good deal of the inflation appears to have been 
due to the monopolistic position held by construction 
enterprises which, particularly since the 1965 reforms, 
have apparently often taken advantage of the housing 
shortage and market conditions to raise their charges 
inordinately. See Borba, 20 November 1971, pp.l, 4.
352 Politika, 26 March 1976, p.7, reported that as of 1975, 
housing cost 3,182 dinars per sq. m. in Bor, but 7,202 
per sq. m. in Sarajevo.
353 See, e.g., ' Spri je<*iti, legalizirati ili ru^iti', VUS,
17 September 1975. This article discusses the ticklish 
question of what should be done with divlja nasel~)a 
(unauthorized suburban developments) which are already in 
existence. In this field, as in virtually all other 
fields of social policy in Yugoslavia, practice varies 
considerably from region to region and town to town.
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as some in Eastern Europe).354 For a long time, this area
was entirely neglected. 355 Since the late 1960s, some
fresh initiatives are again being taken. But the starting
point is very low,^j6 and progress, seemingly, not always 
357satisfactory. Sexual education has been introduced in
schools in several republics, but in the largest, Serbia,
resistance is evidently continuing. 358 Child endowment and
354 See UN ECE Economic Survey of Europe 1968 (New York,
1969), p.249, Table 28.
355 As President Tito has put it: 'We'd started well
after the war. Then suddenly money took over and 
everything was looked at purely in terms of the dinar 
(sve se samo kroz dinar gledalo). The few kinder­
gartens there were were disbanded...1 Komunist,
2 February 1976, p.8.
356 See K. Ankucic, 'Realizacija dru^tvene zaStite dece, 
ciljeva vaspitanja i obrazovanja kao faktor populacione 
politike u SFRJ*, paper presented to the 1973 Belgrade 
Population Policy Conference (mimeograph). As the 
author indicates, not only were child-care centres 
greatly neglected in Yugoslavia up till the late 1960s, 
but also the criteria for admission to them (mainly 
financial) were prejudicial to the less well-off.
357 See, e.g., 'Kad se zakida na deci', Politika, 20 April
1976; 'Djeca su £rtve, a tko su krivci?' VUS,
19 February 1975.
358 See NIN, 29 June 1975, for an article on the dismantling 
of an apparently well respected sexual education 
program in a Belgrade school. In this respect Serbia
is lagging far behind Croatia, Slovenia and Vojvodina 
(NIN, 15 February 1976, p.27). In general, Serbia 
appears to be markedly less liberal on most matters 
of this kind: in respect of abortion, divorce and
homosexuality (NIN, 30 November 1975, p.10), there 
are similar signs of a greater conservatism on the 
part of the Serbs than their northern neighbours.
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related social service benefits have been increased in 
recent years, but they are certainly not on anything like 
the level that is being maintained in some of the more 
emphatically pro-natalist countries of Europe.
It was only relatively recently, however, that 
Yugoslavia definitively charted its new course in social 
and population policy; and it is possible that the next 
decade or so will see practice and theory brought far 
closer together. Moreover, Yugoslavia's economic means are 
still relatively limited. In the wealthier republic of 
Slovenia, considerable progress has already been achieved.
If the Slovenian model is emulated elsewhere in the country, 
and if the interesne zajednice prove to be a success, 
Yugoslavia will have a population policy that is at once 
humane, liberal and organizationally unique.
Yugoslavia's approach to population policy differs
sharply from that of other Socialist countries in several
respects. Poland and the Soviet Union, though markedly less
pro-natalist than the other Socialist countries, at least
declare themselves to be pro-natalist, and are becoming
gradually more so. Even by contrast with them, Yugoslavia
is emphatically not pro-natalist or mercantilist. There
is far less of what I have termed 'econocentrism' in Yugoslav
population policy than elsewhere in Socialist Europe.
The unequivocal emphasis on human rights and freedom from
administrative restrictions or oppressive propaganda
campaigns about 'proper' family models also mark Yugoslavia
off from counterpart regimes elsewhere. And the
decentralization of population policy-making is, of course,
360a feature quite unique among Socialist states.
360 Compare the discussion at pp.254-55, above.
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While the relative liberalism of Soviet population 
policy seems curious given the attitude of the present 
Soviet leadership to other matters, and seems thereby to 
suggest that no clear parallel need necessarily obtain 
between the overall orientation of a Socialist regime and 
its population policy, the Yugoslav case, on the other hand 
(like the Hungarian, Rumanian and Polish cases) seems to 
confirm that such a parallel indeed does exist; and that 
the exceptional liberalism of Yugoslav population policy 
is a reflection of the exceptional liberalism of the regime 
itself (when judged by Socialist standards). Its sustained 
tolerance of emigration and legal abortion despite their 
apparent threat both to the national interest and to powerful 
ethnic interests within the country seem to point to a high 
degree of principled devotion to man-centred ends and means. 
In population policy, Yugoslav protestations of anti-etatism 
seem genuinely borne out by the facts on record.
But there are other influences at work, not all
of which may be quite so lofty. First and foremost, it is
undoubtedly the case that the Federal authorities are bound
to be resistant to pro-natalist and mercantilist arguments
as long as they are confronted by labour surpluses and a
severe unemployment problem. Though the logical connection
between the two policy-areas may not be very close, the
leadership is likely to react instinctively along the lines
of: 'We don't want more people - we've got more than we
361can handle already'. Moreover, it seems probable
361 The draft Long-term Plan speaks with satisfaction of
the projected decline in the rate of population growth 
over the next decade, saying that it will bring 
Yugoslav reproduction closer to the type prevailing 
in 'developed countries'. The passage in question 
betrays no sensitivity to the fact that, judged by (cont.)
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(as in the Soviet Union) that top-level interest in and
understanding of Yugoslavia's true demographic situation are
still not very great. Highly-placed politicians do not speak
about demographic indicators or show any keen awareness of
population trends, unlike their colleagues in Hungary, Bulgaria
362or Czechoslovakia, for example. And again as in the Soviet
case, it seems more than likely that the leadership is 
ham-strung by the nationalities issue: even if the 'Christian'
element could agree on the need for vigorous pro-natalism 
(and Serbs and Croats would be likely to suspect one another's 
motives) they would not wish to exacerbate the already very 
delicate inter-republican and inter-ethnic relations in the 
party and the country by taking any strongly centralist and 
strongly quantitative population policy line . Liberalism 
and decentralization are, in a sense, the line of least 
resistance, the only resolution of otherwise irreconcilable 
contending interests.
The exceptional vigour and strength of the Yugoslav 
family planning movement may be in large measure a consequence 
of some of the factors already mentioned. But it seems that 
it should also be accorded the status of an independent
361 (cont.) more analytical measures, Croatia and Serbia
had already far outdone 'developed countries' in fertility 
limitation by the end of the 1950s. The plan goes on 
to declare that this 'calming down' (smirenje) of 
population growth would favour economic and social 
development. Osnova zajedni^ke politike dugorocnog 
razvoja, p.XIV.
362 Or even perhaps those in Poland and the USSR. Cf. 
pp.340-41, and p.258, note 189. Gierek and Brezhnev 
have now at least used the phrase 'population policy' 
or similar. To my knowledge, Tito still has not.
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influence on events. Most of the successive developments
in official policy have occurred in response to initiatives
363stemming from the family planners. Among the latter,
in turn, there has been a strong feminist influence.
Population policy is quite often regarded as being in large 
measure a feminine preserve; and this is true in the Yugoslav 
case as well. Feminine pressures everywhere in the Socialist 
world (and outside it) tend to be in the direction of 
humanizing reproduction rather than increasing it. In this 
context, it may be of relevance that the social and political 
standing of women in Yugoslavia is rather higher than elsewhere
in Eastern Europe. ~^4
363 'The initiative did not flow from governmental or 
planning bodies, whom the complexity of demographico- 
socio-economic trends completely eluded.... Nor were 
socio-political organizations [i.e., the party, the 
Socialist Alliance, the Trade Unions, etc.] ready
to take up the initiative to seek political solutions 
for existing demographic problems. In this respect, 
the activities of the Conference for Social Action 
among Women formed an exception. They made a major 
contribution to bringing about abortion reform and 
the attainment of a political attitude to family 
planning'. Macura, 'Komponente populacione politike', 
p.558.
364 This generalization is undoubtedly less applicable
to the less developed southern regions of the country.
But official population policy seems to reflect 
northern liberalism (rather than northern chauvinism) 
in large measure. Perhaps at the grass roots, the 
position of women in the north is not much better 
than it is elsewhere in Socialist Europe either.
Certainly press reports of inequality between the 
sexes and weak participation in social and political 
life by women are frequent. But at the top, at least, 
women have been relatively prominent in recent years.
Two women have been successively President of the (cont.)
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It has been suggested that the Yugoslav theory 
°f population policy is both liberally humane, and ingeniously 
well adapted to the country* s very difficult politico- 
demographic situation. But quite apart from the deficiencies 
of practice, there are some serious lacunae and ill-concealed 
dilemmas in the policy itself. They may be inevitable, but 
they are there.
To begin with, there is the crucial question of 
whether and how decentralization of demographic goal-fixing 
will achieve the reduction of regional differences to which 
Federal policy is committed. The Federation has effectively 
delegated responsibility for this task to the lower tiers 
of government, whilst at the same time placing limits on the 
means they might use to set about it. It has not, on the 
other hand, proposed any system for co-ordinating emergent 
republican and provincial policies to achieve the harmonious 
results sought. What if the regions with rapidly growing 
populations, for example, made no effort to reduce their 
fertility? What if they were to decide for nationalist 
reasons to pursue pro-natalist policies? And how should 
the Federation respond if all the regional authorities do
364 (cont.) League of Communists of Croatia (Savka Dabcevic- 
Kucar and Milka Planinc); and a woman was for some 
time Secretary of the Serbian party (Latinka Perovic).
In this connection, it is worth recalling that Perovic 
participated in the 1964 Borba round-table debate on 
population policy, taking a strongly feminist and 
1anti-pro-natalist' line (Borba, 2 and 3 February 1964).
The case of Vida Tomsic of Slovenia is also significant 
(cf. note 332, above). Women's publications in 
Yugoslavia sometimes attain what Western feminists 
might concede to be a considerable degree of sophistication. 
(See, for example, the Zagreb journal Sena). Compare 
the discussion at pp.63-76, 97-99, 241-43 and 318-21, 
above.
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adopt appropriate population policies, but the fertility 
scissors still do not close? Federal policy has set a 
leisurely timetable for achieving 'moderately low' growth 
everywhere. But with or without regional co-operation, 
they may find they have a problem on their hands that seems 
to require adjudication imperatively and without delay.
In addition to being forced to reconcile conflicting
regional trends or conflicting regional policies, the
Federation may also find itself confronted with the cognate
task of reconciling its own or republican perceptions of
the country's socio-economic and political needs with
wayward macrotrends in parental decision-making. If, for
example, parental sovereignty results in further aggravation
of ethnic imbalances, will the Federation continue to defend
complete freedom of choice? Alternatively, if overall
fertility were to fall to a level where it is held to be
manifestly too low to sustain further economic development
or the most elementary national defence, should the Federation
then intervene? Yugoslav theorists have proposed at least
two solutions to dilemmas of this kind. One suggestion
emphasizes the 'happy circumstance' that, as fertility surveys
have shown» parents in high-fertility areas wish to have
fewer children than they in fact have, whereas those in
365low-fertility areas wish to have more. But it is an
unstable theoretical structure that rests on a 'happy 
circumstance'. What if patterns of parental preference 
were to alter in directions adjudged unsuitable by the 
authorities? In any case, Macura's happy circumstance is 
not entirely felicitous since there remain considerable
365 M. Macura, 'Komponente populacione politike', pp.573-74.
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differences between notions of ideal family size in
366different regions and among different ethnic groups.
Another suggestion that has been made is that any potential
conflict between national needs and individual decisions
will be averted by the fullest development of self-management
The individual citizen will be drawn fully into the making
of population policy through local authorities and 'interest
communities', and will thereby be enabled to see how private
and public responsibilities should be matched. In this
version, the right to family planning should also be seen 
367as a duty. It is not explained, however, how all
individual citizens will gain such a grasp of economic 
and macrodemographic trends as to be able to judiciously 
blend their procreatory aspirations with the needs and 
possibilities of the nation in any given epoch. What if 
the economic and educational measures sanctioned prove 
unequal to the task of guiding the individual's conscience? 
This is, or will be, everywhere a difficult moral problem.
In Yugoslavia it is even more difficult than elsewhere 
because of the ethnic complication. The glosses of Macura 
and Tomsic do not really provide a solution. But given 
the problem's quite exceptional delicacy in Yugoslav 
conditions, it is understandable that official and even 
semi-official thinking should hold back from trying to solve 
it until the last possible moment.
366 According to a major fertility survey conducted in 
1970, the ideal number of children varied by republic 
and province between 2.3 in Serbia proper and 3.8 in 
Kosovo; the number actually desired varied between 2.0 
in Serbia proper and 3.6 in Kosovo. G. Todorovic,
'Idealni i ^eljeni broj dece', Stanovnistvo IX (1971), 
no. 3-4* p.297, at p.301 and 305.
367 V. Tom^ic^, ' Planiran je porodice i populaciona politika* 
(mimeograph), esp. pp.15-18.
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It has been suggested that one of the reasons why 
Federal population policy assumed its present liberal form 
in Yugoslavia was that this made it possible to at least 
shelve if not solve certain intractable domestic political 
problems. It will, however, be a continuing problem for 
Federal population policy to contain the different cross­
currents that threaten it. Ethno-regional particularisms
368are the most prominent among them. But there are others.
The debate over legal abortion is evidently continuing, and
368 Perhaps it should be emphasized once more that Yugoslavs 
are intensely conscious of (though not necessarily 
well-informed about) ethno-demographic trends. For 
a sense of the keen expectancy with which the provisional 
and final Census results by nationality were awaited 
in 1971-72, see the two articles entitled 'Nacije u 
popisu*, in NIN, 4 July 1971 and 28 May 1972. The 
articles also convey something of the eagerness felt by 
defenders of official policy to play down the whole 
event. The first article assured its readers that 
'practically' there could be no 'overtaking' on the 
population league tables, since the differences between 
the various ethnic groups were too great. The second 
article had to admit, however, that the Macedonians 
had fallen back two places, whilst the Moslems and 
Albanians had advanced two and one respectively.
The article quoted the Director of the Federal Statistical 
Institute as claiming that there had been no surprises, 
but went on to declare, nonetheless, that there had been 
both surprises and 'fundamental shifts'.
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seems unlikely to subside in the near future. Obviously
it would be impractical as well as undesirable to have 
sharply different criteria in different republics, as 
women reluctant to avail themselves of the services of 
non-professionals could simply travel to another region.
Reversal of the present liberal policy in all areas might 
also fail in its purpose, if that purpose were to strengthen 
the relative position of the less fertile majority. Eastern 
European experience suggests that in the early phase of 
fertility limitation, if abortion is available, it will 
be preferred to other methods. Accordingly, reversal of 
the abortion legislation might have only slight effects 
in the north, whilst seriously checking a growing trend 
towards family planning in the less developed regions.
Despite the problematicality of abortion reform and counter­
reform as population policy, pressures of that kind are probably
369 The Catholic Church in Slovenia and Croatia launched 
a fierce campaign against legal abortion just as the 
legislation confirming it was being considered.
(David, Abortion and Family Planning, p.201.)
Opposition is not confined to the Church, however.
For an instance of Serbian opposition, see B. Stambolovic, 
'Planiranje porodice i demografska situacija u opstinama 
Srbije', Srpski arhiv za celokupno lekarstvo 1971, 
no.7-8, p.475. Stambolovic, a doctor, speaks with 
the greatest anxiety about the threat posed by abortion 
to the biological future of the nation (by which he 
means the Serbs), and repeatedly compares a woman's moral 
and civic obligation to bear children with a man's duty 
to serve in the army. The article is also enlivened 
by some comical demographic logic. For an instance of 
Macedonian opposition, see A. Kjurcijev 'Niektore 
aspekty polityki ludnosciowej w Jugosi'awii' , paper 
presented to the 1972 Warsaw Conference on Population 
Policy (mimeograph), pp.12-14. Kjurcijev believes 
abortion laws should be made an instrument of 
differentiated population policy.
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not easily contained. There is also an ongoing struggle
between defenders of the official orientation which sees
population policy as firmly integrated in social policy and
principles, and those who would like to make it an independent
and autonomous area of policy with its own objectives and 
370priorities. Finally, mention might be made of those who
favour migration as a solution to population pressures and
371those who believe family planning should be made the answer; 
and, relatedly, the Malthusians and the anti-Malthusians.
All of these (and other) issues of principle tend to become 
tangled up with the existing ethno-regional lines of division 
so that each reinforces the other. None of them have really 
been permanently solved by the present Federal policy.
Ill Population Policy below the Federal Level
While the Federal authorities have to some extent 
simplified the task of republican authorities in the field 
of population policy by laying down guidelines that remove 
certain elements of agonizing choice, they have not solved 
all their problems for them. As the administration of social 
and population policy is now decentralized virtually to 
the level of the BOAL, republican authorities may well encounter 
many of the problems of co-ordination and reconciliation 
that have previously been outlined as facing the Federation, 
the moreso since most of the republics, like the Federation
370 A problem already familiar from the Polish context (cf. 
pp.333-34, above). See, e.g., D. Stampar, 'Planiranje 
porodice u Jugoslaviji - razvoj i problemi', esp. pp.12-17.
371 Cf. note 265, above. This debate has been going on in 
that form for some time. See Migracije stanovnistva 
Jugoslavije, p.339.
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itself, are torn by their own internal regional and ethnic 
372divisions. Moreover, in fobbing the more strictly
demographic aspects of policy-formation off onto the lower 
levels, the Federation has freed itself of the difficult 
task 0f finding population policies that will be capable 
of achieving numerical aims. At the same time, of course, 
it has restricted the lower authorities' range of choice. 
The republics which would like to increase their fertility 
are virtually limited to offering various kinds of economic 
inducements to achieve their objective. While they may 
approve of the kinds of policies involved as a matter of 
principle (generous child endowment, maternity leave and 
benefits, extensive networks of child-care centres, etc.), 
it may not be within their economic means to provide all 
these things within the foreseeable future. Slovenia is 
the only republic that is relatively well enough placed to
372 As in the case of Yugoslavia as a whole, there is
generally a strong correlation between regional, ethnic 
and developmental factors within the republics. All 
the republics now have their own regional policies 
aimed at reducing the economic gap between their more 
and less developed communes. The problems are perhaps 
particularly acute in Serbia proper, Montenegro and 
Macedonia. See Politika, 20 November 1975, p.10 
(Macedonia); Politika, 12 December 1975, p.9 and 
10 June 1976, p.8 (Montenegro); and NIN, 9 and 16 
February 1975 (Serbia proper). Leading party officials 
in Serbia and Montenegro who are quoted in these 
articles describe the regional development question as 
'politically very sensitive' and 'very complex and 
sensitive' respectively. From the context, it is 
clear that each had in mind the strongly Moslem Sandzak 
area which spans the Serbo-Montenegrin border.
Cf. note 205, above.
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afford extensive programs of this kind; and its fertility 
is in fact well above that of Serbia or Croatia, and has been 
for many years. Serbs and Croats may, therefore, feel that 
the ethical guidelines laid down by the Federation discriminate 
against them.
Numerous policy problems and dilemmas await the 
republican authorities, some of them strongly ethno-regiona1 
in colouration, and some of them more universal. For example, 
should child-care centres be built to enable mothers to 
participate fully in public life, or is it economically, 
socially and educationally preferable that women should rear 
their children themselves for at least the first years of 
their life? If pro-natalist inducements are offered for 
higher-order children, how steeply progressive should they 
be? Should a means test be applied for family benefits, and 
if so from what level? Should special efforts be made to 
encourage the fertility of any particular categories of 
the population (say, those whose fertility is lowest, or 
those whose rearing performance seems best)? It will not 
be possible to go into all of these questions here. Rather,
I shall restrict myself to saying something about the 
pattern of republican and provincial differentiation of 
policy, as seen from our central natalist vantage-point.
Decentralization of child endowment payments has 
been in force in Yugoslavia since 1967 in the case of 
republics, and in 1969 in the case of the autonomous provinces. 
In the time that has elapsed since, there has emerged a 
definite tendency towards the payment of higher benefits in 
the wealthier and less fertile regions and lower benefits in
373 M. Mladenovic, Dru^tvena zastita porodice i dece 
(Belgrade, 1973), pp.178-79.
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the poorer and more fertile regions. However, the
375differences are still not spectacular, and may reflect
relative capacities to pay more than differences in degree
of pro-natalist ambition. Moreover, a means test is applied
and payments are graduated by parental income as well as by 
376birth-order. Income-tax concessions for dependant family
members are also granted in varying amounts by the different 
republican and provincial authorities (and may be varied by 
communal authorities as well). But again it would seem that 
differences by republic are not very great and do not 
reflect any obvious division between pro- and anti-natalist
374 See Table 15, Appendix C.
375 There is a tendency for family benefit increases to 
follow inflation in a fairly automatic fashion in one 
republic after another. There are signs also of 
central policy direction in this area. See, e.g., 
Komunist, 12 August 1974, pp.1-2. Increases are not 
always more modest in the more fertile and less prosperous 
regions. Thus Politika, 4 February 1976, p.9, reported
a 30% increase in family allowances in Kosovo (higher 
than equivalent rates of increase elsewhere, and higher 
than the increase in the cost of living in Kosovo over 
the relevant period).
376 All of this suggests that the orientation is more to 
social policy than to pro-natalist population policy.
This impression is probably borne out by the language 
of the sparse press reports on the subject, which never 
contain pro-natalist accents. See, e.g., Borba, 26 July 
1974 (Montenegro); VUS za na^e gradjane u svijetu,
8 January 1975, p.32, Politika, 27 December 1975, p.8, 
and 16 April 1976 (Croatia); and Politika, 2 August 
1974, p.7 (Serbia proper). On Slovenia, see A. Radovan, 
'Zakonodaja o varstvu zena s podrocja dela in socijalne 
varnosti ter o otroSkem varstvu', paper presented to 
the 1974 Slovenian Demographic Symposium (mimeograph), 
pp.20-21. The pattern of degressive gradation of 
benefits after the first three children also seems to 
be fairly standard.
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regional authorities. In any case, only a relatively
small proportion of income-earners are involved, since the 
taxable minimum even before concessions are allowed for 
dependants is customarily twice the average annual income 
for that republic or province. The more basic income tax 
(or 'contribution' - doprinos - as the jargon of self­
management euphemistically terms it) paid by Yugoslav wage- 
earners is now fissiparated into a multitude of republican,
communal and other local or special deductions, which vary
37 8in bewildering fashion from one commune to another, and
379even from one enterprise to another. It is these deductions
which finance the various spheres of social activity and
V377 See 'Cije su makaze o£trije', NIN, 1 December 1974; 
and 'Razli£iti arSini', Politika, 5 December 1975.
Slovenia seems a little more inclined to treat income 
tax as a natalist device. See also 'Bodo dav£ne 
olajsave privabile ätorklje?' (Will Tax Concessions 
Entice the Storks?), Tedenska tribuna (Ljubljana),
21 February 1973.
378 Thus, for example, in Titovo Uzice, workers pay 26 (sic) 
different 'contributions', in Belgrade 24, in Zagreb 16 
and Skopje 13 ('Moja zarada', NIN, 13 June 1976).
See also 'Kolikb nam je socijalna politika socijalisti^ka', 
VUS, 21 February 1976.
379 Enterprises are usually bound by higher authority to 
observe certain principles when determining their own 
allocatory procedures in such matters. Reports of evasion 
are not infrequent, however. Thus, for example, a 
Belgrade enterprise was said to have introduced a system 
of housing allocation that would have required an Albanian 
worker with the firm to have either 800 children, or 
alternatively oily 224 children but 100 years' service
to qualify for a flat (VUS, 4 June 1975). One can well 
imagine the ribald jocosities that might have been 
exchanged as these rules were being framed. Family 
allowances may also vary from enterprise to enterprise.
See, e.g., 'Pomoc radnicima s vi£e dece', Borba,
7 October 1974.
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social security that are potentially of the greatest demographic 
relevance: housing, health, child-care, social security,
etc. As mentioned earlier, the actual politics of these 
allocations under the new constitutional arrangements are 
still somewhat obscure. But given the immense local variation 
that exists, it would probably be safe to say that there are 
as yet few signs of clearly and systematically elaborated 
republican policies of any kind emerging, much less of 
programs of action aimed at achieving palpable, numerical 
demographic goals. A close study of press reports on these 
matters in recent years suggests in any case, that here too 
demographic motivations are extremely seldom in the foreground 
of the decision-makers' minds. Advocates of vigorous 
republican population policies, though less prominent than 
in the period before 1972, still make their voices heard 
from time to time in the press. But for the most part they 
seem to be back in the political wilderness. As at the 
Federal level, the family planners and the social policy 
lobby seem to have relatively better access to authority.
And again as at the Federal level, this is probably 
due to some extent to continuing non-comprehension of 
demographic facts by political elites, and a reluctance to 
grasp sharp ethnic nettles. It may also have something to 
do with disapproval by the centre of vociferously nationalist 
population policies being pursued by the republics or 
provinces.
By making family planning a national dogma and by 
specifying that abortion is to be regarded as a legitimate 
(if highly undesirable) form of fertility control, the 
Federal authorities have, as noted earlier, largely precluded 
the republics and provinces from manipulating either as 
tools of population policy. There are some variations in
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the republican abortion laws that have been drafted since 
the constitutional amendments made this an area of exclusive 
republican responsibility. However these are limited in
T Q Qscope and do not appear to have any demographic significance.
Levels of contraceptive practice differ greatly from republic 
381to republic, and there is some room therefore for the 
less developed regions to apply anti-natalist policies by 
vigorously pursuing family planning campaigns. Calls for
382such action have certainly been made, notably in Macedonia,
380 The Slovenians plan to reduce the period in which abortions 
can be performed on social grounds from 12 to 10 weeks, 
but are doing so for medical reasons. Otherwise, the 
draft of the new Slovenian abortion law was more liberal 
than its predecessors. * 1Zakon o prekinitvi nosecnosti 
(osnutek)1, documentation reproduced for the 1974 
Slovenian Demographic Symposium. The Croatian draft
law on abortion is reportedly the only one in Yugoslavia 
that also explicitly deals with contraception and sex 
education. (1Pobacaj (ne) planira obitelj', VUS 2 
October 1974). A later report on the Croatian draft 
law suggests that the commissions which formerly had to 
approve all abortions will no longer be so empowered in 
the case of early abortions (Politika, 20 February 1976, 
p.9). In abortion legislation, as in the case of family 
allowances, there seems to be a tendency for new measures 
to be taken up by one republic after another, starting 
usually from Slovenia. See '"Pobuna" ginekologa*, NIN,
8 December 1974; and 'Strah od pobacaja', NIN, 8 June 1975.
381 Cf. note 340, above.
y382 K. Miljovski, 'Kretanje stanovnistva, ekonomski razvoj
i nerazvijena podrucja', paper presented to the 1973 
Belgrade Population Policy Conference. Another Macedonian 
contribution to the same Conference argued for a 
differential population policy on the quite explicit 
grounds that such a policy was necessary to preserve 
ethnic harmony between Macedonians and Albanians.
I. Josifovski, 'Problemi populacione politike sa stanovista 
razvoja etni£kih grupa i njihovih medjuetnickih odnosa na 
jednom uzem podru£ju u SR Makedoniji*, Nase teme 1974, 
no.4, p.590. Similar demands were voiced at the same 
conference in respect of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro 
and Kosovo.
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and there is evidence that differentiated republican family
3 83planning policies may now be beginning to be applied.
Of course, some Republican authorities would wish to pursue
anti-natalist policies in some parts of their territory,
384and pro-natalist policies elsewhere. The decentralization
of the Yugoslav system seems to give them a way of doing so.
However, to achieve this, they might have to secure the
co-operation of the local populations concerned, or
alternatively, succeed in manipulating ostensibly autonomous
self-managing decisions by local agencies. Neither course of
action would be without its difficulties. All the major
national groups have centres of power either within Yugoslavia
or beyond its borders. Virtually the only significant
minority group that could be proceeded against with relative
385impunity in such matters would be the Gipsies.
383 See Social Welfare Aspects of Family Planning in 
Yugoslavia (mimeograph) (Belgrade, 1973), p.27.
384 Montenegro and Macedonia, for example, Miljovski
(op.cit.) calls for a 'subtly differentiated policy', 
and Kjur^ijev (op,cit.) for a policy differentiated 
by region (not just by republic or province). A 
Montenegrin contributor to the 1973 Belgrade Conference, 
having deplored the lack of any official support for 
family planning in his republic, went on to speak of 
the need for determining a population policy in 
Montenegro, 'especially in the less developed regions'. 
These, of course, are the strongly Moslem communes 
of the Sandzak (cf. note 372, above). M. Djuric,
'Problemi planiranja porodice u SR Crnoj Gori' 
(mimeograph), pp.l, 2.
385 Per Spiegel, 16 April 1973, p.153, reported that Yugoslav 
officials had been attempting to get rid of Gipsies
as Gastarbeiter to Western Europe, especially to Austria. 
In the Bosnian commune of Kakanj, according to this 
report, some 30 Gipsy families had been given financial 
inducements by the authorities to go abroad. (cont.)
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The development of republican and provincial 
population policies has been little studied either in or 
outside of Yugoslavia to date. To do so would be a formidable 
task, given the complexity, obscurity and at times 
inscrutability of the material. I have not made any systematic 
attempt to do so myself. It may, however, be worth offering 
one's impressions of how policy trends are shaping in the
385 (cont.) It is characteristic that the 1971 Yugoslav
Census reported a total of 12 Gipsies in the whole of 
Kakanj. ('Nacionalni sastav stanovniStva po op^tinama', 
p.14.) The Gipsy population in Yugoslavia may in actual 
fact be very large. One (Gipsy) estimate gives their 
numbers at 650,000, 200,000 of them allegedly in 
Macedonia. (Gratton Puxon, Rom: Europe's Gipsies, Minority 
Rights Group Report No.14 (London, 1973).) The 1961 Yugoslav 
census found 150,000 Romany speakers. Most Yugoslav 
Gipsies are evidently identifying as Serbs or Macedonians. 
Should the Gipsies emerge as an independent ethnic group 
in Yugoslavia, the demo-political consequences might 
be quite significant, especially in Macedonia. See 
also R. Petrovic, 'Demografski razvitak i bioloska 
reprodukcija etnickih grupa u Jugoslaviji', Sociologija, 
1970, no.3-4, p.355, esp. 360, 362-63; 'Nikada se nismo
pomirili s politikom diskriminacije drugih nacionalnosti’, 
Politika, 25 June 1971, tr. in 'Das schwierige Zusammenleben 
der Völker im Kosovo-Gebiet', Osteuropa, XXII (1972), no.3, 
p.Al97 (for comment on attempts by Serbs and Albanians 
in Kosovo to use local Gipsies for their own political 
purposes in the 1971 Census); and NIN, 13 April 1975, 
p.ll (for a curious little article abridged from a 
Vojvodina Hungarian-language paper describing the 
activities of Yugoslav Gipsies in international Romany 
organizations: the President of the World Romany
Congress, Slobodan Berberski of Belgrade, is quoted 
as deploring discrimination against Gipsies in Europe 
and in Yugoslavia, and as referring to a proposal that 
a Gipsy national state, Romanistan, be created. The 
article does not mention any proposed location for 
such a state.)
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different units, simply on the basis of the evidence that
386is more or less readily available.
Slovenia and Croatia seem to be talking most about
387the need for a pro-natalist policy and also taking the
388most vigorous steps towards implementing one. Croatia
was the first republic to introduce the extended maternity
389leave for working mothers, for example, and Slovenia 
is paying more generous family allowances than any other 
republic. While in both republics there are Catholics 
and nationalists who would be only too happy to adopt
386 The task is all the more difficult in that at the 
republican, as at the Federal level, 'Yugoslav 
legislation...has been consistently neutral towards 
demographic phenomena. No direct population policy, 
either pro-natalist, or anti-natalist, has so far 
been made explicit in law or statutory regulations.'
Krajnc-Simoneti et al. op.cit., p.693.
387 For some Slovenian talk see, e.g., 'Vzroki premajhnega
stevila rojstev v Sloveniji', (The Causes of the 
Excessively Low Birth-rate in Slovenia), Komunist 
(Ljubljana edition), 24 November 1972; 'Kak^no
populacijsko politiko potrebujemo?' , Tovariüa, 8 October 
1973; ' Storkljo v slovenski grbl'; and 1 Bodo dav<*ne
olajsave privabile storklje?' The Croats talk rather 
less about population policy since 1971, but see, for 
example, 'Korak ka dru^tvu razvijenih', Politika,
30 March 1975; 'Skupi stanovi - mali natalitet', Borba,
17 August 1974.
388 Slovenia may be doing more as well as talking more 
about population problems. Croatian creche programs, 
for example, are languishing badly. Towards the end 
of the last five-year planning period, it was expected 
that the plan for creche construction would be only 40% 
fulfilled (Komunist, 17 February 1975, p.ll). See also 
the articles on child-care centres in VUS, 16 January 
and 13 November 1974, and 19 February 1975.
389 Evidently for pro-natalist reasons, among others. See 
Krajnc-Simoneti et al. op.cit., p.680.
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'administrative measures' to increase the birth-rate, the 
liberal, economic approach to population policy seems more 
securely established there than anywhere else.
Serbia, despite the fact that its ethno-demographic
interests are as much threatened as either the Slovenians'
or the Croatians', seems strangely sluggish in its response.
Child welfare services in Serbia proper are not apparently
advancing very r a p i d l y , a n d  the press virtually never
391reports on the need for an active population policy,
390 Serbia is well behind Slovenia and even Croatia in the 
provision of pre-school care centres. As of 1970, only 
5.3% of children aged 3-6 in Serbia proper were in 
kindergartens, compared with 8.5% in Croatia, 15.2%
in Slovenia and 24.7% in Vojvodina (Ankucic, op.cit., 
prilog 1). Since then there has been improvement, but 
probably not in relative terms. Of Serbia's 212 
child-care institutions, 163 are in Belgrade; 30 
communes have none at all (Politika, 7 and 21 October 
1975, p.9 in each case). A press article in 1973 
suggested that at that time, family allowances were 
in many cases simply not being paid in Serbia (Borba,
27 October 1973, p.6). And more recently, a rapporteur 
to the Serbian parliament declared that 'the average rate 
of taxation for child welfare [in Serbia] has been falling 
since 1971. Only last year a large number of communal 
child welfare communities in our republic reduced their 
rates...' The speaker went on to say that more would do 
so in 1976, and that plans for the next five years 
revealed a further expected relative decline. (Politika, 
31 July 1976, p.ll) See also Politika, 27 May 1976, p.5, 
for similar complaints about the neglect of child welfare 
in Serbia.
391 The only pro-natalist cris de coeur I have seen in the
Belgrade daily Politika in recent years have not referred 
to Serbia. The issue for 4 April 1976 contained an 
article entitled 'The Contemporary French Family: Where
is the Third Child?' French fertility has been much 
higher than Serbian for twenty years. The article 
contained no apparent allusions to the domestic Serbian 
situation.
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despite the fact that Serbian fertility is the lowest in
the country. There are signs that the illiberal solution
has special appeal in Serbia, but since that is not at
present an available option, their inactivity in other
respects is all the more strange. There seem to be more
traces of pro-natalist thinking in official circles in the
392Vojvodina than in Serbia proper. Among the less developed
regions there seems to be a general disposition to limit
expenditures that might have a pro-natalist impact, but with
the possible exception of Macedonia, no very vigorous anti-
natalist campaigns seem to be being conducted. It would be
interesting to know just exactly to what extent the Macedonian
authorities are seeking to implement the innumerable demands
made by ethnic Macedonians that a differentiated population
policy be put into effect within the republic. There is
some evidence to suggest that they are doing so, and that
the program is meeting with hostility on the part of the393Albanian population. The Kosovo authorities, to my
392 See 'Prazne zibelke', DeJLo, 15 February 1974 (a Slovenian 
translation of an article that had appeared in the Novi 
Sad paper, Dnevnik; and 'Kritiina tacka za bebe',
NIN, 23 June 1974. Because of its age-structure,
Vojvodina's crude birth rate is markedly lower than 
Serbia's (12.7 per thousand, cf. 15.1 per thousand in 
1973) . This may help to explain the greater alarms there.
393 An article about unwholesome nationalisms in Macedonia
mentions Macedonian nationalist fears that the high 
birth rate of certain unidentified people or peoples 
is an attempt to squeeze the Macedonians out of the 
area, and condemns Macedonian nationalists who oppose 
proportionate representation of ethnic minorities in 
socio-political organizations, etc. Albanian nationalists 
are also condemned, among other reasons because: 'They
interpret family planning in a special way, and in that 
respect have a point in common (though from the opposite 
side) with Macedonian nationalists'. 'Nacionalisti^ki 
pucnji u prazno', VUS, 8 October 1975 (reprinted from 
Politika).
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knowledge, are not vigorously pursuing anti-natalism. The
most recent increase in the family allowance there was very
generous (much more so than the concurrent increase in Bosnia
394and Hercegovina, for example). It is possible that
the Kosovo leadership shares the belief of its compatriots
in Tirana that vigorous population growth is essential to
395national (ethnic) security. The Montenegrins also need
to conduct a differentiated policy, and it is possible that
they are now trying to do so, though as of 1973, little was
396being done in the field of fertility control, at least.
But irrespective of the present or future direction 
of republican and provincial policies, the political problems, 
dilemmas and conflicts inherent in the Yugoslav demographic 
situation are unlikely to be rapidly alleviated in the 
decades that lie ahead. They will rather become worse.
394 The most recent increase in Kosovo was 30% (cf. note 
375, above); the most recent increase in Bosnia and 
Hercegovina was only 16.8% (Politika, 24 February 1976, 
P-7) .
395 Compare the report of a Swedish demographer after a visit
to Albania: 1 In addition, one often encounters the
nationalistic argument in favour of a population larger 
than it is at present. The Albanians feel that they
are surrounded by enemies and that if their population 
was larger it would be easier for them to resist possible 
attacks.' E. Hofsten, op.cit., p.156.
396 Cf. note 384, above. The decline in family allowance 
payments in Montenegro after 1970 (cf. Table 15,
Appendix C) may conceivably reflect a punitive policy 
aimed against high fertility, but it seems unlikely.
Like most other republics, Montenegro has a means test 
for family allowances, and pays higher sums to lower- 
income families (Borba, 26 July 1974). This would 
presumably favour the more fertile Albanians and Moslems 
in the less developed communes.
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The efficacy of population policies in either increasing or 
reducing fertility is in itself open to question. Many 
observers take the view that they can achieve little. Some 
Eastern European countries, it is true, are currently 
claiming considerable success for their pro-natalist policies.
In Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Rumania, both natality and 
fertility have undoubtedly been raised. But it remains to 
be seen whether this is a long-term or a short-term effect.
And in any case, they have been able to do so thanks to a 
combination of measures, most of which are not open to 
Yugoslav republican authorities. Thus Rumania, for example, 
abruptly delegalized abortion and banned the import and free 
sale of contraceptives. Czechoslovakia, being a relatively 
advanced economy, has been able to afford to introduce 
generous economic inducements to motherhood. And all are 
able to mount elaborate and orchestrated propaganda campaigns 
on behalf of the family model they deem nationally desirable. 
Virtually none of these approaches seem open to the Yugoslav 
republics at present.
In any case, even if Croatia, Serbia, Vojvodina and 
Slovenia were to institute successful pro-natalist policies, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Hercegovina appropriately 
differentiated programs, and Kosovo a family planning 
campaign of unprecedented intensity, it is unlikely that 
this in itself would avert the ethno-demographic confrontations 
that seem to be already in gestation. The age-structures 
of the different ethnic populations have been so sharply 
differentiated by their recent demographic histories that 
even if inherent fertility levels were to be relatively 
quickly brought to parity, differences in natural growth 
rates would persevere for some decades beyond that time.
As in the case of the Soviet Union, the time when the dominant
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ethnic groups could have sought by policy measures to 
significantly mitigate the trends we are now witnessing 
is buried well in the past. Present actions cannot undo 
present trends. They can only serve - perhaps - to alleviate 
future trends, and, more probably, to ease present neuroses. 
The only real solutions (short of political or other violence) 
lie in accommodation and compromise, acceptance of change 
and imaginative response to it.
521.
CHAPTER 6
THE POLITICS OF POPULATION IN SOCIALIST EUROPE: SOME
GENERALIZATIONS.
In some important respects, the cases of USSR, 
Poland and Yugoslavia deviate from the general pattern of 
demographic politics in Socialist Europe. They are, perhaps, 
if we exclude the anomalous Albania, the three least "typical" 
of all. The USSR and Yugoslavia are far more ethnically 
diverse than any other country in the group; Poland is now 
far less so. All three are markedly less pro-natalist than 
the others. Yugoslavia, with its labour surplus, its 
toleration of mass emigration, its decentralized social policy 
administration and its strong commitment to non-mercantilist 
values is altogether an exceptional case. While pragmatic 
considerations preclude even the most cursory of discussions 
of the politico-demographic problems of the other Socialist 
countries, an overall survey of the entire area may help to 
identify and locate the positions of our three case studies 
more precisely.
Generally speaking, in the present work, five main 
spheres of interaction between demographic trends and politics 
have been distinguished: (a) labour supply and economic
policy; (b) ethnic relations; (c) ideology; (d) inter­
national politics; and (e) population policies and policy­
making. More prominence has been accorded domestic than 
international implications, and particular attention has been 
devoted to (b) and (e) as being the areas of the greatest
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inherent importance and keenest demographic relevance 
respectively. The treatment of the other three has been 
relatively terse, if not sketchy. That same pattern of 
emphasis will be repeated again in these concluding remarks.
6.a. Economic Policy.
In this field, the crucial problem raised (or 
apparently raised) by population trends is that of labour 
supply. Soviet-style economies are extremely profligate 
with resources, human resources included. Labour (like 
capital) has traditionally been cheap, and relatively 
speaking still is. There are also strong reasons inherent 
in the annual and five-year planning systems for hoarding 
materials, human materials again included. Enterprises thus 
have a vested interest in maintaining more people on their 
staff than they need. And since till recently there has 
always been an abundant supply of labour (based more on 
mobilization of women and peasants than on high birth rates 
in the preceding generation, but on the latter also, to some 
extent), there have been few pressures at the macro-economic 
level to strive for efficient and sparing use of labour.
Now, suddenly, the situation has changed or is changing almost 
everywhere. Planners and governments are finding themselves 
having to apportion carefully what they have traditionally
1
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tended to treat as one of nature's limitless bounties. 
Although the causes of this situation are not primarily 
demographic, the dramatic "disappearance" of labour reserves 
has the effect of concentrating the minds of the authorities 
on demographic issues.
Although the overall trend is towards increasing 
scarcity of labour, there have also been periods and regions 
in which demographic fluctuations (as well as other causes)
1. In East Germany and the Czech lands, labour
reserves have been virtually exhausted for some 
time past. In both cases, earlier trends in 
natality and post-War migration played an important 
role in bringing this situation about. In the USSR 
and Poland, the stage of exhaustion has not yet 
quite been reached, but labour shortages are wide­
spread, and will become more so in the future. 
Hungary's labour reserves are apparently now on 
the verge of exhaustion. Even in less developed 
countries like Rumania and Bulgaria, concern about 
diminishing labour resources has become very marked, forcing the regime to adopt such expedients 
as thinning out white-collar personnel, imposing 
labour discipline on school-leavers and graduates, 
inducing pensioners to remain at work, etc. On 
Czechoslovakia, see A. Elias, op. cit.; on Poland 
and the USSR, compare the discussions in 3.a. and 
4.c., above; on Hungary, see, e.g., RFE Research 
Hungarian Situation Report January 11, 1972, June 
25, 1974, January 28, 1975, and January 13, 1976; 
on Rumania, see RFE Research Rumanian Situation 
Report July 26, 1974, and Rumanian Press Survey 
nos 943 (February 22, 1973), 968 and 992 (April 25, 
1975); and on Bulgaria, RFE Research Bulgarian 
Situation Report August 17, 1973, April 26, May 2, 
and August 14, 1974, March 13, May 9, and May 30, 
1975. The labour situation in agriculture is 
usually worse than that in industry. Though 
considerable proportions of the population are 
still engaged in agriculture in the less advanced 
countries (i.e. all other than East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia), in most cases the labour force is 
heavily feminized and ageing, and lacking in skills 
and modern equipment, so that it is often necessary 
to draft urban labour or the army during seasonal 
peaks. At the same time, many regimes are taking 
measures to limit further rural-urban migration.
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have brought about a certain embarrassment of riches. Soviet 
ideology holds, it will be recalled, that unemployment is a 
purely capitalist phenomenon. Stalin abolished it by 
proclamation in the 1930s, and unlike some of his other victims, 
it has not yet been rehabilitated. But there are times when 
Socialist states could make good use of some respectable notion 
of unemployment. In Yugoslavia in the last decade and a half 
(particularly after the efficiency-oriented reforms of 1965), 
unemployment and permitted economic emigration have been rife 
simultaneously; and Stalinist employment doctrines have long 
since been jettisoned. Elsewhere, unemployment is denied 
to exist and often quite effectively concealed by inefficient 
production. But in the areas of rapid population growth, 
concealment is not always possible, and will become less so 
as ever larger cohorts of school-leavers of increasingly urban 
training and orientation add to the accumulated clogging of 
the labour market. This is particularly true of those parts 
of the USSR and Yugoslavia, where natural increase rates 
have been running at Third World levels over the last two 
or three decades.
The prominence of economic, and in particular 
labour-force considerations in demographic debate and policy­
making reflects certain characteristic features of Socialist 
society: its econocentrism, its increasingly technocratic 
outlook and values, its similarity to a gigantic corporation 
(unfettered by company law), and its strong orientation to 
the objectives of physical economic growth. The significance 
of the growing labour shortages in the population policy
context is that pro-natalist views are thereby reinforced.
As the labour shortages increase and are sharply aggravated
by the fertility decline of the late fifties and early sixties,
it is possible that they may become the catalyst of Eastern
Europe's long-awaited and long-shelved or only partially
implemented economic reforms, which, in some conceptions,
are expected to lead to a decentralization of decision-making
in Socialist societies generally, and a steady growth of
structural pluralism and private, individual autonomy, with
the worker becoming the focal point in economic processes,
rather than a minor cog in the machinery. However, the
alternative possibility also exists that the demographically-
aggravated labour shortages will lead rather to increasingly
mercantilist population policies, and to elaborate labour
controls of the type introduced by Stalin in 1940 (but this
2time writ technologically large). At present, the latter 
possibility seems if anything the more likely.
In the case of the areas with demographically- 
aggravated labour surpluses, it is quite possible that serious 
local unrest may develop, not perhaps due so much to economic 
hardship consequent on unemployment (Socialist economies are
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2. Compare the discussion in 3.a., above. Obviously
the role of demographic trends in such a case 
cannot be more than that of precipitating factor. 
Here again, some of the less developed countries 
with relatively recent histories of demographic 
transition are well to the forefront, suggesting 
that another important element involved is the 
strength of liberal political culture in the 
country concerned. For some Bulgarian and Rumanian 
essays into "administrative measures" in the field 
of labour policy, see RFE Research Bulgarian 
Situation Report April 23, 1970, October 22, 1971 
and May 9, 1975; and Rumanian Situation Report 
March 14, 1975 and P. Gafton "Labour Organization 
and Labour Discipline in Rumania" RFE Research
Rumania September 7, 1970.
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quite efficient at swallowing labour surpluses - though 
in Yugoslavia the unemployment problem may well play a crucial 
role) as to the complications introduced into the situation 
by the ethnic factor, to a brief discussion of which I shall 
now turn.
6.b. Ethnic Relations.
Of the countries in the area, only Poland and East 
Germany can be said to be more or less free of ethnic problems, 
problems which, it will be recalled, bedevilled East European 
politics before the Second World War. Frequently, ethnic 
tensions remain key elements in national politics (for all 
that during periods of calm they may be kept largely hidden 
from view). And in many cases, demographic trends threaten 
to make ethnic relations more and not less volatile.
The Socialist countries can be divided according 
to their ethno-demographic structure into four groups: the
first and most important group comprises the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia. Both have a large and dominant or formerly 
dominant group forming near to 50% of the total population, 
and considerable numbers of larger and smaller ethnic 
minorities, many of which present the regimes with serious 
political and social problems. The differential growth rates 
of the various ethnic populations range to wide extremes and 
are in some cases of great political significance.
Czechoslovakia forms a group on its own. Here 
we have a formerly overwhelmingly dominant majority which is 
gradually being overtaken demographically, economically and
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politically by a substantial minority (the Slovaks now form 
close to 30% of the population; in 1921, they comprised
3scarcely more than 15%). This improvement in the relative 
position of the Slovaks owes more to the expulsion of the 
German minority after the war and the annexation of Ruthenia 
by the USSR, than to national birthrate trends. Nonetheless, 
the differentiation in fertility and natural increase (though 
not comparable with that prevailing in the USSR and Yugoslavia) 
has been and continues to be significant. In addition to the
4Czech-Slovak ethno-demographic problem, Czechoslovakia is 
also faced by the rapid growth of a highly fertile pariah
3. 15.1% in 1921 (Srb. op. cit.,p. 302) and 29.2% in 
1970 (Statistickä ro^enka CSSR 1972, p. 103).
4. For general discussions of the Slovak-Czech 
relationship in recent years, see, e.g., H.
Klocke "Das slowakische Problem - gestern, heute, 
morgen" Osteuropa 1971 no. 10, p. 773; M. Zaninovich 
and D. Brown "Political Integration in Czechoslovakia: 
The Implications of the Prague Spring and Soviet 
Intervention" Journal of International Affairs,
1973 no. 1, p. 66; Robert R. King Minorities under 
Communism Ch. 6; Hajek and Niznansky (sic)
"Policies and Problems in Slovakia" RFE Research 
Czechoslovakia November 28, 1969. For some up-to- 
date data on Slovakia's relative progress vis-ä-vis 
the Czech lands, see RFE Research Czechoslovakian 
Situation Report September 4, 1974 and December 10, 
1975.
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5minority in its Gipsy community. There is also a 
substantial though demographically stagnant Hungarian 
minority (4% of the total population), and small and 
rapidly disappearing German and Jewish communities.
Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania all 
have significant ethnic minorities, but none of comparable 
weight to that of the Slovaks. Little is known about 
Albania's minorities, which will accordingly be excluded 
from the discussion. Rumania has a culturally and politic­
ally formidable minority in its Transylvanian Hungarians, 
who formed 8.5% of the population according to the 1966 
census. (This may well be an under-estimate). There is 
also a significant German minority (2%), and a Gipsy 
population which is being progressively defined out of
5. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, data on the Gipsies
in Czechoslovakia are not very satisfactory. A 
Romany spokesman gives the figure of 300,000, (G.
Puxon op. cit., p. 23). During the later 1960s, 
some rather startling estimates and projections 
concerning the size of the Gipsy population reached 
the pages of the Czechoslovakian press. Thus Ul£ 
cites a forward estimate of 300,000 for 1970 and 
one million by the year 2000. (0. Ul£ "Communist
National Minority Policy: The Case of the Gipsies 
in Czechoslovakia" Soviet Studies XX (1969), p. 421, 
at p. 422. Lidovä demokracie January 22, 1970, 
cited a current estimate of 300,000 (quoted in V. 
Pekelsk# "Die Zigeunerfrage in den ost- und 
südosteuropäischen Staaten" Osteuropa 1970 no. 9, 
p. 616). The 1970 Czechoslovakian Census seems to 
have managed to produce a rather low result for the 
Gipsies: 203,000,later adjusted to 220,000. The 
latter figure is almost certainly still an under­
estimate. Gipsy fertility is extremely high and 
the projection of 1 million for the year 2000 may 
not prove to have been entirely fanciful. In 
addition to the literature cited, see "The Gipsies" 
East Europe vol. 14 (1965) no. 10, p. 20, and RFE 
Research Czechoslovakian Situation Report September 
23, 1971, March 8, 1972, October 17, 1973, July 31, 
1974, and February 25, 1976.
529.
existence. However, the natural increase of the minorities 
appears to be modest and they are in relative decline.
While this may be a fictional trend in the case of the Gipsies 
it is likely to represent reality in the case of the other 
ethnic groups. Thus population developments seem to be working 
for the assimilatory ambitions of the Rumanian regime 
(ambitions which have been to some extent softened recently, 
partly under pressure from Moscow).  ^ Hungary has a number 
of minority groups which it treats with elaborate respect, 
apparently in the hope thereby of securing better conditions 
for its own large minorities in surrounding countries. Of 
these, the only one representing a serious demographico- 
political problem is the Gipsy minority, which, like that 
in Czechoslovakia, is increasing rapidly and likely to present
6. Cf. footnote 164 to Ch. 5. In addition to the
literature cited there, see W. Reiter "Die 
Nationalitätenpolitik der rumänischen Volksrepublik 
im Spiegel ihrer Statistik" Osteuropa XI (1961) 
p. 189; "Zur Frage der Gleichberechtigung der 
Minderheiten im heutigen Rumänien" Osteuropa XXV 
(1975) p. 40; Robert R. King "Die 
Nationalitätenfrage in der Rumänischen Politik" 
Osteuropäische Rundschau 1971 no. 10, p. 15 and 
no. 11, p. 10; "The Escalation of Rumanian-Soviet 
Historical Polemics over Bessarabia" RFE Research 
RAD Background Report (Rumania) February 12, 1976; 
"Economic Progress and the National Minorities"
RFE Research Rumania September 27, 1972; and 
Situation Report Rumania March 1, 1971.
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severe social, if not also directly political problems in 
7the future. Bulgaria too has a rapidly growing minority 
in its Turks, whose fertility appears to far outstrip that 
of the Bulgars themselves, and whose relative strength 
(currently about 10% of the total population) continues to 
be considerable and to increase, despite the effects of 
intermittent emigration. There are also substantial (2 to 
3%) Macedonian and Bulgarian Moslem (Pomak) minorities,gand a sizable Gipsy population. Thus in one country
7. On the Hungarian Gipsies, see the two Hungarian 
articles translated in "Zigeuner in Osteuropa" 
Osteuropa XXI (1971) no. 2, p. A115. Like other 
East European states, the Hungarians do not accord 
recognition to the Gipsies as a national group, and 
official statistics are not available. Puxon,
op, cit., estimates the Hungarian Gipsy population 
at 480,000. Whatever their present numbers, as the 
articles referred to above make clear, they are 
growing very rapidly. On Hungarian policy towards 
its other minority groups (recently estimated to 
total 450,000, i.e. less than Puxon's estimate for 
the Gipsies), see the Hungarian articles translated 
in RFE Research Hungarian Press Survey January 7,
June 2, and July 16, 1970, June 15, September 12 and 
September 26, 1973. See also Robert R. King Minorit­
ies under Communism Chs. 4 & 9; "Mehr Bewegungsraum 
für nationale Minderheiten in Ungarn" Osteuropa XXII 
(1972) no. 4, p. A262; and RFE Research Hungarian 
Situation Report December 11, 1973 and March 11, 1976.
8. Precise figures are not available. At their most 
recent census, in accordance with their new hard-line 
nationalities policy, the Bulgarians statistically 
abolished their ethnic minorities. (RFE Research 
Bulgarian Situation Report January 28, 1976). See 
the discussions in 5.d. and 5.f., above, and footnote 
164 to Ch. 5. See also M. Costello "Emigration of 
Bulgarian Turks: Foreign and Domestic Considerations" 
RFE Research Bulgaria October 16, 1969; and 
Bulgarian Situation Report August 27, 1970, February 
21, 1974, November 11, 1975, and March 17, May 14, 
and June 24, 1976.
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within this group (Rumania) we have a very significant 
minority which is, however, in demographic decline; and two 
where the minorities are less formidable in political terms 
(and in demographic terms in the case of Hungary), but are 
on the other hand growing much faster than the host nation.
Finally we have East Germany, with its small and
9dwindling Lusatian Sorb communities, and Poland with its 
rather larger, but also dwindling East Slav, German and 
Jewish minorities. ^  While some of the Polish minorities 
are extremely important politically, it is not their 
demographic strength or growth which makes them so.
Basically I would suggest that countries in the 
bloc are faced by ethno-demographic problems of two or 
perhaps three types: racial or quasi-racial and non-racial.^ 
By racial conflicts, I mean those in which ingroup and 
outgroup are socially identified on the basis of visible 
physical differences which are believed to be and in some 
measure actually are more or less immutable. Quasi-racial 
conflicts are those in which there is a strong subjective 
conviction of recognizable physical differences (believed to 
be more or less immutable), but in which this conviction is 
in fact demonstrably based rather on cultural stigmata (dress, 
hair arrangement, etc.). Non-racial ethnic tensions are those
9. Cf. note 164 to Ch. 5. above.
10. Compare the discussion in 4.d., above.
11. Compare the discussion in 3.b. (i), above.
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based on cultural differences not lending themselves to 
immediate physical identification. Racial feelings , I would 
suggest, in addition to creating and maintaining greater 
inter-group distance, tend both to be more severe and more 
resistant to ameliorative social trends or policies than 
non-racial ethnic tensions. The different types are not, 
however, clearly distinguished and mutually exclusive: quasi- 
racial conflicts form a kind of extended and diffuse border 
area between the two poles of racial and non-racial. In the 
European Socialist countries, there are examples of all three: 
relations between Russians (and other Europeans) and the 
Moslem peoples of Central Asia, for example, or more 
debatably, between Eastern Europeans and their gipsy communit­
ies could, I believe, be classified as racial. Relations 
between certain Christian Slav groups in Yugoslavia and the 
Shiptars, or between the Russians and Ukrainians and Soviet 
Jews may represent instances of quasi-racialism. And 
relations between Czechs and Slovaks, Rumanians and 
Hungarians, and Russians and Ukrainians or Latvians seem 
typical instances of non-racial ethnic conflicts. It should 
perhaps be stressed, that no East European country appears to 
have racial divisions quite so sharp and intractable as those 
currently afflicting Britain or the USA. To say this, 
however, is not to say that ethnic harmony in the Socialist 
countries is any greater; merely that the physical bases for 
prejudice are not nearly so evident, and that therefore the 
prejudice itself may prove to be less deep-rooted.
From the demographico-political point of view, the
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distinction between racial and non-racial, though somewhat 
furry and based in the twilight areas of transition on 
erratic, subjective and irrational social definitions of 
what "race" is, has a considerable significance. Whereas 
in the case of national or non-racial conflicts, the tension 
appears to stem from perceptions (however distorted) 
concerning the division of wealth, power and prestige in 
the community, in the case of racial tensions, while these 
factors may also be present, we are confronted, in addition, 
with a more volatile and unpredictable element of disinterested 
loathing and disgust. Whereas in the first case, there may 
be a certain mutual respect between the two communities (if 
not a great deal of love), in the second, tolerant contempt 
is the best that can be hoped for. In demographico-political 
terms one is in the first case dealing basically with a 
"fifty-fifty" problem; that is to say, only when one side's 
effective dominance is challenged by demographic trends, will 
violence be likely to be precipitated by those trends. In 
the case of racial conflicts, on the other hand, any 
demographic change may be regarded as intolerable, no matter 
how slight. It is sufficient for one black to move into the 
neighbourhood, for the local bigots to organize. In other 
words with racial tensions, a modest redistribution of 
numbers may be sufficient to touch off violence.
But there is a further reason why the demographic 
factor may accentuate the already greater volatility of 
racial tensions. For it is an empirical demographic fact 
that racial (and, to a lesser degree, quasi-racial) differences
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are more frequently associated with sharp divergences in
fertility levels than other kinds of ethnic differences.
If these judgements about the nature of ethnic 
tensions in the European Socialist countries are correct, 
it seems to follow that the USSR is exposed to a particularly 
dangerous situation. For there racial distance is more 
marked; and the racial tensions are between major population 
groups. Elsewhere, racial distance is physically less 
apparent, and may therefore prove more amenable to social 
or political management. Gipsy communities, like Jewish 
ones, could be sufficiently suffused into their surroundings 
by socio-economic development for the physical differences to 
lose all their subjective salience (though even that may not 
eliminate the incidence of "racialist" attitudes among the 
host populations). More importantly, however, it needs to 
be emphasized that the racial and quasi-racial tensions out­
side the USSR almost all involve overwhelming majorities and 
relatively modest (if rapidly expanding) minorities. In 
other words the problems that arise are likely to be social 
rather than political in the first instance; though they do 
perhaps contain the danger of scapegoating civil disorders, 
and social and political degeneration of the kind that has 
been observed in many other parts of the world. The one 
quasi-racial conflict that seems to involve two groups of
12
12. Consider, for example, the enormous divergence
between European and Central Asian birth rates 
in the USSR, and between "Christian Slav" and 
Shiptar; and Magyar and Gipsy natality in 
Yugoslavia and Hungary respectively. Outside 
Socialist Europe (e.g. in Southern Africa), 
the same proposition usually holds also.
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politically significant size is that between the Albanians 
and some of the Christian Slavic nations of Yugoslavia.
Should social distance and conventions coupled with political 
hostility maintain subjective perceptions of "inherent" 
differences in this case (where the differentiating stigmata 
are very largely cultural in reality), an already extremely 
delicate problem may degenerate into something far worse.
It is, of course, quite possible that it will be 
non-racial ethnic tensions that prove to be politically the 
most troublesome in the area. There the demographic factor 
will be less relevant in objective terms, as differences in 
demographic behaviour between different "European" groups 
are no longer very great. But in some cases they are still 
of significance (Moldavians and Russians; Czechs and Slovaks; 
Moslem Serbo-Croat speakers and others). And in many others 
they may be felt to be of significance. In inter-ethnic 
relations, the wildest fantasies sometimes acquire a 
particularly virulent and destructive reification.
While differences of demographic behaviour are 
frequently inflated in the minds of their observers, one 
cannot help feeling also that in some cases the full 
implications of population trends in Socialist Europe have 
not yet been grasped by those most directly involved. As one 
contemplates the trends in socio-demographic development 
of the Shiptars and their neighbours, or the Soviet Central 
Asians and their neighbours, it is difficult to avoid 
feeling a kind of awe and dread at the magnitude of the 
forces at work and the violent and contradictory momenta
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they are either creating or whipping on. The ethno- 
demographic advance of some communities and the retreat 
of others calls to mind the movement of large land masses 
on plates headed in opposing directions. The existing socio­
political forms seem too rigid (especially in the Soviet case) 
to permit these masses free movement, but at the same time 
too brittle to withstand for ever the increasing pressures 
that are building up. Without some skilled and timely 
subterranean lubrication, major ruptures in the crust of 
society seem inevitable.
6.c. Ideology.
The ideological impact of rapid population growth 
in the world and rapid population decline within the Socialist 
countries themselves has dealt a severe blow to anti- 
Malthusian self-confidence at home, and slightly modified the 
erstwhile rigour of anti-Malthusian doctrines abroad. The 
Stalinist "law" of socialist population has been more or less 
dethroned, the science of demography rehabilitated, and 
tentative first steps towards a total ideological reappraisal 
of the situation taken. It seems unlikely, however,that 
demography will now be ever "reideologized". The regimes 
have basically pragmatic and (with the exception of Yugoslavia) 
mercantilist attitudes towards population. They want more 
subjects, and they would like to solve demographic problems 
as they become aware of them, on the basis of informed and 
expert advice. Western analyses and techniques are not 
necessarily eschewed because they are Western. Contacts
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between Eastern and Western demographers are growing, and 
in many ways may be closer than those prevailing in any other 
social science. The anti-Malthusian tradition remains 
influential, but rather more as a normative than an empirical 
orientation for domestic purposes. Internationally, anti- 
Malthusianism, after a period of partial eclipse after 1965, 
seems to be growing in favour again, as the Soviet Union 
perceives a resurgence of anti-Malthusian attitudes among 
Third World countries (particularly those in Africa and Latin 
America) and seeks to capitalize upon it, or at least, to not 
be left behind by it. The Soviet Bloc countries naturally 
follow Moscow's lead (whatever views their demographers or 
other private citizens may have), and Rumania and Yugoslavia, 
while acting independently, are moved by analogous considerat­
ions .
In the other relevant sphere of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, that concerning relations between the sexes, the 
family, and the role of women in the home and society, there 
has been a good deal of discussion recently in most of the 
Socialist countries, but little decisive deviation from the 
Soviet pattern described in l.d., above. In most of the 
countries, especially Yugoslavia, but also in East Germany, 
Poland, and elsewhere, there has been since the mid-fifties 
a certain revival of the sexual liberalism of traditional 
Marxism. But in Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary, this 
revival has come under some threat in recent years because 
of the emergence of a new pro-natalist patriarchalism 
justified in terms of the "biological future of the nation".
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And in Rumania in 1966, there was a total about-face on all 
such issues simultaneously, in a concerted attempt to revive 
the nation's drooping birth-rate. In this and other ways, 
there is a tendency for practical or extraneous policy 
considerations to dilute implementation of the ideological 
teachings of the classics on demographically relevant matters. 
Evan where the position of women is rather more advanced at 
the verbal or theoretical level (as in Yugoslavia), it may 
well be worse in practical terms.
Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that the 
relative socio-economic strength and importance of women in 
Socialist society has undoubtedly grown in recent decades 
(as elsewhere in areas of European culture, and possibly a 
little faster); and that the liberal element in the Marxist- 
Leninist tradition on sexual and family matters has not 
been by any means wholly eliminated, despite the reverses it 
has suffered in Stalinist Russia and contemporary Rumania.
The doctrinal tenets remain alive and available to be 
utilized by defenders of such causes as women's rights, the 
autonomy of family life, and freedom of choice in sexual 
matters.
6.d. International Politics
Given the stability, not to say the immobilism 
of international relations among the European Socialist 
countries since the war, the importance of any factors, the 
demographic included, seems slight when compared with the 
overwhelming diplomatic and military superiority of the
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Soviet Union. The highly complex pattern of affinities 
and antagonisms that existed in Central and Eastern Europe 
before the Second World War has been largely obliterated 
by Soviet hegemony. As far as more global concerns go, it 
is perhaps worth noting that demographic trends on either 
side of the Warsaw Pact - NATO line more or less parallel 
one another, and that Soviet fertility decline is more 
than balanced by that occurring in Eastern Europe itself 
(so that its hegemony over the area is not being reduced by 
the demographic factor). Turning to consider what I have 
referred to as the latent geo-politics of the area, it is 
presumably not without significance that, for example, the 
Ukrainian population is growing only very slowly compared 
to that of Poland; that Poland, from being scarcely more 
than 30% larger than East Germany in population in 1946, is 
now almost twice as large; that the difference between the 
Polish and the combined East and West German populations is 
currently diminishing by about half a million a year; that 
the indigenous Moldavian population, owing to its higher 
fertility, is maintaining its relative ethnic superiority in 
the Moldavian Republic of the USSR, despite extensive and 
presumably not accidental Slav immigration. The true 
significance of such developments will probably only become 
apparent when Soviet Russian influence in the area declines. 
Nonethless, despite the limited practical relevance of 
these trends for the present, they quite certainly engage 
the intellectual interest, and even more the emotions of 
demographic commentators in the area,whatever their overt 
political persuasion. Debates about national population
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policy (of which I will say more in the next section) 
invariably raise the subject of what is usually referred 
to vaguely and euphemistically as "the national interest".
It is clear that those who think in these terms are 
intimately looking forward to, or in any case not left 
irresolute and inconsolable by, the prospect of Soviet 
withdrawal from the area.
t
The two spheres in which demographic trends are 
of the keenest contemporary relevance are Sino-Soviet 
relations and Yugoslavia's relations with its Socialist 
neighbours, especially Albania. China's population is so 
vast and its absolute rate of increase so far in excess of 
that of the Soviet Union (and its European element in 
particular) , that whatever view might be taken of the 
notion of demographic "lateral pressures", or of the strategic 
significance of manpower in the nuclear age, it seems clear 
that the Soviet Union at least must regard the trends with 
a good deal of apprehension.
The Yugoslav-Albanian case involves a different 
and rather less problematical kind of demographic factor.
The Albanians in Albania are obviously not going to multiply 
to the point where they will thereby achieve some early 
ascendancy in terms of national military or economic power 
(though their growth may not be strategically irrelevant).
The demographic triggering mechanism is located inside 
Yugoslavia itself, in its large and rapidly growing Shiptar 
minority, whose growing strength and ambitions seem likely 
sooner or later to precipitate some kind of structural
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transformation. This the Yugoslav state may be hard put 
to accommodate, particularly if the internal mechanism 
touches off some kind of external intervention as well as 
a domestic crisis.
Despite the drastic slaughter, migrations and 
deportations of the World War 11 period, many of Eastern 
Europe's traditional ethnic entanglements have remained in 
dimensions sufficient to cause trouble. Many of these have 
an external aspect of some importance. In some cases that 
external aspect is quasi-demographic in the sense that 
disputes about censuses or population trends in the ethnic 
group in question seem to lie at the heart of the matter.
But probably in no case, other than the two mentioned, will 
differential growth rates play a crucial role in igniting 
or seriously exacerbating conflict.
136.e. Population Policy and Policy-making.
Domestic population policies, it has been pointed 
out, are difficult to study inasmuch that many social 
policies may be adopted for non-demographic reasons and yet 
appear to have considerable impact on demographic development. 
Moreover, governments with populationist intentions have 
often chosen to conceal those intentions behind a smokescreen 
of more lofty humanist aspirations. In this work, I have in 
general used the term population policy in the sense of 
programs or measures aimed deliberately and consciously at
13. For some general works on population policy in 
Eastern Europe, see footnote 2 to the 
Introduction, p. 5, above.
affecting population growth rates, though attention has 
also been devoted to certain demographically relevant social 
policies whose status as population policy would be difficult 
to establish.
The first point that needs to be made about the 
Socialist countries from this point of view is that most of 
them do have population policies in the sense of conscious 
and deliberate attitudes and actions. In the USSR, Poland, 
Yugoslavia and the GDR, governmental concern is perhaps 
less pronounced than elsewhere (though public concern in 
the first three at least, is very great). But in general 
throughout the European Socialist world, official interest 
in population issues is high and growing. Politicians in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria often refer to 
population statistics with the same kind of tender regard 
that company directors might devote to key items in their 
annual report. And in the USSR and Yugoslavia, it is 
possible that much more concern would be expressed were the 
issue not quite so politically sensitive.
The next general point to note is that throughout 
virtually the entire area,both in official and non-official 
circles, there is a strongly pro-natalist orientation which 
contrasts sharply with the influence of movements like Zero 
Population Growth in the West. There are probably several 
different reasons for this.
1. The continuing influence of the anti- 
Malthusian tradition, and the extreme rationalist optimism 
with which it has been associated ever since Marx and
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Engels' time.
2. The mercantilist attitude of Socialist 
governments to the accumulation of national wealth of all 
kinds. Socialist governments are composed of men who in 
a much more meaningful sense than their bourgeois counter­
parts in the West own their countries. Their power and 
their sphere of competence are much greater. And since 
the bureaucratic stabilization of the post-Stalin years, 
their tenure of (some) office is much more secure than that in 
virtually any other system anywhere else in the world. 
Accordingly, they have a natural and long-term interest in 
seeing their ranches expand.
3. Regimes which emphasize the glory or 
importance of the state, be they right-wing or left-wing, 
seem disposed to adopt pro-natalist policies. (Compare 
the well-known cases of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.
This factor is doubtless related to point 2) .
4. The prominence of economic planners and 
planning considerations in governmental decision-making.
When planners encounter labour shortages (as they have been 
doing increasingly in the last decade or so), it is natural 
that they should feel an impulse to "solve" the problem by 
planning for higher production of labour power. These 
labour shortages are not necessarily related to past trends
in the birth-rate, and the policy inference may be fallacious. 
But it seems to be often made. (Again this is a point related 
to point 2).
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5. The sharp drop in fertility that occurred in 
the Socialist countries in the 1950s and 1960s, and the 
slightly delayed echo it has produced in the minds of many
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Socialist politicians and publicists. While this has been 
undoubtedly an important subjective factor, it should 
be remembered that even sharper fertility declines have 
occurred in many Western countries in the later 1960s and 
early 1970s without so far giving rise to anything 
approaching the national anxieties felt by both governments 
(in many cases) and wide sections of the general public (in 
virtually all cases) in Eastern Europe. What we are 
probably dealing with here is thus a combination of sharp 
demographic stimulus and extreme nationalist sensitivity.
The European Socialist countries can be divided 
according to the degree of their pro-natalism, and also 
according to the methods by which they are pursuing their 
objectives.
In degree of pro-natalism, they can be sub-divided 
into three groups:
(i) the more emphatically pro-natalist, as 
judged both by the saliency of this 
issue in official statements and by 
the programs adopted: Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania;
(ii) the more mildly pro-natalist, who 
declare themselves to be so oriented, 
but less often, and have a more modest 
program of positive and negative 
inducements to child-birth; East Germany,
Poland and the USSR;
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(iii) Yugoslavia, which is formally neutral,
and declares that its population policy 
at the federal level at least is 
concerned with purely non-numerical 
values; and also that decisions as to 
the desirability of changing vital 
rates are best decentralized.
Socialist commentators on population policy usually 
distinguish three types of policies that can be used to 
further the state's objectives: (a) economic (by which they
have in mind such measures as maternity and child-care leave, 
family benefits and maternity grants, child-care allowances, 
taxes on the single and childless, subsidies for children's 
goods, etc.); (b) moral (by which they mean propaganda 
campaigns in public entertainment and the media, mobilization 
of mass organizations, etc.); and (c) legal-administrative 
(by which they mean prohibiting or permitting abortion and 
contraceptives, raising or lowering the minimum age for 
marriage, administrative regulations affecting housing 
allocations, etc.).
It will be apparent that of these three categories, 
only the first and third are in any marked degree available 
to most Western governments; and in the case of the third, the 
idea of their being manipulated as a policy weapon in order 
to affect the birth-rate (especially in an upward direction) 
has begun to seem remote (though of course in some countries 
limitations on abortion and contraception still exist for
moral" reasons) .
546.
In Socialist Europe, however, all three types of
measures are widely employed, and each can serve as a rough
classificatory principle. In the four more pro-natalist
states use is made of all three types though in varying
degree. Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary all make use
of legal-administrative measures but in moderation, placing
much greater emphasis on economic and "moral" inducements
and penalties. In fact, there were periods in the late
1950s and the 1960s when none of them had recourse to
restrictive legislation to increase the birth rate. Hungary
in particular followed a markedly liberal policy in regard to
15both abortions and contraceptives. Czechoslovakia did
14. In addition to the chapters on Hungary in David
op. cit. , Kirk et al. op. cit. , and Berelson op. cit. , 
see E. Szabady "Hungary" in The Population Council 
Country Profiles July 1974; "Ungarn propagiert die 
Drei-Kinder-Familie" Osteuropa 1974 no. 5, p. A290; 
"Verbesserte soziale Massnahmen der ungarischen 
Regierung" Osteuropa 1975 no. 10, p. A505; and 
among the innumerable valuable reports on topics 
related to population policy that have been published 
by Radio Free Europe, see especially "Hungarian 
Demographic Policy at Turning Point" and "New Rules 
on Induced Abortion" in RFE Research Hungary 
October 18, 1973 and January 23, 1974.
15. For Czechoslovakia, see David op. cit.; Kirk et al 
op. cit.; Berelson op. cit.; Vladni populacni 
komisi D&ti na&e budoucnost Prague 1972;
Population Policy in Czechoslovakia Orbis, Prague 
1974; V. Srb "Population Development and Population 
Policy in Czechoslovakia" Population Studies vol. 16 
(1962-63), p. 147; A. Heitlinger "Pro-natalist 
Population Policies in Czechoslovakia" Population 
Studies vol. 30 (1976) no. 1, p. 123; K. Grzybowski 
"Czechoslovakia" in Luke T. Lee and Arthur Larson 
(eds) Population and Law Leiden 1971, p. 235;
"Sozial- und Bevölkerungspolitik in der 
Tschechoslowakei" Osteuropa 1975 no. 2, p.AlOO.
Radio Free Europe publications are again an 
invaluable source.
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apply some mild demographically-oriented restrictions on the
availability of abortion, if only intermittently, whilst 
16in Bulgaria, it appears that contraceptives have never
been made very widely accessible. Now all three have
populationist restrictions on the availability of legal
abortion. Rumania, after a period of tolerance towards
divorce, abortion and contraception, suddenly greatly
restricted all three in 1966 in an attempt to increase its 
17birth rate. These restrictive measures have been
16. According to Kirk et al., vol. 1, p. 157, 
contraceptives are not advertised in Bulgaria and 
are available in pharmacies only on prescription.
K. Dzienio "Do^wiadczenia europejskich kraj6w
socjalistycznych w zakresie ksztaltowania polityki 
ludno£ciowej" (mimeographed paper presented to the 
1972 Warsaw Population Policy conference), p. 28 
confirms that contraceptives are not available for 
sale. On Bulgaria, see in addition Berelson op. cit.; 
David op. cit.; I. Stefanow "Problemy polityki 
demograficznej w Bulgarii" in Polityka ludno£ciowa: 
wspdlczesne problemy, p. 430; Bulgarian Ministry of 
information and Communications Naselenie i 
demograficheskaia politika Narodnoi Respubliki 
Bolgarii Sofia 1974; V. Kassabov "La natality en 
Bulgarie: r£sultats, perspectives, politique" 
Population XXIX (1974) no. 2, p. 275. See also Radio Free Europe Bulgarian Situation Reports.,passim.
17. On the 1966 legislation and its demographic impact, 
see H. David and N. Wright "Abortion Legislation: 
the Romanian Experience" Studies in Family Planning 
vol. 2 (1971) no. 10, p. 205; and M. Teitelbaum 
"Fertility Effects of the Abolition of Legal 
Abortion in Romania" Population Studies November 
1972, p. 405. More generally on Rumanian population 
policy, see H.p. David op. cit.; Kirk et al. op. 
cit.; Berelson op. cit.; I. Ceterchi et al. Le 
droit et la croissance de la population en Roumanie 
Rumanian National Demographic Commission, Bucharest, 
1974; I. Marinescu et al. "Niektdre aspekty polityki 
ludno£ciowej w Rumunii" Polityka ludno^ciowa: 
wspdlczesne problemy p. 495; RFE Research Rumanian 
Situation Reports, passim.
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maintained to the present. However, the population has 
naturally developed methods of bypassing them, so that the 
100% increase in the birth rate registered in the first year 
(200% in the first months) has since been dwindling away; 
moreover, illegal abortion is evidently rising, and so again 
is divorce. Rumania's relative stress on economic induce­
ments is less than that of the other three states, though 
some were introduced at the same time as the illiberal 
package of 1966. While it is difficult to assess saturation 
levels of propaganda, it would probably be fair to say that 
of all the pro-natalist states, Czechoslovakia is maintaining 
the most elaborate, all-pervasive and obtrusive media campaign 
on behalf of fecundity.
East Germany in a certain sense forms a group on
its own, inasmuch that it has a number of strongly pro-
18natalist measures on its books, and a very great, indeed 
a notorious need for a pro-natalist policy to make up for
18. On East German population policy, see Henry P.
David op. cit.; Kirk et al. op. cit.;K.H. Mehlan 
"Reducing Abortion Rate and Increasing 
Fertility by Social Policy in the German Democratic 
Republic" UN World Population Conference 1965 vol. 
II, p. 223; G. Schulz "German Democratic Republic" 
in L. Lee and A. Larson op. cit.; H. Harmsen 
"Abortion Laws; Stringency in Rumania and Relax­
ation in East Germany" Review of Soviet Medical 
Sciences VI (1969) no. 2, p. 19; "Report of the 
Government of the German Democratic Republic on 
population policy and population development in 
connection with economic and social development" 
(mimeograph prepared by the GDR for the UN World 
Population Conference in Bucharest, 1974; P. 
Khalatbari et al. "Problemy polityki ludno£ciowej 
w NRD" Polityka ludno£ciowa: wspdlczesne problemy, 
p. 480.
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its large emigratory losses in the pre-Wall era, and its 
spectacularly low birth rate (currently by far the lowest 
in Eastern Europe). Yet in fact, there appears to be no 
very emphatic propaganda campaign conducted there on behalf 
of motherhood; and recently (1972), legal abortion was made 
unconditionally available on demand. Earlier, East Germany 
had shared with Albania, and after 1966, Rumania, the 
position of being the only Socialist states with strongly 
restrictive legislation on abortion.
Albania also forms a group on its own. Abortion
is illegal, and contraceptives largely unknown. The birth
rate is by far the highest in Europe, and the official view
is that this is an extremely good thing, and symptomatic
of the vibrant life-affirming strength of the Albanian 
19people. It is difficult to describe government policy
as pro-natalist in the usual sense, however, since 
specifically pro-natalist inducements are entirely superfluous.
Yugoslavia is the only country among the nine which 
is not explicitly or ostensibly pro-natalist. Officially, 
Yugoslavia is committed to a purely social, humane and non- 
quantitative view of population policy. It is stated as an 
immutable constitutional principle that parents have the 
right to plan their families by any means they see fit,
19. Albanian fertility seems to be declining at last,
and doing it faster than that of the Albanian 
population across the Yugoslav border. However, 
this is not evidently due to the spread of family 
planning services which remain primitive or non­
existent. See Hosten op. cit. See also the 
journal of abstracts ABSEES for occasional notes 
on Albanian demographic trends and their official 
exegesis. (Cf. footnote 395 to ch. 5) .
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including abortion (which is, however, viewed officially 
as a dangerous and unsatisfactory means of fertility 
control). It is, moreover, held that parents have a right 
to information about all methods of family planning, and 
encouragement is given to organizations engaged on spreading 
knowledge about these matters. At the Republican level, 
and indeed at the communal level, policies of encouraging 
or discouraging population growth may be followed within 
these guidelines.
Poland and the USSR are in many ways similar to 
one another. Each maintains some economic inducements to 
having children. This, however, may be largely inspired by 
social motivations at this stage (whatever the original 
intention of the legislation - in the Soviet case, it was, 
at the outset, clearly pro-natalist). Each also maintains 
liberal legislation on abortion, contraception and divorce 
(despite the fact that there have been pressures within the 
regimes and within the respective populations for more 
"administrative" pro-natalist policies to be adopted - from 
Catholics and nationalists in Poland, and from Russian and 
other nationalists in the USSR). Neither has any more than 
a mild and relatively unobtrusive propaganda campaign in 
favour of motherhood (for a time in the late 1950s Poland 
actually had a very active campaign against the high birth 
rate that then still prevailed).
In the more decisively pro-natalist Socialist 
countries, debate over population policy issues has to some 
extent been narrowed. A definite policy line has been
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adopted and it remains principally to implement and applaud 
(though criticism of implementation may sometimes create an 
opening for more normative evaluation of existing policy). 
Nonetheless when questions of demographically relevant social 
policy or population policy in general are broached in the 
Socialist countries, a wide variety of issues tend to rise 
to the surface. It is indeed remarkable with what candour 
and vehemence these issues have at times been discussed.
This having been said, it needs to be added at once that the 
areas we have identified as ethnic relations and international 
politics are normally not alluded to in explicit form. It 
is considerations of that kind lurking in the background, 
however, which appear to give the whole subject-matter the 
special piquancy it has in the East European context. Where 
most serious political discussion is taboo, demographic 
commentary forms a splendid surrogate. But the emotional 
energy invested in demographic debate is not wholly misplaced 
or wholly symbolic. The differential trends in fertility in 
particular are not by any means always the figments of 
inflamed nationalist imaginations (though Eastern Europe has 
plenty of those); and it is not surprising that many Socialist 
observers are keenly if discreetly absorbed by them. Apart 
from ethnic and national rivalries, however, there are a 
number of important matters raised by population problems 
which Socialist demographic commentators do discuss quite 
explicitly. Particular prominent among them are such issues 
as: living standards and consumption priorities; public 
versus private expenditure; egalitarian versus demographic 
considerations; the role of population growth in long-term
4economic development and planning; the place of women in 
society and the home; the future of the family and of 
relations between the sexes; sexual education for the young; 
eugenics and the rights of the individual; abortion and 
contraception; divorce; the mechanics of social and population 
policy-making; the role of social scientists in the Socialist 
polity; and so on. Within the confines of this brief summary, 
it would be impossible to convey very much of the variety of 
opinion that finds expression on any of these matters. Some­
thing of that variety can be gleaned from the discussion in 
Ch. 4.g. of Poland's population debate of recent years. Many 
of the Polish themes are prominent elsewhere; few are peculiar 
to Poland alone.
Perhaps the most significant thing about the 
Socialist population debate latterly has been the 
persistent assertiveness with which non-official people of 
one kind $nd another have sought to present their views.
Among them, those working in demography and related 
disciplines have been particularly prominent. Whatever views 
they espoused (and there has often been a good deal of unity 
among them), they have almost invariably made an explicit or 
implicit claim that on all matters (including the normative 
and the political sensitive) they should at least be 
consulted. At times, their claims are even carried to the
point of suggesting that demographic policy-making might 
best be left in their hands more or less entirely. Most of 
them (whether employed by government departments or 
universities) seem to accept the principle of bureaucratic
decision-making in these as in other matters. But they
552.
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demand a say, and in some cases virtually imply that they 
should become the bureaucracy for these purposes. It ought 
not to be inferred from this, however, that these experts 
are necessarily illiberal or manipulatively technocratic 
in outlook. They are often, in fact, the main advocates 
of parental sovereignty and economic rather than 
"administrative" solutions. And if they sometimes declare 
a preference for the former over the latter on the stated 
grounds that economic solutions are more effective, it may 
well be that they are merely speaking to their superiors 
in a manner which they know will be more readily understood.
There has been a good deal of formalization of 
decision-making about population problems in recent years. 
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Rumania, East Germany and Poland 
have all established central government commissions that are 
charged with co-ordinating research into population problems 
and recommending possible solutions to their governments.
The Czech Population Commission is particularly powerful.
There is also a similar body located in a ministry in 
Hungary, and a recent report suggests that a prestigious 
demographic centre in Moscow University has been charged with 
similar responsibilities by the Soviet authorities. While 
this reflects to some extent a general trend throughout the 
world, one nonetheless gets the impression that in this, as 
in other respects, the concern of Socialist governments about 
population development runs well ahead of that of their 
Western counterparts.
Given the single-minded pro-natalism of the 
Socialist countries it might be asked whether this development
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is wholly desirable. Despite the fact that the policies 
being adopted by Socialist governments are more or less 
liberal and the advice being tendered them is in general 
more liberal still, and despite the fact that eugenics has 
for four decades received an almost uniformly bad press in 
the Socialist countries, and that no eugenic experiments 
are, to my knowledge, being legislated for or otherwise 
permitted, one is still left with a slight feeling of 
unease that states with a tradition embracing the Gulag 
Archipelago and the Serbskii Institute are taking a keen 
and increasingly active interest in their subjects' 
reproductive behaviour. If all this is not to end in 
1984 and Brave New World, what will stop it? Will the 
humanist ideals of would-be demographer-kings be sufficient? 
Would they themselves survive the temptations of Socialist 
bureaucratic power with those ideals intact if their claims 
to rule were recognized? How much of the original liberalism 
of Marx and Engels has survived to the present generation of 
Socialist bureaucratic decision-makers?
There is another rather disturbing aspect of the 
Socialist approach to population policy. At a time when the 
considered opinion of many experts is that population and 
economic growth must be halted and redirected if the world is 
to survive, it is not particularly reassuring that the 
Socialist countries (Yugoslavia excepted) are set determinedly 
on a course of pro-natalism at home and demogogic "anti- 
Malthusianism" abroad. If demographic disarmament is indeed 
to become an issue of world politics, Socialist attitudes
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are likely to make the negotiations hard and protracted. 
Ehrlichites and Family Planners in the West might well 
take more careful note than they seem to have done so far 
that there is a large part of the world where their ideas 
are almost completely shut out.
t
APPENDIX A - SOVIET POPULATION DATA
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TABLE 1
CRUDE BIRTH, DEATH AND NATURAL INCREASE 
RATES IN THE USSR 1926-1973 (%)
Births Deaths Nat. Incr
1926 44,0 20,3 23,7
1928 44,3 23,3 21,0
1937 38,7 18,9 19,8
1938 37,5 17,5 20,0
1939 36,5 17,3 19,2
1940 31,2 18,0 13,2
1950 26.7 9,7 17,0
1955 25,7 8,2 17,5
1956 25,2 7,6 17,6
1957 25,4 7,8 17,6
1958 25,3 7,2 18,1
1959 25,0 7,6 17,4
1960 24,9 7, 1 17,8
1961 23,8 7,2 16,6
1962 22,4 7,5 14,9
1963 21,1 7,2 13,9
1964 19,5 6,9 12,6
1965 18,4 7,3 11,1
1966 18,2 7,3 10,9
1967 17,3 7,6 9,7
1968 17,2 7,7 9,5
1969 17,0 8,1 8,9
1970 17,4 8,2 9,2
1971 17,8 8,2 9,6
1972 17,8 8,5 9,3
1973 17,6 8,6 9,0
SOURCE: Naselenie SSSR: Spravochnik (Moscow , 1974) , I.
(In present-day territory).
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TABLE 3
ESTIMATED MATERNAL AND PATERNAL GROSS 
REPRODUCTION RATES IN THE USSR 1950-1971
Year
Gross reproduction rate index (1950 = 100)
Maternal Paternal Maternal Paternal
1950 141 213 100 100
1951 142 209 101 98
1952 140 200 99 94
1953 133 185 94 87
1954 143 193 101 91
1955 140 184 99 86
1956 137 177 97 83
1957 138 177 98 83
1958 138 175 98 82
1959 137 172 97 81
1960 138 171 98 80
1961 134 164 95 77
1962 129 154 91 72
1963 126 147 89 69
1964 121 137 86 64
1965 118 130 84 61
1966 120 130 85 61
1967 117 126 83 59
1968 116 127 82 60
1969 115 128 82 60
1970 118 132 84 62
1971 120 136 85 64
SOURCE: F. Leedy , "Demographic Trends in the USSR", US
Congress Joint Economic Committee, Soviet 
Economic Prospects for the Seventies (Washington,
C.C., 1973), p. 440.
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TABLE 5
NUMERICAL TRENDS IN SOVIET ETHNIC GROUPINGS
I. Nations Forming their own Republics
Numbers (in thousands) Number in as percent
1970 
of:
Peoples 1926 1959 1970 1926 1959
Russians 77,791 114,114 129,015 165.8 113.1
Ukrainians 31,195 37,253 40,753 . . . 109.4
Uzbeks 3,928 6,015 9,195 234.1 152.9
Belorussians 4,739 7,913 9,052 • • • 114.4
Kazakhs 3,968 3,622 5,299 133.5 146.3
Azerbaidzhans 1,715 2,940 4,380 255.4 149.0
Armenians 1,568 2,787 3,559 227.0 127.7
Georgians 1,821 2,692 3,245 178.2 120.6
Moldavians 279 2,214 2,698 . . . 121.9
Lithuanians 42 2,326 2,665 . . . 114.6
Tadzhiks 980 1,397 2,136 218.0 152.9
Turkmens 764 1,002 1,525 199.6 152.2
Kirgiz 763 969 1,452 190.3 149.9
Latvians 151 1,400 1,430 . . . 102.2
Estonians 155 989 1,007 • • • 101.9
TABLE 5 Contd.
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NUMERICAL TRENDS IN SOVIET ETHNIC GROUPINGS
II. Peoples Having Some Degree of Formal Autonomy
Numbers (in thousands) Number in as percent
1970 
of :
Peoples 1926 1959 1970 1926 1959
1 2 3 4 5 6
Tatars 31,311 4,968 5,931 179.1 119.4
Jews 2 ,666 2,268 2,151 . . . 94.8
Chuvashes 1.,117 1,470 1,694 151.7 115.3
Peoples of 
Daghestan 698 945 1,365 195.6 144.5
Mordvinians 1.,340 1,285 1,263 94.3 98.3
Bashkirs 714 989 1,240 173.7 125.4
Udmurts 514 625 704 137.0 112.7
Chechens 319 419 613 192.2 146.3
Maris 428 504 599 140.0 118.8
Ossetes 272 413 488 179.4 118.2
Komis and
Komi-
Permiaks
376 431 475 126.3 110.2
Buriats 238 253 315 132.4 124.5
Iakuts 241 233 296 122.8 127.0
Kabardinians 140 204 280 200.0 137.3
Karakalpaks 146 173 236 161.6 136.4
Ingushes 74 106 158 213.5 149.0
Peoples of the 
North, Siberia, 
and Far East
131 130 151 115.3 116.2
Karelians 248 167 146 58.9 87.4
Touvinians . . . 100 139 . . . 139.0
Kalmyks 132 106 137 103.8 129.3
Karachais 55 81 113 205.5 139.5
Adyghe 65 80 100 215.4 125.0
Abkahazians 57 65 83 145.6 127.7
Khakasses 46 57 67 145.7 117.6
Balkars 33 42 60 181.8 142.9
Altaians 51 45 56 109.8 124.5
Circassians • • • 30 40 • • • 133.3
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NUMERICAL TRENDS IN SOVIET ETHNIC GROUPINGS 
III. Peoples Not Having Territorial Unit of Their Own
Numbers (in thousands) Number in 1970 as percent of:
Peoples 1926 1959 1970 1926 1959
Germans 1,239 1,620 1,846 149.0 114.0
Poles 782 1,380 1,167 • • • 84.6
Koreans 87 314 357 • • • 113.7
Bulgarians 111 324 351 • • • 108.3
Greeks 214 309 337 157.5 109.1
Gipsies 61 132 175 ... 132.6
Uighurs 66 95 173 262.1 182.1
Hungarians 6 155 166 . . . 107.1
Gagauz 1 124 157 . . . 126.6
Rumanians 5 106 119 ... 112.3
Kurds 69 59 89 129.0 150.8
FinnsTurksDungans
135915
933522
857939 26Ö.0
91.4
225.7177.3
Iranians 
(Persians)
53 21 28 52.8 133.3
Abazinians 14 20 25 178.6 125.0
Assyrians 10 22 24 240.0 109.1
Czechs 17 25 21 123.5 84.0
Tats 29 11 17 58.6 154.5
Shors 13 15 16 123.1 106.7
Slovaks 10 15 12 120.0 80.0
SOURCE: S .I . Bruk, "Population <Df the USSR - Changes in its
Demographic, Social and Ethnic Structure", Geoforum,
No. 9 (1972) pp. 16-17. (The author 's name has been re
transliterated into the form that will be more familiar
to readers of this kind of material. The stylings of
the three sub-groups have also been altered in an
attempt at greater clarity.)
TABLE 6
CHANGES IN PERCENTAGES OF ETHNIC POPULATIONS 
USING THEIR OWN MOTHER TONGUE
563.
1926 1959 1970
Inside Outside
Total Total Urban Rural own
repub­
lic
own
repub­
lic
Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Russians 99.7 99.8 99.9 99.8 100.0 99.3 99.8
Ukrainians 87.1 87.7 77.2 94.5 93.5 51.2 85.7
Belorussians 71.9 84.2 63.5 94.2 93.2 41.9 80.6
Lithuanians 46.9 97.8 96.6 98.4 99.2 80.3 97.9
Letts 79.0 95.1 93.1 96.9 98.4 53.2 95.2
Estonians 88.4 95.2 93.1 97.0 99.3 56.6 95.5
Moldavians 92.3 95.2 78.4 97.7 98.2 77.7 95.0
Georgians 96.5 98.6 96.8 99.7 99.5 73.4 98.4
Armenians 92.4 89.9 84.4 97.1 99.2 78.1 91.4
Azerbaidzhans 93.8 97.6 96.4 98.2 98.1 95.1 98.2
Kazakhs 99.6 98.4 96.7 98.9 99.2 95.6 98.0
Uzbeks 99.1 98.4 96.7 98.9 98.6 97.4 98.6
Turkmens 97.3 98.9 97.3 99.4 99.5 92.0 98.9
Kirgiz 99.0 98.7 97.4 98.9 99.7 92.3 98.8
Tadzhiks 98.3 98.1 96.4 98.6 99.3 94.6 98.5
Tatars 98.9 92.1 87.5 96.1 98.9 89.3 89.2
Bashkirs 53.8 61.9 73.3 59.1 57.6 75.1 66.2
Chuvashes 98.7 90.8 71.2 95.6 97.5 83.2 86.9
Mordvinians 94.0 78.1 52.2 88.8 97.3 70.9 77.8
Maris 99.3 95.1 75.8 97.8 97.8 92.6 91.2
Udmurts 98.9 89.1 69.7 94.7 93.2 75.9 82.6
Komis 96.5 88.7 74.3 93.4 93.8 60.9 83.7
Karelians 95.5 71.3 51.7 80.0 80.9 61.3 63.0
Kabardinians 99.3 97.9 90.8 91.1 99.2 79.2 98.0
Ossetes 97.9 89.1 82.0 93.0 98.0 73.1 88.6
Chechens 99.7 98.9 97.0 99.4 99.7 97.8 98.7
Avars 99.3 97.2 91.2 97.2 99.2 80.6 97.2
Kalmyks 99.3 91.0 83.8 93.2 98.2 79.6 91.7
Buriats 98.1 94.9 81.5 97.6 96.8 93.1 92.6
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1926 1959 1970
Total Total Urban Rural
Inside
own
repub­
lic
Outside
own
repub­
lic
Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Iakuts 99.7 97.5 90.7 98.9 98.2 82.8 96.3
Jews 71.9 21.5 21.5 31.1 - - 17.7
Germans 94.9 75.0 66.3 80.6 - - 66.8
Poles 42.9 45.2 38.6 48.6 32.5
SOURCE: V .I. Kozlov, "Ethnic Processes in the USSR,"
Geoforum, No . 9 (1972) , p. 50.
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TABLE 7
DIFFERENTIAL GROWTH RATES BY NATIONALITY 
(AVERAGE PERCENTAGE INCREASES PER ANNUM) 1959-1970
Estonian 0.2
Latvian 0.2
Ukrainian 0.8
Russian 1.1
Belorussian 1.2
Lithuanian 1.2
Georgian 1.7
Moldavian 1.8
Armenian 2.3
Kazakh 3.5
Azerbaidzhan 3.7
Kirgiz 3.7
Tadzhik 3.9
Turkmen 3.9
Uzbek 3.9
SOURCE: Leedy, p 450
TABLE 8
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I. ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF THE USSR POPULATION OF 
ABLE-BODIED AGES 1959-1990 (AS OF JAN.1 , IN THOUSANDS)
Population of able-bodied ages^
Plan Period Total Increase 
(1)
Average Annual 
(2)
Increase
1959-65 5,173 734
1966-70 7,970 1,599
1971-75 12,849 2,570
1976-80 10,728 2,146
1981-85 2,944 589
1986-90 3,039 608
1. Males, 16 to 59 years of age; females 16 to 54 years of
II. ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS OF THE POPULATIONS OF ABLE- 
BODIED AGES IN THE FIVE REPUBLICS OF CENTRAL ASIA 
(INCLUDING KAZAKHSTAN) 1971-1990 (AS OF JAN.1, IN THOUSANDS)
Population of able-bodied ages
Total Increase As a percent of national increase
Plan Period (1) (2)
1971-75 3,045 23.7
1976-80 3,593 33.5
1981-85 2,936 99.7
1986-90 3,162 104.0
SOURCE: M. Feshbach and S. Rapawy, "Labor Constraints in the
Five-Year Plan," Soviet Economic Prospects for the
Seventies, p. 492.
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TABLE 9
PROPORTION OF POPULATION IN ABLE-BODIED AGE-GROUPS 
BY REPUBLIC IN 1970 (IN %)
RSFSR 56.2 Moldavian 53.3
Ukrainian SSR 55.6 Latvian 56.3
Belorussian SSR 53.0 Kirgiz SSR 45.2
Uzbek SSR 42.2 Tadzhik SSR 42.3
Kazakh SSR 50.0 Armenian SSR 48.4
Georgian SSR 52.8 Turkmen SSR 43.9
Azerbaidzhan SSR 43.9 Estonian SSR 56.3
Lithuanian SSR 53.7
SOURCE: Naselenie SSR: Spravochnik (Moscow, 1974) . 26.
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1. BASIC DEMOGRAPHIC RATES IN POST-WAR POLAND (per thousand)
Marriages Divorces Live Births Deaths Natural
Increase
Infantile
Mortality’
1950 10.8 0.4 30.7 11.6 19.1 111.2
1955 9.5 0.5 29.1 9.6 19.5 82.2
1960 8.2 0.5 22.6 7.6 15.0 54.8
1965 6.3 0.8 17.4 7.4 10.0 41.4
1970 8.5 1.1 16.6 8.1 8.5 33.4
1973 9.4 1.2 17.9 8.3 9.6 26.1
* Infantile mortality rates per 1,000 live births 
Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 1974, p. XX-XXI
2. URBAN AND RURAL NET REPRODUCTION RATIOS IN POLAND
Overall Urban Rural
1950 1.491 1.300 1.610
1955 1.519 1.366 1.675
1960 1.339 1.098 1.601
1965 1.149 0.879 1.487
1970 1.011 0.794 1.315
1973 1.055 0.805 1.449
Source: Rocznik Demograficzny 1974, p. 107
3. OFFICIALLY REGISTERED ABORTIONS* (in thousands)
1961 230
1963 260
1965 235
1968 220
1970 213
1971 204
*It is generally agreed that in Poland the official statistics on abortions 
are very incomplete. (Though there is some disagreement about how incomplete 
they are - see second source quoted below, at p. 101). The figures include 
abortions, presumably mostly illegal, that were begun outside hospitals.
Sources: Polityka ludno^ciowa: wspdlczesne problemy, Warsaw 1973, p. 129
S. Klonowicz: "Legalizacja sztucznych poronierf a dynamika rozrodczo^ci 
W Polsce" Studia pemograficzne 36 (1974) p. 101.
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TABLE 4
TABLE 5
. NET INCREASES IN WORKING-AGE POPULATION AND ABSOLUTE NUMBERS REACHING
EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE
Net Increase 
(in thousands)
Numbers reaching 18
1951-1955 1,130 2,370
1956-1960 0,660 2,210
1961-1965 0,790 2,070
1966-1970 1,560 3,170
1971-1975 1,740 3,500
1976-1980 1,510 3,270
1981-1985 0,750 2,660
1986-1990 0,350 2,650
Source: A. Rajkiewicz,
"Arbeitsmarkt 
Rundschau, No.
Ekonomista 2j 1971, p 
und Vollbeschäftigung 
9, 1972, p. 1.
. 198, cited in H. Trend, 
in Polen", Osteuropäische
OFFICIAL LABOUR MARKET
Seeking Work
(in
Men Women
STATISTICS 1955-75*
Vacancies
thousands)
Men Women
Number of vacancies 
per individual seek­
ing work 
Men Women
1955 10.7 19.9 39.2 7.2 3.7 0.4
1960 7.4 29.9 39.7 6.8 5.4 0.2
1965 7.5 54.5 40.8 12.1 5.4 0.2
1970 8.1 71.3 31.0 8.5 3.9 0.1
1973 1.3 26.8 105.7 41.2 81.3 1.5
1975 3.4 15.6 98.0 48.6 28.8 3.1
*These figures should not be taken as giving an accurate picture of 
unemployment in Poland (cf. footnote 46). However they do reflect 
certain general trends, eg., the unemployment among women in 
Gomulka's last year (1970) or the overemployment of men (despite 
the enormous cohorts of school-leavers coming onto the labour 
market) under Gierek.
Source: M. Kabaj "Bariera Zatrudnienia" 2g October 12, 1975. A
misprint in the source has been corrected after reference 
to the original.
570lBle 6* (i) Dwellings Completed
(thousands)
1960 142.1
1965 170.5
1969 197.0
1970 194.2
1971 190.6
1974 249.8
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny 1975 p. XLVII
6. (ii) Number of newly-built dwellings per 1000 marriages
1965 853 1970 693
1966 779 1971 653
1967 780 1972 668
1968 733 1973 722
1969 729 1974 782
Source: W. Czeczerda: "Wyz i mieszkania" ZG June 29, 1975.
6. (iii) Number of households per one hundred dwellings
Overall Urban Rural
1970 116 120 111
1974 116 119 112
Statistical deficit of dwellings (Number of households minus 
number of dwellings)
Overall Urban Rural
1970 1295 883 412
1974 1357 920 437
Source: T. Zarski: "Mieszkania w czteroleciu" ZG May 11, 1975.
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TABLE 5A .
NET INTER-REPUBLICAN MIGRATORY BALANCE 1961
(IN THOUSANDS).
Bosnia & Hercegovina - 259
Montenegro 75
Croatia 45
Macedonia 5
Slovenia 1
Serbia + 358
SOURCE: Migracije stanovniisftva Jugoslavije, p. 102.
NOTE: This table, which is based on the results of the
1961 Census, should not be taken to be an accurate 
indicator of the precise net result of inter­
republican migratory movements in the decades 
preceding 1961. Nor does it convey any impression 
of the indirect demographic effects of those
movements.
576.
TABLE 5B.
NET INTER-REGIONAL MIGRATION 1961-1971 
(IN THOUSANDS).
Bosnia & Hercegovina — 187
Montenegro - 14
Croatia + 59
Macedonia - 21
Slovenia + 34
Serbia proper + 148
Vojvodina + 27
Kosovo — 47
SOURCE: Stariha Mladen, "Notranje neto migracije SFRJ v razdobju
med popisoma 1961 in 1971 po republikah in pokrajinah, 
po spolu in po starosti", paper presented to the Slovenian 
Demographic Symposium (Slovenski demografski simpozij) 
held in Ljubljana 1974. p. 4.
NOTE: These calculations, though a more accurate measure than
those in Table 5A (having a more limited time reference 
and being based on a more sophisticated methodology) 
also suffer from a serious drawback in that they do not 
take account of workers "temporarily" employed or 
resident in republics or regions outside that in which 
they have their permanent residence. Thus, for example, 
the Slovenian party newspaper Delo estimated in 1970 
(issue for July 3-4) that there were 120,000 workers 
from other republics employed at that time in Slovenia.
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TABLE 10 581
ETHNIC DEMOGRAPHIC STRENGTH BY REPUBLIC AND PROVINCE
1961 AND 1971 (% OF TOTAL).
B and H 1961 1971 Vojvodina 1961 1971
Moslems 25.7 39.6 Serbs 54.9 55.8
Serbs 42.9 37.2 Hungarians 23.9 21.7
Croats 21.7 20.6 Croats 7.8 7.1
Slovaks 4.0 3.7
Montenegro Rumanians 3.1 2.7
Montenegrins 81. 4 67.1 Montenegrins. 1.9 1.9
Moslems 6.5 13.3
Albanians 5.5 6.7 Kosovo
Serbs 3.0 7.5 Albanians 67.2 73.7
Serbs 23.6 18.4
Croatia Montenegrins 3.9 2.5
Croats 80. 3 79.4 Moslems 0.8 2.1
Serbs 15.0 14.2 Turks 2.7 1.0
Macedonia
Macedonians 71.2 69.3
Albanians 13.0 17.0
Turks 9.4 6.6
Serbs 3.1 2.8
Slovenia
Slovenians 95.6 94.0
Serbia (total)
Serbs 74.6 71.2
Albanians 9.2 11.7
Hungarians 5.9 5.1
Croats 2. 6 2.2
Moslems 1.2 1.8
Montenegrins 1.4 1.5
Serbia proper. 
Serbs 92.6 89.5
Moslems 1.7 2.4
Albanians 1.1 1.2
Bulgarians 1.1 0.9
Montenegrins 0.7 1.1
SOURCE: Savezni zavod za statistiku Statisti£ki bilten Nr. 727 (plus
Aneks uz Statisti<*ki Bilten 727) "Nacionalni sastav 
stanovniätva po op&tinama1' Belgrade 1972.
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